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Abstract 
Compellence is a strategy that employs pressure to induce others to take 
specific actions. Contemporary international peace operations are expected 
to use force, if necessary, to protect civilians and/or maintain and restore 
order in the very volatile environment of post-civil war states. This 
challenging task requires peacekeepers to proactively change the status quo 
through compelling local warring factions to stop violence, disarm, and join 
peace processes. This thesis adopts a comparative case study approach, 
systematically analyses peace operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and 
Somalia, and identifies conditions under which compellence is likely to 
succeed in peace operations. 
 The overall finding of the thesis is that there are five conditions which 
favour the success of compellence in peace operations: the use of the 
gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy; the actual use of force as the source 
of credibility; the achievement of counter-coercion negation as a form of 
denial; the achievement of stronghold neutralisation, which is another form 
of denial; and the absence of third-party support on the target side. Thus, a 
clearly one-sided situation in favour of compellers is necessary because 
target armed groups are evasive, and they have higher interests and 
stronger motivation than compellers in what is in dispute. 
 This thesis provides the first systematic attempt to specifically analyse 
conditions for the success of compellence in international peace operations. 
This study contributes to the literature of compellence by identifying 
conditions for its success, focusing on the understudied context of 
compellence against non-state actors. The study also contributes to the field 
of peace operations by demonstrating how compellence can be a causal 
mechanism for achieving their objectives and when it is likely to work. The 
findings have practical implications as well. The conditions indicate what 
practitioners should achieve to successfully employ the strategy in peace 
operations. 
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Introduction 
The use and utility of force has been one of the most popular issues in 
international relations research. During the Cold War, much of the interest 
was directed towards deterrence. The major reasons behind this were the 
bipolar international structure that was based on the rivalry between two 
superpowers and the invention and accumulation of nuclear weapons. The 
prevention of nuclear war became one of the most important policy problems 
of the era and thus fuelled research on deterrence (Jervis, 1979, p.290; 
Sperandei, 2006, pp.255, 257; Art and Greenhill, 2018, p.3).1 
 The post-Cold War era, however, has witnessed increased interest in 
another type of use of threat and force – namely, compellence. The United 
States (US) and other Western states realised the utility of compellence in 
responding to regional conflicts, and this led to increased attention to 
compellence research (Sperandei, 2006, pp.253, 257; Art and Greenhill, 
2018, pp.3-4). Post-Cold War security problems have been characterised by 
multiple threats that occur at various places, in contrast to those of the Cold 
War era, which centred on a clear rival structure. As a result, the prominent 
challenge has shifted from preventing conflicts to responding effectively to 
those that have already occurred and are ongoing. This requires action in a 
proactive and often robust manner in order to alter the undesirable behaviour 
of the protagonists involved and restore the original condition that has been 
disrupted. For these purposes, compellence is more appropriate than 
deterrence. 
 Compellence is an attractive strategy. In contrast to deterrence, which 
is a strategy to maintain the status quo, compellence aims to alter it, thereby 
enabling actors to pursue objectives in a proactive manner. Moreover, 
compellence seeks to achieve this by persuading others through the 
utilisation of pressure instead of defeating them. This means that the 
 
1  Regarding the history of deterrence theory and policy, see, for example, 
Jervis (1979) and Freedman (2004). 
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strategy, if successfully employed, can achieve objectives with less – or 
even no – destruction and casualties compared to war (George, 1994a, p.9). 
 The literature in this field has mainly focused on bargaining between 
states during crises and wars, in particular those involving the US and its 
allies. However, the logic of compellence is quite general and can be applied 
to various contexts. Any dispute or confrontation in which one side demands 
the other to change its behaviour, such as trade frictions, can be analysed 
from the perspective of the strategy, and the actors involved can be other 
than states. 
 One such promising but under-explored application is the use of 
compellence in peace operations. Once non-coercive endeavours to assist 
in the maintenance of ceasefires that had already been realised in interstate 
conflicts, peace operations have evolved into more complex undertakings to 
stabilise and reconstruct states during or following intrastate conflict. In the 
course of this transformation, international forces in peace operations have 
come to be expected to use force, if necessary, to protect civilians and/or 
maintain and restore order in the very fragile environment of post-civil war 
states. This means that “peacekeepers” are often deployed into 
environments in which no peace to keep exists, and they have to proactively 
change the status quo through influencing local parties. 
 Creating a peaceful security environment, rather than merely keeping 
it peaceful, represents a significant challenge for recent operations. For 
example, peacekeepers were not ready to confront the hostile rebel forces in 
Sierra Leone, and the operation was pushed to the verge of collapse. Peace 
operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have not been able 
to establish a secure environment and prevent attacks on civilians by armed 
groups despite the repeated use of force by peacekeepers. A United Nations 
(UN) review report points out that between 2010 and 2013, peacekeepers 
failed to provide immediate responses in 80% of cases in which civilians 
were under the threat of physical violence (UN, 2014a, paras.18-19). 
Peacekeepers even struggle to protect themselves. As of 30 June 2020, 
more than 130 peacekeepers have been killed by malicious acts in Mali, 
where they have been under attack repeatedly since their deployment in 
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2013 (UN, 2020). In spite of these difficulties, the international community 
continues to authorise peace operations to employ force if necessary under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which is the provision for forceful measures to 
maintain and restore international peace and security. Intervening forces in 
peace operations can no longer stick to the traditional mode of the non-use 
of force; they have to find an effective way to employ force instead. However, 
a doctrine or clear guidance for peacekeepers on how to use force under 
new enlarged authorisations is still lacking (Nsia-Pepra, 2014, pp.60-61; de 
Coning et al., 2017). 
 It is therefore imperative to understand the conditions under which the 
threat and use of force can be effective in the context of peace operations. 
Research on peace operations has so far been relatively under-theorised, 
and studies focusing on the “robust” type of operation that is authorised to 
use force beyond self-defence are especially needed in light of the difficulty 
that peace operations have in using force. Here, the theory of compellence 
can provide causal logic as to how peace operations can achieve objectives 
through the threat of and actual proactive use of force. The theory also 
provides a starting point for the exploration of the conditions under which 
such an approach is likely to work. 
 This is the topic of this thesis. It analyses cases of peace operations 
from the perspective of compellence and explores the conditions in which 
the strategy is more or less likely to succeed. Such an investigation provides 
practical implications for international military interventions into civil wars, 
which is one of the major contemporary security challenges, and promotes 
the theorisation of robust peace operations. 
 Moreover, such an examination is also beneficial to the field of 
compellence. First, compellence against non-state actors is still understudied, 
despite the prominence of these groups in today’s security environment, and 
compellence in the context of peace operations provides a good opportunity 
to examine the characteristics and utility of the strategy against non-state 
armed groups. Second, the context-based study of compellence deepens 
the understanding of conditions for success in a specified manner. As 
compellence can be employed in various settings for diverse objectives, 
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there is a natural limitation on the specificity of arguments about conditions 
for success or mechanisms if trying to cover compellence in general. This 
thesis promotes our understanding of these aspects of compellence by 
empirically examining which part of the existing arguments on compellence 
applies to the specific context of peace operations. In this way, the thesis 
also contributes to the development of the theory of compellence. 
 While some studies have applied the concept of compellence and 
insights from the field to peace operations, there has been no dedicated, 
systematic attempt to analyse the conditions for the success of compellence 
in peace operations. This thesis fills this gap. 
Research Questions and the Contributions of the Thesis 
This thesis is guided by the following three research questions. The overall 
research question is as follows: 
 
 Under what conditions is compellence in peace operations more 
likely to succeed? 
 
This study addresses the question by applying the theory of compellence to 
the context of peace operations; thus, the main question can be rephrased 
as follows: 
 
 Do the conditions for success shown in the theory of compellence 
correctly predict and explain the results of compellence in peace 
operations? 
 
This application of the theory of compellence to the context of peace 
operations is not straightforward, for the theory was built on interstate crises 
and conflicts, while the actors involved in peace operations are usually 
coalitions of states and non-state armed groups. Hence, a further question 
has to be asked to understand compellence in peace operations: 
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 How do the unique features of the context of peace operations 
affect the form or requirement for the success of compellence? 
 
The first question is important because compellence should be employed 
based on insights into when it is likely to work. Compellence is not an easy 
strategy and is generally believed to be more difficult than deterrence for a 
number of reasons. First, while deterred targets can deny the effect of 
threats and claim that they have no intention to challenge the status quo, 
accepting demands to take specific actions under pressure – that is, to 
submit to compellence – is more visible as a form of capitulation and entails 
greater political costs for targets (Schelling, 1966, pp.82-83). Second, 
compellent demands can easily be open-ended, and it can be difficult to 
convince targets that there will be no additional demands after accepting 
immediate ones, while deterrent demands are relatively clear and finite, for 
they are connected to the status quo (Schelling, 1966, pp.72-75). Third, 
compellence settings are likely to make targets more risk acceptant and 
therefore resilient to pressure. Prospect theory, which is based on empirical 
patterns found in psychological experiments, argues that people who try to 
prevent losses tend to perceive the value of issues in dispute as greater and 
become more risk acceptant than those who try to increase their gains. 
Deterrence is an attempt to prevent others from changing the situation in 
their favour, so the target side is trying to increase its gain. On the contrary, 
compellence aims to change the status quo in favour of compellers in a way 
that sacrifices the interests of targets, so the targets tend to become more 
resolved in trying to avoid loss (Schaub, 2004, pp.401-402; Levy, 2008, 
pp.542-543). 
 Although it is difficult to identify all cases of compellence and 
deterrence, a dedicated dataset of compellence shows the full-compliance 
success rate of interstate compellence between 1918 and 2001 as 41.4%, 
which is lower than the success rate of extended deterrence shown in other 
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studies (Sechser, 2011, pp.389, 395-396).2 Another study identifies 36 cases 
of coercive diplomacy employed by Western states between 1990 and 2008, 
with nine temporary successes, three “costly” successes, and three “cheap” 
successes; this is, once again, not a very high success ratio (Jakobsen, 
2010, pp.287-291, 296). 
 Compellence is not risk free. If opponents do not accede to demands 
in spite of pressure, compellers have to decide whether to give up objectives 
and back down or pursue the objectives forcibly (George, 1994a, p.9). 
Moreover, employing the pressure of force in crisis situations, which are full 
of miscommunications and misunderstandings, entails the risk of escalation, 
which can result in inadvertent armed confrontations (Lebow, 1981; George 
and Simons, 1994a, p.290). 
 Nevertheless, studies on compellence have not yet been sufficiently 
developed to provide useful guidance on the employment of the strategy. As 
will be shown in Chapter 1, a number of factors can affect the result of the 
strategy, and there is no consensus on the conditions for success. Moreover, 
compellence against non-state actors is an especially under-explored aspect 
of the strategy. Therefore, there is no useful analytical framework for the use 
of compellence in peace operations, and this research begins by 
establishing one. 
 One of the reasons why consensus has not yet been reached on the 
conditions for success is the scope of the existing studies. Major existing 
studies on compellence have no explicit scope for their arguments (see 
Chapter 1). However, the logic of compellence is quite general and can be 
applied to a broad range of situations, from trade frictions to bargaining 
 
2  Based on an examination of international crises between 1823 and 1973, 
Petersen (1986, pp.283-284) argues that compellence is not more 
difficult than deterrence. Sechser (2011, pp.393-394), however, points 
out that Petersen’s coding is inadequate, because he assumes that all 
wars are preceded by compellence and regards faits accomplis as 
compellence. In addition, Sechser’s dataset includes more cases than 
Petersen’s. 
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during wars. This broad applicability renders it difficult to pin down conditions 
for success in a concrete manner when one is attempting to cover 
compellence in general. Instead, narrowing the scope can be beneficial to 
the improvement of the theory’s accuracy in exchange for generality. By 
focusing on compellence employed in a specific context, studies can shed 
light on the factors that affect the results of the strategy in a more detailed 
and specified manner, thereby contributing to the further development of the 
theory. 
 In other words, this is an attempt to develop a “middle-range theory” 
of compellence with a focus on a specific subset of the strategy. Middle-
range theories sit between two extremes of general theories that try to 
explain all or a vast range of phenomena in a field and particular descriptions 
of something without any generalisation (Merton, 1968, pp.39, 45). Instead, 
middle-range theories aim to explain limited subcategories of events through 
conditional generalisation (George and Bennett, 2005, p.266). Of course, 
what constitutes “middle” or “subset” is relative and depends on how one 
defines or categorises a field of study (Mahoney, 1980, p.327). In fact, the 
theory of compellence itself is a middle-range theory of international relations 
or foreign policy (George and Bennett, 2005, p.268). However, it is possible 
to develop a middle-range theory of compellence because of the concept’s 
generality. 
 In light of the difficulty of further developing a theory covering 
compellence as a general phenomenon, developing its middle-range 
theories can be fruitful. Some analysts have observed that the focus on 
middle-range theories entails the risk of generating fractured and 
incompatible hypotheses (Merton, 1968, p.51; Morrow and Muchinsky, 1980, 
p.36). However, the specification of arguments of general theories is a valid 
rationale for the development of middle-range theories (Mahoney, 1980, 
p.331). In addition, although the scope of each of these subset-focused 
theories is small, they can, as a whole, provide a better understanding of the 
strategy when combined. Such a collection of middle-range theories can be 
developed into a typological theory by reorganising and integrating them 
based on common independent and dependent variables (Lepgold, 1998a, 
pp.56-57; George and Bennett, 2005, ch.11). 
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 Therefore, the application of the theory of compellence to peace 
operations can be beneficial to the development of the theory. By focusing 
on a specific context, the theory of compellence can be refined in terms of 
the conditions of success and the specific forms of coercive mechanisms. 
 The exploration of conditions for the success of compellence in peace 
operations is beneficial to the field of peace operations as well. As will be 
shown in Chapter 1, although the field has a long research history, 
explanatory theories have developed only recently and are still in need of 
additional studies. In particular, the utility of peace operations in terms of 
halting ongoing violence and the causal mechanisms involved in how peace 
operations work are under-explored. Moreover, because peace operations 
have come to perform such a wide variety of activities throughout all phases 
of response to conflicts, it is difficult to build theories covering peace 
operations in general. Therefore, formulating middle-range theories focusing 
on a specific subtype would also be fruitful in this field (Bures, 2007). 
 Considering the challenges that peace operations face, as discussed 
earlier, the natural focus would be on the robust type of peace operations. 
Contemporary peace operations are struggling to implement security-related 
tasks in violent environments. Their tasks are now to create peace and 
stability – that is, to change the status quo on the ground, including the 
employment of threats and force if necessary. This means that international 
troops need to compel local warring factions to abandon violence and join 
peace processes. Therefore, the perspective of compellence can advance 
the theorisation of the field through the provision of causal logic of how 
robust peace operations achieve objectives and insights regarding when it 
works. Such theoretical insights are expected to provide practical 
implications regarding what kind of factors and conditions practitioners 
should pay attention to and manipulate to successfully conduct robust peace 
operations. 
 In spite of the practical and theoretical utility of such a study, there 
has been no dedicated, systematic attempt to explore the conditions under 
which compellence is likely to succeed in peace operations. As Chapter 1 
will show, there have been studies that combine compellence and peace 
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operations. However, some of them are descriptive, and other explanatory 
studies are based on a single case study or a comparison with cases other 
than peace operations, or they do not systematically examine the conditions 
for success. Therefore, existing studies do not provide a sound answer to 
the question of success conditions. This study will address this question. 
 Sceptics may wonder whether a theory that is developed based on 
interactions between states can be applied to those involving non-state 
actors. Nonetheless, the logic of coercion itself is applicable to a wide range 
of situations. Sayigh (1998, p.213) argues that “[c]oercion … pervades all 
human relations, whether those of the family, wider polity, or international 
society”. In discussing deterrence, Morgan (2003, pp.58-59) points out that 
sending threats is a simple method of communication that is understandable 
even by targets who have little rationality, such as children or animals, and 
that such a simple form of communication can work against targets about 
whom the deterrers know little. In a similar vein, Quinlan (2004, p.11) points 
out that deterrence is based on “basic and permanent facts about human 
behaviour” – that is, people choose their behaviour based on anticipated 
results, thus avoiding behaviour that seems to bring more losses than gains, 
and this calculation can be influenced from the outside. These arguments 
apply not only to deterrence but also to compellence. Payne et al. (2008) 
also argue that non-state actors are coercible and that it is wrong to think 
that they are irrational or have nothing to be threatened about and therefore 
cannot be coerced. Non-state actors in conflicts also behave strategically 
and use violence as a tool to pursue political objectives (e.g. Duyvesteyn, 
2005; Greenhill and Major, 2006/07; Berrebi, 2009). In light of these 
commonalities, the theory of compellence can be applied to contexts 
involving non-state actors, such as peace operations. 
 Of course, this application to a new context requires the appropriate 
modification and extension of the theory; therefore, the second and third 
research questions need to be asked. Some of the insights from the existing 
studies on the conditions for the success of compellence may apply 
straightforwardly to compellence in peace operations, but others may not. 
This should be empirically examined, but the conditions may well be different, 
taking into account the uniqueness of the context. For example, non-state 
- 10 - 
armed groups are usually less organised and cohesive than states, and the 
groups’ leaders may not have tight control over their followers. This means 
that persuading or making a deal with leaders may not be sufficient for 
success, and additional efforts to persuade followers may be required 
(Byman and Waxman, 2002, pp.192-193). In addition, the compellers in 
peace operations are usually coalitions of states, rather than a single state. 
Therefore, both the advantages and disadvantages of coalitional 
compellence are likely to appear in compellence in peace operations (Posen, 
1996, pp.83-84; Byman and Waxman, 2002, ch.6). Moreover, one of the 
most important features of the context is that compellers intervene in civil 
war as third parties, which means that the target side is expected to have 
much stronger interests in and motivation regarding the issues they confront 
the compellers (Posen, 1996, pp.82, 84; Byman and Waxman, 2002, p.190; 
Crawford, 2009, p.288). These and other features of the context of peace 
operations must affect the modality of compellence. 
 Therefore, this study deductively derives the conditions for success of 
compellence in peace operations based on insights from the literature while 
paying attention to the unique features of peace operations. The validity of 
the conditions is examined empirically through a comparative case study, 
and the findings from the empirical examinations provide answers to the 
three research questions. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the literature of 
compellence and peace operations. It introduces the concepts and 
theoretical frameworks that are relevant to the topic and identifies the 
remaining gaps in knowledge to which this research can speak, as well as its 
overall original contribution. The chapter points out that previous studies 
have not examined the conditions for the success of compellence in peace 
operations in a dedicated and systematic manner and explains the expected 
benefits of such research. 
 Chapter 2 establishes the analytical framework for the thesis. The 
chapter first clarifies the scope of this research. There are some variations in 
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compellence in peace operations – for example, whether the target is a state 
or a non-state armed group – and this study restricts its scope to a specific 
subtype among them. The scope of this research is explicit military 
compellence in UN-related peace operations that is employed against non-
state armed groups and accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. This 
focus is necessary so that more valid findings can be drawn from 
comparable cases. 
 Following the clarification, the chapter deductively derives the 
conditions that are expected to favour the success of compellence in peace 
operations, drawing on insights from existing studies. This process takes into 
account the unique features of the context of peace operations, and the 
conditions are expressed in the form of hypotheses to be examined 
empirically. 
 There are five such conditions. The first is that the balance of troops 
is in favour of compellers. Compellence is expected to be more likely to 
succeed if the compellers have a larger force than the opponents, because 
target armed groups facing stronger forces must anticipate that they are 
likely to be defeated and suffer great costs. 
 The second is the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy 
combined with the carrot-and-stick strategy. Regarding how to apply 
pressure, specific coercive strategies can be largely divided into an 
ultimatum and the gradual turning of the screw – that is, a strategy of 
gradually escalating pressure – and each can be combined with the use of 
positive inducements. Considering that it would be difficult to defeat non-
state armed groups quickly, it is expected that gradually increased pressure, 
combined with the use of carrots, is more effective than an ultimatum. 
 The third condition is the actual use of force as a source of credibility. 
This research examines four possible sources of credibility: national interests, 
strong domestic support, previously acquired advantageous reputation, and 
the actual use of force. Among them, it is expected that the demonstration of 
competence through the actual use of force in the theatre of operation is 
required in order to make subsequent threats credible, because highly 
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resolved armed groups are unlikely to succumb to mere threats short of 
using force. 
 The fourth condition is the achievement of counter-coercion negation 
by peacekeepers as a form of denial. Regarding the kind of pressure, the 
denial type is expected to be more effective than punishment. This research 
identifies four specific ways to achieve denial that can be applied in peace 
operations. They are attrition, stronghold neutralisation, decapitation, and 
counter-coercion negation. Among them, counter-coercion negation is 
expected to be necessary, because highly motivated armed groups would try 
to drive back compellers in the contest of endurance, and their counter-
moves will need to be contained so that they are deprived of the hope to win. 
 The fifth and final condition is the absence of third-party support on 
the target side. It is expected that the existence of support from outside 
would enhance target armed groups’ resilience against compellent pressure, 
so the absence of this would constrain or reduce their combat capabilities 
and demoralise them, thereby facilitating the success of compellence. 
 Following this, Chapter 2 discusses methodological issues to design 
an appropriate empirical framework. A comparative case study approach is 
the best available one for this study, and the chapter introduces three 
methods of analysis: the congruence method, the most-similar-design 
comparison, and the cross-case analysis. The chapter also discusses how 
the cases are selected. 
 Chapters 3 to 5 are case studies. Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the most 
successful cases of compellence in peace operations: the interventions in 
East Timor by an Australian-led multinational force, the International Force 
for East Timor (INTERFET), and in Sierra Leone by the United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Kingdom (UK) forces. In 
turn, Chapter 5 analyses the case of apparent failure: the intervention in 
Somalia by the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) and the 
US forces. Each chapter employs the congruence method to examine 
whether the expectation of the hypotheses coincides with what actually 
happened in the cases. In addition, Chapter 4 employs the most-similar-
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design comparison by dividing the protracted case of compellence into 
phases and analysing the shifts of conditions and consequences. 
 The findings from these within-case analyses are put together, and 
patterns among them are examined in Chapter 6, which conducts cross-case 
comparisons. The analysis finds that the empirical cases provide support for 
three hypotheses, partial support for another, and little to no support for the 
other. 
 The overall finding of the thesis is that there are five conditions which 
favour the success of compellence in peace operations: the use of the 
gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy; the actual use of force as the source 
of credibility; the achievement of counter-coercion negation as a form of 
denial; the achievement of stronghold neutralisation, which is another form of 
denial; and the absence of third-party support on the target side. A 
successful case examined in the thesis demonstrates that all five conditions 
constituted a collective sufficient condition for success. Another successful 
case demonstrates that four of them in combination were sufficient and that 
the stronghold neutralisation was not necessary for success. Stronghold 
neutralisation seems to be necessary when target armed groups are self-
sustainable because of the strongholds and have an interest in the 
continuation of the conflict. 
 The above result demonstrates that some factors that are regarded as 
important in existing studies are also important in compellence in peace 
operations, while others are not. Among the factors that are not confirmed to 
be important, some are expected to be unimportant when the hypotheses 
are derived, but others turn out to be unimportant unexpectedly. The latter 
includes the non-support of the compellers’ numerical advantage over the 
targets and the use of positive inducements. In a sense, it is not surprising 
that different factors turn out to be important in different settings. At the 
same time, the finding is counter-intuitive because these factors are thought 
to be important in the literature and at least logically seem to play important 
roles in the context of peace operations as well. However, this study finds 
that compellence in this context can succeed without these conditions being 
met provided that other conditions for success are satisfied. 
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 The collective sufficient conditions indicate that compellers need to 
create a clearly one-sided advantageous situation to compel armed groups 
to accept the heaviest type of demands. The thesis argues that this 
demanding requirement is the result of the unique features of the context of 
peace operations. The targets of compellence are resilient and evasive 
armed groups, which are difficult to defeat quickly. Moreover, because 
international forces intervene in others’ wars, local conflicting parties have 
much larger interests in and motivation regarding what is in dispute. This 
means that compellers in the context cannot fulfil one of the most important 
conditions for success pointed out in the literature: the asymmetry of 
motivation in favour of compellers. Given these disadvantages, compellers in 
the context of peace operations have to create a clearly advantageous 
situation so that target armed groups are deprived of any hope to withstand 
the compellence. 
 The identification of collective sufficient conditions for the success of 
compellence in peace operations is a meaningful contribution to the literature 
of compellence. As discussed above, the conditions for success in this 
context are somewhat different from those for successful compellence in 
general; not all conditions that are regarded as important for success in the 
literature turned out to be so in the context of peace operations, and some 
are even hard to satisfy. The approach of focusing on a specific context 
enabled this study to identify the conditions with more specificity. Studies of 
compellence have largely focused on cases between states and the utility of 
the strategy against non-state actors is under-explored. This study reveals 
the conditions for the success of compellence in peace operations in a 
dedicated manner based on a systematic empirical examination. 
 Another contribution to the literature is the identification of effective 
ways to apply compellence by denial in the context of peace operations. In 
terms of coercive mechanisms, the literature largely agrees that compellence 
by denial is more effective than that by punishment. However, because how 
denial is achieved depends on the opponents’ objectives and strategies, 
specific approaches to denial can differ from context to context. This study 
identifies four such approaches that are employable in the context of peace 
operations and finds counter-coercion negation to be especially effective, 
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while stronghold neutralisation also plays an important role under certain 
circumstances. 
 This study contributes to the field of peace operations as well. 
Compellence theory provides a causal mechanism for the success of robust 
peace operations and demonstrates when such an approach is more likely to 
work. As the development of explanatory theory in the field of peace 
operations is still insufficient, the application of compellence theory promotes 
the theorisation of the field. 
 The findings also have practical implications. How to manage ongoing 
violence is one of the gravest challenges for contemporary peace operations. 
This study demonstrates that compellence can be an approach to this task. 
Its findings will be of value to practitioners by indicating what must be 
realised to successfully employ the coercive approach in peace operations. 
 Of course, a piece of research cannot fill the gaps in the fields 
completely; additional research is required. The thesis concludes by 
considering potential topics and areas for further research. 
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Chapter 1 
Compellence and Peace Operations: 
Concept, Theory, and History 
This chapter defines key concepts used in the thesis and reviews the 
literature on relevant topics. First, the chapter reviews the concept of and 
previous research on compellence. Second, it reviews the development of 
and related research on peace operations, especially regarding their 
effectiveness in civil wars. Finally, it explains the applicability of the theory of 
compellence to the context of peace operations and reviews existing studies 
that take similar approaches. 
1.1  Compellence 
1.1.1  The Concept of Compellence 
Compellence is a strategy which employs pressure, including the threat 
and/or actual use of force, to induce others to take actions as demanded. 
Compellence is a type of coercion. Johnson et al. (2002, p.7) define coercion 
as “causing someone to choose one course of action over another by 
making the choice preferred by the coercer appear more attractive than the 
alternative, which the coercer wishes to avoid”. In affecting others’ choices, 
coercers can employ various incentives and pressure, including the threat 
and actual use of force. Even if force is used, however, coercion is different 
from achieving one’s objectives forcibly. Freedman (1998) emphasises that 
the central feature of coercion is that it leaves a choice on the target side 
(p.16). The aim of coercion is to induce the target to behave as demanded 
by the coercer, not to defeat the target and impose the coercer’s will. 
Coercion is also different from total consent or peaceful persuasion. If 
coercion succeeds, the opponent chooses to behave as the coercer 
demands, but the choice is what the opponent would not have made if it had 
not been under pressure by the coercer. Coercion, therefore, can be 
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understood as occupying the spectrum with consent and control on each 
end (Freedman, 1998, p.16). 
 Coercion can be divided into two strategies: deterrence and 
compellence. Both back up the coercer’s demands with threats for 
noncompliance, but the nature of the demands differs. In deterrence, the 
coercer demands that the target refrain from taking a particular action 
(Johnson et al., 2002, p.10). Conversely, in compellence, the coercer 
demands that the target take a particular action, such as to initiate 
something, change the course of or stop what the target is doing, or undo 
what it has done (Schaub, 1998, pp.44, 47-49; Johnson et al., 2002, p.13). 
In other words, deterrence is a strategy to maintain the status quo, while the 
aim of compellence is to change it (Schaub, 1998, pp.37-38). 
 Deterrence and compellence also differ regarding the role of the 
actual use of force. Deterrence is a passive and static strategy: Actors draw 
lines; demand that targets not cross them, with threats being invoked if they 
do; and wait with the hope that the targets will never do so (Schelling, 1966, 
pp.71-72). Deterrence fails when targets defy demands and deterrers put 
threats to use force into practice (Art, 2003a, p.8). If force is used, the effort 
has shifted from deterrence to compellence to induce the targets to stop 
and/or undo their actions, or to defence to forcibly prevent the targets from 
continuing their actions. Conversely, compellence can entail both the threat 
and the actual use of force. As the status quo is unfavourable to compellers, 
it is compellers who have to take the initiative and proactively put pressure 
on targets (Schelling, 1966, p.72). This pressure “often requires that the 
punishment be administered until the other acts … This is because often the 
only way to become committed to an action is to initiate it” (Schelling, 1966, 
p.70). 
 Previous research on compellence does not reflect consensus in 
terms of whether and to what extent the actual use of force should be 
included in the concept of compellence. Pape (1996), for example, focuses 
on the use of compellent air power in major wars, and he regards the use of 
massive amounts of force as compellence. In contrast, George and his 
colleagues (George and Simons, 1994b) make much of the diplomatic side 
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of compellence in their study and use the term “coercive diplomacy”. They 
argue that only the limited use of force for the purpose of demonstrating 
one’s resolve should be included in coercive diplomacy. Art (2003a, pp.9-10) 
divides compellence into three types: “diplomatic use”, which involves only 
the threat of force; “demonstrative use”, which contains “the exemplary and 
limited use of force”; and “full-scale use”, which is identical to war and 
whatever force is employed as far as necessary to secure compliance with 
demands. He regards the first two categories as coercive diplomacy, and he 
argues that the use of force exceeding limited use means the failure of 
coercive diplomacy. Schaub (1998, pp.42-44) also regards compellence as 
being basically composed of the threat of force, and regards its execution, 
termed as offence, as the failure of compellence, though he accepts the 
possibility of “[t]he demonstrative use of force” in compellence. 
 The distinction between the limited and full-scale use of force, 
however, leaves the question of how to define “the limited use of force”. Art 
(2003b, p.360) admits that making such a distinction can be difficult and 
claims that whether the line is crossed should be judged based on the level 
of destruction that is suffered by the target, rather than that of the force 
employed. Freedman (1998, pp.21-22) points out that the amount of force 
that is necessary to secure the acceptance of demands is determined by the 
target’s capability and that the considerable application of force can be 
necessary to demonstrate one’s resolve. He instead proposes that focus be 
placed on the previously mentioned difference of control and coercion – that 
is, whether the target retains a choice or not. In line with this argument, 
Jakobsen (1998a; 2011) defines the limited use of force as that which leaves 
a choice to the target. This definition, he argues, includes the use of 
conventional air and sea power per se, assuming that it cannot bring about 
decisive effects when used alone, and limited ground invasions short of 
attaining one’s objectives forcibly. In contrast, he regards the use of land 
power, as well as air and sea support, for the purpose of decisively resolving 
disputes as the full-scale use of force, and their use thus indicates the failure 
of compellence. However, the use of air power can be decisive, as Jakobsen 
himself admits, when the objective is the destruction of the target. In addition, 
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labelling substantial airstrikes as “limited” is curious, which is again a point 
that Jakobsen himself admits (Jakobsen, 2011, pp.162-163). 
 Rather than sticking to the notion of the limited use of force, the line 
should be drawn at whether force is used at all. The actual employment of 
force is a major decision. Compellence with mere threats remains in a purely 
diplomatic realm, and it is a great success of compellence if the compellers 
are able to induce the targets without recourse to the actual use of force. 
 With that being said, the use of force per se should not be regarded 
as a failure of compellence. As Freedman (1998) argues, as long as the 
target retains choice, the use of force remains in the domain of compellence 
no matter how much and what kind of force is used. According to this 
definition, almost all kinds of application of military force can fall into the 
realm of compellence. Those that are excluded from compellence are limited 
to those achieve objectives regardless of the intent of the targets, such as 
the creation of faits accomplis; annihilation wars; surgical strikes to eliminate 
certain targets, such as the Osirak airstrike carried out by Israel; and 
hostage-rescue operations executed by special forces (Pape, 1996, p.12; 
Mueller, 1998, pp.184-185; Jakobsen, 2011, pp.162-163). 
 Under this rather broad definition, research on compellence should 
pay attention to two aspects. One is the evaluation of outcomes. First and 
foremost, it must be asked whether the demands of the compellers were 
accepted by the targets. However, this question is not enough, and the 
matter of how the compellers brought the targets to the point must be 
considered. If the targets capitulate at the threat stage, this is clearly the 
most successful form of compellence. Once force is actually employed, 
however, it complicates the evaluation: Although capitulation after the 
massive use of force can still be regarded as a success of compellence, for 
the target selected to capitulate, this is different from securing acquiescence 
only with the very minor use of force. Byman and Waxman (2002, pp.4-5) 
point out that it is expected that the more destruction inflicted on targets, the 
less freedom of choice left to them. The simple success–failure dichotomy 
based on whether or not demands are met cannot take this difference into 
account and is inappropriate. Rather, the successfulness of compellence 
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should be evaluated in degree (Pape, 1996, p.15; Bratton, 2005, pp.110-
111; Jakobsen, 2019, pp.291-293); for example, based on the 
aforementioned spectrum of coercion, compliance secured near the end of 
consent on the spectrum should be regarded as an outright success, but if it 
is secured near the end of control, it should be regarded as almost a failure. 
 The other aspect to pay attention to is the contexts in which 
compellence is employed. From the perspective of understanding strategy 
as being composed of ends, ways, and means (Lykke, 1989; Yarger, 2012), 
the defining feature of compellence lies in the “ways” – namely, how the 
objectives are achieved – and it can be combined with various ends, as well 
as instruments and resources. In fact, the logic of compellence – that is, 
employing pressure to affect others’ decision-making and shape their choice 
– can be applied to a wide variety of situations, from major wars to 
international economic disputes,3 as long as they entail bargaining or other 
kinds of communication to persuade others. In addition, its applicability is not 
limited to international relations; it can be applied to contexts such as 
domestic crime control, how to discipline one’s children, and other 
interpersonal relationships involving the use of pressure. Because of this 
generality, when research on compellence is being conducted, one should 
be aware of the applicability of its findings. Some findings may apply to a 
wide range of contexts related to the logic of compellence, but others may 
apply only to a certain type of compellence or context. 
1.1.2  Previous Research on Compellence 
There are two seminal bodies of work on compellence. One is by Thomas 
Schelling, the pioneer of the field who coined the term and elucidated the 
concept. Schelling (1966) distinguishes two ways to achieve objectives 
through force: one is brute force – that is, achieving objectives forcibly – and 
the other is coercion. He categorises the function of force into four areas by 
combining the above distinction and whether the objective is to change or 
 
3  Hirst (1998) provides an example of a study on the use of compellence 
in regard to economic issues. 
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maintain the status quo. Compellence is the label he attaches to coercion to 
change the status quo, and he logically describes its characteristics based 
on insights from game theory. He explores a number of issues such as 
credibility, commitments, reputation, the manipulation of risks, and the link 
between threats and assurances. However, he uses only historical examples 
as illustrations and does not test his argument empirically. 
 The other body of work is by Alexander George and his colleagues 
(George et al., 1971; 2nd ed., George and Simons, 1994b). They distinguish 
the offensive and defensive use of compellence, referring to the former as a 
“blackmail strategy” and the latter as “coercive diplomacy” (George, 1994a, 
pp.7-8). They focus on the latter in their comparative case study and 
inductively identify a number of conditions which affect the result of coercive 
diplomacy. Within this, “contextual variables” include factors such as the kind 
of challenges that coercers face, the image that protagonists have about war, 
the use of coalitions, and the isolation of targets. In addition, there are other 
“conditions that favor coercive diplomacy”: “clarity of the objective”, “strength 
of motivation”, “asymmetry of motivation”, “sense of urgency”, “strong 
leadership”, “adequate domestic and international support”, “unacceptability 
of threatened escalation”, and “clarity concerning the precise terms of 
settlement of the crisis”. Though they do not argue that any of them is a 
necessary or sufficient condition for the success of the strategy, they regard 
“asymmetry of motivation”, “sense of urgency”, “unacceptability of threatened 
escalation”, and “clarity of settlement terms” as especially important among 
those conditions favouring success (George and Simons, 1994a, pp.270-274, 
279-287). 
 Despite their focus on the defensive use of compellence, the 
applicability of their findings can be wider than this. Freedman (1998, p.18) 
criticises the distinction between the offensive and defensive use of 
compellence, because George includes as a type of coercive diplomacy the 
demands to alter the behaviour of targets by changing the members of their 
regimes, which seems to be one of the most offensive demands. Art (2003a, 
p.19) points out that what is offensive and defensive can change depending 
on the perspectives of the protagonists. In addition, Levy (2008, pp.542-543) 
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argues that the conditions that George developed can be applied to the 
offensive use of coercive diplomacy. 
 After these seminal bodies of work, researchers have accumulated 
knowledge on compellence. First, the understanding of the concept itself has 
been deepened. As mentioned in the previous section, Freedman (1998) 
clarifies the concept of coercion by placing it between consent and control. 
He also points out that coercion is a mutual interaction and that targets try to 
increase the coercers’ enforcement costs through counter-coercion 
(Freedman, 1998, p.30). 
 The interactive nature of coercion is further explored by Byman and 
Waxman (2002, pp.37-38). They emphasise that coercion is a dynamic 
interaction between the coercers and opponents. The opponents take 
countermeasures to mitigate or neutralise the costs inflicted on them and to 
inflict costs on the coercers. Regarding the specific counter-coercive 
strategies that Western powers often face, Byman and Waxman (1999, 
pp.111-116) raise three: “civilian suffering-based strategies”, which exploit 
the sensitivities to casualties suffered by civilians in the target states; 
“coalition-fracturing strategies”, which exploit the difficulty of maintaining 
unity among the coalition members; and “casualty-generating strategies”, 
which exploit the sensitivities to casualties suffered by their own nationals. 
 Second, studies have explored the conditions for the success of 
compellence. This is the part of the literature that is most relevant to this 
thesis, but unfortunately, consensus has not yet been reached regarding 
success conditions. 
 Some of these studies do not include empirical examinations. Schaub 
(1998, pp.47-57) argues that the following factors affect the result of 
compellence: the value of what is demanded for the targets (stopping 
something that is ongoing is easier than undoing something that has already 
been achieved or initiating something new, and the demands related to 
domestic issues are more difficult to accept than those related to diplomatic 
policies), whether the compellence is driven by need or opportunity (need-
driven compellence is more credible but more inflexible than opportunity-
driven compellence), the clarity of the demands and threats (clarity facilitates 
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compellence), and whether demands are made publicly or secretly (publicity 
hinders compellence). According to Schaub, the necessary type and amount 
of the military capability depend on the content of the demands and threats, 
and whether the actual employment of force militates for or against 
compellence is unclear. 
 Johnson et al. (2002, p.19) discuss conventional coercion. They raise 
four factors as the determinants of the effectiveness of coercion: the 
perceived capability of the coercers, the credibility of the threats, the severity 
of the threats compared to what is at stake, and the availability of counter-
coercion by the opponents. 
 From the viewpoint of coercion as dynamic interaction, Byman and 
Waxman (2002, p.30) maintain that the two factors are important for the 
success of compellence. One is to identify and threaten the opponents’ 
“pressure points”, or “areas the adversary cannot impenetrably guard”. The 
other is to establish escalation dominance, or “the ability to increase the 
threatened costs to an adversary while denying the adversary the 
opportunity to neutralize those costs or to counterescalate”. 
 Other studies combine theoretical discussions with empirical 
examination. Kagan (1998) reorganises the conditions identified by George 
and his colleagues into two groups: “situational factors” and “tactical factors”. 
The former are factors that the coercers cannot manipulate in the short term, 
and they include the balances of power and interests, restraints on the 
coercers based on domestic factors, the responses of other states, and the 
stubbornness of the targets (p.91). The latter are those that the coercers can 
select in the implementation of the strategy, and they include the level of the 
demands; the extent of the urgency put on the demands; the extent, 
explicitness, and publicness of the threats; the use of exemplary force; and 
the use of carrots (pp.94-95). She argues that the situational factors have a 
stronger explanatory power regarding the results of coercion than the tactical 
factors, and she demonstrates this through two case studies. 
 Blechman and Wittes (1999) analyse the limited use of force by the 
US during the Bush senior and Clinton administrations. The factors they 
examine are the existence of a historical precedent, public and international 
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support, the urgency put on demands, tangible actions in addition to threats, 
the clarity and degree of demands, the visibility of compliance, the use of 
positive incentives, and the potency of threats (pp.7-11). Based on the 
analysis of eight cases during the two administrations, they argue that the 
level of demand, the visibility of compliance, positive inducements, domestic 
support, and the potency of threats are important factors affecting the results 
of the use of threats and limited force (pp.26-27). 
 Treverton (2000, p.12) argues that compellence is more likely to 
succeed when the following conditions are satisfied: the opponents are non-
democratic and are adversaries rather than friends of the compellers; the 
opponents lack domestic support; the power base of the target regimes can 
be effectively threatened; the balance of interest and resolve is in favour of 
the compellers; a clear and accepted status quo exists; a successful 
precedent exists; compliance with demands is verifiable; the compellers’ 
security interests are involved; the compellers have strong domestic support; 
the compellers act unilaterally rather than as a coalition; the compellers use 
direct, clear, and proportional threats; and the compellers regard 
compellence as a campaign rather than as a one-off attempt. He examines 
the validity of the conditions using three cases of US compellence. 
 Art and his colleagues add eight new cases of coercive diplomacy to 
the work by George and Simons (Art and Cronin, 2003). Based on the 
examinations of US coercive diplomacy in the 1990s and the early 2000s, 
Art (2003b) concludes that the conditions that favour coercive diplomacy 
identified by George and his colleagues are supported. He argues that two 
of the conditions are critically important – namely, making opponents fear 
escalation and ensuring that the balance of motivation is in favour of the 
coercers (pp.372, 383). He further finds that the provision of carrots 
corresponds with the success of coercive diplomacy, while the type of 
demand does not (p.401). 
 In addition to a case study approach, a quantitative approach is used 
in studies on compellence. Based on the Militarized Compellent Threats 
dataset, a newly constructed dataset of interstate compellence between 
1918 and 2001, Sechser (2011, pp.389-391) finds that compellers seem to 
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succeed more often when they resort to the show of force in compellence. 
Conversely, the compellers that have a larger military expenditure than the 
targets, possess nuclear weapons, or are democratic do not have a better 
chance at being successful in compellence. Post (2019) combines Sechser’s 
dataset with information about the type of force involved in threats and finds 
that the demonstration of air power is less effective than the show of force 
involving land or sea power. According to him, this is because the use of air 
power is cheaper and less risky than the use of other types of force and 
therefore does not strengthen the perceived resolve of the compellers. 
 These studies discuss compellence without a specific scope, but 
Jakobsen (1998a; 1998b) explores conditions for success, focusing on the 
specific context of compellence by coalitions of states against opponents 
who have already used force. In the first attempt (Jakobsen, 1998b), he 
modifies the conditions identified by George and his colleagues, and uses 
them to interpret the failure of coercive diplomacy in the Kuwait crisis. The 
conditions are “image of war”, “isolation of adversary”, “adversary cohesion”, 
“clear demand”, “use of ultimatum”, “threaten to defeat the adversary with 
little cost”, “usable military options”, “strong leadership”, “domestic support”, 
“international support”, “assurance against future demands”, and “use of 
carrot” (pp.75-79). In a later attempt (Jakobsen, 1998a), he builds a more 
parsimonious framework based on arguments by Schelling while 
incorporating the conditions that George and Simons regard as especially 
important. He calls the framework “ideal policy”, in the sense that it is what 
states can do for the best. It is composed of “a threat of force to defeat the 
opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost, backed by the 
necessary capability”; “a deadline for compliance”; “an assurance to the 
adversary against future demands”; and “an offer of carrots for compliance” 
(pp.30, 32). He tests the framework in three cases and demonstrates that it 
predicts their results well (pp.131-132). He also argues that states implement 
the ideal policy when they have the will to use force based on the 
combinations of the levels of interest involved, the likelihood of military 
success, and the extent of domestic support (pp. 43, 136-137). 
 Another study focusing on a specific context explores the use of 
compellence which demands regime change (Downes, 2018). Despite 
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regime change being one of the heaviest possible demands, the Militarized 
Compellent Threats dataset shows that compellence demanding regime 
change tends to succeed more frequently than compellence involving other 
weaker demands. Downes explains that the counter-intuitive pattern is the 
result of the selection effect: States tend to demand regime change only 
when such an attempt is likely to work. He argues that the factors leading to 
the success of compellence demanding regime change are overwhelming 
relative material power, geographic proximity, the isolation of target states, 
the show of force, and the assurance of the outgoing leader’s security. 
 Related to the conditions for the success of the strategy, several 
recent studies examine why major powers often fail to compel weaker states. 
Haun (2015) explains that the counter-intuitive phenomenon occurs because 
the huge advantage in relative power tends to drive major powers to issue 
demands that are unacceptable for the targets, such as territories or regime 
change. His study suggests that the level of demand has critical importance 
for the success of compellence. Sechser (2010; 2016; 2018) answers the 
same question, focusing on weak target states’ concern regarding future 
compellence. If weak states expect that they will be targets of compellence 
again, they have an incentive to resist the demand they are facing now for 
the sake of building a reputation that they are stubborn and willing to accept 
high costs. The explanation highlights the importance of the assurance that 
no additional demand will be made. Chamberlain (2016) proposes another 
alternative explanation. She argues that weak target states reject US 
demands and keep rejecting them even after the launch of military strikes, 
because the weak states believe that the US would not proceed to the brute-
force realisation of objectives through a costly war. Chamberlain’s argument 
emphasises the importance of the resolve to accept costs and the potent 
threats to defeat stubborn targets. 
 As a whole, these studies examine similar factors which can affect the 
cost–benefit calculations of targets and compellers. They cover factors 
related to what is demanded, what is threatened in what manner, and what 
kind and number of resources are available for compellers and targets. 
Multiple studies argue for the importance of such conditions as the stronger 
interests and motivation on the side of the compellers, the potency and 
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credibility of the threats, the assurance against future demands, the use of 
positive inducements, the existence of domestic support, the existence of 
strong leadership, and the lack of external support on the target side. At the 
same time, the studies draw seemingly contradictory conclusions about the 
importance of the relative ease, clarity, and publicness of the demands; the 
urgency accompanying the demands; the use of exemplary force; and the 
existence of international support. 
 These disagreements stem in part from the use of cases in different 
contexts in the assessments; factors that affect the results of compellence in 
one context can be unimportant in other circumstances. Among the studies 
dealing with compellence in general, George and Simons (1994b), Blechman 
and Wittes (1999), Treverton (2000), and Art and Cronin (2003) analyse 
cases of US compellence, but their empirical examinations mix quite 
different contexts. What they have in common is the examination of 
compellence against a weaker power (e.g. Libya, Iraq, and North Korea) and 
in regard to a humanitarian intervention (e.g. Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Haiti). 
However, the cases that George and Simons (1994b) use include 
compellence involving two superpowers (Cuba and Laos), that during the 
World War II (Japan just before Pearl Harbour), and that in a limited war 
(Vietnam). In turn, Treverton (2000) includes compellence against a non-
hostile country (India over nuclear development), and Art and Cronin (2003) 
include compellence against terrorists in their cases. Kagan (1998) employs 
two cases of European major powers’ compellence against small states in 
the pre-World War I era, and Sechser (2011) covers 210 cases of interstate 
compellence between 1918 and 2001 dealing with versatile protagonists and 
issues. 
 If these cases in diverse contexts had the same conclusion, their 
findings would be valid as conditions for the success of compellence in 
general; however, the existing studies did not reach a consensus on the 
conditions. Consensus seems difficult to achieve if the studies deal with 
versatile contexts simultaneously. 
 Contextual differences are expected to affect the conditions for 
success. For example, the conditions for the success of compellence in a 
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situation in which one or both sides have already resorted to force, such as 
compellence during interstate or civil wars, may be different from those in 
crises where neither side has actually used force. If the protagonists have 
huge sunk costs from using force, they may be more difficult to compel and 
may require additional conditions to be satisfied compared to compelling 
targets that have no sunk costs. Another difference related to context is the 
possibility of nuclear war. Actors may behave differently (being more risk 
acceptant, for example) if there is no possibility that their confrontation will 
escalates to nuclear war. Therefore, success conditions for compellence 
between conventional powers or in regard to humanitarian interventions may 
be different from those for compellence between nuclear superpowers. A 
further example of different contexts is compellence between states and 
against non-state actors. As non-state actors seldom have solid 
organisations and their leaders’ control over members tends to be weak 
(Byman and Waxman, 2002, p.192), successful compellence against non-
state actors may require conditions that enable compellers to obtain a clear 
upper hand that is obvious to the rank-and-file members in addition to their 
leaders. 
 Moreover, whether compellers can manipulate factors that affect the 
results of compellence also differs from context to context. For example, the 
balance of force is basically fixed in interstate crises because states cannot 
increase their overall force suddenly. In peace operations, however, the size 
of the intervening force can be increased or decreased in the short term. Of 
course, when organising peace operations, the assembly of troops is not an 
easy task, and the size of the force is beyond the control of any actor. Yet, 
because the troops of multinational forces are drawn from a far larger 
potential pool of states in the international community, there is a realistic 
possibility of increasing the size of the forces if the need arises. In contrast, 
the balance of interest is a factor that states can manipulate when they 
select issues and demands in using compellence. However, this factor is 
fixed in regard to peace operations because they intervene in others’ wars 
and local warring parties – namely, targets of compellence – have far larger 
stakes (Posen, 1996, pp.82, 84; Crawford, 2009, p.288). If the target side 
has a stronger interest in the issue in dispute, the compellers can limit their 
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demands so that they do not harm the vital interests of the target, thereby 
making the demands more acceptable. However, this is a difficult option for 
peace operations because their mandates are given by the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) and they cannot change the mandates by themselves. The 
UNSC is a collective body that is composed of 15 member states; therefore, 
the council’s decision is a result of political negotiations and compromise 
among them and is therefore inflexible, although there may be some room 
for manoeuvre. Moreover, it is unlikely that the council would retract 
demands such as the halt of violence or disarmament, which are 
fundamental to conflict resolution and stabilisation and have to be realised 
somehow. Hence, peace operations have to employ compellence without 
satisfying one of the factors that the existing studies regard as very important 
for the success of the strategy. 
 Whether compellers can manipulate factors has different practical 
implications. If the conditions for success are factors that are beyond the 
compellers’ realm of manipulation, the compellers should pay attention to 
diagnosing and deciding on the correct situation in which to employ 
compellence. If the conditions are factors that the compellers can manipulate, 
then they should pay more attention to formulating the appropriate policy 
and strategy of compellence. 
 Given the differences between contexts, it can be fruitful to narrow 
down the scope of a study to a specific context when examining the relative 
importance of the factors that can affect the result of the strategy. Such 
middle-range theories are expected to identify success conditions in a more 
specified manner in exchange for the width of their applicability. Among the 
studies reviewed, those conducted by Jakobsen (1998a; 1998b) and 
Downes (2018) fall into the approach of building a middle-range theory. In 
this respect, the approach of this thesis is similar to that used in their studies. 
This research is a part of such efforts to build a middle-range theory, 
focusing on the compellence that is carried out in peace operations. 
 The third aspect of compellence that has been explored in the 
literature is coercive mechanisms. From the perspective of coercive 
mechanisms, pressure used in compellence, like that used in deterrence, 
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can be largely divided into two categories: punishment and denial. Both try to 
manipulate the cost–benefit calculations of the targets and convince them 
that defiance against the compellers’ demands will result in the overall costs 
exceeding the benefits of the defiance. The two types of pressure, however, 
work on different sides of the calculation. Compellence by punishment 
threatens to increase the costs of defiance, while compellence by denial 
threatens to reduce the possibility of attaining the benefits of defiance (Pape, 
1996, p.18; Johnson et al., 2002, pp.16-17). As Freedman (1998, pp.29-30) 
explains, punishment in its pure form does not hinder the capability of targets 
to pursue their original courses of action, and the execution of the threat of 
punishment does not lead to control. Conversely, the execution of the threat 
of denial directly affects the targets’ capability to pursue their objectives and 
leads to control at the end. Therefore, the difference between compellence 
by denial and brute force is that of degree (Byman and Waxman, 2002, p.78). 
In reality, of course, both types of pressure are often employed in a mixed 
manner. 
 The most extensive study on coercive mechanism is that by Pape 
(1996), who focuses on the use of air power. He examines the effectiveness 
of denial and punishment by analysing 33 cases of the application of 
strategic air power, and he concludes that denial has a better chance of 
success than punishment. Despite agreeing that denial is a potent form of 
compellence, Mueller (1998) points out that Pape focuses on compellence 
over vital stakes for targets, and his conclusion that punishment does not 
work may not apply to cases that involve non-vital issues. Dekker (2011) 
improves Pape’s denial model from the perspective of interactions between 
compellers and targets. He argues that what is important in denying targets’ 
military strategies is to negate their counter-coercive efforts, and he 
demonstrates the importance of this factor through a case study of bombing 
campaigns in the Vietnam War. 
 Not limited to air power but also discussing the use of coercion in 
general, Byman and Waxman (2002, p.78) argue that denial makes coercion 
more likely to succeed, although they do not conduct an empirical test. Art 
(2003b, pp.399-401) finds that the use of the strong denial type of pressure 
was more effective than other forms of pressure in the cases of US coercive 
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diplomacy. Examining 28 cases, de Wijk (2014) also finds that the threat or 
use of ground forces and the pursuance of control, which is pressure of the 
denial type, correlate with the success of coercive attempts (pp.124-125). 
However, he regards victories secured through brute force, such as the 
forcible regime change in Iraq, as the success of coercion (p.324), although 
he defines coercion as an attempt to “manipulate and influence” the choice 
of other actors (p.16). Therefore, his conceptualisation and its application to 
empirical cases contain some problems. 
 In these studies, it is largely agreed that denial is a more reliable form 
of compellence than punishment. This is expected to also apply to 
compellence in peace operations, because, as Posen (1996, pp.86-108) 
argues, the opponents in such a context seldom have assets that can be 
threatened as a form of punishment. 
 However, it is expected that the specific ways in which compellers can 
achieve denial differ from context to context. Denial aims to negate 
opponents’ strategies; thus, its specific form depends on the opponents’ 
objectives and how they try to achieve them (Mueller, 1998, p.214). This 
means that different kinds of denial can work in different contexts, and again, 
focused studies on specific contexts can be fruitful for the advancement of 
the understanding of coercive mechanisms. 
 Finally, there are some studies that explore aspects of compellence 
that became important after the end of the Cold War. One such aspect is the 
use of coalitions. This is strongly related to compellence in peace operations, 
for it is usually carried out by multinational forces. Coalitions entail both 
advantages and disadvantages. Regarding the advantages, coalitions gather 
more military resources and intelligence; isolate targets diplomatically; and 
bring legitimacy to operations, thus strengthening domestic support. The 
disadvantages include the difficulty of coordination among members in terms 
of interests and objectives, the possible lack of unity regarding messages 
sent to targets, and inefficiency in military operations caused by additional 
decision-making requirements and procedures. All of these disadvantages 
damage the credibility of the threats that are issued by the coalitions 
(George and Simons, 1994a, p.273; Waxman, 1997, pp.39-44; Byman and 
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Waxman, 2002, pp.154-169; Morgan, 2003, pp.178-186). Byman and 
Waxman (2002, pp.170-171) argue that the unity of coalitions is crucial in 
successfully conducting coalitional coercion. Unity brings potency and 
credibility to pressure, as well as resiliency against adversaries’ counter-
coercion. Success or failure at the tactical level is expected to create positive 
or negative spirals, respectively. Tactical success strengthens the unity of 
coalitions, which makes following threats more credible and adversaries 
more likely to be restrained. In contrast, tactical failure undermines the unity 
of coalitions and thus damages the credibility of following threats, which 
makes adversaries more likely to challenge coercers. 
 The other aspect of compellence becoming more important in the 
post-Cold War era is the use of the strategy against non-state actors. The 
majority of studies on coercion against non-state actors focus on terrorism 
and usually use the concept of deterrence, but the arguments also tend to 
include compellence in their scopes. Although they do not address 
compellence in peace operations, their discussions provide useful insights 
that are adaptable to it. 
 The first point that the researchers in this group of studies raise is that 
coercing terrorists is difficult for various reasons. Terrorists have strong 
motivation, and confrontation against them tends to fall into a zero-sum one, 
which hinders the use of reassurances and carrots (Lepgold, 1998b, pp.139, 
141-142; Davis and Jenkins, 2002, pp.4-5; Crenshaw, 2003, pp.310-311, 
313; Bowen, 2004, p.64). It is difficult to understand terrorists’ perspectives 
because of their different values and cultural systems, as well as the lack of 
information (Crenshaw, 2003, p.311; Bowen, 2004, pp.56, 59). Terrorists 
also have loose intra-organisational control, and using force against them 
can be difficult due to the scarcity of appropriate targets or can even be 
counterproductive, leading to the enhancement of enmity against Western 
governments and of the legitimacy of the terrorists (Treverton, 2000, pp.28-
29; Crenshaw, 2003, pp.310, 312; Bowen, 2004, pp.62-63). In addition, 
terrorists also respond and adapt to counterterrorism measures and try to 
counter or circumvent them (Harvey and Wilner, 2012). 
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 Nevertheless, the researchers argue that coercing terrorists is 
possible. One feature of the argument is the focus on the utility of denial. 
Nuclear deterrence theory is centred on the threat of punishment, but 
punishment is difficult to apply against terrorists due to the lack of targetable 
valuable assets.4 Therefore, researchers instead explore how the threat of 
denial can be applied against terrorists. For example, enhancing the security 
of possible targets makes them more difficult for terrorists to attack. The 
interception of materials or other support provided for terrorists can reduce 
their capabilities. Measures to mitigate the effects of terrorists’ attacks also 
prevent terrorists from achieving the desired effects and responses (Bowen, 
2004, pp.61-62; Lebovic, 2007, pp.162-167; Smith and Talbot, 2008, pp.56-
59; Wilner, 2011, pp.22-23; 2015, pp.61-66). Geipel (2007) provides 
empirical support that terrorism in Europe during the Cold War was 
restrained and defeated as they lost hope because of the denial measures 
employed by governments. 
 Another feature of the studies of the field is their understanding of 
coercion against terrorists as cumulative effects rather than as a one-off, all-
or-nothing attempt. They refer specifically to the Israeli strategic concept of 
“cumulative deterrence”. This concept assumes the existence of persistent 
violent challenges and seeks to reduce them through repetitive forceful 
reactions rather than to prevent violence completely through the use of mere 
threats (Bar-Joseph, 1998, pp.156-157; Almog, 2004; Bar, 2008, pp.36-38; 
Rid, 2012). This concept is called deterrence, but what it represents is in 
effect compellence: Coercers try to halt violence by using force successfully 
and thereby affecting the calculation of the perpetrators. 
 The empirical examinations of cumulative deterrence have provided 
contradictory results. Hafez and Hatfield (2006) find that Israel’s targeted 
 
4  Some researchers argue that the punishment type of pressure can be 
applied if the target is seen as a wider system. For example, punishment 
is easier to apply against patron states of terrorists (Lepgold, 1998b, 
pp.142-143; Bowen, 2004, p.65; Kuperwasser, 2008, p.131; Wilner, 
2011, pp.14-17; 2013, p.750). 
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killings of Palestinian leaders and cadres neither reduced nor increased 
Palestinian violence. Maoz (2007) statistically examines the effect of Israel’s 
limited use of force against Arab states and non-state actors and concludes 
that the cumulative deterrent effect is not confirmed. In contrast, Byman 
(2006) and Bar (2012) argue that Israel’s targeted killings contributed to 
constraining Palestinian terrorists and reduced the effectiveness of their 
attacks. Wilner (2010; 2015) examines the targeted killings of terrorists in 
Afghanistan. He finds that successful targeted killings hindered the operation 
of the Taliban, degraded its attacks to less sophisticated forms, and 
weakened the motivations of its members. 
 Payne et al. (2008) also argue that coercing non-state actors requires 
a variety of approaches and a long period of trial and error. They examine 10 
cases of coercion by states against non-state actors, from historical pirate 
problems to post-World War II counterterrorism. The authors find that 
punishment alone was ineffective and denial was required. The states often 
tried to defeat the non-state actors, and this attempt could have coercive 
effects even if there was a failure to defeat them. The states also used 
carrots in addition to pressure, and they were effective when the objectives 
of the non-state actors were limited. The authors also emphasise the 
importance of obtaining up-to-date information about non-state actors to 
design effective coercion. Based on the case studies, they argue that 
coercion is more likely to succeed when target non-state actors have strong 
leadership and limited goals and have no foreign support nor sanctuaries. 
 These studies show that the concepts of compellence and deterrence 
are applicable and useful in analysing confrontation with non-state actors. 
Although the number of studies on this aspect of compellence is still small 
and further systematic empirical examination is required, the theoretical 
arguments and empirical findings reviewed here imply that the denial type of 
pressure seems to play a larger role, and the repetitive employment of force 
is likely to be required in compelling non-state armed groups. These findings 
may well apply to compellence in peace operations. 
 In addition to the studies dealing directly with compellence that have 
been reviewed so far, there are others that do not focus on compellence but 
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discuss issues related to it. One such issue is how to make threats credible 
in coercion. As leaders have an incentive to misrepresent their resolve to 
fight wars to make opponents back down in crises, mere statements do not 
constitute credible threats (Fearon, 1994a, p.578). How to make threats 
credible is also a critical issue in compellence in peace operations, so these 
studies can be helpful for this research. 
 The conventional wisdom is that the relative balances of power and 
interests between protagonists determine the effectiveness of threats. Some 
studies argue that both are important. Huth and Russett (1984) find that 
deterrers’ interests and the local balance of force effectively explain the 
result of extended-immediate deterrence. Danilovic (2001) similarly finds that 
the balance of interest effectively explains the result of extended-immediate 
deterrence and that power balance also corresponds with the result. 
Regarding extended-general deterrence, Johnson et al. (2015) find that 
allies with better capabilities and stronger links are less likely to face 
aggressions. Press (2005) also argues that leaders evaluate the credibility of 
opponents’ threats based on the power and interests they perceive the 
opponents to have. Others contend that either of the balance of force or 
interests is important. Huth (1988) finds that the short-term and immediate 
balance of force affects the result of extended-immediate deterrence. 
George and Smoke (1974, pp.558-561) argue that the credibility of 
deterrence depends on deterrers’ national interests involved in the issues in 
dispute rather than on the commitment techniques that they employ. Maoz 
(1983) finds that the results of international crises do not depend on relative 
capability but on the balance of resolve. 
 Fearon (1994b, pp.245-248) argues that the effectiveness of threats 
in regard to immediate deterrence depends on the challengers’ prior 
expectations about these two factors. If the actors challenge the defenders 
despite knowing that the latter have stronger interests in the issues that are 
in dispute, the challengers must also have a very strong motivation to risk 
wars; thus, immediate deterrence hardly works. Conversely, if the 
challengers act opportunistically, believing that the defenders’ interests are 
small, then the deterrent threats reveal the defenders’ strong resolve and 
should work. Similarly, rational actors challenge stronger defenders only on 
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issues that the challengers think the defenders have no resolve to defend. 
Therefore, deterrent threats signal the defenders’ true resolve and should be 
effective. Fearon re-evaluates data used by Huth and Russett and confirms 
that his hypotheses fit the data better. 
 In addition to the balances of power and interests, there are two other 
factors that researchers have discussed extensively as sources of the 
credibility of threats. One is audience costs. Fearon (1994a) contends that 
the credibility of threats in crises depends on the cost that domestic 
audiences would impose on their leaders when they fail to execute the 
threats they made in public, because such acts hurt their countries’ honour 
and reputation. He argues that the balance of capabilities and interests 
cannot affect the results of crises, because rational protagonists must have 
considered them when deciding to challenge or resist the challenge unless 
they are unobservable. He instead claims that audience costs are the key 
determinant of who wins in crises; the side with the greater audience costs – 
for example, democratic states – can better signal its resolve and is less 
likely to back down. 
 Some researchers support and extend Fearon’s argument. Eyerman 
and Hart (1996), Partell and Palmer (1999), Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001), and 
McManus (2014) statistically examine the hypotheses drawn from Fearon’s 
argument and conclude that they are supported. Smith (1998) explores the 
logic of how audience costs are generated assuming that leaders’ 
performance in crises reveals their competence and thereby affects their 
chances of re-election. Schultz (2001) instead argues that democratic states 
can send credible threats because of the openness of domestic discussion 
and the genuine domestic support that it can show. 
 However, others pose questions about and point out some problems 
with the audience cost theory. The first critique is that with regard to deciding 
whether to punish their leaders, people make much of the substance of 
policy or the salience of the issues in dispute, rather than of the consistency 
between their leaders’ words and deeds (Clare, 2007; Snyder and Borghard, 
2011). Second, in reality, leaders usually make their threats vague enough to 
ensure that they avoid the consistency problem (Snyder and Borghard, 
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2011; Trachtenberg, 2012). Third, autocratic states do not understand the 
domestic dynamics of democratic states and the audience costs that 
democratic leaders suffer (Snyder and Borghard, 2011; Mercer, 2012). 
Fourth, the information citizens can obtain on foreign policies is limited and 
can be manipulated, which makes it difficult for the citizens to play the role of 
punisher (Gartzke and Lupu, 2012; Mercer, 2012). In addition, Downes and 
Sechser (2012) point out that the two databases – the Militarized Interstate 
Dispute and the International Crisis Behavior – that are commonly used to 
test the audience cost theory are not suitable for this purpose because the 
majority of the cases included in these datasets do not involve coercive 
threats. The authors use the Militarized Compellent Threats dataset instead 
and conclude that democratic states do not perform better in compellence, 
contradicting the key prediction of the audience cost theory. 
 Gartzke and Lupu (2012) point out that the audience cost theory is 
inherently difficult to test because leaders would not document their 
exploitation, if any, of audience costs. Several researchers try to cope with 
this difficulty through the use of an experimental approach (Tomz, 2007; 
Levendusky and Horowitz, 2012; Davies and Johns, 2013). However, 
experiments do not confirm that people actually vote against leaders who 
have backed down in crises and generate audience costs nor that this is 
advantageous in international bargaining. In sum, the debates over the 
effectiveness of audience costs are ongoing (Levy, 2012). 
 The other possible source of threat credibility that has attracted great 
attention is reputation. Traditionally, researchers have regarded reputation 
as an important factor affecting the credibility of threats. For example, 
Schelling (1966) regards commitments as interdependent, and the failure to 
protect one of them renders it difficult to make adversaries believe that the 
state will protect other commitments (p.55). He therefore contends that 
“face” in the sense of states’ “reputation for action” is “one of the few things 
worth fighting over”; at the same time, he warns against staking it on every 
occasion (pp.124-125). In a similar vein, Blechman and Wittes (1999, pp.27-
28) argue that US performances in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia make 
the targets of US compellence stubborn, believing that they can defeat the 
US. Lieberman (1995, pp.898-899) argues that reputation is context 
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dependent and that a state’s previous performance affects its opponents’ 
calculations only if the context of the confrontation is similar. 
 States’ leaders care deeply about their own reputations and act to 
defend them, to the extent that one researcher describes such a tendency 
as a “cult” (Tang, 2005). According to some studies, this concern for 
reputation even drives states to proactively initiate and escalate 
confrontations or fight wars that they are likely to lose for the purpose of 
reputation building when they expect future confrontations (Clare and 
Danilovic, 2010; Sechser, 2010; 2016; 2018). 
 Some researchers, however, cast doubt on this conventional belief. 
They agree that reputation is not worth fighting for, but their arguments vary 
regarding whether states can have reputations at all and, if so, what kinds. 
Some argue that only a certain type of reputation can be earned. Mercer 
(1996, pp.46-47) contends that adversarial states do not earn a reputation 
for lacking resolve. Owing to psychological biases, dispositional explanations 
tend to be provided when others behave in an undesirable manner, while 
desirable behaviours tend to be attributed to situations. Mercer argues that 
this tendency suggests that a state that in an adversarial relationship with 
another can earn a reputation for resolve, because being resolved is 
undesirable for the opponent, but it can hardly ever earn a reputation for 
weakness, because being weak is desirable for the opponent. 
 In contrast to Mercer, Shannon and Dennis (2007) contend that a 
reputation for lacking resolve can be earned while that for having resolve is 
difficult to attain, and such a reputation can be situation specific. Actors tend 
to have a negative image, such as that of a paper tiger, of their enemies and 
they interpret new information with a bias that enhances this image. In a 
similar vein, Fettweis (2007/08, pp.625-627) regards Al-Qaeda’s frequent 
reference to the US’s lack of resolve as unchangeable not only because the 
former uses such rhetoric as a tool of recruitment but also because the 
asymmetric power balance forces the former to believe in the weakness of 
the latter’s resolve regardless of the truth. 
 Tang (2005) and Press (2005) argue that reputation cannot be 
obtained nor does it matter. Tang (2005, p.50) argues that because of the 
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uncertainty that is derived from anarchy, states have to assume the worst-
case scenario – that is, their adversaries are resolute in every crisis – and 
behave accordingly. This necessity makes the past behaviour of adversaries 
irrelevant; therefore, no reputation is formed. Press (2005, pp.22-23) 
similarly argues that states’ leaders do not rely on the past behaviour of 
adversaries when they assess the credibility of the threats made by the 
adversaries. This is because the anarchy of the international environment 
forces leaders to be careful, every crisis is unique, and people tend to make 
decisions cautiously and analytically when faced with serious ones. 
 As each of the above bodies of work has its own supporting evidence, 
the debate is unresolved. With regard to peace operations, Morgan (2003, 
pp.191-192) is sceptical of the idea that collective actors can earn reputation, 
especially if the targets of coercion differ from case to case. Similarly, 
Crawford (2009, pp.286-287) argues that reputation does not work in 
collective UN operations, because the member and context of each 
operation differ and the connection between past and future operations is 
weak. However, there seems to be a possibility that reputation also plays a 
role in peace operations. The UN, peace operation as a whole, or specific 
troop-contributing countries may have a certain type of reputation, which can 
affect the credibility of threats to use force in peace operations, or they may 
have no reputation. This point is worth examining as a possible factor which 
can affect the result of compellence in peace operations. 
 Another issue that is deeply related to compellence is the utility of 
rewards or positive inducements. These are another type of leverage that is 
frequently used to influence others. Moreover, studies on deterrence and 
compellence have pointed out the utility of combining threats with positive 
inducements, which can compensate for the damage that targets suffer or 
can work as a face-saving measure (George et al., 1971; George and 
Smoke, 1974; 1989; Jervis, 1979; George and Simons, 1994b; Byman and 
Waxman, 2002; Art and Cronin, 2003). Although the utility of positive 
inducements has attracted less attention than that of threats, some 
researchers have studied the topic. 
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 It is important to distinguish positive inducements or rewards from 
assurances. Positive inducements bring the increase of value for targets 
compared to the expectations they hold. Conversely, an assurance is a 
“conditional commitment neither to reward nor punish” (Baldwin, 1971, pp.23, 
26). For threats to be effective, they must be accompanied by assurances 
that threats will not be carried out if the targets accept the demands 
(Schelling, 1966, pp.4, 74). In the same way, the conditional promises of 
rewards must also be accompanied by assurances that rewards will not be 
provided in cases of noncompliance (Baldwin, 1971, p.26). 
 Rewards are thought to have some advantages in comparison to 
threats. Negative pressure derives negative responses, such as fear and 
resistance, from targets and can hinder cooperation in other issues, while 
positive inducements derive amicable responses, such as hope and 
attraction, which can facilitate further cooperation (Baldwin, 1971, pp.32-33). 
Threats from the outside may also increase support for target regimes 
because of the “rally-round-the-flag” effect (Nincic, 2006, pp.323-324; 2010, 
pp.144-145; 2011, p.23). Moreover, when promises are used for the purpose 
of compellence, the structure turns into one that is similar to that of 
deterrence by threats – that is, make demands, show promises, and wait. 
This absolves the compellers from taking initiatives and related risks and can 
thus be more efficient than relying on threats. Furthermore, the targets of 
compellence must suffer fewer political costs in accepting demands with 
rewards than doing so under threat (Davis, 2000, pp.24-25). 
 At the same time, the use of positive inducements has its own 
difficulties. First, providing rewards for actors who perform malicious acts, 
such as large-scale human rights violations, would be morally wrong and 
inappropriate (Cortright, 1997, pp.278-279). Second, providing rewards 
tends to be regarded as a sign of weakness and punishment as strength, 
and the latter can attract stronger support in domestic politics (Baldwin, 1971, 
p.34; Milburn and Christie, 1989, p.632; Leng, 1993, pp.169-171). Third, the 
provision of rewards to halt unwanted behaviour can lead to moral hazards 
and contrarily facilitate the unwanted behaviour with the aim of obtaining 
additional rewards (Baldwin, 1971, p.36; Cortright, 1997, pp.277-278). This 
concern is considerable, especially when rewards are used for the purpose 
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of deterrence (Davis, 2000, p.24). Fourth, in adversarial relations, the 
intentions behind the offers of rewards can be perceived sceptically or even 
suspected of being plots (Milburn and Christie, 1989, pp.630-631). Fifth, it is 
often difficult to match demands with proposed rewards. What providers 
think of as rewards may not be perceived as such by targets, because of 
differences in preferences or values (Baldwin, 1971, p.24; Milburn and 
Christie, 1989, pp.628-629). Moreover, although the demands are often 
political in nature, the proposed rewards tend to be economic or symbolic, 
and this asymmetry makes it difficult to reach agreements (Nincic, 2011, 
pp.62-63, 174-176). 
 Therefore, neither threats nor rewards are superior to one another. 
Their utilities depend on the situation (Baldwin, 1971, pp.34-35), and some 
researchers point out the utility of combining them. Nincic (2010, p.181; 2011, 
p.88) argues that sanctions weaken target regimes and make them more 
susceptible to rewards if they are seen in a longer timeframe, while pressure 
from the outside can strengthen regimes in the short term. Leng (1993, 
p.149) analyses 40 international crises and finds that the combination of 
negative and positive inducements employed in a reciprocating manner 
tends to end crises in concessions or diplomatic victories, while sole reliance 
on coercive inducements tends to escalate crises into wars far more 
frequently. Art (2003b, pp.388-389) also raises positive inducements as a 
facilitating factor of compellence and argues that they should be provided 
after compellers have employed pressure in order to avoid carrots being 
misunderstood as a sign of weakness. In examining the use of coercion 
against non-state actors, Payne et al. (2008, pp.22-24) also find that 
combining positive inducements with pressure has utility. However, they 
warn that simply giving what is demanded can be ineffective or even harmful 
for coercers, citing examples of when accepting the demands of terrorists did 
not lead to them ceasing their activities. 
 In sum, positive inducements can facilitate compellence when 
combined with pressure. Regarding compellence in peace operations, 
positive inducements can also be employed as a leverage. Although the 
identification of the optimal use of positive inducements requires further 
empirical examination, the studies on positive inducements are also helpful 
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in deriving hypotheses about the conditions for the success of compellence 
in peace operations. 
 This section has reviewed the literature on compellence and its 
related studies. Starting from the two seminal works – one by Schelling and 
the other by George and his colleagues – researchers have explored issues 
such as conditions for the success of compellence, coercive mechanisms, 
the impact of using coalitions and targeting non-state actors in employing the 
strategy, the sources of threat credibility, and the utility of positive 
inducements. However, the discussions on all of these aspects are 
inconclusive and require additional studies. 
 The most significant gap in the literature regards the disagreement 
about the conditions for the success of compellence. Existing studies draw 
contradictory conclusions about the relative importance of some factors that 
can affect the result of compellence. As the strategy is useful but risky, an 
improved understanding of this aspect is desired. One reasons for the 
disagreement is the mix of cases from different contexts in the empirical 
examinations. Compellence is applicable to a wide range of contexts, and 
different factors can be important in different settings. In addition, whether 
conditions are manipulable by compellers differs from context to context. 
Therefore, to further specify the conditions of success, narrowing down the 
scope of research and focusing on a specific context can be fruitful. 
 This approach of limiting the scope can also be fruitful in advancing 
the understanding of coercive mechanisms. The literature largely agrees that 
the pressure of denial is more effective than that of punishment. However, 
the logic of denial can encompass diverse measures, depending on the 
opponents’ objectives and strategies. Therefore, again, narrowing down the 
scope is expected to be helpful for identifying the usable style of denial in 
specific situations. 
 Consequently, a study of compellence focusing on the specific 
context of peace operations is expected to contribute to the specification of 
the conditions of success and coercive mechanisms. Moreover, the context 
provides an opportunity to advance the understanding of coalitional 
compellence against non-state actors. The review shows that the number of 
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studies on compellence by coalitions and against non-state actors remains 
small despite these being the major players of the current strategic 
environment. Moreover, the existing studies on compellence against non-
state actors focus on counterterrorism and are even less explored in other 
contexts. A study of compellence in peace operations would be a valuable 
contribution to improving the understanding of the utility of the strategy 
against non-state actors. The insights from the reviewed studies of 
compellence and its related issues provide a starting point for building the 
analytical framework for this study. However, the framework also needs to 
integrate insights from studies on peace operations. 
1.2  Peace Operations 
1.2.1  The Concept and Development of Peace Operations 
In this thesis, the term “peace operations” is defined as field operations that 
are deployed to manage and/or resolve violent conflicts. This is a modified 
version of the definition provided in the UN document so-called the Capstone 
Doctrine: “Field operations deployed to prevent, manage, and/or resolve 
violent conflicts or reduce the risk of their recurrence” (United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations [UNDPKO] and Department of 
Field Support [DFS], 2008, p.98). The term peace operations is usually used 
as an umbrella concept which embraces all phases of international 
involvement in conflicts, such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement, and post-conflict peacebuilding. However, the focus of this 
research is the use of force in peace operations; therefore, the scope of the 
term is limited here to realms which can involve combats by dropping words 
related to prevention and recurrence from the definition. With regard to 
actors who conduct peace operations, this definition does not exclude non-
UN operations carried out by regional organisations, coalitions of the willing, 
nor individual states. In fact, one of the features of contemporary peace 
operations is cooperation among various actors. In particular, non-UN forces 
cooperating with UN operations in the form of the sequential division of 
labour and/or co-deployment tend to carry out operations that involve the 
use of force, so it is important to include them in the scope of this research. 
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 The expected role of force in peace operations has changed 
drastically over the course of its development, from no expectation for 
combat capability to the possible substantial use of force. Typical peace 
operations during the Cold War, now referred to as “traditional 
peacekeeping”, were activities which deployed neutral international forces 
under the command of the UN with the consent of conflicting parties to 
maintain ceasefires in interstate conflicts. Against the backdrop of the 
paralysis of the UNSC, which made it impossible to activate Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, traditional peacekeeping was non-coercive in nature and 
operated based on the so-called traditional principles of peacekeeping: the 
consent of conflicting parties, neutrality, and the non-use of force except self-
defence. In traditional peacekeeping, the peacekeepers were not expected 
to use force in performing their duties under the assumption that the 
conflicting parties would cooperate with them. 
 However, at least at the conceptual level, the occasions on which 
peacekeepers could use force under the concept of “self-defence” expanded 
steadily during the early days of peacekeeping. In the first major armed 
peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), self-
defence meant the protection of peacekeepers themselves and shooting 
back if they were fired on or under the clear threat of being attacked. In the 
“summary study” of UNEF, the then UN Secretary-General, Dag 
Hammarskjöld, showed his understanding of self-defence as not taking the 
initiative regarding the use of force (Findlay, 2002, pp.34, 41, 47; Sloan, 
2011, pp.23-25). 
 During the second major peacekeeping operation, the United Nations 
Operation in the Congo (ONUC), self-defence came to include not only 
resistance against forceful attempts to disarm and/or capture UN personnel, 
property, and positions but also resistance against forceful attempts to 
hinder the peacekeepers from “carrying out their responsibilities” and 
securing their freedom of movement (Findlay, 2002, pp.60-61, 64; 
Chesterman, 2005, p.104). Later, the UNSC authorised ONUC to use force 
beyond self-defence, and ONUC conducted proactive military operations. 
The UN maintained that ONUC’s use of force was an act of self-defence 
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(Findlay, 2002, pp.70-71, 77-81; Chesterman, 2005, p.104; Sloan, 2014, 
p.686). 
 Although the Congo experience was considered an aberration that 
should not be repeated, the interpretation of self-defence in a subsequent 
mission, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, did not revert to 
that in UNEF and remained in line with the understanding in ONUC (Findlay, 
2002, p.92; Sloan, 2011, pp.27-28). Moreover, in establishing another 
peacekeeping mission, UNEF II, the then UN Secretary-General, Kurt 
Waldheim, proposed that instead of “responsibility”, “[s]elf-defence would 
include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from 
discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council”, and this 
was approved by the UNSC (Findlay, 2002, p.100; Sloan, 2011, p.28). All 
subsequent missions were given guidelines including the defence of 
mandate as part of self-defence (UNDPKO, 1995, p.20). 
 This wider concept of self-defence, which included the defence of 
mandate, could be problematic because it could entail almost any kind of 
use of force (Findlay, 2002, p.19; Sloan, 2014, p.684). If the mandates were 
broad, the peacekeepers’ use of force in self-defence could be almost 
indistinguishable from enforcement activities (Cox, 1999, p.255). However, 
as a matter of fact, this conceptual enlargement of self-defence did not bring 
about an increase in peacekeepers’ use of force (Roberts, 1995, p.14). 
Force commanders on the ground made a realistic judgement that they 
needed cooperation from conflicting parties and peacekeepers’ arms were 
not strong enough to defeat the parties (Goulding, 1993, p.455). 
 The end of the Cold War and subsequent developments made a huge 
impact on peace operations and forced their transformation. In the post-Cold 
War era, intrastate conflicts became a major international security problem. 
Accordingly, peace operations also came to be used as a tool to intervene in 
civil wars with the tasks of stabilising the situations and mitigating 
humanitarian suffering. However, functioning in the traditional mode, the 
peacekeepers soon faced difficulties in carrying out their mandates in the 
harsh environment. Peace agreements in civil wars are precarious, and 
conflicting parties tend to break them very soon after they are signed. 
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Conflicting parties often manipulate their consent for peacekeeping, and 
some parties, called “spoilers”, actively obstruct peace processes and 
peacekeepers’ activities using violent means. 
 Against this backdrop, arguments emerged that the international 
forces that were involved in peace operations should be prepared to use 
force. This new trend firstly surfaced in “An Agenda for Peace”, which is a 
document that was prepared by the UN Secretary-General at the time, 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as a response to the expectation that the UN would 
have a larger role in international security in the post-Cold War world. In the 
document, Boutros-Ghali showed his intention for the UN to become actively 
involved in all phases of conflict resolution from preventive diplomacy to 
post-conflict peacebuilding. He proposed the establishment of peace 
enforcement units, which would be “more heavily armed than peace-keeping 
forces” and would work “to restore and maintain the cease-fire”, which was a 
task that was deemed too heavy for peacekeeping (UN, 1992, para.44). 
 However, it soon became clear that it is difficult to put the concept of 
peace enforcement into practice. In Somalia, the peacekeepers tried to 
forcefully disarm warring factions but had to withdraw without achieving the 
objective after suffering huge casualties. The peacekeeping operation that 
was deployed to Bosnia was given a mandate to protect “safe areas”, but the 
peacekeepers could not prevent ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica. Moreover, 
hundreds of peacekeepers themselves were taken hostage by a conflicting 
party, and military action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
was required to end the conflict. As a result of the failures, strong arguments 
arose that peacekeeping should remain in traditional non-coercive mode. 
Boutros-Ghali himself also admitted that the UN did not have the capability 
to conduct enforcement operations, except very limited ones, and that the 
traditional principles of peacekeeping should be adhered to (UN, 1995, 
paras.33-36, 77). 
 Nevertheless, from around the turn of the century, peacekeeping 
started to once again embrace a more forceful approach, thereby blurring 
the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This is 
because going back to neutral peacekeeping did not provide a solution for 
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coping with the severe environment of civil war. This was vividly 
demonstrated in Rwanda, where peacekeepers in traditional mode could not 
prevent and stop the genocide. 
 One of the resulting trends has been the expansion of non-UN peace 
operations conducted by regional organisations, coalitions of the willing, and 
even a single state. Regional organisations, such as NATO, the European 
Union (EU), the African Union, and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), have conducted multiple peace operations. 
Western states sometimes lead coalitions of the willing (e.g. the US and 
Australia) or individually launch military operations in support of other peace 
missions (e.g. the UK and France). These non-UN missions tend to engage 
in high-intensity operations against specific warring factions that are violently 
disrupting peace processes. The operations are usually sanctioned or 
acknowledged by the UNSC and cooperate with UN missions either by 
preceding, co-deploying with, or succeeding them (Bellamy and Williams, 
2005; Sloan, 2011, pp.51-54; Diehl and Balas, 2014, pp.79-80, 85-106; Bara 
and Hultman, 2020). 
 The other trend has been the militarisation of UN peace operations 
(Sloan, 2011). The necessity for peacekeepers to use force if required is 
strongly advocated in the “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations” (UN, 2000a), or the so-called Brahimi Report, which was named 
after the chair of the panel. Among the recommendations, which cover a 
broad range of topics, the report states that peacekeepers should be able to 
defend mission mandates and contingents and should be allowed to use 
sufficient force to “silence a source” of attacks so that peacekeepers do not 
“cede the initiative to their attackers” (para.49). In addition, the report 
differentiates between neutrality, which it defines as the “equal treatment of 
all parties in all cases for all time”, and impartiality, which it defines as the 
“adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a 
mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles”, and it notes that the latter 
should be an operational principle for peacekeeping (para.50). In this context, 
the report calls for peacekeepers to protect civilians, even by using force, 
although it stresses the danger of giving them such a task without providing 
the necessary resources (paras.50, 62-63). In sum, the Brahimi Report calls 
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for militarily capable forces “with robust rules of engagement” (para.55) for 
peacekeeping and expects them to use force if necessary to carry out their 
mandates and protect civilians. 
 In fact, the vast majority of the peacekeeping operations established 
after the Brahimi Report have been given mandates under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, as well as the task of protecting civilians. This robust posture in 
peacekeeping is positively self-evaluated by the UN in the Capstone 
Doctrine, which states the following: 
 
the Security Council has given United Nations peacekeeping 
operations “robust” mandates authorizing them to “use all necessary 
means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, 
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist 
the national authorities in maintaining law and order. By proactively 
using force in defense of their mandates, these United Nations 
peacekeeping operations have succeeded in improving the security 
situation and creating an environment conducive to longer-term 
peacebuilding in the countries where they are deployed (UNDPKO 
and DFS, 2008, p.34). 
 
 However, this movement towards robust peacekeeping is not without 
criticism. The first major concern is the lack of resources. Robust 
peacekeeping requires combat capabilities and the will to take risks so that 
even in vast areas of operations, including difficult terrains, the 
peacekeepers can protect themselves and the civilians under threat. In 
reality, peace operations are often short of troops who are ready to take risks. 
They are also short of critical equipment, including armoured vehicles and 
helicopters, and such capabilities are difficult to achieve (Gowan and 
Tortolani, 2008; Sloan, 2011, pp.283-288; Tardy, 2011, pp.160-161; Nsia-
Pepra, 2014, pp.64-68; Nadin et al., 2015, pp.93-98). This is especially the 
case when peacekeepers are faced with increasingly capable spoilers, who 
employ sophisticated means and tactics (Gowan and Tortolani, 2008, pp.52-
53; Sheeran, 2015, pp.106-108; Rhoads, 2016, pp.177-178). International 
troops need to protect themselves, the civilian components of the missions, 
and the local residents from likely retaliatory attacks (Sloan, 2011, p.290; 
Hunt, 2017, pp.115-118). Raising expectations by promoting robust missions 
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and then failing to implement them on the ground will expose civilians to 
even greater risks and tarnish the credibility of the UN and its peacekeeping 
efforts (Sloan, 2011, p.290; Nsia-Pepra, 2014, p.61; Rhoads, 2016, pp.105, 
173-177). 
 The second criticism, which is related to the first, is the imbalance or 
unfairness of burdens. Developing countries, which provide the vast majority 
of troops for peacekeeping, have a grievance that developed countries 
including the US, the UK, and France, which are permanent members of the 
UNSC, promote and decide on robust mandates without bearing the burden 
of their implementation in terms of the provision of troops for such missions. 
Some developing countries are critical of the concept of robust 
peacekeeping itself, regarding it as a threat to their sovereignty, and they call 
for peacekeeping to remain within the realm of traditional principles (Benner 
et al., 2011, p.18; Tardy, 2011, pp.158-159; Nsia-Pepra, 2014, pp.59-60; 
Rhoads, 2016, pp.97-101). 
 The third concern is the inherent ambiguity in the new understanding 
of impartiality. The concept of impartiality, in keeping with the Brahimi Report, 
hinges upon the distinction between right and wrong based on international 
norms. However, this distinction is difficult to apply on the ground, because 
the positions of the perpetrators and victims of violence would differ 
depending on perspective and could change from one day to the next. Such 
judgement requires a clear understanding of the situation based on sufficient 
information, which is difficult to obtain (Williams, 2010; Rhoads, 2016). 
Moreover, peace operations inherently tend to take sides with governments, 
as evidenced by the fact that peacekeepers are frequently tasked with 
supporting the efforts of local governments to re-establish and extend their 
authorities and governance within their territories (Nadin et al., 2015, p.13; 
Peter, 2015, p.359; Aoi et al., 2017, pp.18-19). In fact, governments or their 
security forces can be perpetrators of violence. However, peacekeepers 
usually cannot take forceful measures against host governments due to their 
fear of losing consent and cooperation (Sloan, 2011, pp.288-289; UN, 2014a, 
para.40). Taking actions, including the use of force, based on such dubious 
impartiality can lead to biased behaviour by peacekeepers (Tardy, 2011, 
p.163; Rhoads, 2016). Moreover, peacekeepers would be unable to be 
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impartial mediators between conflicting parties if international troops employ 
force against one of the parties (Peter, 2015, p.364; Rhoads, 2016, p.78). 
These concerns have led to calls for more attention to be paid to politics 
rather than employing solutions that involve force based on such a skewed 
simplification (Tardy, 2011, p.156; Rhoads, 2016). 
 The report of High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, or 
the so-called HIPPO Report, which is another UN review report published in 
2015, also shows some reservations about the robust trend of UN peace 
operations. It emphasises that for UN peace operations with the mandate to 
protect civilians, every effort, including the use of force, should be made to 
implement it, and it argues that peacekeepers should be able to use force 
“ranging from containment via deterrence and coercion to direct 
confrontation” to defend their mandates (UN, 2015, paras.83, 90, 92, 128). 
However, it warns that the expectation for peace operations to protect 
civilians has grown so high that they have not been able to live up with it 
(paras.27, 84, 91). The report draws attention to the limitations of peace 
operations and points out the necessity to adjust the mandates to the 
existing capabilities and to control expectations (paras.38, 95, 97, 103). 
Despite acceptance of the possibility that UN peace operations are given 
enforcement mandates, the report claims that such measures should be 
exceptional and that a better option is to use coalitions of the willing or 
regional actors (paras.113, 117-123). 
 As these critiques indicate, the current trend of robustness in peace 
operations faces some challenges. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
peace operations should revert to the traditional basics, as this would simply 
repeat the course of the 1990s. No one can deny the importance of 
employing a political approach, but the protection of civilians who are in 
imminent danger cannot wait for the fruition of political processes; it requires 
an immediate physical response on the ground (Nadin et al., 2015, p.109). 
The necessary resources and capabilities are not guaranteed but are 
sometimes provided, and the missions subsequently succeed, as some 
cases reviewed in Chapter 2 indicate. The legitimate grievances of rebels or 
the communities they are based should be considered seriously, but this 
does not eliminate the necessity to contain their violence. Moreover, 
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sometimes there are clear perpetrators of violence and violators of peace 
processes who need to be confronted. Peace operations are expected to 
remain one of the most frequently used tools in conflict management (Aoi 
and de Coning, 2017, p.308), and provided that the international community 
makes much of the execution of missions and the prevention of humanitarian 
disasters, the international forces that are involved in peace operations have 
to be prepared to use force. In fact, African countries call for more robust 
missions on their continent to halt civil war violence (Abiola et al., 2017, 
pp.159, 167-168; Karlsrud, 2018, pp.123-124, 129-130). The HIPPO Report 
also expects that the UN will continue to be assigned conflict management 
tasks (UN, 2015, para.115). 
 Of course, robust peace operations entail greater risks for 
peacekeepers, and caution is necessary. However, a recent UN report, the 
so-called Cruz Report, points out that peacekeepers mostly suffer casualties 
because of inaction rather than due to taking actions, and it strongly 
emphasises the necessity to discard the “Chapter VI Syndrome”. The report 
urges peacekeepers to take proactive and even preemptive stances in terms 
of force protection and responses to attacks, and it warns that the failure to 
do so invites further attacks (dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017). 
 Therefore, peace operations need to be adapted to new standard 
tasks and operational environments through the adoption of more proactive 
stances. What is required for research in the field is to identify the conditions 
under which such a robust approach is likely to succeed in halting ongoing 
violence. 
1.2.2  Previous Research on Peace Operations 
Research on peace operations has a long history, and a vast number of 
studies in this area exist. Nevertheless, they have tended to be 
historical/descriptive or legal/normative arguments, and the field has long 
lacked explanatory theories that are based on systematic analysis. However, 
since around the year 2000, studies have started to provide a systematic 
analysis of the effects of peace operations (Fortna and Howard, 2008). 
Previous studies reveal through statistical analysis that peace operations 
have contributed to maintaining peace after civil wars (Doyle and Sambanis, 
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2000; 2006; Fortna, 2003; 2004; 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008) and 
preventing the spread of conflicts (Beardsley, 2011; Beardsley and Gleditsch, 
2015). 
 These positive effects of peace operations can be spurious if the 
international community selects easy cases when launching operations 
(Fortna, 2008, p.3). However, studies on where peace operations tend to be 
deployed have found some evidence that they are sent to deal with difficult 
cases rather than easy ones. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) find that wars 
with higher casualties tend to attract UN peace operations. Similarly, 
Hultman (2013) finds that UN operations, especially robust ones, are more 
likely to be deployed to deal with cases that involve high civilian casualties. 
Although Fortna (2004; 2008) does not find that the death toll affects the 
likelihood of peace operations, she finds that UN operations authorised 
under Chapter VII are more likely to be deployed in cases in which previous 
ceasefires or peace agreements have collapsed and multiple factions are at 
war. Even when it comes to peace operations by individual states or 
coalitions of states, Rost and Greig (2011) find that states are more likely to 
deploy missions when conflicts kill more people in battles and generate more 
refugees. Major powers also tend to send operations when multiple factions 
are engaged in conflicts. 
 However, the discussion is not conclusive, as studies have shown 
contradictory findings on the effects of factors such as the duration of wars, 
ethnic rivalry, and mountainous terrain (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 
2004; 2008; Mullenbach, 2005; Rost and Greig, 2011; Hultman, 2013). Other 
strategic factors, such as the geographical locations, the size of the target 
states’ military forces, ethnic and economic ties, and the involvement of 
major powers, also affect the likelihood of peace operations (Gilligan and 
Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2004; 2008; Mullenbach, 2005; Rost and Greig, 
2011); therefore, peace operations are not determined solely by 
humanitarian factors nor by the needs of the states that are in conflict. 
Nevertheless, with regard to the decision to send peace operations, at least 
it can be said that the international community does not systematically pick 
easy cases. 
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 Researchers disagree on the effect of peace operations on ongoing 
violence. Regan (2002) finds that neutral interventions prolong civil wars and 
that interventions under international organisations do not have a significant 
effect on the duration of civil wars. Heldt (2001) and Gilligan and Sergenti 
(2008) also find that UN operations are not effective at stopping ongoing civil 
wars. However, they do not distinguish between different types of peace 
operations, and there remains the possibility that a certain kind of operation 
is effective at curtailing civil wars. Costalli (2014) analyses violence at the 
regional level in the Bosnian civil war and finds that the deployment of 
peacekeepers does not affect the level of violence. This is an interesting 
study which analyses data at the subnational level, but it deals with only one 
conflict and requires additional research to generalise the findings. 
 Other studies show that some types of intervention can mitigate 
ongoing violence. Krain (2005) finds that partial interventions against 
perpetrators, rather than neutral ones, are effective at reducing the severity 
of state-supported genocides and politicides. Hultman (2010) and Nsia-
Pepra (2014) find that robust peace operations with a civilian protection 
mandate have an effect on reducing violence against civilians. Studies have 
also found that peace operations with larger troop numbers are more 
effective in terms of protecting civilians (Hultman et al., 2013; 2019; Nsia-
Pepra, 2014; Kathman and Wood, 2016; Bara and Hultman, 2020), reducing 
casualties on the battlefield (Hultman et al., 2019), and realising negotiated 
settlements (Kathman and Benson, 2019). Haass and Ansorg (2018) find 
that not only the number of troops but also their quality affect the 
performance of peacekeepers with regard to protecting civilians from 
violence. Several recent studies analysing the subnational-level data of 
multiple UN missions in Africa also find that the deployment of peacekeepers 
shortens the duration of ongoing conflict (Ruggeri et al., 2017) and reduces 
violence by rebels (Fjelde et al., 2019; Phayal and Prins, 2020). These 
studies suggest that appropriately authorised and capable interventions 
focusing on the perpetrators of violence can make a difference on the 
ground. 
 Researchers have also explored conditions for the success of peace 
operations. These studies have different scopes, use various success 
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criteria, and raise a number of factors as the conditions. These factors can 
be largely divided into two groups. 
 The characteristics of conflicts or conflicting parties are the focus of 
some studies. For example, Heldt (2001) argues that structural factors 
related to the characteristics of civil wars, such as the level of ethnic 
polarisation and economic development, as well as whether the host state is 
a democracy, have greater influence on the outcomes of the missions than 
the nature of the missions. Gromes (2019) also finds that non-robust 
peacekeeping missions can maintain peace only after relatively benign civil 
wars, such as those that are non-ethnic, are less intensive, or ended with a 
peace agreement or a victory for one side. Environmental factors must affect 
the results of peacekeeping, but peace operations are often deployed to 
areas in which there are difficult situations and it is necessary to explore how 
they can work in a harsh environment. Regarding conditios for success, 
some other researchers raise conflicting parties’ cooperation regarding UN 
missions, their willingness to solve problems through non-violent means, and 
the existence of peace agreements (Bratt, 1997; Pushkina, 2006; Adebajo, 
2011). However, these insights are not helpful in coping with one of the most 
serious challenges in contemporary peace operations: how to deal with 
spoilers who do not cooperate with and even employ violence against 
peacekeepers and peace processes. 
 The other type of factor is related to the characteristics of peace 
operations. This includes adherence to the traditional principles of 
peacekeeping (Bratt, 1997), good leadership of UN missions (Adebajo, 
2011), and organisational learning during operations (Howard, 2008). 
However, the traditional principles are not helpful in today’s usual missions, 
which are given robust mandates and are expected to confront spoilers 
when necessary. In addition, leadership and learning are too general as 
explanatory factors, although the adaptability and flexibility of missions are 
important. Without a clear explanation of causal mechanisms, these 
arguments indicate little about the factors that are necessary for success. 
 Among the conditions the studies raise, the provision of sufficient 
resources for peace operations (Bratt, 1997; Pushkina, 2006; Koko and 
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Essis, 2012) and the absence of external support for warring factions (Bratt, 
1997; Pushkina, 2006; Adebajo, 2011) can also be relevant for robust peace 
operations. These factors must be directly related to the cost–benefit 
calculations of relevant actors and can thus affect the outcomes of 
operations. 
 Peace operations entail various objectives and are thus expected to 
function based on multiple mechanisms. Some objectives, such as 
distributing humanitarian aid, building infrastructure, and training local police, 
can be directly achieved by the acts of peacekeepers. In contrast, military-
related objectives, such as the maintenance of ceasefires, the restoration of 
security, and the disarmament of warring factions, are difficult to achieve 
directly. These objectives require certain acts of conflicting parties, and 
peace operations achieve the objectives by affecting the parties’ behaviour. 
Therefore, at least regarding the latter type of objectives, an understanding 
of the mechanisms governing how peace operations can affect conflicting 
parties is necessary for the exploration of the conditions for success. Without 
this identification, such an exploration remains atheoretical, has no causal 
logic, or has logic that is too general. 
 Some studies start to shed light on the causal mechanisms of peace 
operations, but this aspect of the field is especially under-explored. Among 
the existing research, a study by Fortna (2008) is the most systematic 
attempt to illustrate the causal mechanisms. However, her interest lies in 
how peacekeepers can help maintain a ceasefire that has already been 
achieved. Therefore, she raises deterrence as one of the possible 
mechanisms but does not explore the use of force to change the status quo. 
 Regarding mechanisms that stop ongoing violence, previously 
mentioned studies provide some assumed logic. Krain (2005) assumes that 
partial interventions against the perpetrators of genocides work through two 
mechanisms. One is that interventions signal the resolve of the international 
community not to accept genocides, and the other is that interventions force 
the perpetrators to use their capabilities to counter the interventions and thus 
constrain their ability to commit genocides. Hultman et al. (2019) assume 
that peacekeepers reduce violence in civil wars through two mechanisms: by 
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increasing the cost of using violence and by facilitating the commitment to 
peace. They argue that these mechanisms are brought into play through the 
activities of peacekeepers, such as the separation of conflicting parties, 
disarmament, the verification of compliance with peace processes, and 
policing. However, these proposed mechanisms are not empirically 
examined, and further studies are required. Nsia-Pepra (2014) argues that 
robust peacekeeping, which has potent military capabilities, stops violence 
against civilians by raising the expected costs of using violence. He 
inappropriately calls the function as deterrence, but what he describes is, in 
effect, compellence. 
 Another major work on the mechanisms of peacekeeping is a recent 
book by Howard (2019). She categorises the power that UN peacekeepers 
exercise to change local parties’ behaviour into persuasion, inducement, and 
coercion. Her list of specific forms of coercion includes compellence, as well 
as deterrence, defence, surveillance, and arrest (p.134). However, she 
especially emphasises that peacekeepers do not and cannot resort to 
compellence because of the three principles of peacekeeping and capacity 
limitation (pp.129-130, 199). She contends that the use of compellence 
makes peacekeepers a party to conflict and that peacekeepers therefore 
cannot resort to compellence by definition (pp.140-141). 
 Her argument, however, has limitations. While her scope is UN 
peacekeeping, peace operations as a whole, including peace enforcement 
and non-UN operations, can and do resort to compellence. In fact, she 
positively evaluates the combination of such non-UN operations and UN 
peacekeeping (Howard, 2019, pp.194-196). Moreover, UN operations have 
also employed compellence in some cases. Howard refers solely to the 
defeat of M23 as an exceptional case of compellence by a UN operation 
(p.136), but there are other cases of compellence by UN operations, as 
shown in the next chapter. While it is debatable how to label these 
operations – peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or others – UN review 
papers, as well as the African countries that suffer most from civil wars, call 
for robustness of peace operations, as mentioned in the previous section. It 
can be said that at least there remains a necessity to look into the conditions 
under which compellence can work in the context of peace operations. 
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 In fact, compellence can be one of the causal mechanisms that work 
in peace operations, especially those used to affect the behaviour of 
conflicting parties and thereby achieve the security-related objectives. Of 
course, not all peace operations employ compellence. The strategy is based 
on the proactive use of pressure and can be relevant to only certain types of 
peace operations – namely, robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 
 As with the study of compellence, narrowing down the scope to a 
specific type of peace operation can be helpful in advancing the study of 
peace operations. While it is important to evaluate and analyse peace 
operations from a holistic viewpoint, doing so is not easy because of the 
diversity of tasks they perform and the actors involved (Diehl and Druckman, 
2018). Bures (2007) points out that peace operations have become too 
diverse to build a general theory and calls for middle-range theories which 
focus on a specific type of peace operation. An example of research in this 
direction is that conducted by van der Lijn (2006; 2009), who focuses on 
peacebuilding operations. He finds that impartiality and the non-use of force 
– factors that are traditionally said to be important for success – are not 
important in this type of mission. Instead, other factors that have not been 
featured in past studies, such as conflicting parties’ perceived feeling of 
security and the treatment of the root causes of conflicts, are more important 
for peacebuilding missions to be successful. Different types of peace 
operations at different phases of conflict with different objectives naturally 
rely on different kinds of mechanisms to achieve the objectives; thus, 
different conditions can be important for their success. 
 To address peacekeepers’ challenges in dealing with ongoing 
violence, more focused and dedicated theory development about robust 
operations can be fruitful, and the theory of compellence can be helpful for 
this effort. Having said that, the theory of compellence is not a middle-range 
theory of robust peacekeeping itself, because robust peacekeeping 
operations are multidimensional. Their mandates usually include not only the 
maintenance or restoration of security and the protection of civilians but also 
peacebuilding tasks. This means that robust peace operations rely on 
multiple mechanisms, and compellence can be only one of them. Still, 
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compellence can be a very important or even the central mechanism of 
robust peace operations, as it deals with their core security-related tasks. 
 In the context of robust peace operations, international troops are 
expected to confront the perpetrators of violence. Therefore, another 
important field of study related to this research is that of violence in civil wars. 
In this field, some researchers have studied so-called spoilers – that is, 
“leaders and factions who view a particular peace as opposed to their 
interests and who are willing to use violence to undermine it” (Stedman, 
2008, p.147). Spoilers are not limited to rebel forces; rather, actors on the 
government side, such as the military, militias, or even the government itself, 
can be spoilers (Höglund and Zartman, 2006).5 These spoilers would be the 
targets of compellence in peace operations. 
 Researchers have explored coping strategies against spoilers, as well 
as spoilers’ various objectives and motivations. Stedman (1997, pp.10-16) 
proposes a typology composed of three types of spoilers: limited spoilers, 
greedy spoilers, and total spoilers. A response to limited spoilers can be 
inducements, or providing what they demand, if their objectives are 
acceptable to others. If not, they have to be dealt with through socialisation – 
that is, changing their behaviour through a mix of carrots and sticks, as well 
as the use of persuasion to accept new norms – or through coercion, which 
includes the use of coercive diplomacy. Total spoilers pursue total power in 
an all-or-nothing manner, and it is impossible to affect their preferences. 
Therefore, the appropriate coping strategies are to defeat them or to 
marginalise them through spurring peace processes while protecting the 
participants in these processes. Greedy spoilers fall between the two, and 
their objectives extend or shrink according to the costs and risks of pursuing 
them. Socialisation is adequate in dealing with them in the long term, but a 
mix of coercion and inducement can be effective in the short term. 
 
5  Some define spoilers in a broader manner to include entities other than 
parties to conflicts; these include diaspora groups or multinational 
corporations (Newman and Richmond, 2006, p.4). 
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 Some researchers emphasise the importance of differentiating 
between spoiling to derail peace processes and doing so to shape them 
(Newman and Richmond, 2006, p.18; Zahar, 2006, pp.38-39). Darby (2001, 
pp.47-49, 58-61) argues that confidence building is required when 
participants in peace processes are spoilers. Regarding spoiling by outsiders, 
he calls for isolation and criminalisation if they try to destruct peace 
processes, while arguing that persuasion through pressure is adequate for 
opportunistic spoilers who try to influence the processes. Zahar (2006, 
pp.38-45; 2008, pp.162-170; 2010, pp.270-272) argues that both the insiders 
and outsiders of peace processes can use violence for the purpose of 
derailing, as well as to shape the processes. Zahar contends that all parties 
that resort to violence have to think of the costs, capabilities and 
opportunities, and that potent foreign military interventions can constrain 
them. 
 Pearlman (2008/09, pp.84-85) points out that spoilers can also use 
violence to their benefit in intra-factional rivalries. Peace agreements can be 
advantageous for some groups in a faction but not for others. She argues 
that a group can employ violence based on intra-factional political motivation 
when the faction does not have a commonly accepted representation system 
and when the group is not leading the faction. 
 Some researchers who regard it as impossible to diagnose the 
objectives of spoilers focus solely on their capabilities and opportunities. 
According to Stepanova (2006, pp.90-96), spoilers with potent capabilities, 
especially those equipped with decentralised organisations and radicalism 
that rationalise violence, use terrorism strategically to achieve their 
objectives. Spoilers with potent capabilities are too important to marginalise 
and have to be dealt with through politicisation so that their organisations 
become hierarchical and thus lose the capability to conduct terrorism. 
Conversely, spoilers who are smaller in scale can be dealt with at the 
operational level and marginalised or defeated. Greenhill and Major (2006/07, 
pp.9-14, 37-39) argue that all spoilers seek to maximise their benefits, and 
their objectives shift according to their opportunities. Therefore, what matters 
is the balance of power; every party to a conflict can be a spoiler, but only 
those with power can be problematic. Third-party interveners should reduce 
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the gain from spoiling and increase that from peace, and the success or 
failure of this depends on the availability of sufficient carrots and sticks. 
 All the reviewed studies argue that spoilers behave strategically, and 
this means that they can be influenced from the outside. Spoilers employ 
violence as a tool for political purposes, whether the objectives are intra-
factional or to shape or derail peace processes. As long as their acts are 
purposeful, it is possible to affect them using leverage. Their susceptibility 
differs according to the strength of their resolve; less resolute spoilers can be 
relatively easily manipulated by carrots and sticks, while strongly resolute 
ones may have to be forcefully contained or eliminated. 
 Compellence can be an effective strategy for spoiler management. A 
review article of spoiler studies points out that there are very few studies 
about how to manage existing spoilers, in comparison to studies on the 
emergence of spoilers or the concept itself (Nilsson and Kovacs, 2011, 
pp.619, 622). Although the authors of the article are cautious about the utility 
of force in spoiler management (p.622), there must be situations in which 
only force can be used to cope with spoilers; hence, it is important to explore 
the conditions under which force can be an effective response. The 
expected function of force is likely to be compellence, for intervening forces 
have to confront the ongoing violence by spoilers, which means that the 
purpose of the use of force is to change the status quo. The study of 
compellence in peace operations is also desirable from this perspective. 
 In short, studies on peace operations have gaps in their theoretical 
bases. The field has been relatively under-theorised, and the subject is now 
too diverse to enable the building of a general theory covering the conditions 
of success for all types of operations based on sound causal logic. Rather, 
theory building should focus on a specific type of peace operation, and 
bearing in mind that one of the biggest challenges of contemporary peace 
operations is how to cope with ongoing violence by spoilers, a middle-range 
theory on robust peace operations is desired. The theory of compellence can 
be useful for such an effort; it can provide the field with causal logic 
regarding how peace operations can affect the behaviour of spoilers and 
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achieve the objectives of operations. The next section explores what this 
synthesis looks like. 
1.3  Compellence and Peace Operations 
1.3.1  The Application of the Concept and Theory of Compellence 
to Peace Operations 
To carry out mandates in precarious civil war environments, international 
forces often have to use force proactively rather than passively. If a ceasefire 
is realised and no attack on civilians happens when international forces 
intervene, the task of the latter will be to maintain the status quo. In this case, 
the expected function of force is deterrence. However, if a ceasefire breaks 
down and civilians are under attack, which often happens, there is no peace 
to keep, and the task for the intervening forces will be to change the status 
quo. Deterrence, a strategy to maintain the status quo, is not applicable for 
this purpose, and the international forces have to take the initiative and act 
proactively instead. 
 There are two ways to use force to change the status quo. One is to 
achieve the objective through brute force. International forces can defeat 
spoilers by killing or detaining them. This may be necessary at the tactical 
level, but doing so at the operational level may not be desirable. Assuming 
that all the conflicting factions have to reconcile with each other and live 
together after civil wars, defeating one of them completely can be 
counterproductive. The other way is compellence. As a strategy to change 
the status quo, but short of defeating the enemy completely, compellence 
seems to be a suitable stragety for international forces to use when dealing 
with spoilers. Successful compellence enables international forces to 
achieve their objectives with less destruction. 
 The targets of compellence in peace operations can be states, non-
state actors, or both. Peacekeepers’ usual targets, especially regarding the 
use of force, are non-state armed groups. These include rebels, pro-
government militias, armed gangs, and terrorists. States can be targets 
when they are spoilers or when they provide support for non-state spoilers. 
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The latter case is indirect compellence against non-state actors and may be 
employed against them simultaneously with direct compellence. 
 Compellence in peace operations can employ both the pressure of 
denial and punishment. For example, compellence by denial for disarming a 
warring faction can proceed as follows. Intervening forces demand an armed 
faction to disarm – maybe with a deadline – and threaten the faction that if it 
does not do so voluntarily, the troops will forcibly disarm the faction’s 
members. If the mere threat works and the armed faction disarms, this is the 
success of compellence without the actual use of force. If the faction does 
not disarm by the deadline, the international forces put the threat into 
practice and start cordon-and-search operations. If the members of the 
armed group that encounters the combat-ready foreign troops suddenly 
surrender their arms, believing that resistance would end in vain, this is 
again the success of compellence at the tactical level without the use of 
force. In contrast, if the armed elements decline to disarm and resist by force, 
the international forces have to suppress the resistance by killing or 
detaining them. This is the fulfilment of the objective through brute force at 
the tactical level. If the news of this defeat spreads among other members of 
the armed faction and makes them believe that sooner or later they will be 
forcibly disarmed, this can lead to a tide of voluntary disarmament. In this 
case, a single tactical defeat affected the decisions of many other members 
and can therefore be regarded as successful compellence at the operational 
level with the minor use of force. If the single defeat does not affect other 
members of the armed group, the intervening forces have to continue the 
effort to disarm them. The more tactical defeats the international forces need 
to induce the remaining members of the armed group to disarm, the less 
successful the compellent attempts of the forces. If the intervening forces 
end up forcibly clearing all the areas held by the armed group, this is brute 
force and the failure of compellence. 
 The protection of civilians or the restoration of order in general can 
also proceed similarly. To stop prevailing violence in a certain area, 
international forces can launch intensive patrols. Spoilers who exploit the 
security vacuum may stop their violence due to the mere fact that the 
intervening forces start to patrol, as they fear the risk of being detained or 
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killed when they encounter these patrols. This is the success of compellence 
with only threats. If the spoilers are more determined and do not stop 
plundering or attacking civilians, the patrolling units have to confront the 
spoilers. Contact can happen in the form of encounters between patrols and 
spoilers, deliberate attacks by spoilers against patrols, or patrols’ 
investigations of or assaults on the bases of spoilers. Although the defeat or 
detention of spoilers in each battle is a recourse to brute force, if these 
defeats discourage other spoilers from continuing activities in the area, this 
is the success of compellence at the operational level with the actual use of 
force. 
 If intervening forces employ defensive measures in protecting civilians, 
such as the deployment of protection units in villages or the establishment of 
guarded safe areas, the distinction between compellence and deterrence, as 
well as between compellence and brute force, can become blurred. If the 
threat of attacks against civilians exists but the attacks are not yet realised 
when the protective measures start, and if attacks do not happen 
subsequently, this is the success of deterrence. However, if these measures 
are taken as a response to frequent attacks against civilians, and if the 
measures succeed in preventing new attacks, this can be regarded as the 
success of compellence in the sense that the acts of intervening forces 
stopped what was happening rather than preventing something from 
happening in the first place. If armed groups attack the protected sites and 
the international forces repel the attack, this is the successful defence of the 
sites through brute force. However, if the perpetrators attempt repeated 
attacks against the sites if the defensive measures do not exist, this halt of 
the attack after the defeat can be regarded as the success of compellence 
because the defeat changed the minds of the perpetrators and made them 
choose not to repeat the attacks. The difference in evaluation depends on 
the aims and intents of the perpetrators. 
 Pressure other than the use of force can be put on spoilers. For 
example, if spoilers exploit the natural resources of the territories they 
control and earn from exporting them, curbing the trade can be the pressure 
of punishment. If the spoilers depend on the revenue from the natural 
resources to enable them to continue their rebellion or if the groups are 
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rather criminal in nature and their purpose is to exploit the resources, the 
pressure to curb the trade constitutes denial. The curbing of illicit trade in 
real cases is expected to have both characteristics of punishment and denial. 
 Another non-military form of pressure is the political one. When a goal 
of spoilers is to obtain political power, denying it can constitute pressure 
against them. However, it is necessary to distinguish between the application 
of a negative inducement and the withdrawal of a positive one (Baldwin, 
1971, pp.25-26). The denial of access to political power can be the former 
and is thus compellence only when access is taken for granted. In this case, 
because having such access is the status quo, the deprivation of 
opportunities for political participation is the decrease in utility and thus 
negative pressure for the spoilers. 
 For example, when a rebel force joins a peace process that includes 
the holding of an election, the rebel force perceives its participation in the 
election as secured, and this constitutes the rebel force’s reference line. If 
the peace agreement also contains provisions for disarmament but the rebel 
force refuses to follow them, a peace operation can threaten the rebel force 
by indicating that the operation will not allow the rebel force’s participation in 
the election if it does not comply with the disarmament. In this case, the 
threat of exclusion from the election is the application of a negative 
inducement: The rebel force is threatened with the reduction of utility from 
the reference line. 
 In contrast, if a rebel force remains outside of a peace process, its 
reference line is having no access to political power. In this case, an offer to 
join an election is the provision of a positive inducement, which increases the 
utility of the rebel compared to the status quo. If this offer is conditional and 
linked to disarmament, the offer is accompanied by another message that 
the provision will be withheld if the rebel does not accept the condition. This 
is similar to the former example, but it differs on the point that the denial of 
the rebel’s political participation is the non-realisation of the increase of utility, 
rather than the decrease of it, from the reference line. Therefore, this is not 
compellence but a different strategy that relies on the carrot. 
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 Economic and political pressure is a common choice when peace 
operations and the international community supporting them exert pressure 
on governments. Governments can be the main targets of compellence or 
can be the subjects of pressure in the form of indirect compellence against 
the non-state actors that the governments are supporting. Such pressure is 
punishment in either case. 
 As illustrated, it is possible for compellence to achieve the objectives 
of peace operations in a proactive manner with minimal destruction, but 
military compellence is not risk free. If spoilers do not capitulate despite 
pressure, international forces have to choose between defeating them or 
giving up fulfilling objectives. In addition, the substantial use of force may be 
necessary before securing acquiescence. In some cases, spoilers can 
simply be so determined that compellence does not work. As will be shown 
in the next section, previous research emphasises the difficulty of employing 
compellence in peace operations and humanitarian interventions. 
 Nevertheless, some past peace operations succeeded in compelling 
parties to conflicts to stop destructive behaviour or to abide by peace 
agreements, so it is not impossible (see Chapter 2). As long as peace 
operations are assigned tasks to change the status quo, intervening forces 
cannot remain in a passive mode and have to think about the employment of 
compellence. To maximise the prospect of success and minimise the risk, it 
is necessary to explore the conditions under which compellence is more 
likely to succeed in the context of peace operations. 
1.3.2  Previous Research Combining Compellence and Peace 
Operations 
There have been some bodies of work in which the concept of compellence 
has been applied to peace operations and humanitarian interventions, but 
this field is basically under-explored. The existing studies discuss both the 
difficulties and utilities of compellence in such contexts, and some explore 
conditions for success. 
 Posen (1996), Byman and Waxman (2002), and Morgan (2003) 
discuss the difficulties of compellence in peace operations. Humanitarian 
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military action tends to take the form of compellence rather than deterrence 
because humanitarian crises are difficult to predict and proceed at high 
speed; thus, forces intervene to respond to crises that have already 
happened rather than to prevent them (Posen, 1996, pp.80-82; Morgan, 
2003, pp.280-281). 
 Many factors militate against interveners and undermine the credibility 
of threats. The local parties have greater interests than the interveners, as 
the former are prompted by threats, while the latter’s motive is usually 
humanitarian. Interventions are usually conducted in coalitions, which are 
difficult to maintain when no vital interest is involved. It is also difficult to 
credibly threaten that the interveners will mobilise enough capability to 
confront the local parties (Posen, 1996, pp.82-85; Byman and Waxman, 
2002, pp.175-176, 183-190). Because of these difficulties, mere threats are 
not likely to work, and interveners have to be prepared for actual combat 
(Posen, 1996, p.86). 
 Interveners also face problems in using force. The restrictions 
discussed above, as well as the unacceptability of casualties, weak domestic 
support, need to maintain impartiality and refrain from causing damage, and 
the difficulty of distinguishing combatants from civilians, hinder the actual 
use of force; thus, it is difficult to realise escalation dominance (Byman and 
Waxman, 2002, pp.175-176, 183-189; Morgan, 2003, pp.280-281). 
 Coercive mechanisms also entail difficulties. The weak organisation of 
non-state actors can hamper the work of coercive mechanisms, because 
even if leaders are successfully coerced, this does not guarantee that 
subordinates will follow the decisions of their leaders (Byman and Waxman, 
2002, p.192). Punishment by strategic bombing is difficult to apply because 
opponents seldom have valuable targets that can be bombed. The more 
likely responses are the establishment of protected safe zones, the 
enforcement of ceasefires, and the conduct of thorough disarmament, all of 
which constitute denial and require a substantial amount of force (Posen, 
1996, pp.86-108; Byman and Waxman, 2002, pp.190-191; Morgan, 2003, 
p.281). 
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 Moreover, non-state adversaries employ counter-coercion to deny 
coercers from achieving their objectives and to undermine their domestic 
support and the unity of coalitions. Non-state adversaries try to survive 
pressure from coercers, inflict casualties on intervening forces, and provoke 
the generation of collateral damage. Given the weak motivation of coercers, 
their combination can severely degrade domestic support and create rifts in 
coalitions, which can lead to the termination of interventions (Byman and 
Waxman, 2002, pp.194-198). 
 In spite of these difficulties, some existing studies point out the utility 
of compellence in peace operations and try to explore its characteristics, 
including its conditions for success. Ruggie (1996) calls for a middle option 
between peacekeeping and enforcement and raises coercive diplomacy as 
an appropriate concept. Daniel and Hayes (1996, pp.108-119) also point out 
the necessity of a middle option that is similar to coercive diplomacy, 
referring to it as “inducement”, and they argue that credible force is 
necessary for its success. They consider the UN incapable of carrying out 
this type of intervention, except a small one, and claim that outsourcing to 
coalitions of the willing is desirable. However, these studies do not engage 
with empirical evidence to explore related questions on the use of coercive 
strategy in peace operations. 
 There are empirical studies as well. Some of them are rather more 
descriptive than explanatory and mention actual cases for exemplary or 
illustrative purposes. For example, in exemplifying the application of 
compellence, Johnson et al. (2002) include the cases of peace operations in 
Bosnia and Somalia. Sayigh (1998) describes compellence by and against 
the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon including a Syrian 
intervention. Gow (1998) and Thies (2003) discuss compellent attempts 
against Yugoslavia. Adibe (1998) examines the use and non-use of 
compellence in interventions in civil wars in Liberia, Somalia, and Rwanda. 
Daniel et al. (1999) look into the use of compellence, which they refer to as 
“coercive inducement”, in peace operations in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, 
and Haiti. Larsdotter (2019) analyses mandates given to the two UN 
missions in the DRC from the viewpoint of Schelling’s four categories, which 
include compellence. Although these studies demonstrate that the concept 
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of compellence is applicable to peace operations and the actions of or 
against non-state actors, they do not engage with theoretical questions. 
 In other bodies of work, compellence in peace operations is 
approached from an explanatory perspective. These studies can be largely 
divided into three groups. The first analyses cases of non-military 
compellence in peace operations (Stedman, 1997; Khong, 1998). Although 
they are interesting studies that examine the utility of non-military coercive 
measures, they do not shed light on the problem of the use of force in peace 
operations. 
 The second group deals with military compellence in peace 
operations but treats the use of compellence as an independent variable to 
explain the results of cases (Martin-Brûlé, 2012; Beadle and Kjeksrud, 2018; 
Kjeksrud, 2019). However, this explanation is insufficient because results 
vary among cases in which compellence is employed, as will be shown in 
the following chapter. A number of factors can affect the outcome of 
compellence; therefore, it is necessary to look more closely at these factors. 
 The third group explains conditions under which military compellence 
is more likely to succeed in peace operations; it therefore contains the 
studies that are most relevant to this project. The factors and cases being 
examined in these studies vary from study to study, as do the studies of 
compellence in general. 
 Harvey (1997) and Jakobsen (2000) analyse multiple instances of 
coercion in the Bosnian civil war. Harvey (1997) raises four conditions for the 
success of deterrence and compellence: the communication of the 
undesirable behaviour and threats, the significance of the threats, the 
existence of the capability to carry out the threats, and the demonstration of 
resolve (p.186). He analyses eight coercive attempts during 1993 and 1994 
and shows that coercion succeeded when all the conditions were satisfied. 
Jakobsen (2000) analyses six coercive interactions in Bosnia from the 
viewpoint of eight facilitating conditions. The conditions are as follows: the 
use of denial, the possession of the capability to carry out threats, the use of 
deadlines, the taking of steps to signal the coercers’ resolve, the possession 
of a reputation for carrying out threats, the demonstration that the 
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enforcement cost is acceptable for the coercers, and the use of assurances 
and carrots (pp.4-6). As a result of these empirical examinations, he 
emphasises the importance of the use of assurances and positive 
inducements in addition to the credibility of threats (pp.18-19). 
 Other studies in the third group use multiple cases in their 
examinations. These studies include those reviewed in the first section of 
this chapter. Jakobsen (1998a) uses the former Yugoslavia, and Blechman 
and Wittes (1999) use Somalia and Bosnia as part of their multiple case 
studies for examining the conditions for the success of compellence. Two 
chapters of Art and Cronin’s (2003) work also deal with Somalia and Bosnia. 
Bensahel (2003) analyses two operations in Somalia: the United Taskforce 
(UNITAF) and UNOSOM II. She attributes the former’s success to its strong 
military capability, maintenance of impartiality, and limited objectives, while 
she attributes the latter’s failure to its weak capability, perceived lack of 
impartiality, and broad objectives that violated the vital interests of the local 
factions (pp.32-33, 35-37). Burg (2003) compares compellence in Bosnia 
and Kosovo. He raises the creation of stalemate on the ground, the use of 
positive inducements, and the pressure of air power as the factors that 
facilitated success in Bosnia (pp.65-66). Art (2003b) compares these cases 
with others to examine the conditions of success. De Wijk’s (2014) work also 
includes peace operations in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, East Timor, 
Sierra Leone, and Mali among the 28 cases it analyses. He finds that the 
punishment type of pressure and airstrikes tend to be ineffective and that the 
occupation of territories by ground forces is necessary for compelling non-
state actors (pp.142-143). However, his examination does not distinguish 
between coercion against non-state actors in peace operations and its use in 
other contexts, such as counterinsurgency, and, as previously mentioned, 
his evaluation of success and failure as coercion is problematic. 
 Tanner (1996, pp.131-132, 135-138) argues that disarmament in civil 
wars requires compellence by peacekeepers at the tactical level while the 
consent of parties is maintained at the strategic level. Regarding the 
necessary conditions for the success of compellence, he raises the 
possession of military capability that is sufficient for tactical superiority, the 
maintenance of legitimacy and impartiality, autonomy and flexibility at the 
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tactical level, a clear mandate, and domestic and international support. 
These arguments are based on his observations of peace operations in the 
1990s. Although he assumes that consent for the disarmament of warring 
factions is obtained from the leaders, this is one of the challenges of 
compellence, and the strategy is applicable at both the strategic and tactical 
levels. 
 Carment and Harvey (2001, ch.4) propose four conditions for 
success: the clear definition of unacceptable behaviour, the communication 
of commitment to carry out threats in the case of noncompliance, the 
possession of the capability to implement the threats, and the demonstration 
of resolve. They apply the framework to coercive attempts in Bosnia, which 
are divided into fourteen instances, and in Kosovo, which are divided into 
three instances. They conclude that the conditions effectively explain the 
success and failure of the attempts. 
 Seybolt (2008, pp.39-45, 180-183) analyses humanitarian 
interventions in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor. He 
largely divides the objectives of interventions into four categories: “assist aid 
delivery”, “protect aid operations”, “save the victims”, and “defeat the 
perpetrators”. These objectives can be pursued using five strategies: 
avoidance,6 deterrence, defence, compellence, and offence. He emphasises 
the importance of matching objectives and strategies with problems on the 
ground and explores the conditions under which each strategy works well. 
Regarding compellence, he states that the following factors affect its results: 
the clear communication of the interveners’ intention, the taking of action to 
back up their words, the acceptance of the risks and costs involved, the use 
of sufficient military capability, the imposition of deadlines and the seizure of 
the initiative if they are ignored, the support of the population in operational 
areas, and the effects of the geographical features and infrastructure of the 
operational areas. 
 
6  The aim of the strategy of avoidance is to avoid confrontations with 
opponents, and intervening forces focus on the provision of 
humanitarian aid (Seybolt, 2008, pp.40-41). 
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 The reviewed studies discuss similar factors to those addressed in the 
literature of compellence in general. The factors that are regarded in multiple 
studies as being important for the success of compellence in peace 
operations include the existence of the capability to carry out threats, the 
demonstration of resolve, the use of denial, the use of deadlines, the 
demonstration of cost tolerance, the use of positive inducements, and the 
maintenance of impartiality. The final factor of impartiality is unique to the 
context of peace operations, but others constitute a subset of the conditions 
examined in the studies of compellence that have broader scopes. 
 These studies provide a valuable contribution to the under-explored 
aspect of compellence. They demonstrate that compellence can succeed in 
peace operations despite the difficulties, and they provide clues about 
understanding when the strategy is likely to work in this context. They also 
suggest that existing knowledge – or at least part of it – about compellence 
in general applies to compellence in peace operations. 
 However, these studies also have shortcomings. Besides the specific 
problems mentioned in several of the reviewed studies, another major 
shortcoming of the studies is their limited empirical base. Harvey (1997) and 
Jakobsen (2000) rely on within-case comparisons and do not examine other 
cases. Other studies examine multiple cases, but they compare the cases of 
peace operations with those of other contexts, such as humanitarian 
interventions other than peace operations and compellence between states; 
they are not focused specifically on the use of compellence in peace 
operations. Moreover, Tanner (1996) and Seybolt (2008) do not provide 
explicit and systematic comparisons of the cases from the perspective of the 
conditions for success. 
 In sum, there is no study which examines conditions for the success 
of compellence in peace operations based on the systematic comparison of 
multiple cases in a dedicated manner. The study of compellence in peace 
operations is largely under-explored. Existing studies emphasise the 
difficulty involved in it, but it is neither impossible nor undesirable. On the 
contrary, as will be shown in the next chapter, there were some cases of 
successful compellence in peace operations, and such an approach is 
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necessary if the international community hopes to pursue objectives to 
change the status quo in a volatile environment. To successfully employ 
compellence in peace operations, it is imperative to find out under what 
conditions the strategy is more likely to succeed. However, the existing 
studies do not provide a sound answer. Some studies are simply descriptive 
and do not explore explanatory questions. Others deal with the problem and 
propose various factors as the conditions for success. While these are a 
valuable contribution to the literature, their empirical base is limited. The 
studies are based on either within-case comparisons without further cases, 
comparisons between multiple cases but including cases other than peace 
operations, or unsystematic comparisons focusing on multiple cases of 
peace operations. Therefore, to explore the conditions for success, more 
systematic and focused studies on compellence in peace operations are 
required. 
 This study makes such an effort. Through the systematic examination 
of compellence in peace operations, it contributes to both fields of study. 
Regarding compellence, it helps to advance the understanding of the 
strategy’s conditions for success, as well as coercive mechanisms in a 
specific context. The context of peace operations is especially useful for 
examining the strategy’s utility against non-state actors. Regarding peace 
operations, this study helps to advance the theorisation of the field by 
showing a possible causal mechanism and when it is likely to work. In this 
way, this study addresses the gaps in the fields of compellence and peace 
operations. Moreover, in light of the difficulty that peacekeepers face in 
coping with violent challenges, this study is important not only academically 
but also practically. The findings are expected to help practitioners 
identifying the factors to which they should pay attention when conducting 
robust peace operations. 
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Chapter 2 
Analytical Framework 
This chapter sets up the analytical framework for this thesis. First, it specifies 
the scope of this research. Compellence in peace operations is versatile in 
its targets and the type of pressure that is employed, as illustrated in the 
previous chapter. Therefore, further clarification of the scope is required. 
Second, the chapter derives the conditions that favour the success of 
compellence in peace operations. The conditions are based on insights from 
existing studies and take into account the unique features of peace 
operations. The derived conditions are stated as hypotheses to be examined 
empirically. Third, this chapter discusses the methodological aspect of the 
research. The chapter shows that the best available option is a comparative 
case study and explains three specific methods of analysis that are 
employed in this research. Finally, the chapter identifies the pool of relevant 
cases and selects cases for detailed examination. 
2.1  The Clarification of the Scope of the Research 
Compellence can be applied in various ways in peace operations. However, 
it is difficult to examine all of them at once due to practical limitations; 
therefore, it is necessary to limit the scope of this research to a specific type 
of compellence in peace operations. 
 To begin with, this research focuses on compellence against non-
state actors and excludes compellence whose main targets are states. This 
is because, first, the usual targets of compellence in peace operations are 
non-state armed groups and, second, the existing studies have already 
examined compellence against states, as reviewed in Chapter 1. This focus 
does not exclude compellence against pro-government militias that act as 
the proxies of governments. Militias may receive official or legal recognition 
from governments, as well as cooperation from states’ regular forces, and 
the members of regular forces may even directly participate in militias. 
However, pro-government militias are treated as non-state armed groups as 
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long as they have organisations that are distinguishable from states’ regular 
forces and thus have some extent of autonomy (Francis, 2005, pp.4-5; 
Hofmann and Schneckener, 2011, pp.604-605; Carey et al., 2012, pp.250-
251). 
 Regarding pressure, although various kinds of pressure are 
employable in compellence, this research focuses on compellence that 
entails explicit proactive military pressure. There are two reasons for this. 
First, the development of the theory of compellence has largely focused on 
the use of military pressure. It is therefore natural to start from the analysis of 
the utility of force when applying the theory to new, under-explored contexts. 
Second, stopping ongoing violence, an objective that is supposed to be 
pursued by compellence in peace operations, requires measures with quick 
effects to protect the lives of victims. Military leverage is expected to be 
compared to more modest types of pressure, such as economic sanctions. 
 The scope is also limited to cases with heavy demands. This study 
distinguishes two categories of demands: those of the heaviest type and 
those that are limited. The former consists of demands against targets to 
cease to exist as independent armed groups, such as complete 
disarmament, or to cease armed activities and give up their objectives. In 
this research, all demands short of these, such as to disarm a specific type 
of weapon or to cease activities in a specific area, are regarded as limited. 
 There are two reasons for this focus on the heaviest type of demands. 
One is that the conditions of success in difficult settings are also supposed to 
be sufficient for easier cases. The other is the practical difficulty of identifying 
cases with limited demands. The heaviest type of demands are usually 
stated in the UNSC’s resolutions as overall objectives of missions and are 
therefore easy to identify. However, cases of compellence with limited 
demands may emerge locally on a small scale, and their identification 
requires a thorough review of all the possible relevant cases. This is 
unfeasible for this piece of research, because it would necessitate 
conducting dozens of case studies. 
 Although compellers can usually change the extent of their demands 
based on the response of the targets, it is expected that peace operations 
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that put the heaviest type of demand on warring factions do not easily 
compromise on their demands. This is because the mandates of peace 
operations are decided and given by the UNSC, and peace operations on 
the ground cannot change their core objectives by themselves. The UNSC 
has the authority to change the demands against warring factions in civil 
wars and the mandates of peace operations accordingly. However, the 
council is also expected not to retract the demands for the termination of 
violence and disarmament, because these are so fundamental to stabilising 
countries suffering from civil wars that they have to be fulfilled. Therefore, it 
is expected that the cases of peace operations that put the heaviest type of 
demands on targets remain so once they fall into the scope. 
 Finally, this research limits its scope to peace operations conducted 
by the UN and those conducted by non-UN actors in cooperation with UN 
missions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a trend in post-Cold War 
peace operations is an increase in non-UN peace operations conducted by 
regional organisations, coalitions of the willing, and single states. On the one 
hand, it is desirable to include these non-UN missions in the scope of this 
research, because they tend to conduct higher-intensity operations than the 
UN ones and are likely to be relevant to compellence. On the other hand, it 
is also necessary to exclude partial interventions into civil wars whose 
purpose is not the promotion of peace through managing and/or resolving 
violent conflicts. Therefore, regarding non-UN missions, this research limits 
its scope to those conducted in cooperation with the UN. More specific 
criteria are discussed later in another section of this chapter. 
 It is also necessary to elaborate on how to evaluate the outcomes of 
cases in this research. How to evaluate peace operations is itself a major 
topic of the field (Diehl and Druckman, 2010), but this research focuses on 
the utility of compellence in peace operations. The evaluation of the results 
of compellence is also a complicated issue, especially with the current focus 
on compellence against non-state actors. In studies dealing with 
compellence against states, success or failure is determined based on 
whether the target states comply with demands made by compellers. The 
compliance usually means the explicit or tacit acceptance of the demands by 
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the leaders of the states and the actual change of the states’ or 
governments’ behaviour. 
 The evaluation of compellence against non-state actors should also 
focus on their leaders and on groups as collective entities. The acceptance 
of demands by leaders is an important criterion for the success of 
compellence. However, this cannot be the sole criterion, because the 
leaders may not effectively control their followers (Byman and Waxman, 
2002, p.192). In addition, an armed group may not have a clear leader. Thus, 
it is also necessary to look at whether other members of the groups accept 
the demands. Here, what is examined is the behaviour of groups as 
collective entities rather than that of individual members. Information on the 
latter is difficult to obtain and practically impossible to examine. Therefore, 
the actual change of behaviour as groups should also be used as a criterion 
for the evaluation of results. 
 It should be noted that the success of compellence does not 
necessarily mean the success of peace operations from other perspectives. 
Compellence focuses on rather short-term demands in the stabilisation 
phase and does not deal with the long-term peacebuilding aspect of peace 
operations. Therefore, a case is regarded as a success as long as local 
armed groups agree to disarm under military pressure from intervening 
forces regardless of whether the state can establish a stable government 
and prevent the recurrence of violence thereafter. This of course does not 
mean that long-term peacebuilding is unimportant, but, rather, that it merely 
represents a difference in focus. In addition, this focus on compellence with 
proactive military pressure does not mean that the use of force per se is 
desirable. On the contrary, as discussed in Chapter 1, the less force, if any, 
that is used in changing opponents’ behaviour, the better the success of 
compellence. 
 In sum, this study deals with cases of explicit military compellence in 
UN-related peace operations that are employed against non-state armed 
groups and accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. While this scope 
does not cover all cases of compellence in peace operations, the limit is 
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necessary to ensure the homogeneity of the cases and to derive sound 
findings from the comparisons. 
2.2  Conditions Favouring the Success of Compellence in 
Peace Operations 
In this section, hypotheses about the conditions leading to the success of 
compellence in peace operations are formulated by modifying or extending 
the existing arguments. Existing studies have examined the conditions for 
the success of compellence, as discussed in the previous chapter, but there 
is no study that analyses such conditions in the context of peace operations 
based on a systematic comparison of multiple cases in a dedicated manner. 
Therefore, it is necessary to start by constructing an analytical framework for 
compellence in peace operations. 
 The reviewed studies raise a number of factors that can affect the 
outcome of compellence, as summarised in Table 2.1. The conditions that 
are discussed in existing studies dealing with compellence in peace 
operations are basically a subset of the conditions that are examined in the 
studies of compellence with broader scopes. While there are conditions that 
multiple researchers on compellence or coercion regard as important for 
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Table 2.1  Conditions for the Success of Compellence Discussed in Existing 
Studies 
 
Compellence in general 

































 stronger interests and 
motivation on compeller side 
 potency and credibility of 
threats 
 assurance against future 
demands 
 use of denial type of 
pressure 
 use of positive inducements 
 domestic support for 
compellers 
 strong leadership 
 lack of external support on 
target side 
 capability to carry out threats 
 demonstration of resolve 
 use of denial type of 
pressure 
 use of deadlines 
 demonstration of cost 
tolerance 



































 relative ease, clarity, and 
publicness of demands 
 urgency accompanying 
demands 
 use of exemplary force 
 international support for 
compellers 
 reputation of compellers 




 It is necessary to consider which of the above factors can be relevant 
to compellence in peace operations, because some of them are expected to 
be fixed across cases or irrelevant, given the context and scope of this study. 
First, the balance of interest, a factor that existing studies regard as very 
important for the success of compellence, is always unfavourable to 
compellers in the context of peace operations. This is because international 
forces intervene in others’ wars as third parties, and the target side has far 
larger stakes in the issues that are in dispute (Posen, 1996, pp.82, 84; 
Crawford, 2009, p.288). This unfavourable balance of interest constitutes a 
basic assumption in the formulation of the following hypotheses. Second, as 
explained in the previous section, the scope of this study is limited to 
compellence accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. These 
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demands are usually clearly and publicly stated in the UNSC resolutions; 
therefore, the relative ease, clarity, and publicness of the demands are also 
fixed. Third, assurance against future demands is likely to be irrelevant 
because of the scope. The assurance that additional demands will not be 
made is important when targets perceive that there is a realistic possibility of 
another compellence being employed against them (Schelling, 1966, pp.74-
75; Jakobsen, 1998a, pp.29-30; Sechser, 2010; 2016; 2018). As this study 
focuses on cases in which compellers demanded armed groups to 
completely disarm or halt violence and give up their objectives, the targets 
were expected to be non-threatening after accepting the demands and 
therefore unlikely to be targets of compellence again. The problem for the 
targets was not future demands, but the very heavy demands they were 
faced with. Finally, because the scope is also limited to UN-related missions, 
the cases examined in this research are expected to be impartial 
interventions and have international support; therefore, these factors are 
also fixed. 
 The remaining factors are the candidates of the conditions for the 
success of compellence in peace operations, and this study reorganises 
them into five sets of factors: troop numbers, the strategy of compellence, 
credibility, denial, and third-party support. All of these factors are expected to 
affect the cost–benefit calculations of the targets of compellence. The factors 
are presented in five hypotheses that state the expectations about the 
conditions under which compellence in peace operations is likely to succeed. 
The hypotheses are formulated in connection with the basic features of the 
context of peace operations; these include coalitional compellence, targets 
as non-state actors, and the target side having much stronger interests in the 
issues in dispute. 
2.2.1  Troop Numbers 
The first hypothesis focuses on troop numbers as a factor related to the 
potency of threats. The consequence of defiance must be costly enough to 
persuade the targets to accept the demands. The balance of force is a major 
factor in realising this, because target armed groups that are facing stronger 
forces must anticipate that their probability of winning the conflict is low. 
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Therefore, it is expected that compellence is more likely to be successful if 
the compellers have a larger force than the opponents. 
 It may seem too simplistic to focus on troop numbers in examining the 
costs that targets expect to suffer, but this is a reasonable factor to take into 
account. First, the quality side of force is dealt with in another hypothesis. It 
is better to take into account both the quantity and quality of forces in 
examining the balance of force between protagonists. Quantity is a relatively 
straightforward factor to measure, but measuring quality is difficult. It goes 
without saying that troops with a higher quality are better, but there remains 
the question of what kind of quality is desirable and the answer differs from 
context to context. Therefore, this hypothesis focuses on the quantity side of 
force; the quality side is discussed in another hypothesis that deals with how 
to apply the denial type of pressure. Second, it would be better if the balance 
of whole material power could be taken into account in examining the 
quantity aspect of the balance of force, but this is infeasible. It is difficult to 
obtain the inventories of protagonists’ armouries – in particular those of the 
armed groups. Moreover, armed groups usually use guerrilla tactics and do 
not possess a substantial amount of heavy equipment. Peace operations are 
also basically conducted by ground troops which are mainly composed of 
infantries. Therefore, in the context of peace operations, both sides rely on 
foot soldiers as the core of their forces, so it is reasonable to focus on the 
balance of troop numbers in examining the balance of force. 
 Existing studies in relevant fields have focused on the numerical 
aspect of force in a different manner. Some studies on coercion incorporate 
the numerical balance of troops between protagonists as a factor in 
examining what leads to the success of the strategy (e.g. Maoz, 1983; Huth 
1988). Quantitative studies on peace operations tend to focus on the size of 
missions and argue that operations with larger numbers of troops are more 
effective (e.g. Ruggeri et al., 2012; Hultman et al., 2013; 2019; Kathman and 
Wood, 2016; Bara and Hultman, 2020). Studies on counterinsurgency 
usually examine the ratio of troops to local population rather than to 
insurgents, because it is difficult to know the number of insurgents, and 
because the literature emphasises the importance of the residents’ roles (e.g. 
McGrath, 2006; Kneece et al., 2010). Some studies of peace operations also 
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adopt this approach and analyse cases using the troop-to-population ratio 
(Jones et al., 2005; Gowan and Tortolani, 2008; Williams, 2010; Anderson, 
2014). 
 This study focuses on the balance of troops between compellers and 
targets, rather than on compellers’ absolute number or the troop-to-
population ratio. The main reason for this is that the logic of compellence 
focuses on confrontations between armed entities and how to affect 
opponents’ cost–benefit calculations. Measuring the balance of force, 
therefore, is the most straightforward approach in terms of taking into 
account the numerical aspect of force. Quantitative studies can examine the 
marginal effect of the increase in troops, but this study cannot take this 
approach because it adopts a comparative case-study strategy, as will be 
explained in the following section. Regarding the troop-to-population ratio, 
Moore (2013) criticises the widely used criterion of 20 troops per 1,000 
population, maintaining that it is not adequate. Moreover, the assumption 
behind this approach is that the insurgents depend on the support that is 
provided by the population, but this does not necessarily apply to peace 
operations. Contemporary peace operations have some similarity with 
counterinsurgency (Mockaitis, 1999; Friis, 2010), and the assumption would 
be valid if they intervened in full-fledged insurgencies. However, the spoilers 
that peace operations face may be armed gangs, criminal groups, or rebels 
relying on foreign support. Therefore, for this research, an examination of the 
balance between compellers and targets in terms of troop numbers is the 
most appropriate approach. 
 The calculation also takes into account the strength of local forces 
who are friendly to peace operations. Under the concept of impartiality, 
which is distinguished from neutrality, intervening forces may have to 
confront one or more local factions, which can lead to effectively taking sides 
with others (Nadin et al., 2015, pp.79-80; Rhoads, 2016). From the viewpoint 
of the targets of compellence, the local forces cooperating with the 
international forces are also threats. Therefore, in examining the balance of 
troops, it is appropriate to include these de facto local auxiliary forces on the 
side of the compellers. 
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H1: Compellence in peace operations is more likely to succeed if the 
balance of troops is favourable to the compellers. 
 
2.2.2  The Strategy of Compellence 
The nature of pressure may also affect the result of compellence in peace 
operations. A possibly relevant aspect of pressure is how to put it on targets 
– namely, the strategy of compellence. The second hypothesis is that the 
gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy combined with positive inducements is 
more effective than other strategies. 
 George (1994b, pp.16-19) identifies five specific forms or strategies of 
coercive diplomacy. Four are distinguished based on the extent to which 
they try to convey urgency. The first is the classic ultimatum, which is 
composed of demands, a deadline for compliance, and clearly stated threats 
for cases of noncompliance. The second is the tacit ultimatum, which is the 
use of a threat that lacks one of the three components of an ultimatum. The 
third strategy is the gradual turning of the screw, which is the gradual 
escalation of pressure. The fourth strategy, “try and see”, refers to the 
application of a limited threat or pressure to see the response of the target. 
Among these strategies, the classic and tacit ultimatum aim to create a 
strong sense of urgency on the side of the target through the use of an 
explicit deadline or other means. The gradual turning of the screw conveys 
weaker urgency because it lacks a deadline and applies pressure in the form 
of a step-by-step escalation. The urgency created by the try-and-see 
strategy is even weaker, for it does not elaborate on what will follow after a 
probing move. The fifth strategy that George raises is the “carrot and stick”, 
which is defined by the use of positive inducements in addition to threats. 
Therefore, it can be combined with any of the above four strategies. Past 
studies largely regard the use of carrots as one of the factors favouring the 
success of compellence (e.g. George and Simons, 1994b; Byman and 
Waxman, 2002; Art and Cronin, 2003). 
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 There is a possibility that one of these strategies is more effective 
than the others. In the context of peace operations, the try-and-see strategy 
does not seem to work. This is because the targets in this context clearly 
have stronger interests and motivation. The application of limited probing 
pressure by the weakly motivated side is expected to be ineffective. 
 The question is which of the stronger variants is more effective in 
peace operations. The ultimatum type of pressure may be effective because 
of its power to convey strong urgency. Nadin et al. (2015, p.84), for example, 
argue that “[t]he ultimatum forms a central element of robust peacekeeping”. 
However, in the existing studies on compellence, there are different opinions 
on the utility of ultimatums. Jakobsen (1998a; 1998b) regards an ultimatum 
with an explicit deadline as the most effective form of coercive diplomacy. 
Morgan (2009, p.173) takes the same position, arguing that collective 
coercion tends to turn into gradually increased pressure and is therefore 
likely to be ineffective. In their studies on compellence in peace operations, 
Jakobsen (2000) and Seybolt (2008, p.183) also raise the use of deadlines 
as a condition for success. George and co-authors raise urgency as one of 
the important conditions for success when an ultimatum is employed, but 
they refrain from arguing that it is the most effective strategy, and they point 
out some risks that it entails (George and Simons, 1994a, pp.274-277, 287-
288; Lauren, 1994, pp.44-45). Kagan (1998) argues that the choice of 
strategy is not important for successful compellence. Similarly, Blechman 
and Wittes (1999) find no correlation between the existence of urgency and 
the outcome of compellence. If the ultimatum type of pressure is effective, 
the target should accept the compeller’s demand by the deadline or following 
the initial implementation of the threat soon after the deadline. 
 However, taking into account the nature of non-state armed groups, 
the gradual turning of the screw is expected to be more effective than an 
ultimatum in peace operations. When a deadline is set, it should be 
accompanied by dire threats for noncompliance – hopefully that of decisive 
military defeat, which Jakobsen (1998a; 1998b) calls for. When confronting 
non-state armed groups, however, it is very difficult to envision their quick 
and decisive defeat (Jakobsen, 2010, pp.293-294). They are usually evasive 
guerrillas, gangs, or terrorists. Except when confronting small groups, 
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military operations against non-state armed groups are expected to be 
prolonged. Therefore, it is highly likely that a deadline does not convey 
urgency to targets. Without the fear of a quick defeat, non-state armed 
groups can resort to a try-and-see strategy of their own by trying resistance 
and seeing how well they can cope with the intervening forces. Without the 
possibility of defeating the opponents quickly, the only viable approach is to 
escalate pressure gradually until the non-state armed groups realise that the 
threat is serious. This may be achieved relatively quickly – for example, in 
weeks or months – or may take years. Even in a prolonged case, pressure 
can be understood as the gradual turning of the screw if it is applied in 
successive ways, and it may well include options other than the use of force, 
such as an arms embargo or other sanctions. If the gradual-turning-of-the-
screw strategy is effective, the targets should accept the compellers’ 
demands only after pressure has been applied repeatedly and its effect has 
accumulated. 
 Of course, these two strategies are not mutually exclusive, and 
compellers may employ both to compel the same target. Even in such a 
case, the empirical evaluation of each strategy’s effectiveness would not be 
difficult if the compellent attempt is clearly separated into phases and each 
strategy is employed in distinct phases. Even if the two strategies are 
employed consecutively, if an ultimatum fails to compel the target to 
capitulate soon and other pressure accumulates, this would be regarded as 
a case of the gradual turning of the screw. A case that is harder to evaluate 
would be one in which the compeller’s use of the gradual-turning-of-the-
screw strategy is followed by an ultimatum and then the capitulation of the 
target. In such a case, the ultimatum may function as a part of the gradually 
increased pressure and be the final straw that induces the target. If this is 
the case, the success would be attributed to the use of the gradual-turning-
of-the-screw strategy. However, if the final use of the ultimatum has a 
qualitatively different impact on the target, such as creating a strong sense of 
urgency, the success would be at least partially attributed to the use of the 
ultimatum. Such a case would require careful examination. 
 Regarding positive inducements, their use can be effective in peace 
operations as well. Jakobsen (2000) and Burg (2003) argue that positive 
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inducements contributed to the success of compellence in Bosnia. In 
addition, Paul et al. (2013, pp.109-111) reveal that the provision of carrots 
correlates with the success of counterinsurgency. Peace processes in 
intrastate conflicts often involve power sharing, the provision of amnesty for 
acts during wars, and the provision of various material and other support for 
combatants in disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) 
programmes. Such positive inducements can facilitate the acceptance of 
compellers’ demands by targets by somewhat mitigating or compensating for 
the damage they suffer from doing so. Taken together, the most effective 
strategy is expected to be a combination of the gradual turning of the screw 
and the carrot and stick. 
 
H2: Compellence in peace operations is more likely to succeed if the 
compellers employ the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy in 
combination with the carrot-and-stick strategy. 
 
2.2.3  Credibility 
The third hypothesis covers factors related to another aspect of pressure: 
the credibility of threats. This is what the compellence literature regards as 
an important condition of success. Considering the insights from the studies 
that were reviewed in Chapter 1, there are four possible sources of 
credibility: national interests, strong domestic support, previously acquired 
advantageous reputation, and the actual use of force.7 The hypothesis is that 
 
7  The thesis does not examine the effect of audience costs. Audience cost 
theory assumes that the balance of capabilities and interests are taken 
into account when decisions are made to challenge others; thus, both 
sides in the crises are highly resolved and audience costs as third 
factors become important (Fearon, 1994a; 1994b). However, in the 
context of peace operations, the targets of compellence have a very 
clear advantage in the relative balance of interests against compellers. 
With this highly intuitive advantage, non-state actors in civil wars do not 
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compared to other sources, the actual use of force is more effective in 
regard to making compellent threats credible in peace operations. 
 How to understand national interests – the first possible source of 
threat credibility (e.g. George and Simons, 1994a; Schaub, 1998; Treverton, 
2000) – is a big issue in the field of international relations. Accroding to 
realist theories, national interests are the accumulation of power and the 
survival of state (Burchill, 2005, ch.2). Other branches of theories present 
different views and include wider issues in national interests, such as the 
pursuance of international common interests (Burchill, 2005, pp.162-170) 
and even value-based moral behaviour, depending on the identities of states 
(Nye, 1999; Burchill, 2005, pp.195-201). 
 However, what is discussed here is national interests that can 
increase the credibility of the threats to use force, seen from the eyes of the 
targets of compellence. Jervis (1979, p.314) categorises interests into three 
types: intrinsic interest, strategic interest, and commitment. Similarly, Press 
(2005, pp.25-26) divides interests into vital interests, important interests, and 
concerns. Even the proponents of a wider understanding of national 
interests rank the types of interests and regard the strategic ones as more 
important than the others (Burchill, 2005, pp.175, 183). This directly relates 
to whether states should be ready to use force to pursue different kinds of 
interests, and there are arguments that force should be considered only 
when more important strategic interests are at stake in the issues at hand 
(Nye, 1999, p.32; Walton, 2009). Moreover, in the context of compellence in 
peace operations, the target local factions have stronger interests in the 
issues that are in dispute. Taking these points into account, it is unlikely that 
the involvement of weaker variants of interests strengthens the credibility of 
the threats to use force. 
 Therefore, this study focuses on the narrow strategic interests of the 
intervening states that can directly affect their security or their accumulation 
 
seem to pay attention to the domestic audience costs of intervening 
states as a sign of resolve. Therefore, this study does not focus on 
audience costs as a source of credibility. 
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of power. If such strategic interests of compellers are involved, compellent 
threats can be credible. Whether compellers’ national interests are involved 
or not is fixed from the initiation of compellence, unless new countries join 
the peace operations later. Hence, if compellers’ strategic interests lend 
credibility to threats, the threats should be effective from the beginning, 
assuming that the targets of compellence are aware of the salience of the 
issues to the compellers. 
 The second possible source of credibility is compellers’ domestic 
support. The existing studies on compellence regard this factor as facilitating 
the success of the strategy (e.g. George and Simons, 1994a; Blechman and 
Wittes, 1999; Treverton, 2000), and it can be important in peace operations 
as well. Strong domestic support for participation in peace operations can 
increase the costs and risks that states can bear, enabling the states’ 
leaders to adopt a robust stance on the use of force. Therefore, if the targets 
of compellence are aware of this fact, the existence of strong domestic 
support may directly enhance the credibility of the threats by the intervening 
forces. 
 If domestic support plays a major role in affecting the credibility of 
threats, then threats should be effective when compellers receive strong 
domestic support. The domestic support that compellers receive for 
participating in a peace operation can fluctuate during the operation for 
various reasons, which include not only how well the operation is going but 
also factors that are irrelevant to the operation. The existence of domestic 
support in participating states can be confirmed through polls or the 
discussions or resolutions of national congresses. 
 The third factor that can affect credibility is the reputation of the 
compellers based on their past behaviour. As discussed in Chapter 1, in the 
existing studies on reputation, there is disagreement over whether actors 
can have a reputation at all and if so, what kind (e.g. Mercer, 1996; Shannon 
and Dennis, 2007; Press, 2005). If the UN as a whole or specific troop-
contributing countries have a strong reputation for having resolve or 
capabilities, such a reputation can enhance the credibility of threats by 
raising the expectation that similar robust actions will also be taken in the 
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current operation. In contrast, having a reputation for lacking resolve or 
being weak can hinder compellence by impairing the credibility of threats. 
 By definition, the existence of a previously acquired advantageous 
reputation, which is based on the actor’s past activities, is fixed from the 
initiation of compellence in the same way as the national interests discussed 
above. Therefore, if a reputation based on past behaviour generates the 
credibility of threats, the threats should be effective from the beginning. Even 
though it is difficult to observe the existence of a strong reputation, the 
targets’ statements or other information can indicate what kind of image the 
targets have about the interveners or their past operations. 
 The fourth method of increasing credibility is the actual employment of 
force by compellers. In the past studies reviewed in Chapter 1, there is 
disagreement over the utility of the exemplary use of force (e.g. George, 
1994a; Kagan, 1998; Schaub, 1998; Byman, 2006; Wilner, 2010). However, 
actually demonstrating that compellers can follow through with their threats 
must be the strongest way to back up the threats. Actors can not only have a 
reputation based on their past behaviour but can also build a reputation for 
having resolve and capabilities by actually using force in a theatre of 
operation (Tang, 2005, pp.38-39). The precedents of the use of force by 
international troops in the current operation, especially the successful use of 
force resulting in the defeat of target armed groups, demonstrates the 
competence of the troops. Such use of force impresses targets with the 
capability and will of the intervening forces and thus makes subsequent 
threats more credible. As Schelling (1966, p.70) writes, “often the only way 
to become committed to an action is to initiate it”. 
 Among these four sources, it is expected that the actual use of force 
is more effective than the others and is required in lending credibility to 
compellent threats in peace operations. The balance of interests is clearly 
against the intervening forces, and non-state actors are likely to assume that 
the intervening forces do not have the resolve to confront them. Moreover, 
the coalitional nature of peace operations undermines the credibility of their 
threats. Therefore, mere threats by international forces are unlikely to work 
even if they are supported by other sources of credibility, short of the actual 
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use of force. Rather, as argued in studies on the deterrence of terrorism and 
cumulative deterrence, the credibility of pressure in compellence against 
non-state actors is expected to hinge upon the repeated execution of threats 
and the accumulation of tactical victories to impress intervening forces’ 
competence and resolve on the targets. 
 
H3: Compellence in peace operations is more likely to succeed if the 
credibility of the compellers’ threats is supported by the actual use of 
force. 
 
2.2.4  Denial 
The fourth hypothesis focuses on the other aspect of pressure – namely, its 
type. As discussed in Chapter 1, compellence by denial is likely to be more 
effective than compellence by punishment, particularly against non-state 
actors (e.g. Pape, 1996; Posen, 1996; Byman and Waxman, 2002; Art, 
2003b; Geipel, 2007). However, how to apply the denial type of pressure is 
highly context dependent, as Mueller (1998, p.214) points out, so the 
following question remains: What is the most effective way to achieve denial 
in the context of peace operations? 
 It is possible to think of four approaches to denial that are generally 
applicable to peace operations. Although all of them can possibly reduce the 
capability of targets and hinder their strategies for achieving their objectives, 
the hypothesis is that the approach that blocks opponents’ counter-coercive 
moves is especially required in the context of peace operations. 
 The first possible approach to achieving denial is attrition. Whatever 
purpose armed groups pursue, they need fighting forces. Hence, manpower 
is one of the necessary resources for insurgents (Mets and Millen, 2004, 
pp.7-8). Attrition aims to reduce the number of opponent combatants by 
means of killing and wounding, thereby hindering the opponents’ strategy. 
 The second is stronghold neutralisation. This approach seeks to 
disturb the opponents’ operations by capturing or destroying their 
strongholds. The importance of strongholds or safe havens for armed groups 
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has been acknowledged in the studies of insurgency (Connable and Libicki, 
2010, pp.34-49; Treistman, 2012). Safe havens within the state in which the 
insurgents are operating or in neighbouring states are thought to be one of 
the necessary assets of insurgents (Mets and Millen, 2004, pp.7-8). A study 
on the use of coercion against non-state groups also raises the absence of 
sanctuaries as one of the conditions for the success of the strategy (Payne 
et al., 2008, p.29). Therefore, this approach can be effective in peace 
operations as well. 
 The third is decapitation. Decapitation seeks to neutralise the 
opponents’ leaders by killing or capturing them, and this can create 
compellent effects based on denial and punishment in several different ways 
(Pape, 1996, pp.55, 80). One is to threaten the incumbent leaders. The 
threat of murder can affect their calculations and lead to a change in the 
target-groups’ behaviour (Hosmer, 2001, pp.2-3; Byman and Waxman, 2002, 
pp.72-73). This pressure falls under punishment; it threatens the leaders’ 
lives, which are their most valuable assets (Mueller, 1998, p.218). Other 
forms of decapitation seek to manipulate the behaviour of succeeding 
leaders and target organisations by killing or detaining current leaders. The 
actual neutralisation of leaders constitutes brute force rather than 
compellence for the leaders themselves (Byman and Waxman, 2002, p.72). 
However, for opponents in the form of groups, the elimination of their leaders 
would hinder their operational capabilities and thus make it difficult for them 
to achieve their objectives (Hosmer, 2001, pp.3-4; Wilner, 2011, p.20). If 
they capitulate because of this difficulty, this constitutes successful 
compellence by denial (Pape, 1996, p.80; Mueller, 1998, p.218). In addition, 
the successors of the eliminated leaders may take an amicable stance 
towards the compellers and accept their demands. If this change comes 
from the fear of suffering the same fate as their predecessors, this is also 
successful compellence by punishment (Pape, 1996, p.80). Conversely, if 
the new leaders are more susceptible to pressure than their predecessors, it 
may be easier to persuade them of the futility and pessimistic prospects of 
their armed struggles. This is also successful compellence by denial. Of 
course, these are logical distinctions and several of them are likely to 
operate simultaneously in reality. Some researchers are sceptical about the 
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utility of decapitation (Hosmer, 2001; Hafez and Hatfield, 2006; Jordan, 
2009), while others support it, albeit with caveats (Geipel, 2007; Lebovic, 
2007; Cronin, 2009; Long, 2010; Johnston, 2012). Therefore, the literature is 
divided on the utility of this approach, but at least there is a possibility that 
decapitation works in peace operations. 
 The last possible approach to denial is counter-coercion negation. 
The previous three approaches aim to inflict damage on the opponents. 
Compellence, however, is mutual interaction, and the target side also tries to 
inflict damage on the compellers. Even when the targets of compellence 
suffer considerable damage, they may not succumb to pressure as long as 
they can maintain their hope of repelling the compellers by means of their 
own compellence. Therefore, denying opponents’ counter-coercive attempts 
can be effective in regard to making them realise the improbability of 
achieving their objectives. 
 Regarding the specific counter-coercive strategies that opponents can 
use, Byman and Waxman (1999, p.111) identify three: “civilian suffering-
based strategies”, “coalition-fracturing strategies”, and “casualty-generating 
strategies”. In civilian suffering-based strategies, armed groups try to hinder 
the compellers’ offence or undermine support for them by putting civilians in 
danger – for example, by using them as human shields or launching 
retaliatory attacks against civilian populations (Byman and Waxman, 1999, 
pp.111-113; Nadin et al., 2014, pp.91-92). The aim of coalition-fracturing 
strategies is to hinder compellence by exacerbating the rifts among 
compellers, which cannot be eliminated as long as states with different 
interests and priorities form coalitions. For example, the fake amicable 
stances of target armed groups may increase some coalition members’ 
doubts regarding the necessity to escalate pressure. Mounting casualties 
may also create and compound disagreements within coalitions (Byman and 
Waxman, 1999, pp.113-114; Morgan, 2003, pp.183-185). Finally, in 
casualty-generating strategies, target armed groups try to inflict casualties 
on intervening forces and thereby induce them to halt their compellence. As 
the compellers seldom have any vital interests in the conflicts in which they 
are intervening, suffering casualties may break their will to continue the 
intervention (Byman and Waxman, 1999, pp.114-116). Some studies point 
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out the importance of counter-coercion negation (Byman and Waxman, 
1999; Johnson et al., 2002, pp.22-23; Dekker, 2011; Harvey and Wilner, 
2012). 
 Among the four approaches to achieving denial, counter-coercion 
negation is expected to be necessary in the context of peace operations. In 
this context, local armed groups have stronger motivation than intervening 
international forces and have typically been fighting civil wars for years. 
These features suggest that the target side is ready to accept high costs. 
This must be especially so based on the hope that international forces are 
not strongly resolved and can thus be compelled to withdraw. Based on this 
hope, local armed groups may well expect to win the contest of endurance. If 
they are deprived of the hope to win, the targets must become more 
susceptible to pressure. Therefore, to compel targets with such characters, it 
is likely to be necessary to crush their hopes by denying their counter-
coercive attempts. 
 
H4: Compellence in peace operations is more likely to succeed if the 
compellers achieve counter-coercion negation as a form of denial. 
 
2.2.5  Third-Party Support 
The fifth and final hypothesis covers third-party support for the targets of 
compellence, and it is expected that compellence is more likely to be 
successful if such support is absent. The studies on compellence that were 
reviewed in Chapter 1 point out the importance of the lack of external 
support on the target side for the success of the strategy (e.g. George and 
Simons, 1994a; Kagan, 1998; Downes, 2018). Studies on insurgencies also 
acknowledge the importance of foreign support for insurgents. Such support 
can take various forms, including moral, political, and material support, as 
well as the provision of sanctuaries (O’Neill, 1990, pp.114-119). A study 
points out that the majority of successful insurgencies received foreign 
support (Connable and Libicki, 2010, pp.62-75). Another study reveals that 
insurgencies are likely to fail when they are cut off from supporters, 
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regardless of whether they are domestic or foreign, and that the existence of 
foreign support correlates with the failure of counterinsurgency (Paul et al., 
2013, pp.130-133, 151). Taking into account that targets are non-state 
armed groups, these arguments imply that the absence of third-party support 
facilitates the success of compellence in peace operations as well. In fact, 
Pushkina (2006, pp.139-140) finds that the lack of foreign support for local 
warring factions correlates with the success of peacekeeping. 
 Third-party support is likely to make targets more resilient to 
compellent pressure. With more weapons, sanctuaries, and other war 
matériel provided by their supporters, armed groups can fight back against 
international troops and continue to pursue their objectives. Therefore, the 
absence or cessation of third-party support is expected to constraint or 
reduce the combat capability of targets and facilitate denial. This is 
especially so when target armed groups are heavily dependent on their 
supporters. 
 The cessation of political support from a third party may also 
demoralise armed groups when it makes their objectives unattainable. For 
example, assume that an ethnic armed group fights a civil war with support 
from a neighbouring country with the same ethnicity, and it pursues 
secession from the current state and potential integration with its neighbour. 
If the support from the neighbour is halted, this will be a severe blow to the 
ethnic armed group not only militarily but also politically, effectively signifying 
an abandonment, which makes the integration almost unattainable. In such 
a situation, the armed group is expected to be demoralised and more 
susceptible to compellent pressure. 
 Whether third-party support exists or not tends to be regarded as an 
environmental factor, but it is also manipulable by compellers (Crawford, 
2018). If target armed groups receive third-party support, peace operations 
or the wider international community can employ positive and/or negative 
inducements to persuade the supporter to halt the support. 
 
H5: Compellence in peace operations is more likely to succeed if the 
targets receive little support from third parties. 
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2.3  Methodology 
The hypotheses should be empirically tested so that the validity of the 
conditions can be examined. After considering other methodological options, 
this section discusses why a comparative case study is the most feasible 
approach for this research, and it explains three specific methods of analysis. 
 A possible approach to examining the hypotheses is to use statistical 
analysis, which would shed light on whether and how much impact each 
condition of interest has on the result of compellence. However, the 
approach is difficult to apply to this research because of the relatively large 
number of conditions and the small number of available cases, as identified 
in the next section. Of course, it is possible to apply statistical analysis by 
reducing the variables or expanding the scope of the study and thereby 
increasing the number of relevant cases. This approach directs a study 
towards producing a general theory that tries to explain a wide range of 
phenomena in a parsimonious manner. However, such an approach does 
not correspond to the aim of this research, which is to build a middle-range 
theory that explains a specific subset of a phenomenon with a relatively large 
number of variables to avoid excessive simplification. 
 Another possible method is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). 
QCA aims to find sufficient and necessary conditions by analysing all 
possible combinations of independent variables and the responding results 
of the empirical cases for each combination (Ragin, 2000; 2014, chs.6-7). 
QCA is especially suitable when an examined phenomenon is expected to 
have conjunctural causation – that is, when a specific combination of factors, 
rather than a single factor, has a causal effect – and equifinality, which is 
when different (combinations of) factors can lead to the same result (Ragin, 
2000, chs.5, 9; 2014, pp.24-26, 101; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, 
pp.12, 78-79). If these expectations are met and conjunctural sufficient 
conditions are expressed in a minimal or non-redundant way, this means 
that each individual factor composing a conjunctural sufficient condition is an 
INUS condition, or “an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is 
itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result” (Mackie, 1965, p.245; 
Mahoney, 2008, pp.418-419; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p.79). 
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 Mackie (1965, p.245) provides an example of the cause of a fire in 
explaining the concept of INUS condition. Supposing that a house caught 
fire and a later investigation revealed that an electrical short circuit caused it, 
he points out that the factor was neither necessary nor sufficient to cause 
the fire and that its causal role should be understood in combination with 
other factors. For the short circuit to cause the fire, there must have been a 
flammable item close enough to it, a sprinkler system must have been 
absent, and other factors may also have been necessary. In this example, 
each of the factors was indispensable to cause the fire. Without the short 
circuit, the flammable item would not have been ignited. Without the 
flammable item, the short circuit would have ignited nothing. If there had 
been a sprinkler system, the fire would have been extinguished before 
flaming up. Moreover, because a fire has many causes, this combination of 
factors is sufficient but not necessary for causing the fire; different (sets of) 
causes could also have set fire to the house at the time. He proposed that a 
factor such as the short circuit in the example should be called an INUS 
condition. 
 It seems appropriate to assume that causality in compellence has 
such features. As compellence is a very complex phenomenon, none of the 
conditions derived in the previous section is expected to be individually 
sufficient for the success of the strategy. This expectation is in line with the 
studies reviewed in Chapter 1, which suggest that multiple factors can 
positively affect the outcome of the strategy. Rather, it is expected that the 
above conditions’ combined effect leads to a successful result; therefore, 
they collectively constitute a sufficient condition for success. This means that 
each condition is likely to be an INUS condition. Moreover, different 
combinations among them or with other factors can lead to success. 
 QCA accordingly seems to be an attractive method for this study, but 
it requires a considerable amount of work. An in-depth understanding of 
each case is necessary to assess whether each condition is satisfied in the 
cases examined. The criteria used for the assessments themselves are also 
subject to change based on empirical data (Ragin, 2000, ch.11; 2014, 
pp.120-121; Rihoux and Lobe, 2009). This dialogue between theory and 
data may end in the conducting of full-fledged case studies (Vogt et al., 2014, 
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pp.320-321). QCA has another strength: It can systematically analyse mid-
sized numbers of cases, which tend to fall into the void between small- and 
large-N studies (Vogt et al., 2014, p.308). The number of relevant cases for 
this study is also mid-sized – a dozen cases as identified in the next section 
– but examining all of them is not feasible for this body of research as a 
result of the time and resource that would be required. 
 Therefore, a comparative case study is the best available option for 
this research. A case study approach has its limitations. As the number of 
cases examined is small, studies can draw different and biased inferences 
depending on which cases they examine. To make reasonable causal 
inferences, cases should be selected carefully. 
 To mitigate the weakness of comparative case studies, this body of 
research employs three different case study methods for its empirical 
analysis. The first is the congruence method, which is a comparison between 
a hypothesis and a case. If the prediction of a hypothesis is consistent with 
the result of a case, this strengthens the confidence in the hypothesis 
(George and Bennett, 2005, p.181). Confirmation in multiple cases further 
strengthens this confidence, like multiple experiments that replicate findings. 
The greater the number of replications, the more reliable the hypothesis (Yin, 
2014, pp.57, 61). In its simplest form, the method is used to determine 
whether a certain value of the independent variable corresponds with the 
expected value of the dependent variable in a case (George and Bennett, 
2005, pp.181-183). In addition, if a theory specifies a causal mechanism and 
its observable implications are observed in a case as expected, this would 
be strong confirmation of the theory (Beach and Pedersen, 2016, ch.8). The 
method can also be used to decide which of the competing theoretical claims 
better fits and explains a case (Blatter and Haverland, 2012, ch.4). 
 As this research aims to identify the conditions for the success of 
compellence in peace operations, the congruence method should be applied 
to cases of success and failure to demonstrate that the conditions can 
explain the differences in the results. Examining cases with different values 
on the dependent variable prevents selection bias that estimates causal 
effects weakly, which happens when comparative case studies examine only 
- 97 - 
cases that have similar results (King et al., 1994, pp.129-130; Collier and 
Mahoney, 1996; Collier et al., 2004, pp.94-95). 
 In particular, the hypotheses should pass this test in the cases of 
outright success and failure – that is, exhibit extreme values on the 
dependent variable – because extreme values on variables provide clear 
predictions (Eckstein, 1975, pp.119-120). The conditions are expected to be 
satisfied in the case of outright success, and they are expected to be absent 
in the case of outright failure. In addition, the effects of the independent 
variables are expected to appear strongly in cases with extreme values on 
the dependent variables (King et al., 1994, pp.141-142; Evera, 1997, pp.79-
81). The effect of the confirmation or disconfirmation of propositions in cases 
with extreme values on variables is stronger than in other cases with 
moderate values (Lijphart, 1971, p.692). 
 The second method is the most-similar-design comparison. The 
comparison of cases that have few differences but quite different results 
suggests that the few differences are the cause of the different results, 
because other factors are controlled (Mill, 1973, p.391; Evera, 1997, p.57; 
Gerring, 2007, pp.131-139). In the real world, each case of any social 
phenomena is unique and it is difficult to find cases that are similar enough 
to compare based on this approach. One of the best possible ways to 
employ this method is to make a comparison between two or more phases 
within a case. This temporal comparison makes it possible to examine the 
effects of changes in independent variables on the dependent variable while 
keeping environmental conditions more or less constant (Lijphart, 1971, 
p.689; Evera, 1997, pp.82-83; George and Bennett, 2005, pp.166-167). 
Therefore, a case of protracted compellence should be analysed so that the 
effects of changes in variables of interest can be observed. 
 The final method is cross-case comparisons. The previous two 
methods are forms of within-case analysis. After these examinations, all 
cases should be analysed jointly to determine whether any patterns emerge 
across them. It is problematic that cross-case comparisons cannot rule out 
the possibility that the patterns found are caused by exogenous factors, 
because they are not controlled in the examination. However, the reliability 
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of cross-case comparisons can be enhanced by combining them with 
insights from within-case analyses. Even though the comparison cannot be 
ideally controlled, any consistency that is found can provide additional 
support or non-support for the hypotheses. 
 This study relies on both primary and secondary sources. They 
include two interviews – one with Lord David Richards, who was a British 
force commander in Sierra Leone, and the other with Dr David Kilcullen, who 
was a company commander of the Australian force in East Timor – 
conducted by the author; documents released by the UN, governments, and 
humanitarian organisations; the records of international trials; and media 
articles, which include reports from the ground and interviews with the 
people involved. Some published works also provide firsthand accounts of 
the cases. 
  In sum, this body of research conducts a comparative case study. 
More specifically, it combines three case study methods: the congruence 
method, which compares the expectations of the hypotheses and what 
actually happened in a case; the most-similar-design comparison, which 
compares different phases of a case in a before-and-after manner; and 
cross-case comparisons, which looks for consistency across the examined 
cases. These three types of analysis complement each other and provide 
valuable insights into the causality of compellence in peace operations. 
2.4  Relevant Cases 
This section identifies cases that are relevant to this research. As shown in 
Chapter 1, this research defines peace operations as field operations that 
are deployed to manage and/or resolve violent conflicts, regardless of 
whether the executants are the UN or other entities. However, not all peace 
operations employ compellence in carrying out their mandates; therefore, it 
is necessary to identify cases that can be used for testing the hypotheses. 
As clarified earlier in this chapter, the scope of this research is UN-related 
peace operations that issued the heaviest type of demands and employed 
threats or force proactively against non-state armed groups. This section 
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identifies which of the post-Cold War peace operations fall into the scope 
and selects those used in case studies. 
 With regard to UN operations, they must be authorised to use force 
beyond self-defence to employ compellence, because compellence requires 
threatening targets by indicating that their noncompliance with demands will 
lead to escalated pressure. Peace operations in the traditional mode can use 
force in self-defence only; this cannot exert proactive pressure. Therefore, 
UN operations that are authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to 
use all necessary means – namely, force beyond self-defence – to carry out 
their mandates can be relevant. 
 With regard to non-UN operations, the scope of this research is 
technically limited to cases related to UN operations so that cases of partial 
intervention in civil wars can be excluded. More specifically, the relevant 
non-UN operations are those that are authorised by the UNSC and are 
preceded, co-deployed with, or succeed UN operations. As with UN 
operations, they also have to be authorised to use force beyond self-defence 
to employ compellence. However, there are a few cases in which states 
intervened without explicit authorisation from the UNSC and supported 
peace operations on the ground. This research also regards these as peace 
operations as long as they were co-deployed and cooperated with explicitly 
authorised operations, because such interventions are usually appreciated 
and supported by the UNSC, and it is difficult to distinguish their effects from 
those of authorised operations. 
 In sum, there are three categories of peace operations that can be 
relevant to this study: (1) UN operations that were authorised to use all 
necessary means under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; (2) non-UN 
operations that were authorised to use all necessary means under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter and were preceded, co-deployed with, or succeeded 
UN operations; and (3) non-UN operations that were not authorised by the 
UNSC but were co-deployed with and assisted operations that fell into 
categories (1) or (2). The peace operations that deployed to civil wars after 
the end of the Cold War and satisfy the above conditions are listed in Table 
2.2. 
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Table 2.2  Potentially Relevant Missions 
Missions with * were not authorised to use force beyond self-defence 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and are not included in the list. 
Missions are listed in the order of their authorised dates, followed by 
related missions regardless of authorised date. 
Names of Missions Category 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) 1 
Implementation Force (IFOR) 2, succeeded UNPROFOR 
United Taskforce (UNITAF) 2, preceded UNOSOM II 
United Nations Operation in Somalia II 
(UNOSOM II) 
1 
US forces (Quick Reaction Force [QRF] and 
Task Force [TF] Ranger) 
3, co-deployed with UNOSOM II 
Multinational Force (MNF) in Haiti 
2, preceded United Nations 
Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)* 
Operation Turquoise 
2, co-deployed with United 
Nations Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR)* 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) 
2, co-deployed with United 
Nations Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (UNMIBH)* 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
2, co-deployed with United 
Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)* 
International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) 2, preceded UNTAET 
United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET) 
1 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) 
1 
UK forces 3, co-deployed with UNAMSIL 
United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) 
1 
Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) 2, co-deployed with MONUC 
EU Force R. D. Congo 2, co-deployed with MONUC 
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor 
(UNMISET) 
1 
ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) 
2, preceded United Nations 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)* 
ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) 2, preceded UNOCI 
French forces (Operation Licorne) 
2, preceded and co-deployed 
with UNOCI 
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire 
(UNOCI) 
1 
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Multinational Interim Force (MIF) 
2, preceded United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH)* 
United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) 1 
United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) 1 
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation 
in Darfur (UNAMID) 
1 
United Nations Mission in the Central African 
Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) 
1 
European Union Force Chad/Central African 
Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR) 
2, co-deployed with MINURCAT 
United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUSCO) 
1 
United Nations Organization Interim Security 
Force for Abyei (UNISFA) 
1 
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South 
Sudan (UNMISS) 
1 
French forces (Operation Serval and Operation 
Barkhane) 
3, co-deployed with AFISMA 
2, co-deployed with MINUSMA 
African-led International Support Mission in Mali 
(AFISMA) 
2, preceded MINUSMA 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) 
1 
African-led International Support Mission in the 
Central African Republic (MISCA) 
2, preceded MINUSCA 
French forces (Operation Sangaris) 
2, co-deployed with MISCA and 
MINUSCA 
European Union military operation in the Central 
African Republic (EUFOR RCA) 
2, co-deployed with MISCA and 
MINUSCA 
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 




 However, not all of these operations actually employed compellence. 
They were authorised to use force in a proactive manner in carrying out their 
mandates, but a significant number of them refrained from doing so or 
threatening to do so. Many of these missions used force in self-defence but 
not proactively. In fact, information obtainable from the reports of the UN 
Secretary-General on UN operations, reports on non-UN operations 
submitted to the UNSC by executants, and some other studies indicate that 
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Operation Turquoise, as well as the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), Kosovo 
Force (KFOR), EU Force R. D. Congo, United Nations Mission of Support in 
East Timor (UNMISET), ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), 
Multinational Interim Force (MIF), United Nations Operation in Burundi 
(ONUB), United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), African Union-
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), United Nations 
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), European 
Union Force Chad/Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR), United 
Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), United 
Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), and European 
Union military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA), did 
not or have not used the proactive pressure of force and thus are not cases 
of compellence. On at least one occasion, the United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) 
launched a proactive operation to capture terrorists (de Cherisey, 2017). 
However, this is an exception, and the mission as a whole has not been 
proactive in exerting pressure. Therefore, MINUSMA is also not regarded as 
a case of compellence in this study. 
 There are other missions that cannot be used in this study. First, 
peace operations in the Central African Republic are ongoing, and the 
outcome is pending. Hence, although the African-led International Support 
Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA), United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African 
Republic (MINUSCA), and French forces under Operation Sangaris 
employed threats and actual force in a proactive manner (e.g. UN, 2014b; 
2017; 2018), they cannot be used for this research. 
 Second, several peace operations employed compellence against 
governments and therefore are not suitable for this research. This category 
includes the Multinational Force (MNF) in Haiti, the ECOWAS Mission in 
Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI), the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire 
(UNOCI), and the French forces under Operation Licorne. 
 The remaining missions employed compellence against non-state 
actors in carrying out their mandates. However, some of them put limited 
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demands on their targets and are thus outside the scope of this research. 
These are UNITAF, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the 
Implementation Force (IFOR), and the Interim Emergency Multinational 
Force (IEMF). 
 The rest of the operations constitute the pool of relevant cases for this 
research. The first compellent attempt in post-Cold War peace operations 
happened in Somalia in response to a humanitarian crisis caused by a 
severe civil war. After UNITAF, a US-led multinational force, temporarily 
restored security for humanitarian assistance, UNOSOM II was deployed in 
1993 with wide-ranging tasks, which included the disarmament of warring 
factions (UNSC, 1993a). The factions were not ready to disarm, and in 
particular, the Somali National Alliance (SNA), the faction led by Mohamed 
Farah Aidid, forcefully resisted disarmament. UNOSOM II and supporting US 
forces fiercely engaged with the SNA, but the compellers could not compel 
the faction to disarm, and after suffering casualties, they had to relinquish 
compellence without achieving their objectives (e.g. Bensahel, 2003). 
 The next relevant cases are two missions in East Timor. The first was 
INTERFET, an Australian-led multinational force that was deployed in 1999 
when the pro-integration militias resorted to massive violence and 
destruction after residents chose independence from Indonesian rule in a 
referendum. The demand of the compeller was to stop the violence (UNSC, 
1999a), effectively meaning to accept the independence of East Timor, 
which was a total defeat for the militias. INTERFET was deployed throughout 
East Timor and engaged with the militias several times, but it used only a 
small amount of force in the course of the operation (Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade [DFAT], 2001, pp.147-148, 153-154). The militias fled to 
West Timor, an Indonesian territory, and largely ceased violence while they 
continued small-scale infiltrations and attacks from there (UN, 2000c, 
paras.2, 22-23). INTERFET could largely achieve its objective with little use 
of force; therefore, the compellence was almost successful. 
 The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET), which succeeded INTERFET, also employed compellence 
against the remnants of pro-integration militias. The infiltration and activity of 
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the militias expanded to inner regions in July 2000, although the number of 
militias operating inside of East Timor was estimated to be a maximum of 
150 (UNSC, 2000d, pp.2-3; 2000e, p.4). In response, UNTAET launched 
proactive operations against them, demanding surrender and disarmament 
(Friel, 2000a; UNSC, 2000e, p.4; UNTAET, 2000). While some of the militias 
surrendered, many fled back to West Timor after the operations (Agence 
France Presse [AFP], 13 Nov 2000; UN, 2000k, para.9; UNSC, 2000e, p.4). 
Thereafter, the militias’ infiltrations from West Timor and their attacks in the 
border area still persisted on a smaller scale (Greenlees, 2001; UN, 2001d, 
paras.22-23; 2001f, para.27). Therefore, the compellence was a limited 
success. 
 Sierra Leone also experienced compellence by peace operations from 
2000 to 2001. After almost a decade had passed since the outbreak of a civil 
war in the country, UNAMSIL was deployed to Sierra Leone in 1999 in 
accordance with the Lomé Peace Agreement between the government and 
the main rebel force, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). However, the 
RUF reneged on the agreement by rejecting disarmament and launching an 
offensive towards the capital in May 2000 (UN, 2000e, paras.56-64; Prince, 
2002, pp.195-196). Against this background, the UK intervened and assisted 
UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone government to push back the RUF (Dorman, 
2009, pp.79-80, 92-94). The compellers demanded that the RUF disarm and 
demobilise in accordance with the peace agreement (UNSC, 1999b). After 
being exposed to various forms of pressure, as well as negotiations, the 
RUF acceded to disarmament in 2001 (UN, 2001e, paras.2-3; UNAMSIL, 
2001i). In the process, the compellers experienced a number of substantial 
engagements with the RUF, so the compellence was not an ideal success 
but was still a major one. 
 In addition, the intervening forces and the Serra Leone government 
also compelled another armed group called the West Side Boys (WSB). The 
WSB took the side of the government and fought against the RUF when it 
advanced towards the capital in May 2000. However, the WSB soon came to 
cause frictions, including armed clashes, with other pro-government forces 
and preyed on civilians. The Sierra Leone government demanded that the 
WSB disarm, but it refused to do so despite UNAMSIL launching an attack 
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on it (UN, 2000g, paras.22-23). In August 2000, the WSB kidnapped UK 
soldiers who were in Sierra Leone to train the new government army. The 
UK, with the assistance of UNAMSIL and the government army, launched a 
hostage-rescue operation the following month and destroyed a WSB camp 
while inflicting substantial casualties on the WSB’s fighting forces and 
capturing its leader. After the operation, the remaining WSB members joined 
a disarmament programme en masse, and the group collapsed (UN, 2000i, 
para.17). This case can be regarded as rather successful compellence. 
 The DRC, the next country in which peace operations employed 
compellence, is one of the places to which most robust peace operations 
have been deployed. There are two regions which witnessed compellence: 
Ituri and Kivus. 
 In Ituri, inter-ethnic violence between the Hema and Lendu flared up 
from 1999 against the background of the lack of governance due to a civil 
war at the state level. The United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the UN mission operated in 
the country, first failed to respond to the violence. However, after the IEMF, a 
French-led EU operation, intervened to manage the humanitarian disaster in 
the regional capital, Bunia, in 2003, MONUC came to adopt a robust 
approach against armed groups in Ituri and tried to disarm them in support of 
the DRC government. MONUC, which deployed a brigade-sized force in Ituri, 
had to launch proactive operations many times before the government could 
persuade the armed groups to accept the demands through negotiations 
(International Crisis Group [ICG], 2004; 2008; Isberg and Tillberg, 2012). 
The leaders of major Ituri armed groups agreed to be integrated into the 
national army in 2006 and actually did so in 2007. However, some of the 
rank and file did not follow the decision and continued resistance (ICG, 2008, 
pp.3-4, 34-35; Tamm, 2013, pp.36-37). Taken together, the outcome was 
rather successful; targets largely accepted the demands but only after the 
substantial use of force. 
 Peace operations in the DRC have also employed compellence in 
Kivus. One of the targets was the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda (FDLR), the Rwandan Hutu rebel operating in the DRC. Peace 
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agreements of the civil war in the DRC demanded that the Hutu rebels 
disarm and return to Rwanda (UN, 1999e; 2002c; UNSC, 2002). After 
voluntary disarmament efforts were made, MONUC started to use 
compellence in cooperation with the DRC army from 2004 and repeatedly 
conducted proactive military operations against the FDLR (e.g. UN, 2005a, 
para.34; Isberg and Tillberg, 2012, p.156). As a result, the leader of the 
FDLR declared its willingness to disarm, and some FDLR members joined 
the disarmament programme (UN, 2005a, paras.43-44; 2006b, para.57; ICG, 
2009, p.19). However, the FDLR as a group never disarmed, and it 
maintained its operational capability (e.g. UN, 2005b, paras.26-28; 2006a, 
paras.27-28; 2007, para.16). The compellent attempt waned without 
realising the disarmament and repatriation of the FDLR as the focus of 
MONUC and the DRC government shifted to an election in 2006 (ICG, 2009, 
p.20). Therefore, the compellence against the FDLR was unsuccessful. 
 Another target of compellence in Kivus was a Tutsi-based rebel group, 
the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), which was led 
by Laurent Nkunda. In November 2006, a Tutsi businessman was murdered 
by police in Sake, and Nkunda invaded the town with his force in retaliation 
(Stearns, 2012, p.29). The CNDP further advanced to the regional capital, 
Goma, and MONUC responded by attacking and inflicting substantial 
damage on the CNDP, which halted its offence and enabled the Congolese 
army to recapture Sake (ICG, 2007, p.8; Stearns, 2012, p.29; Nadin et al., 
2015, p.75). The DRC government and the UN demanded that the CNDP 
halt its violence and accept integration into the army (Radio Okapi, 2006; 
UNSC, 2006), but some clashes continued between the army and the CNDP 
(e.g. IRIN, 2006a; 2006b; ICG, 2007, p.8). The subsequent negotiation led to 
an agreement with a major compromise on the side of the government in 
January 2007. The CNDP was to be integrated into the national army, but 
this was to be done in a manner that preserved much of its command-and-
control structure. Moreover, the scheme collapsed within months (ICG, 2007, 
pp.8-11; Stearns, 2012, p.30). In sum, the compellence against the CNDP 
was partially successful: An agreement was reached after a major 
compromise and the substantial use of force. 
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 The other compellent attempt in the DRC was exerted by the United 
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (MONUSCO), the mission following MONUC, and the DRC 
government against the M23, which was the successor of the CNDP. The 
failure of integration of the CNDP into the national army led to the defection 
of ex-CNDP soldiers and the creation of the M23 in May 2012 (Stearns, 
2012, pp.43-44). In response, MONUSCO’s newly established intervention 
brigade and the DRC government resorted to offensive military operations 
against the rebels from mid-2013. The demand against the M23 was that it 
was to cease the rebellion and demobilise (UNSC, 2013). The compellers 
conquered all the M23’s strongholds after several fierce battles, and the 
armed group declared the end of the rebellion and fled to Uganda and 
Rwanda (UN, 2013b, paras.19-20). Subsequently, the government and the 
M23 signed declarations after peace talks (UN, 2013b, para.35; 2013c, 
para.11). The case ended with the target’s acceptance of the compellers’ 
demands, but it should be regarded as only barely successful, because the 
compellers’ objectives were achieved almost forcibly. 
 The last remaining case from Table 2.2 is an intervention in Mali. The 
turmoil in Mali was triggered by the rebellion of the National Movement for 
the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg armed group, in January 
2012. The MNLA launched the rebellion in cooperation with regional and 
domestic Islamic extremist groups, but the Islamic extremists soon 
marginalised the Tuareg rebels, and the rebel-held areas fell into the hands 
of the extremists (Shurkin, 2014, pp.5-6). Against this background, the 
African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and France 
intervened in 2013. The objectives of the intervention were to recover the 
northern part of Mali and to “[d]estroy” terrorists (UNSC, 2012; Shurkin, 2014, 
pp.7-8; Tramond and Seigneur, 2014, p.79). The French forces, AFISMA, 
and the Malian forces pushed back the Islamist forces, secured major 
population areas, and cleared their strongholds (UN, 2013a, para.18; 
Tramond and Seigneur, 2014, pp.79-83). Thus, the compellers were able to 
restore the occupied northern part of Mali, but only after using a substantial 
amount of force and defeating the Islamist forces. Moreover, despite 
suffering substantial damage, the Islamic extremists did not disappear and 
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continued attacks, including suicide bombings, against the French and 
Malian forces, as well as AFISMA and the succeeding MINUSMA (e.g. UN, 
2013a, paras.24-25; 2014c, para.14). Therefore, the operation in Mali was a 
failure in terms of compellence: It achieved one objective forcibly and failed 
to achieve the other. 
 Finally, there is another mission that should be added to the pool of 
relevant cases. It is the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), which was established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
However, it was not authorised to use all necessary means to carry out its 
mandates (UNSC, 2004) and was therefore not included in Table 2.2. As a 
matter of fact, MINUSTAH employed threats and force proactively to counter 
the threats of the heavily armed gangs that were prominent in the 
shantytowns of the capital, Port-au-Prince, after a rebellion led to a regime 
change. 
 MINUSTAH’s compellence against the gang groups can be divided 
into two phases. The first phase is from 2004 to the presidential election in 
2006, and the second is from late 2006 to 2007. Both the transitional 
government in the first phase and the newly elected government in the 
second phase demanded that the illegal armed groups disarm (Reuters, 
2004; UN, 2004, para.11; Cockayne, 2014, p.750). The first phase ended in 
failure. MINUSTAH and the Haitian police launched multiple operations to 
secure the shantytowns and killed or arrested a number of gangs, but they 
could not disarm the gangs or contain their violence (Cockayne, 2014, 
pp.746-748). The gangs significantly decreased their violent activities 
immediately before the election, but this was because they supported René 
Préval, the frontrunner in the presidential election (ICG, 2006, p.1). The lull 
in violence ended several months after the election of Préval (Anon, 2006, 
p.13), and MINUSTAH and the Haitian police force again engaged in fierce 
battles with gangs and cleared their strongholds (Cockayne, 2014, pp.752-
753). The gangs were killed, arrested, or dispersed, and the security of the 
urban areas was restored (Dziedzic and Perito, 2008, p.5). The second 
phase of compellence was successful, but only barely so; it involved the 
substantial use of force and was rather close to falling into the category of 
control. 
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 These 12 cases constitute the pool of relevant cases – that is, UN-
related peace operations’ compellence against non-state armed groups 
accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. The above overview is 
summarised in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3  Relevant Cases 
Compeller(s) Target(s) Year(s) Result 
UNOSOM II and US forces SNA 1993 
Failed (Compellence ceased and 







Almost successful (Demands 







Partially successful (Demands 
were partially accepted; little 
force was used) 
UNAMSIL, UK forces, and 
Sierra Leone government 
RUF 2000–
2001 
Almost successful (Demands 
were accepted; substantial force 
was used) 
UNAMSIL, UK forces, and 
Sierra Leone government 
WSB 2000 
Rather successful (Demands 
were almost accepted; 
substantial force was used) 






Rather successful (Demands 
were almost accepted; 
substantial force was used) 




Failed (Compellence ceased) 




Partially successful (Agreement 
was reached after major 
compromise; substantial force 
was used) 
MONUSCO and DRC 
government 
M23 2013 
Barely successful (Objectives 












Barely successful (Objectives 
were achieved almost forcibly) 
French forces, AFISMA, 




Failed (Objectives were achieved 
partially and forcibly) 
 
 It is infeasible to use all 12 cases in a comparative case study, so it is 
necessary to select a few for detailed analysis. As discussed in the previous 
section on methodology, cases of outright success and failure should be 
examined using the congruence method. Among the relevant cases, those 
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that ended in the highest degree of success are INTERFET in East Timor 
and UNAMSIL and the UK forces in Sierra Leone. In contrast, the case that 
ended in the clearest failure is UNOSOM II and the US forces in Somalia. 
These are the most suitable cases for the use of the congruence method. 
The derived conditions for success should be present in the cases of 
INTERFET and UNAMSIL and the UK forces, and they should be absent in 
the case of UNOSOM II and the US forces. In addition, a prolonged case 
should be examined so that the most-similar-design comparison can be 
applied. Of the above three, the Sierra Leone case constituted prolonged 
compellence and can be divided into multiple phases, which makes the 
before-and-after temporal comparison between them possible. Therefore, 
the three cases satisfy the methodological requirements and are suitable for 
case studies. 
 This chapter has set up the analytical framework of this research. 
First, it has clarified the study’s scope: cases of explicit military compellence 
in UN-related peace operations that are employed against non-state armed 
groups and accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. Second, the 
chapter has outlined the conditions for the success of compellence in peace 
operations based on existing studies while taking into account the contextual 
features. The conditions have then been formulated into five hypotheses. 
Third, it has explained the methodology of this study. The study conducts a 
comparative case study and, more specifically, employs three analytical 
methods: the congruence method, the most-similar-design comparison, and 
cross-case comparison. Finally, the chapter has reviewed post-Cold War 
peace operations and identified the cases that fall into the scope of this 
research. Among the relevant cases, the chapter selected three for detailed 
case studies – INTERFET, UNAMSIL and the UK forces, and UNOSOM II 
and the US forces. The following three chapters will analyse the cases one 
by one, and then Chapter 6 will combine the findings and provide cross-case 
analyses. 
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Chapter 3 
East Timor: INTERFET 
This first empirical chapter deals with compellence in East Timor from 1999 
to 2000. The compeller of the case was INTERFET, an Australian-led 
multinational force, and the target was pro-Indonesian militias. This chapter 
employs the congruence method and determines whether the predictions of 
the hypotheses correspond with the actual events. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, this is one of the most successful cases of compellence in 
peace operations, which means that at least some of the conditions for 
success are expected to be fulfilled in it. The chapter first reviews the event 
leading to the deployment of INTERFET and its activities, followed by an 
examination of how closely the hypotheses coincide with what actually 
happened. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings. 
3.1  Background 
In 1975, East Timor, which was a Portuguese colony, entered into a civil war 
between political factions that pursued different ways of decolonisation and 
development. Among these factions, Revolutionary Front for an Independent 
East Timor (FRETILIN) with a leftist stance got the upper hand in the war 
(United Nations Department of Public Information [UNDPI], 2000, p.3; 
Commission of Truth and Friendship [CTF] Indonesia-Timor-Leste, 2008, 
pp.35-36; The Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and 
Reconciliation [CAVR], 2013, pp.169-171, 182-187). 
 However, the result of the civil war was not independence but, rather, 
a long occupation by Indonesia. Indonesia, whose territory included the 
western half of Timor Island and who shared borders with East Timor, hoped 
to prevent the emergence of a small independent state that was vulnerable 
to the influence of communist powers (Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.8-9; 
CAVR, 2013, pp.162-163). Given the failure of its covert influence operations 
and the independence declaration of East Timor by the leftist FRETILIN, 
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Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion in late 1975. Although Indonesia 
occupied the entire territory by 1979, FRETILIN’s guerrilla resistance through 
its armed wing, Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL), 
continued, and the political front developed into a nationalist independent 
movement. Indonesia responded with violent suppression, and international 
attention and concern increased (UNDPI, 2000a, pp.3-5; CTF, 2008, pp.48-
49; CAVR, 2013, pp.174-176, 202-210, 228, 235-246, 254-257, 265-269). 
 The situation started to change in the late 1990s. Indonesia suffered 
severely from the currency crisis in 1997, and the Suharto regime collapsed 
the following year. In June 1998, the new president of Indonesia, 
Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, announced his intention to propose an 
autonomy deal to the East Timorese. Furthermore, in January 1999, he even 
offered separation from Indonesia if they rejected the autonomy (UNDPI, 
2000a, pp.6-7; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.25, 101). The decision 
seems to have been driven by a number of factors, including the need to 
improve Indonesia’s international image to secure financial assistance that 
was vital for economic recovery, the desire to solve the burdensome East 
Timor problem once and for all, and the expectation that the East Timorese 
would choose to remain a part of Indonesia (Moore, 2001, pp.33-34; 
Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.56-57, 99-101; van Klinken et al., 2006, 
p.72). 
 After negotiations took place between Indonesia, Portugal, and the 
UN, the decision was made on 5 May 1999 to hold a “popular consultation” – 
that is, an effective referendum – in East Timor to ask people whether they 
would accept the autonomy plan. If the plan was rejected, the territory was to 
be independent under the support of the UN (Marker, 2003; UN, 1999a). The 
UN subsequently established the United Nations Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET) to organise the referendum (UNDPI, 2000a, pp.17-18). 
 However, the Indonesian military was not ready to accept the 
independence of East Timor. It had spilt a great amount of blood to quell the 
resistance, had made much of the unity of the nation, and was concerned 
about the effect of independence on other separatist movements in the 
country (Sherlock, 1999, p.16; Cotton, 2004, pp.62-64; Robinson, 2010, 
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p.99). Some East Timorese who had vested interests in Indonesian rule, 
such as the officials of the provincial government, also feared independence, 
as it would mean abandonment by Indonesia (Kammen, 2001, p.181; van 
Klinken et al., 2006, p.73; Cristalis, 2009, p.139). 
 To prevent independence, they recruited East Timorese and 
organised pro-integration militias, and they initiated a violent intimidation 
campaign so that the referendum would end in the acceptance of autonomy 
(Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.136-140; KPP HAM, 2006, pp.29, 39-40). 
However, their violence failed to achieve the desired effect. Despite the poor 
security conditions, the referendum was successfully held by UNAMET on 
30 August 1999. The result was overwhelming support for independence, 
with 78.5% of voters rejecting the autonomy plan with a voter turnout of 
98.6% (UNDPI, 2000a, pp.38-40). 
 Violence by the pro-integration militias and the Indonesian security 
forces flared up on large scale all over the territory after the announcement 
of the voting result on 4 September. They killed independence supporters, 
clergy, local UN staff, and their families. Some indiscriminate massacres 
also happened in places such as churches, to which people escaped (KPP 
HAM, 2006, pp.35-36; CAVR, 2013, p.1081). Their atrocities also included 
the arson and destruction of buildings and infrastructure, as well as the 
forceful deportation of people to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia 
(Dolan et al., 2004, p.12; KPP HAM, 2006, pp.35-39). Of the population of 
800,000, an estimated 1,400 to 1,500 were killed (CAVR, 2013, p.1058), 
250,000 to 280,000 moved out of East Timor under coercion or voluntarily, 
over 300,000 were internally displaced and went into hiding in hills and 
forests, and about 70% of the territory’s buildings and infrastructure were 
destroyed (Dolan et al., 2004, p.12). 
 Besides killing and destruction as punishment for the choice of 
independence, the post-ballot violence is understood to have been 
employed strategically. One of the perceived purposes was the 
delegitimisation of the ballot result through the creation of a massive flood of 
people to West Timor. This population movement was falsely presented as a 
voluntary one that occurred because people wanted to remain under 
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Indonesian rule (Reuter, 1999a; KPP HAM, 2006, p.41). Another major 
objective seems to have been to clear out independence supporters and 
divide the territory into two parts, with the western half remaining a part of 
Indonesia. From before the vote, East Timor Governor Abilio Soares and 
notorious militia leader Eurico Guterres had repeatedly claimed that East 
Timor should be partitioned if independence was selected in the vote (Dodd, 
1999a; Kristalis, 1999; Murdoch, 1999a; Djajamihardja, 2000, p.111). They 
continued to argue for the separation after the vote, referring to the 21% vote 
for autonomy and claiming that people in the western region supported the 
integration (AFP, 22 Sep 1999; Suwastoyo, 1999). 
3.2  The Deployment and Activity of INTERFET 
The widespread violence naturally provoked harsh criticism against the 
Indonesian government, which was responsible for maintaining the security 
of East Timor under the agreement between Indonesia, Portugal, and the 
UN on 5 May. Despite international calls to accept an international peace 
operation, the government repeatedly rejected it (e.g. Martinkus, 1999a; 
Riley, 1999). The Indonesian government sent in reinforcement troops and 
imposed martial law on 7 September, but the rampage continued (McInerney, 
1999a; Reuters, 1999b; The Jakarta Post, 1999d; UNDPI, 2000a, p.46; 
Greenlees and Garran, 2002, p.229). To persuade Indonesia to accept a 
peace operation, some countries, including the US and the UK, halted their 
military assistance to Indonesia, and some international financial 
organisations implied that they would halt their financial assistance, which 
was vital for Indonesia to recover from the currency crisis (Wheeler and 
Dunne, 2001, pp.818-820; Jago, 2010, pp.385, 387). Finally, on 12 
September, the Indonesian government consented to the deployment of an 
international force to restore security in East Timor (Thatcher, 1999; The 
Jakarta Post, 1999e). 
 Taking the urgency into account, it was agreed to dispatch a 
multinational force led by Australia, which had expressed its willingness to 
assume the leading role (Cumming, 1999; Nelson, 1999), rather than a UN 
operation that would take months to be deployed. On 15 September, the 
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UNSC adopted Resolution 1264, which authorised the establishment of the 
multinational force with the following tasks: “to restore peace and security in 
East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, 
within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations”. 
The force was also authorised “to take all necessary measures to fulfil this 
mandate” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UNSC, 1999a). 
 After its acceptance of an international force, the Indonesian 
government started to pull out its armed forces from East Timor, and the 
militias fled with them (Firdaus, 1999a; Lagan, 1999; United Press 
International, 1999). This made the capital, Dili, much quieter than before, 
and widespread killings wound down (Firdaus, 1999b; Moerdijat, 1999; 
Smith and Jarvis, 2018), but some militias remained in the territory and 
continued to perpetrate violence and destruction (Firdaus, 1999c; Johnston, 
1999a; CAVR, 2013, pp.1103-1116, 1320-1332). 
 INTERFET commenced its operation on 20 September. A 1,100-
strong force from Australia, New Zealand, and the UK secured Dili’s airport 
and port on the first day (McInerney, 1999b; DFAT, 2001, p.145). The 
following day, further troops arrived, increasing the force to some 2,300, and 
moved to secure various parts of Dili. On 22 September, INTERFET secured 
another airport in Baucau (Spencer, 1999a; DFAT, 2001, p.146). The 
commander of the local Indonesian forces handed over the responsibility for 
security to the commander of INTERFET on 27 September (Dodd, 1999b; 
Cosgrove, 2006, pp.211-212). The INTERFET troops started to disarm the 
militias in the streets from the day one and carried out sweeping operations 
in the capital (e.g. Friel, 1999; Spencer, 1999a). 
 Violence continued outside Dili while INTERFET was concentrating 
on the city, and stabilisation required forceful responses by INTERFET. After 
securing Dili, INTERFET was deployed to other towns in the east and west, 
where the force also disarmed or chased away the militias. From early 
October, INTERFET moved to secure the western border area of East Timor 
(Cosgrove, 2006, pp.217-218). The militia leaders claimed that East Timor’s 
western region should remain a part of Indonesia, and the area was thought 
of as the stronghold of the militias. Up until that point, INTERFET did not 
- 116 - 
have to actually use force, but it experienced some engagements with the 
militias during stabilisation operations in the western area. As elaborated 
below, INTERFET defeated the militias on each occasion. INTERFET was 
deployed to Oecussi, an enclave in West Timor, in late October and 
established its presence all over East Timor (DFAT, 2001, p.148; Cosgrove, 
2006, pp.247-249). In Oecussi, INTERFET was also challenged by the 
militias and had to use force. The strength of INTERFET increased to 9,400 
in November and reached 11,500 at its height (DFAT, 2001, pp.148, 153). 
 Even though a tense situation continued in the western border area 
and Oecussi, INTERFET largely restored security in most of the territory by 
the end of 1999 (UN, 1999j, p.4; 1999l, p.4; Breen, 2001, p.88; DFAT, 2001, 
p.148). Joao Tavares, the supreme commander of the militias’ umbrella 
organisation, the Integration Fighters’ Force (PPI), declared the disbandment 
of the militias on 13 December (AFP, 14 Dec 1999; The Jakarta Post, 
1999m). Meanwhile, the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) 
had formally accepted the result of the referendum and decided the 
secession of East Timor on 20 October (UNDPI, 2000a, p.56; DFAT, 2001, 
p.156). The UNSC adopted Resolution 1272 on 25 October and thereby 
established UNTAET (UNSC, 1999c), which took over the security 
responsibility from INTERFET on 23 February (DFAT, 2001, p.153). 
Following the UN administration, East Timor became independent on 20 
May 2002. 
3.3  The Examination of the Hypotheses 
It is understood that the military pressure of INTERFET induced the militias 
to halt their violence (e.g. Smith and Dee, 2006, pp.417-418; Seybolt, 2008, 
pp.254-261; Robinson, 2010, p.205). As the militias were using violence and 
INTERFET exerted pressure to change their behaviour, rather than to 
prevent something from happening, the pressure constituted compellence. 
After being pressured by INTERFET, the militias stopped their violence and 
resistance in East Timor despite retaining the capability to keep doing so. In 
fact, a small number of militias continued their armed activities during 
UNTAET (DFAT, 2001, p.169; Smith and Dee, 2003, pp.68-71; Breen and 
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McCauley, 2008, pp.125-147). This means that the compellence by 
INTERFET was not a complete success, but it succeeded in compelling the 
vast majority of the militias and did so using only a very small amount of 
force. Therefore, the compellence by INTERFET can be regarded as a major 
success. 
 The following section analyses the case from the perspective of each 
hypothesis. This chapter employs the congruence method and examines 
how closely the hypotheses coincide with what actually happened. 
3.3.1  Troop Numbers 
The first hypothesis to be examined (i.e. H1) is the troop numbers 
hypothesis. It expects that compellence is likely to succeed if the compellers 
have a numerical advantage over the target armed groups. INTERFET, 
however, succeeded without having a numerical advantage, so the case was 
inconsistent with the expectation. 
 At its peak, INTERFET had some 11,500 troops (Collins, 2000a; 
DFAT, 2001, p.153), but the real number of troops who were prepared for 
combat and could thus be used for compellence was much smaller than the 
total strength of INTERFET. First, its strength gradually increased, and it had 
fewer troops in the early phase. The international units that landed on 20 
September, the first day of the operation, had some 1,100 troops (DFAT, 
2001, p.145). This number increased to 2,300 the next day (Government of 
Australia, 1999). At the end of September, the overall strength of INTERFET 
reached 4,300 troops, of which 3,300 were from Australia (INTERFET, 
1999a). The number steadily grew to 5,000 as of 9 October (INTERFET, 
1999b) and to over 9,000 by the end of October (INTERFET, 1999c). 
 Moreover, security operations in precarious areas were mostly carried 
out by contingents from Australia, New Zealand, and the UK (Ryan, 2000, 
pp.64-65; Ballard, 2008, p.84), so only a part of the international force was 
relevant to compellence. Troops from other countries were small in scale or 
were mainly composed of humanitarian and logistics support units. In 
addition, Southeast Asian countries requested INTERFET not to assign their 
units to the volatile western border area, fearing the risk of confrontation with 
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the Indonesian forces and of suffering casualties (Shenon, 1999 ; Ryan, 
2000, pp.48-53; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.277-278). At the peak, 
Australia provided some 5,500 troops (DFAT, 2001, p.153). New Zealand 
and the UK deployed around 830 (Controller and Auditor-General, 2001, 
p.14) and 300 (Hansard HC Written Answers, 2 December 1999; Reuters, 
1999g), respectively. Their contributions included special operation forces 
from the Australian Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment, New Zealand SAS 
Regiment, and British Special Boat Service, and they composed the 
Response Force, whose strength was around 200 troops (Horner, 2002, 
p.490; Thompson, 2015, p.147). In sum, the total strength of the troops from 
the three countries was some 6,600 at peak. 
 Regarding the potential local auxiliaries, there were some 670 pro-
independence FALINTIL guerrillas, but they did not play a role in 
compellence. Despite the widespread violence in the pre- and post-ballot 
phases, FALINTIL agreed to stay at cantonment sites after August and did 
not retaliate so as to avoid legitimising the violence by the pro-integration 
militias and the supporting Indonesian security forces (Martin, 2001, pp.72-
73; CAVR, 2013, p.296). Although INTERFET requested some help from 
FALINTIL to guide the deployment of INTERFET units (Horner, 2002, pp.501, 
508; Cotton, 2004, p.137), the multinational force tried to keep the guerrillas 
at their bases so that no armed element other than INTERFET would remain 
operative (UN, 1999h, p.5; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.230-231; Kilcullen, 2009, 
p.205). Although there were some reports that FALINTIL clashed with the 
militias or the Indonesian military (e.g. AFP, 29 Sep 1999; Dodd, 1999c), it 
did not participate in putting pressure on the pro-integration militias. It can be 
said that the compellers did not use auxiliary forces in this case; therefore, 
the number of FALINTIL guerrillas should not be added to the size of the 
compeller. 
 Hence, the relevant compeller troop numbers were those of Australia, 
New Zealand, and the UK, and the total changed over time. At first, the 
figure was as small as some 1,100 but was later increased to some 6,600. 
However, again, not all these troops were positioned in areas in which 
compellence was employed, and locally focused examination is required. 
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 Regarding the target side, the true number of the militias is unclear 
and inevitably becomes a matter of conjecture to some extent. Militia leaders, 
including the top militia leader, Tavares, and another notorious leader, 
Guterres, claimed that the strength was 13,000 and later that it was even as 
high as 50,000 (AFP, 25 Feb 1999; Antara, 1999a; Reuter, 1999c; DFAT, 
2001, p.60). Some analyses adopt the speculation of 15,000 (Frost and 
Cobb, 2000, p.10) or 20,000 (Dunn, 2002, p.73), but other estimates show 
much smaller figures. For example, a DFAT publication estimates that the 
figure was several thousands (DFAT, 2001, p.60). This seems to have been 
the estimation that was made by the Australian government at the time. An 
Australian official stated that the strength of the militias was at least 6,000 
(Garran, 1999a), and a pre-deployment news article reported that the 
Australian Defence Force estimated that the core members of the militias 
totalled 5,000 to 7,000 (Daley, 1999a). In an analysis report submitted to the 
Australian parliament, it was estimated that the number of trained and 
committed militias was 2,000 to 5,000 (Cobb, 1999, p.7). A news report 
covering a training camp of the militias reported the militias’ whole strength 
as some 7,000 (Pereira, 1999a), and another article similarly reported that 
the figure was 7,000 at maximum, citing the view of a Western intelligence 
source (Djalal, 1999). The commander of INTERFET, Major General Peter 
Cosgrove, showed his estimate to be about 5,000 in early November 
(Johnston, 1999c), while in early December, INTERFET reported to the UN 
its estimation that 1,000 to 2,000 militias were in West Timor and that fewer 
than 100 remained in East Timor (UN, 1999l, p.4). Based on these different 
views, the best estimate of the militias’ strength seems to be between 5,000 
and 7,000, while the number must have fluctuated, and hard-core elements 
could have been smaller. 
 A factor complicating the comparison is Indonesian troops, but their 
number should be excluded from the size of the target side. When 
INTERFET started its deployment, as many as 15,000 Indonesian troops 
remained in East Timor (Naughton, 1999; Breen, 2001, p.58). They were in 
the process of withdrawal, and the number quickly shrank to some 1,300 in 
about a week (Breen, 2001, p.58; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.211-212). However, a 
significant number of Indonesian troops existed in Dili during the first week of 
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INTERFET, including those passing there on their way to West Timor. Some 
of them were cooperative with INTERFET, but others, especially those who 
had been in East Timor since before the ballot, were hostile and often 
provoked the international troops (Kilcullen, 2000, p.132; Breen, 2001, pp.31, 
34, 43, 48, 55). Nevertheless, the Indonesian military was not an object of 
compellence by direct military pressure. This was an intervention with the 
consent of Indonesia, and the Indonesian troops were naturally excluded 
from the target of disarmament by INTERFET (UN, 1999h, p.5; Cosgrove, 
2006, p.202). The two forces tried to avoid confrontation. Major General 
Cosgrove flew to Dili the day before the commencement of INTERFET and 
coordinated the deployment of the force with Major General Kiki Syahnakri, 
the local commander of the Indonesian forces (Eccleston, 1999; Cosgrove, 
2006, pp.179-186). They maintained coordination after the deployment of 
INTERFET through daily Joint Security Coordination Group meetings 
(Dickens, 2001, p.226; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.194-195). Therefore, it is 
appropriate to exclude the number of Indonesian troops when analysing the 
balance of force. The effects of their support to the militias is analysed in a 
different section dealing with third-party support. 
 The balance of troops between the compeller and the target can be 
analysed locally at each phase of the operation: Dili, the western border area, 
and Oecussi enclave. In Dili, INTERFET soon achieved a numerical 
advantage over the militias. On its first two days, INTERFET deployed more 
than 2,300 troops that were mainly composed of two Australian battalions, a 
British Gurkha company, and the Response Force, as mentioned above. The 
militia group that operated in Dili was Aitarak, led by Guterres, and its 
strength was thought to be about 1,500 (CAVR, 2013, p.291; Robinson, 
2013, p.2749). It was reported that the militias fled from Dili in advance of the 
deployment of INTERFET (Firdaus, 1999a; Lagan, 1999), so the actual 
number of militias who remained in Dili seems to have been smaller than 
1,500. The existence of large Indonesian troops at the time prevented 
INTERFET from simply dominating Dili, but INTERFET had a larger number 
of troops than the militias. This rapid insertion of substantial forces could 
have been one of the factors that caused the initial success of compellence 
in Dili. 
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 In the western border area, however, INTERFET was outnumbered 
by the militias. Initially, INTERFET deployed a force of around 1,000, whose 
main body was an Australian battalion which had some 700 troops 
(Cosgrove, 2006, pp.184, 217-218; Kilcullen, 2010, p.111). Almost all the 
militias were thought to have retreated to West Timor, and it was estimated 
that its overall strength was 5,000 to 7,000, as discussed above, which was 
significantly larger in number than INTERFET in the western area. After mid-
October, two more battalions – one from Australia and the other from New 
Zealand – were deployed to the western area, and the strength of 
INTERFET there increased to 3,000 troops (Shenon, 1999; Breen, 2001, 
pp.63, 67; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.286-287; Burnett, 2015, pp.215-
216). Even with this reinforcement, however, the numerical balance of force 
there was still unfavourable to INTERFET. Moreover, one of the Australian 
battalions was relocated to Oecussi in mid-November, and the presence of 
INTERFET in the western border area was reduced to two battalions (Breen, 
2001, pp.79, 89; Crawford and Harper, 2001, p.96; Blaxland, 2008, p.311). 
 In Oecussi, INTERFET effectively had a numerical advantage over 
the militias. At first, INTERFET deployed a force of an around 200 to 
Oecussi and later replaced it with an Australian battalion (Breen, 2001, 
p.115; Cosgrove, 2006, p.247). Oecussi is an enclave surrounded by 
Indonesian West Timor and the sea, so the militias could concentrate their 
forces there if they chose to do so. This means that INTERFET could have 
been outnumbered by the militias there. However, the militias who were 
active in the area were those from the group named Sakunar. It had at least 
200 members in September (Robinson, 2013, p.2844), and the number 
probably decreased later (Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.292-293). 
Therefore, at least after the deployment of a battalion, INTERFET had a 
numerical advantage. However, this small Sakunar force did not challenge 
the initial small contingent of INTERFET (Crane, 2015, p.174), but it 
launched attacks against a larger force of a battalion in January, as 
elaborated in the following sections. 
 The above analysis demonstrates that INTERFET did not always 
have the favourable balance of troops, and the fact that the case ended in 
success without numerical advantage contradicts the expectation of the 
- 122 - 
hypothesis. INTERFET soon established a numerical advantage over the 
militias in Dili, and this may have contributed to the initial success of 
compellence. However, INTERFET was outnumbered by the militias in the 
western border area, where most of the resistance by the militias occurred. 
Nevertheless, INTERFET was able to successfully compel the militias to give 
up their objectives. Moreover, a small local militia group kept up its activity 
and even challenged a larger INTERFET force in Oecussi. With this 
evidence, it can be said that the favourable balance of troops was not 
necessary for the success of compellence in this case. Therefore, the case 
is not consistent with H1. 
3.3.2  The Strategy of Compellence 
The next to be examined is H2 – that is, the strategy hypothesis – which 
focuses on how compellers apply pressure. The expectation is that the 
combination of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy and the carrot-and-
stick strategy is more effective than an ultimatum. The East Timor case 
demonstrates that the gradual turning of the screw was effective, but without 
any positive inducements used by the compeller. Therefore, the case 
partially corresponds with the hypothesis. 
 INTERFET employed the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy. The 
gradual escalation was carried out geographically, rather than increasing the 
level of threats or destruction capabilities. The mandate of the force did not 
change from that given in UNSC Resolution 1264, which provided blank-
check authorisation to use all necessary means to achieve the broad 
objective of the restoration of order. Immediately before the commencement 
of the operation, Major General Cosgrove told the media, “I think the best 
thing for the militias would be to surrender their weapons and become 
peaceful, law-abiding Timorese. If that is not to their liking, then maybe they 
need to leave East Timor” (Cole-Adams, 1999). He also emphasised that the 
multinational force would be ready to “respond robustly” if the militias 
directed their violence against local and international civilians in East Timor, 
as well as INTERFET itself (Zannuba et al., 1999). He repeated a similar 
warning after the first firefight between INTERFET and the militias on 6 
October, saying, “I feel some sadness for those who attacked Interfet 
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soldiers. They obviously came off worse and that will continue to be the case 
until they negotiate and surrender their weapons” (The Australian, 1999). In 
sum, from the beginning, the compeller threatened the militias with lethal 
force if they did not disarm or leave and stop violence. 
 The type of military capability deployed was also constant. The main 
source of pressure was infantry backed by armoured vehicles and utility 
helicopters. Higher-end platforms, such as naval vessels and fighter aircraft, 
were put on standby in Australia or deployed near East Timor but were not 
used in combat. They were deterrents against the Indonesian regular forces 
rather than constituting compellent pressure against the militias (Cobb, 1999, 
p.5; Dickens, 2001, pp.222-225; McDonald, 2001). 
 With these constant threats and pressure, INTERFET gradually 
expanded its area of deployment. In fact, it had to establish its presence and 
demonstrate its capability in the whole territory before successfully 
compelling the militias, and this seems to have been because the pro-
integration militias were fragmented. There were more than 20 militia 
organisations (Robinson, 2010, p.100), and the connection between them 
was loose, although there was an umbrella organisation – the PPI (Crouch, 
2003, p.151). The supreme commander of the PPI, Tavares, did not seem to 
fully understand or control the whole organisation (Bartu, 2001, p.78). Its 
looseness of command and control could be seen in the fact that a subgroup 
of the Halilintar militia led by a local commander disobeyed the order to 
retreat to West Timor and remained at Aidabasalala, a village in the western 
region within East Timor (Kilcullen, 2000, pp.131, 135-136). Similarly, militia 
activities continued around the Oecussi enclave after January 2000, 
although Tavares had declared that the militias would give up armed 
resistance and would disarm and disband the militia organisations in 
December 1999, as mentioned earlier. Guterres also refused the 
disbandment and claimed to maintain his militia group, although he agreed 
to relinquish the guerrilla war option (Murdoch, 1999d; Reuters, 1999h; 
Martinkus, 2000a). 
 In dealing with these fractured militias, INTERFET had to demonstrate 
its capability in the whole operational area before stabilising the situation. 
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Although the majority of the militias fled to West Timor with the retreating 
Indonesian forces, some remained in East Timor or infiltrated back from 
West Timor and continued violence until INTERFET arrived in their areas. 
 In its first days, INTERFET focused on securing Dili, where it detained 
a number of militias and confiscated weapons (Spencer 1999a; Breen, 2001, 
pp.42-43, 49-50, 53; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.191-192). INTERFET carried out 
an extensive cordon-and-search operation in Dili on 24 September, after 
which the provocation and threats by the militias and the remaining 
Indonesian troops there decreased significantly (Breen, 2001, pp.55-56; 
Cosgrove, 2006, p.209). 
 However, this demonstration of assertiveness did not halt the violence 
and destruction outside Dili. For example, the withdrawing Indonesian forces 
and the militias continued burning buildings in the countryside (Struck, 1999). 
Murder also continued in the central and eastern regions of East Timor; for 
example, at least eight passengers of a car and a passerby on the road 
between Lautém and Baucau in the eastern area were murdered on 25 
September (Dillon, 1999; CAVR, 2013, pp.1092, 1114, 1116). 
 The militias in the eastern town of Com also tried to continue the 
forcible deportation of residents, which was prevented by INTERFET. On 27 
September, INTERFET received a report that the militias were apprehending 
a large number of people at Com and trying to deport them. The Response 
Force was soon deployed to the town and demanded that the militias 
surrender. The militias tried to escape, but the Response Force interdicted 
and arrested them. This intervention freed hundreds of hostages (Horner, 
2002, pp.499-500; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.212-213; McPhedran, 2007, pp.81-
87). A few days later, INTERFET once again rescued residents who were 
held hostage by the militias there (Watts, 1999; Richards, 2014, pp.116-117). 
 The militias remained active in the western area of East Timor as well, 
staying there or infiltrating back from West Timor. Killings and the forceful 
movement of residents continued in Bobonaro, Covalima, and Ainaro in late 
September and October (Martinkus, 1999b; CAVR, 2013, pp.1094, 1104-
1110). Arsons also continued in Ainaro, Balibo, Maliana, and Ermera (Dodd, 
1999d; UNDPI, 1999a; Windhausen, 1999). 
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 To stop the violence, INTERFET had to exert pressure in the western 
area. A numbers of militias remained in the town of Liquica, and they fled 
only after INTERFET dropped warning leaflets just before its actual 
deployment in late September (Murdoch, 1999c; Mydans, 1999). Others 
were more stubborn, and INTERFET’s stabilisation operations in the western 
area, which were launched from early October, did not go as smoothly as its 
previous operations. The militias directly challenged INTERFET in the area, 
and they exchanged fire several times, as elaborated in the next section. An 
example of such stubborn militias was the subgroup of Halilintar, which 
remained at Aidabasalala and continued its killing and other violence. The 
group fled to West Timor only after being defeated by INTERFET in contacts 
(Kilcullen, 2000, pp.135-136; Martinkus, 2001, p.401). It took some time 
before the militias learned the competence of the international force, but 
repeated defeats gradually led to the end of major security incidents in the 
area. 
 Again, these operations by INTERFET were not sufficient to stop the 
militias in the last place in which the force was absent – the Oecussi enclave. 
On 23 September, hundreds of militias started a large-scale hunt for 
independence supporters hiding there (The Jakarta Post, 1999i). The 
murders by the militias and Indonesian soldiers continued throughout late 
September and October (CAVR, 2013, pp.1097, 1116). The militias fled only 
after INTERFET arrived in the enclave in late October, and infiltrations from 
West Timor continued even after that (Aglionby, 1999; Pristel, 1999; Breen, 
2001, p.109). INTERFET had to fight back those infiltrating militias and exert 
pressure on the ground in this area too, as elaborated in the next section. 
 As has been discussed, INTERFET applied pressure against the 
militias using gradual escalation rather than an ultimatum, and this method 
was effective in this case. INTERFET expanded deployment to the whole 
East Timor in sequence to stop violence. This was necessary because the 
militias were fragmented. As there was “not one brain”, INTERFET had to 
accumulate the effect of locally applied pressure to convince the bulk of the 
militias (Kilcullen, 2019). 
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 This development corresponds with the expectation of H2 regarding 
the point that the gradual turning of the screw is effective. However, the 
case’s correspondence to H2 remains partial, because INTERFET did not 
use any positive inducements. The use of carrots was not necessary for 
success in this case. 
3.3.3  Credibility 
The next hypothesis, H3, deals with the credibility of threats. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, there are four possible sources of threat credibility: national 
interests, strong domestic support, a previously acquired advantageous 
reputation, and the actual use of force. The hypothesis is that the actual use 
of force is most effective among them. Although all the potential sources 
existed in this case (pre-earned reputation was mixed, and the condition was 
met only partially), it demonstrates that the actual use of force was 
necessary for success. 
 The first source that will be examined is the salience of the issues to 
the compellers. For Australia, regional stability was at stake in this case, so 
the country’s national interest was involved. In his speech just before the 
launch of INTERFET, Australian Prime Minister John Howard stated the 
following: 
 
We decided to do it, not only because it was right but also because it 
was in our national interest to do so. Continued instability, of the kind 
we have so recently witnessed, in a territory so close to Australia 
could have serious consequences for us in the longer run (Howard, 
1999). 
 
Australia regarded the Asia-Pacific region, particularly its immediate 
neighbourhood, as strategically important (Australian Department of Defence 
[DOD], 1994, pp.16, 86-87; 1997, pp.7-10; 2000, pp.29-31; DFAT, 1997, 
pp.1-2). The experience of Japanese invasion through neighbouring islands 
during World War II drove Australia to be vigilant against instability in the 
region that may be utilised by hostile powers and elements as a launching 
pad to attack Australia (Australian DOD, 1997, p.10; Breen, 2009). There 
was also the risk of refugee flows (Cotton, 2004, p.5). Thus, if East Timor 
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would be independent, its stability was a big stake for Australia (White, 2008, 
p.75). 
 In fact, Australia started preparation for force deployment soon after 
the announcement of Habibie’s decision.8 When East Timor plunged into 
chaos after the vote, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated 
on 4 September that a coalition of the willing–style multinational force would 
be necessary before a UN peacekeeping operation and that Australia could 
lead it (Cumming, 1999; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.237-238). On 6 
September, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called Prime Minister Howard 
to ask to lead a multinational force, and Howard accepted it (DFAT, 2001, 
p.133; Henry, 2013, p.104). 
 The target side also perceived that the strategic interests of Australia 
were involved, although the connotation was negative. There were 
discussions in Indonesia that Australia had ulterior motives, such as its 
interest in the oil in the Timor gap, and that this was why it was taking the 
initiative regarding the international force (Republika, 1999; The Jakarta Post, 
1999f). The militias shared this view and denounced the intervention as a 
neo-colonialist attempt or as being based on territorial ambition (Kompas, 
1999; Kyodo News Service, 1999; Reuter, 1999d; RTP Internacional TV, 
1999). 
 The second possible source of credibility is domestic support, which 
was strong in this case. Opinion polls by Australian newspapers showed that 
Australia enjoyed strong domestic support. Two pre-deployment opinion 
polls showed over 70% support for sending troops to East Timor (Henderson 
and Nason, 1999; Wright, 1999), and a post-deployment one showed over 
 
8  In February 1999, the Australian government decided to raise the 
readiness status of a brigade so that it could deploy two brigades at 
short notice by June. The Australian Defence Force soon started 
planning for participation in a peacekeeping operation, initially assuming 
that it would be a UN-led one, and for non-combatant evacuation 
operations from May, based on a UN request (White, 2008, pp.75-76, 
80-81; Henry, 2013, pp.92-93,101). 
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80% support (Rollins, 1999). Australian participation in INTERFET received 
higher domestic support than any other overseas military deployment after 
World War II (Greenlees and Garran, 2002, p.270). This widespread support 
was a product of the extensive coverage of pre- and post-ballot violence by 
the media, which generated great attention to and humanitarian concern 
about East Timor among the Australian public. This concern was also 
expressed in the forms of mass demonstrations, as well as a large number 
of phone calls and other contact with politicians to urge action (Tapsell and 
Eidenfalk, 2013, pp.587-591). The parliament also provided strong support. 
Even though the opposition criticised the government’s management of the 
crisis, the decision to send Australian troops to East Timor was supported by 
a bipartisan motion (Daley, 1999b; McGregor, 1999). This wide domestic 
support provided the government with flexibility in its moves, as well as 
pressure to “do something” (White, 2008, p.81; Connery, 2010, pp.51-55). 
 The third possible source of credibility is reputation based on previous 
behaviour. In this case, the compeller had a mixed reputation, but it was not 
based on past Australian behaviour. 
 Australia’s most recent experience of similar missions at the time was 
UNITAF in Somalia, and Australian performance in the mission could have 
built an advantageous reputation. An Australian battalion group that joined 
UNITAF was deployed to an area around the southwestern city of Baidoa. 
Despite US hesitation about disarming warring factions during UNITAF, the 
Australians took risks and proactively disarmed the Somalis. The Australians 
suppressed violence by actively patrolling and robustly responding to attacks, 
and they successfully stabilised Baidoa (Mellor, 1995; Patman, 1997; Hardy, 
2007). Australian activities in Baidoa were an exceptional success in 
Somalia, and they demonstrated the Australian troops’ potency in 
stabilisation operations and their will to take risks. 
 However, the Australian performance in Somalia did not lead to an 
advantageous reputation in the eyes of the militias in East Timor. The militias 
regarded INTERFET as a capable force but one that they could cope with 
using irregular tactics. Guterres, a notorious militia leader, said that 
INTERFET had “sophisticated weapons” (Spencer, 1999b), and another 
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recruited militia described the force as “professional soldiers” (Pereira, 
1999a). At the same time, the militias thought that they could counterbalance 
this advantage of INTERFET. Guterres stated, “[INTERFET does] not know 
East Timor as well as the militias. It is not possible for the tanks to go into 
the jungle” (Spencer, 1999b). The other militia mentioned above also added, 
“We are fighting a war on our own turf. We know every corner of East Timor 
much better than our enemies and can easily cause problems for them” 
(Pereira, 1999a). An Aitarak company commander also stated that the 
militias could wage a guerrilla war and inflict pain on Australian troops, while 
admitting that there was no chance to compete with them in a conventional 
war (Pereira, 1999b). Despite Australian troops demonstrating their 
capabilities to counter irregular threats in Somalia, the militias did not have 
such an image about INTERFET. Rather, the militias’ image about the 
capabilities of the Australian forces seems to have been based on a general 
image about the militaries of Western developed countries. 
 In addition to capabilities, the militias’ perception of INTERFET’s 
resolve was not based on Australian troops’ past behaviour. An Aitarak 
platoon commander stated, “Psychologically, we are prepped up more than 
the average Australian soldier, who is probably thinking about what a nice 
life he left behind in Australia for the horrors in East Timor” (Pereira, 1999a). 
This implies that the militias thought that Australians’ resolve was weak. Not 
a militia but a politician, Abdurrahman Wahid, later president of Indonesia, 
had a much clearer image about Australians’ resolve. He said, “It will be like 
Somalia”, and he added, “When 10 [Australian soldiers] are hit, that will 
change public opinion in Australia” (Richburg, 1999a). According to Ball 
(2006, p.196), an Australian intelligence agency reported that the Indonesian 
military and the militias also regarded INTERFET as weakly resolved by 
analogy with the case of Somalia. The above information indicates that the 
target of compellence constructed the image of Australians’ resolve not 
based on their behaviour in Somalia but on more famous US behaviour. The 
Australian forces’ demonstration of their willingness to take risks in 
stabilising Baidoa did not lead to an advantageous reputation. 
 In sum, Australia had a somewhat favourable reputation in terms of 
capabilities but did not have a good reputation in terms of resolve. Despite 
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the successful performance of the Australian troops in Somalia, the militias 
did not construct their image of INTERFET based on the Australians’ past 
behaviour. Rather, the militias’ image was based on a general image about 
Western developed states or more famous US experience. 
 It is difficult to obtain information about the militias’ perceptions of 
these factors and their effects. However, the comparison between the actual 
course of events and the prediction of the hypothesis provides insights into 
these factors’ impacts on the success of compellence. In the case of 
INTERFET, the salience of the issue for Australia and the domestic support 
it had were constant during the intervention. Its pre-earned reputation was 
also constant by definition. Therefore, if these factors had made the threats 
credible and thereby led the compellence to success, the compellence by 
INTERFET should have been successful from beginning to end. Or, if the 
three factors per se had not been enough and other conditions had been 
necessary for the success, the compellence by INTERFET should have 
turned from initial failure to success as the additional conditions came to be 
satisfied. 
 As it was, the East Timor case showed a different pattern: The 
compellence initially went smoothly and then faced some resistance, but it 
finally succeeded. INTERFET faced only very small resistance in its first two 
weeks. There was at least one attempt to point a weapon at INTERFET 
troops (Murdoch, 1999b), one sniper-fire incident (Spencer, 1999a), and 
several standoffs involving not only the militias but also the Indonesian 
troops,9 but the militias usually surrendered without resistance when 
challenged by INTERFET during its operations in Dili and the eastern area. 
 
9  On 21 September, standoffs erupted when a convoy of withdrawing 
Indonesian troops was stopped at checkpoints that had been 
established by INTERFET. INTERFET let the convoy go through after 
tense confrontations (Breen, 2001, pp.44-47; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.201-
204). On 25 September, a small team led by the Response Force visited 
Tibar village to investigate a mass grave. The team encountered the 
militias there, and the troops detained some of them. However, soon, 
- 131 - 
 Despite a promising start, INTERFET faced resistance by force when 
it moved into the western border area. As discussed in detail below, starting 
with an incident on 6 October, INTERFET experienced at least eight 
engagements, including those occurred in Oecussi. To understand the 
change in the militias’ response, it is necessary to take their objectives into 
account. The militias and other integrationists repeatedly claimed before and 
after the ballot that East Timor should be partitioned and that the western 
part should remain in Indonesia. The western area bordering West Timor 
had been relatively pro-Indonesia, and the militias believed that the support 
for autonomy was the majority vote there, although the regional ballot results 
were not announced (AFP, 22 Sep 1999; Suwastoyo, 1999; Djajamihardja, 
2000, p.111; Kilcullen, 2000, pp.133, 150). It can be said that the militias 
were committed to keeping the western area under their control. In fact, 
Guterres declared that the intervening force should not enter western eight 
districts out of thirteen in total in East Timor (Cole-Adams and Skehan, 1999; 
Garran, 1999b). 
 The three sources of credibility were not sufficient to compel the 
militias to stop their violence in the western area. The three seem to have 
been effective in terms of compelling the militias to stop their activities in the 
eastern and central areas, but mere threats, despite being supported by the 
three factors, could not induce the militias to give up their more committed 
objective. 
 What was needed was the actual use of force and the demonstration 
of compeller’s competence – the fourth source of credibility. As described 
below, INTERFET had to resort to force in the western area and Oecussi. 
These combats and defeats were necessary for the militias to realise the 
futility of their resistance. 
 The first use of force by INTERFET occurred on 6 October. That day, 
the Response Force raided the western town of Suai, which was used as the 
 
three trucks full of Indonesian troops and militias appeared, and a 
standoff ensued. It ended as the Indonesians retrieved the detained 
militias and left the scene (Breen, 2001, p.57; Horner, 2002, 498-499). 
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militias’ supply route. During the operation, a bus and a truck full of militias 
coming from West Timor attempted to drive through an INTERFET roadblock. 
The troops stopped the vehicles by firing at the tyres and engine of the truck, 
wounding six militias. The Response Force detained more than 100 militias 
that day and transferred 10 detainees, who had either been wounded or 
were thought to be as important, to Dili. The troops decided to send the 
remaining militias back to West Timor, but on the way, the escorting convoy 
was ambushed by another group of militias. Two SAS soldiers were 
wounded by the first burst, but the troops took cover and returned fire. Soon, 
the reinforcement with armoured vehicles arrived from Suai and repelled the 
attackers. Two militias were killed in the contact (Horner, 2002, pp.503-505; 
Cosgrove, 2006, pp.222-223; McPhedran, 2007, pp.90-98). 
 The Response Force had another small contact with the militias on 9 
October. The militia groups approached the unit’s observation post near Alto 
Lebos and probed the area by firing. One of them pointed his gun at the 
observation post, so the troops shot and killed him. The remaining militias 
fled to West Timor as an INTERFET helicopter arrived on the scene 
(Johnston, 1999b; Horner, 2002, p.506). 
 On 10 October, INTERFET experienced a fierce firefight with the 
regular Indonesian security forces and the militias at Motaain, a village on 
the border between East and West Timor. An Australian battalion received 
information about the presence of the Indonesian forces and the militias at 
Motaain and dispatched a patrol to check the situation. As a matter of fact, 
the village was on the West Timor side of the border, and the militias training 
there with the Indonesian army and police opened fire on the patrol when it 
approached the village.10 The patrol took cover and returned fire. An element 
 
10  The leading element of the patrol was almost about to cross the border 
according to the map used by INTERFET and had just crossed it 
according to the one used by the Indonesian security forces (UN, 1999i, 
Appendix B). The Indonesian side denied the presence of the militias on 
the scene, and the UN investigation that followed also adopted the idea 
(UN, 1999i, p.11). However, the INTERFET troops observed people in 
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of the militias tried to outflank the patrol but was repelled by its rear guard. 
During the firefight, the militias started to retreat from the scene by truck 
under the regular forces’ cover. Eventually, the firing dwindled, and a linguist 
communicated with Indonesians to establish a ceasefire. This engagement 
killed an Indonesian police officer and wounded several others, while 
INTERFET suffered no casualty (UN, 1999i, Attachment 1, pp.2-13; Kilcullen, 
2010, pp.114-127). 
 A Response Force patrol reconnoitring a militia route near the village 
of Aidabasalala also had a major battle on 16 October. Five or six militias 
found the six-man patrol, and one of the militias tried to point his weapon at 
the troops. The SAS troops shot more quickly and downed three of the 
militias. More militias appeared and attacked the troops, seemingly trying to 
surround them, so the patrol broke contact and retreated while inflicting 
casualties on the attackers. After a while, two INTERFET helicopters arrived 
and retrieved the patrol. The series of contacts lasted some 90 minutes, and 
four or five militias were killed and three wounded (Kilcullen, 2000, p.136; 
Horner, 2002, pp.506-508; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.238-239). 
 An Australian company experienced another contact in the vicinity of 
Beluluk Leten village near the border the following week. Helicopter flights 
over the area had been fired upon repeatedly from the ground on the 
previous day, and another flight was used as a lure. Some 30 militias soon 
started firing at the helicopter, and the company challenged the militias. 
However, the militias were accompanied by women and children, who were 
being used as human shields, and only snipers could engage. The sniper 
shots missed their targets but still caused the militias to flee back to West 
Timor (Breen, 2001, p.87; Blaxland, 2008, p.311). 
 The militias’ activities weakened after these defeats. The western 
border region remained tense, and small-scale incursions did not cease 
completely (Ansley, 1999; Ware, 2000). Security incidents happened in the 
 
militia T-shirts on the scene (UN, 1999i, Attachment 1), and moreover, a 
militia who was involved in the incident was later detained by INTERFET 
(Kilcullen, 2000, pp.118-119; 2010, pp.135-136). 
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inner regions as well (UNDPI, 1999b). However, no major security incident 
happened thereafter (UN, 1999j, p.4; 1999l, p.4; Breen, 2001, p.88), and 
then the overall leader of the militias, Tavares, announced the disbandment 
of the militias on 13 December. 
 INTERFET had to use force in Oecussi too. While international troops 
initially detained a number of militias without using force there (Breen, 2001, 
pp.115-118; Horner, 2002, pp.508-509), the militias remained active to the 
end, even after Tavares announced the militias’ disbandment. On 17 
January, some 40 militias confronted and shot at civilians and burnt houses 
in Mahata. The militias retreated when INTERFET arrived at the scene. In 
another incident on the day, INTERFET was attacked by some 20 militias 
near Passabe. INTERFET repelled the attack, and a militia was wounded. 
The militias later attacked INTERFET again in the same area but retreated 
after a counterattack (UN, 2000c, para.22; Breen, 2001, p.120). The next 
day, the militias intruded into the area near Mahata on two occasions. In one 
case, the INTERFET soldiers fired at and drove away the militias after the 
latter directed their weapons at the troops. In the other case, the militias 
retreated without a clash with INTERFET (UN, 2000c, para.23; Breen, 2001, 
p.120). In February, the local militia leader responsible for these and other 
troubles was arrested by the Indonesian authorities, leading to the end of the 
militia group (Breen, 2001, p.120; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.293-294; 
Cosgrove, 2006, pp.304-305). 
 In sum, the actual use of force, albeit a small amount as a whole, was 
necessary to compel the militias. According to the Australian DOD, 13 
incidents occurred and resulted in seven killed and thirteen wounded in total. 
All the casualties were suffered by the militias, except for two Australian 
troops who were wounded and an Indonesian police officer who was killed 
(Dodd, 2000b). These engagements and the actual killing of those who 
refused to halt their violence were necessary to underline the message of 
INTERFET’s threats (Kilcullen, 2019). According to Breen and McCauley 
(2008, p.124), intelligence showed that the perception that the border area 
was dangerous spread among the militias after these engagements. Mere 
threats based on other sources of credibility were not enough to compel the 
militias to give up the partition of East Timor. It was only after the actual use 
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of force that the militias learned the futility of their effort and accepted the 
reality. The course of events corresponds well with the expectation of H3. 
3.3.4  Denial 
The denial hypothesis, H4, is the next to be examined. There are four 
generally applicable ways to achieve denial in peace operations: attrition, 
stronghold neutralisation, decapitation, and counter-coercion negation. The 
hypothesis is that counter-coercion negation is the most effective among 
them. INTERFET achieved denial mostly through counter-coercion negation, 
so this case is consistent with the hypothesis. 
 The first approach to denial is attrition. INTERFET inflicted casualties 
on the militias, but the number was too small to call this attrition. As 
mentioned above, INTERFET killed only six militias and wounded only 
eleven. Even if the militias suffered more casualties that were officially 
unconfirmed, the amount would not exceed a few dozen. With this small 
number of casualties, attrition cannot be the mechanism that worked in this 
case. 
 The second approach, stronghold neutralisation, was only partially 
achieved. INTERFET neutralised the militias’ strongholds in the western 
area of East Timor after October, and this must have constrained the militias’ 
operational capability. Because of its geographical location, the stance of 
regional officials, and the long history of the pro-Indonesian people’s network, 
the western region of East Timor was the stronghold of the militias (Cristalis, 
2009, p.86; Robinson, 2013, pp.2691-2694). The PPI leader, Tavares, also 
had his base in Bobonaro, one of the western districts (Bartu, 2001, p.76). In 
addition to Tavares’s Halilintar, Mahidi and Besi Merah Putih, which were 
infamous militia groups, were from the western region (Antara, 1999a; Bartu, 
2001, p.80). The militias’ operations there were more active than in other 
regions; over 70% of the violence reported to the CAVR happened there 
(CAVR, 2013, pp.509, 550). 
 However, the militias obtained new strongholds in West Timor. It 
seems that the militias’ game plan was to launch a guerrilla war from the 
safe havens in West Timor rather than to hold and resist in the western 
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border region. In fact, most of them quickly retreated to West Timor even 
before INTERFET reached the western area. The militias first held their 
coordination meetings in Dili but relocated their nerve centre to Atambua in 
West Timor (Radio Renascenca, 1999; Reuter, 1999e; Bartu, 2001, pp.87-
88). They dominated refugee camps and created military camps in West 
Timor, from where they launched cross-border attacks (e.g. Hawksley, 1999; 
Pereira, 1999a; Richburg, 1999b). They were left at large in West Timor, and 
the militias’ control of the camps continued well into the year 2000 (e.g. 
Richburg, 1999c; Martinkus, 2000b; Mydans, 2000). As Major General 
Cosgrove admitted, INTERFET could not completely seal the border 
because of its terrain (Chandrasekaran, 1999; Marshall, 1999a; 1999c). 
Therefore, infiltrations into East Timor became harder but were not 
impossible for the militias, and they could continue their attacks against the 
INTERFET border patrols and positions if they wanted to. In sum, stronghold 
neutralisation must have worked against the militias but does not seem to 
have been critical as a source of denial when taking into account the 
existence of their new strongholds in West Timor. 
 The third method of denial is decapitation, but this was not applied 
against the target in this case. An exception was the leader of Sakunar in 
Oecussi, Moko Soares. He was arrested by the Indonesian authorities after 
INTERFET’s strong demand to take action against him (Greenlees and 
Garran, 2002, pp.293-294; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.304-305). However, he was 
merely a local militia leader, and the PPI leader, Tavares, and his deputy, 
Guterres, remained intact. It can be said that the role decapitation played 
was small. 
 The final type of denial to be examined is counter-coercion negation, 
which INTERFET exercised very well. The militias employed casualty-
generating and civilian suffering-based strategies, but INTERFET could 
effectively negate these attempts. 
 The militias’ main counter-coercion strategy was casualty generation. 
They attacked INTERFET units and tried to inflict casualties, as described in 
the previous sections. However, INTERFET suffered only two wounded 
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casualties from hostile actions (Dodd, 2000b), and the militias’ attempts 
failed. 
 INTERFET had good force protection owing to some factors. First, the 
commander of the force, Major General Cosgrove, took a cautious approach 
to troop deployment. He made much of force protection and adopted a 
phased expansion so that the force would not be overstretched. He initially 
concentrated on securing Dili and proceeded to the expansion of troop 
deployments towards the west only after he became confident that he had 
enough troops (Cosgrove, 2006, pp.215-217). Although he took a risk when 
he deployed a small contingent to Oecussi before he could prepare a force 
of adequate size, the commander of the contingent mitigated the risk by 
limiting its area of operation in the enclave so that the small force would not 
be overstretched (Cosgrove, 2006, pp.247-248; Crane, 2015, pp.174-175). 
 Second, INTERFET had troops of high quality. Soldiers from Australia, 
New Zealand, and the UK, which bore the burden of security operations, 
were highly trained and were deployed to East Timor assuming that combat 
would ensue. The Australian troops who were deployed were “probably the 
best trained army that Australia [had] put into the field at the beginning of an 
operation” (Kilcullen, 2019). When attacked, they demonstrated well-
practised procedures and swiftly took cover, which was followed by 
counterattacks (Kilcullen, 2010, p.139). During the ambush on 6 October, the 
troops dragged their wounded mates to a safer place, recovered a medical 
kit from their vehicle, and gave first aid to the wounded, all while under fire 
(Horner, 2002, p.505; Cosgrove, 2006, p.223; McPhedran, 2007, pp.91-93). 
In addition, in multiple contacts, small teams of elite special forces were able 
to survive battles with numerically superior adversaries. 
 Third, INTERFET also possessed valuable assets for force protection. 
One was armoured vehicles. INTERFET deployed them from day one, and 
the militias did not possess anti-armour weapons, so the armoured vehicles 
provided foot soldiers with reliable shields and fire support. During ambush 
on 6 October, the armoured vehicles that were deployed to Suai rushed to 
the ambush site in five to ten minutes and quickly repelled the attackers 
(Horner, 2002, p.505). Another useful asset was helicopters, which were 
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used for medevac, as well as the insertion and extraction of troops. Two 
soldiers who were wounded in the ambush were evacuated to Dili by 
helicopter and were able to receive treatment (Horner, 2002, p.505; 
Cosgrove, 2006, p.223). The Response Force, which was composed of 
special forces, kept at least two patrols with two helicopters ready to move in 
30 minutes as an immediate response team (Horner, 2002, pp.490, 494; 
Thompson, 2015, p.144). The quick send-in of reinforcements and pull-out 
by helicopter helped the outnumbered troops. 
 Finally, the lack of skill on the side of the militias was fortunate for 
INTERFET. As mentioned repeatedly, the INTERFET troops were 
ambushed and/or outnumbered in many of the contacts they experienced, 
and more capable opponents could have inflicted more casualties on the 
international force. Kilcullen, who was a company commander of INTERFET, 
states, “We were very lucky not to lose quite a few people”, taking into 
account the fact that INTERFET experienced multiple engagements 
including heavy ones (2019). In particular, the engagement at Motaain 
ended with no casualties on the INTERFET side, but the first burst of fire 
took the troops by surprise. Cosgrove (2006, p.234) states that it was “a 
minor miracle that none of them was hit”. A factor that contributed to the 
miracle was that the fire that was directed at them was aimed too high to hit 
the targets (Kilcullen, 2010, pp.127, 139). At least in the Motaain incident, 
INTERFET could have suffered more casualties if the militias had been a bit 
better at marksmanship or luck had militated against the troops; they were 
fortunate. 
 The militias also employed civilian casualty generation in a limited 
manner, but INTERFET effectively countered this attempt as well by good 
discipline. The majority of the engagements with the militias happened 
outside populated areas. In Oecussi, the militias intruded near to the 
populated areas, so the INTERFET troops had to be careful in the 
application of force (Cosgrove, 2006, p.306). There was at least one case of 
the militias using human shields in the western border area, but the 
INTERFET unit that was involved in this case avoided harming civilians by 
using only sniper fire (Breen, 2001, p.87). The good discipline of the troops 
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enabled the avoidance of collateral damage and provided the militias with no 
opportunity to exploit the troops’ misconduct. 
 In sum, INTERFET relied on counter-coercion negation and, to a 
lesser extent, stronghold neutralisation in achieving denial. Other forms of 
denial did not play a major role. The militias, including those in command 
positions, became demoralised because of the lack of progress regarding 
their struggle (Djalal, 1999). The militias were deprived of hope for the 
success of resistance by the effective denial by INTERFET. As H4 is that the 
most effective method of denial is counter-coercion negation, the case is 
consistent with the hypothesis. 
3.3.5  Third-Party Support 
The final hypothesis to be examined is H5 – the third-party-support 
hypothesis. This hypothesis is that compellence is likely to succeed if target 
armed groups do not receive third-party support. In this case, Indonesia, 
especially its security forces, provided substantial support to the militias, but 
the support became increasingly weaker. The abandonment by Indonesia 
affected the militias’ decision to give up resistance, so the case corresponds 
with the hypothesis. 
 The pro-integration militias enjoyed substantial support from the 
Indonesian government in the pre-ballot phase. During its rule over East 
Timor, Indonesia had organised local residents into various paramilitary 
groups – from formal militias to death squad–style gangs – and utilised them 
to oppress independence movement and counterinsurgency operations. 
Some pro-integration militias which were active in 1999 were the 
continuation of these paramilitary groups, and others were newly organised 
with the members of these past groups (Robinson, 2001, pp.296-301, 306-
313; KPP HAM, 2006, pp.29-30; CAVR, 2013, pp.368-381). These militias 
were trained, armed and financed by the Indonesian military and civilian 
authorities, and they operated in cooperation with the Indonesian security 
forces (KPP HAM, 2006, pp.32-34, 39-41; CTF, 2008, ch.7; CAVR, 2013, 
pp.381-387). Some regular Indonesian soldiers were the members or even 
leaders of the militias (KPP HAM, 2006, p.30; CAVR, 2013, p.385; Robinson, 
2013, pp.2721-2724). 
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 There were various motives for individuals to join the militias. Some 
were the members of formal civil guard organisations and had been trained 
by the Indonesian forces. Others were violence-prone thugs and criminals 
who were attracted by economic or other material benefits, such as drugs 
and alcohols. There were also members who were forcefully recruited with 
death threats or peer pressure (DFAT, 2001, p.59; Kilcullen, 2000, pp.134-
135, 137, 139; 2009, p.201; KPP HAM, 2006, p.32; Robinson, 2013, 
pp.2721-2722). 
 The pre-ballot activities of the militias seem to have been well 
controlled and coordinated by Indonesia. In fact, scores of instances of 
militia violence were carried out with the active and tacit participation of the 
Indonesian security forces (CAVR, 2013, parts 7-8; Robinson, 2013, 
pp.2726-2728). Moreover, there was a lull in the violence when UNAMET 
started voter registration, suggesting that it was controlled like “a water 
faucet that could be turned on and off at will” (Robinson, 2010, p.131). At 
this stage, the intention of the Indonesian government was to influence 
residents to vote for integration, and the government and the militias worked 
towards the same objective. 
 Even in the post-ballot phase, the rampaging militias still enjoyed the 
active and tacit cooperation and support of the Indonesian security forces on 
the ground. A number of people also witnessed Indonesian military and 
police personnel directing, observing, and assisting with the killing, 
destruction, and forcible movement of people in this period (Human Rights 
Watch [HRW], 1999; CAVR, 2013, parts 7-8; Robinson, 2013, pp.2687, 
2728-2729). The scale of the destruction and the logistic operation for the 
massive population movement also indicate that organisational support and 
cooperation continued (HRW, 1999; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.202-
203). 
 After the ballot, however, against the background of mounting 
international pressure, Jakarta’s interest shifted, and it tried to prove it could 
control the situation. Both President Habibie and the defence 
minister/commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, Wiranto, 
wished for political survival, so they had to avoid international criticism and 
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sanctions that would be a fatal blow to their careers (Greenlees and Garran, 
2002, pp.205-206, 260-262). Habibie’s government accepted the result of 
the vote and called for Indonesians and East Timorese to do so too (The 
Jakarta Post, 1999b; DFAT, 2001, p.125). On 7 September, Wiranto issued 
a written order to the military to use all available means to stop violence by 
the militias (Greenlees and Garran, 2002, p.226). Wiranto also told the militia 
leaders to stop their violence (Antara, 1999b; Imanuddin, 1999; Crouch, 
2003, p.165). However, these measures were not effective in curtailing the 
violence, and the Indonesian government was compelled to accept an 
international force. 
 There is a possibility that these efforts were ungenuine and that all the 
violence was intentionally orchestrated by Jakarta, but there is no firm 
evidence supporting such an interpretation. Recovered internal documents 
show that the Indonesian military prepared contingency plans, including 
mass evacuation, and it openly admitted the existence of such plans (The 
Jakarta Post, 1999a; Moore, 2001, pp.41-43). However, these did not 
contain a scorched-earth operation nor forceful deportation that actually 
happened, and there is no direct evidence that Habibie or Wiranto planned 
and ordered the atrocities (Crouch, 2003, pp.157-158; Robinson, 2013, 
pp.2698-2705). The Indonesian military was highly factionalised, and 
Wiranto, let alone Habibie with his weak power base, had no effective control 
over the entire force (Schulze, 2001; Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.53-55, 
61-63, 165). There is a view that generals and officers belonging to or with a 
background of service in special operation forces or an intelligence 
organisation moved rather independently and directed the militias to 
continue the atrocities despite the efforts of Habibie and Wiranto to change 
the course (McDonald, 2002a; 2002b; Smith and Jarvis, 2018, p.19). 
 What is clear is that the support the militias enjoyed faded away after 
the Indonesian government decided to accept an international force and 
started to pull out its military force from East Timor. Wiranto sent in 
reinforcement units under his control, and the new commander on the 
ground, Major General Syahnakri, initiated the withdrawal of the existing 
units to West Timor. Although these newly sent units also did not confront 
the militias, the replacement gradually led to better control of the situation by 
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Wiranto through Syahnakri (Greenlees and Garran, 2002, pp.228-229, 280; 
Smith and Jarvis, 2018, pp.17-20). A significant number of Indonesian troops 
still remained in East Timor when INTERFET arrived, but the number quickly 
shrank to only some 1,300 by 27 September. They remained only to secure 
some key facilities in Dili, and they withdrew at the end of October (Lague, 
1999; Breen, 2001, p.58; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.211-212). As a result, although 
a small number of elements of the Indonesian special forces may have 
remained with the militias (Kilcullen, 2000, pp.120-121), the militias who 
stayed in East Timor were basically isolated when they encountered 
INTERFET. 
 In contrast, the militias that fled to West Timor with the withdrawing 
Indonesian army still received support from the elements of the Indonesian 
security forces on the ground. Even though Wiranto and the governor of 
West Timor stated that the militias should not use West Timor as a base for 
resistance against INTERFET (The Jakarta Post, 1999g; 1999h), the militias 
were left at large and turned there into their new strongholds, as discussed 
above. An example of the support given to the militias by the Indonesian 
military in West Timor can be seen in the engagement between INTERFET 
and the Indonesian security forces in Motaain on 10 October. The 
engagement erupted when the militias training with the Indonesian army 
opened fire on an INTERFET patrol (Kilcullen, 2000, pp.118-119; 2010, 
pp.129, 135-136). 
 However, this remaining support also dwindled, if not completely 
ceased. Wiranto reiterated that he would not let the militias use West Timor 
as their base (The Jakarta Post, 1999j), and the Indonesian military replaced 
local militia-friendly units and commanders with Major General Syahnakri 
and those who were ready to cooperate with INTERFET (Daley, 1999c; 
Garran, 1999c). The militias were moved away from the border, and border 
control on the Indonesian side became stricter (Kilcullen, 2000, pp.119-120, 
125; 2010, p.136). The military spokesperson in Jakarta spoke of the militias 
as a nuisance, and the top of Indonesian military told the militias’ leaders, 
“Be realistic ... It’s useless” (Richburg, 1999c). The Indonesian security 
forces tightened their grip on the refugee camps and disarmed the militias, 
though not completely (Madjiah, 1999; Marshall, 1999b; Timberlake, 1999). 
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To deal with Soares, the leader of a militia group that remained active 
around the Oecussi enclave to the end, Syahnakri reinforced Indonesian 
units on the border, transferred the local army commander who had not 
stopped Soares, and arrested the leader (Dodd, 2000a; The Jakarta Post, 
2000a; Cosgrove, 2006, pp.304-305). After the engagement in Motaain, in 
which the Indonesian troops and police officers fought poorly, the militias 
also became distrustful of the Indonesian regular forces (Kilcullen, 2010, 
p.136). Kilcullen (2019) describes the support from Indonesian regular troops 
as the militias’ “centre of gravity”. The militias believed that the regular troops 
would protect them, but this belief was crushed when INTERFET actually 
killed the regular troops in Motaain. He regards the loss of their protector as 
one of the biggest blows to the militias. 
 The end of Indonesian support was formalised when the MPR 
endorsed the result of the popular consultation, which was necessary as an 
Indonesian domestic legal procedure. Although the vote was clear support 
for independence, and the Habibie government accepted the result, there 
was no guarantee that the MPR would do so too (The Jakarta Post, 1999c; 
Marker, 2003, p.134). In fact, East Timor governor, Soares, claimed that he 
rejected the ballot result and that East Timor would still be an Indonesian 
territory until the MPR endorsed the result (The Jakarta Post, 1999c). Pro-
integration factions appealed to the MPR to reject the result, claiming the 
vote was flawed because of UNAMET’s bias (DFAT, 2001, p.125). However, 
on 20 October, the MPR accepted the result of the vote and adopted a 
decree to separate East Timor from Indonesia (Reuters, 1999f; DFAT, 2001, 
p.156). That same day, Wahid was elected as the new president of 
Indonesia, and in a letter delivered on 28 October, his government formally 
requested that the UN take over East Timor (The Jakarta Post, 1999k; 1999l; 
DFAT, 2001, p.156). This formal recognition by the Indonesian government 
of the independence of East Timor surely affected the militias. The PPI 
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commander, Tavares, referred to the MPR decree as one of the reasons he 
decided to disband the umbrella militia organisation (AFP, 14 Dec 1999).11 
 As has been discussed, Indonesian support to the pro-integration 
militias greatly decreased from full support and utilisation as proxies to 
abandonment. Some local Indonesian military elements were believed to 
have continued to assist the remaining militias in a limited manner even 
thereafter (Friel, 2000c; Thompson, 2015, pp.149-150). However, it was no 
longer the full organisational support that the militias had enjoyed. As the 
militias depended heavily on the support of the Indonesian military, the end 
of the support significantly affected the militias’ behaviour and led to the 
success of compellence. This case, therefore, corresponds well to H5. 
3.4  Conclusion 
The chapter has analysed the INTERFET intervention in East Timor. The 
Australian-led multinational force successfully compelled the pro-integration 
militias to halt their violence. The deductively derived conditions for success, 
if they are valid, are expected to be fulfilled in this case, which is one of the 
most successful cases of compellence in peace operations. The analysis 
suggests that four conditions constitute a conjunctural sufficient condition: 
the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy, the actual use of force, 
the achievement of effective counter-coercion negation, and the lack of third-
party support on the target side. 
 The expectations of some hypotheses match the actual course of 
events in the case. The militias gave up resistance only after INTERFET 
actually employed force, although the amount was small, and this 
corresponds with H3. From the beginning, Australia was equipped with 
national interest and strong domestic support. Its previously acquired 
 
11  In the statement, Tavares referred to the organisation as the PPTT, 
which stands for the East Timorese Fighter Force. It was used in the 
same as PPI to refer to the umbrella organisation of the militias (HRW, 
1999). 
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reputation was mixed: somewhat favourable regarding its military capability, 
but unfavourable with regard to its resolve. If these three sources of 
credibility had been necessary but needed to be combined with other 
conditions, the operation should have turned from initial failure to later 
success as additional conditions were being fulfilled. However, the operation 
initially went smoothly – successfully compelling the militias in Dili and in the 
eastern area without using force – and then faced resistance in the western 
area but finally succeeded after using force. This development strongly 
suggests that mere threats were not enough and that the actual use of force 
was indispensable. The militias learned the competence of INTERFET in the 
engagements and came to perceive the border area where INTERFET was 
deployed to be dangerous for them. While other sources of credibility may 
have been effective in compelling the militias to give up Dili and the eastern 
part of East Timor, INTERFET had to actually use force to compel the 
militias to give up their more committed objective of retaining the western 
half of East Timor. 
 As expected based on H4, the achievement of effective counter-
coercion negation by INTERFET led to the success of compellence. The 
militias tried to inflict casualties on the international force, but good force 
protection, the lack of skill on the militia side, and some fortune prevented 
this outcome. INTERFET suffered a total of two wounded in engagements, 
but no combat fatalities. The international force also avoided civilian 
casualties when the militias used civilians as human shields. With their 
countermeasures foiled, the militias lost momentum and became 
demoralised. 
 In addition, H5 corresponds well to what happened in the case. The 
severest blow to the militias was the halt of third-party support. As the 
militias were created and used as proxies by Indonesia, their operation 
depended heavily on Indonesian support. However, as the interest of the 
Indonesian government shifted after the popular consultation, its support of 
the militias became increasingly weaker, to the point of abandonment. The 
top militia leader, Tavares, directly referred to the change in the Indonesian 
stance as a reason to dissolve the militias. 
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 This case also partially corresponds to H2. INTERFET had to 
increase pressure by expanding its area of deployment and accumulating 
tactical victories to compel the militias. Although the compeller did not 
employ an ultimatum in this case, it is unlikely that the strategy would have 
worked even if INTERFET had tried it. The militias were highly fragmented, 
with more than 20 organisations, and Tavares exerted only limited control. At 
least some of the militias must have disobeyed his command even if he had 
succumbed to the ultimatum. Moreover, the terrain and the limit on its 
resources prevented INTERFET from quickly dominating the entire 
operational area. The militias envisioned guerrilla-style operations (Antara, 
1999c; Kyodo News Service, 1999; Pereira, 1999b) and had no reason to 
give up resistance without trying first. Taking these points into account, it is 
highly likely that the compeller needed to resort to the gradual-turning-of-the-
screw strategy. However, the correspondence to H2 remains partial because 
INTERFET used no positive inducements. The carrot-and-stick strategy was 
not necessary to bring success in this case. 
 Inconsistent with H1, the numerical advantage was not necessary for 
the success either. INTERFET did not always have a favourable balance of 
force in terms of troop numbers. The force was outnumbered in the western 
border area and initially in Oecussi but could successfully compel the militias. 
Therefore, the East Timor case does not correspond to H1. The case shows 
that compellers that have fewer troops than targets can compel the latter if 
other conditions are satisfied. 
 Summing up, the case is not consistent with H1, only partially 
consistent with H2 on the necessity of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw 
strategy, and consistent with H3 to H5. The case therefore suggests that the 
use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy, the actual use of force, the 
achievement of effective counter-coercion negation, and the lack of third-
party support on the target side constitute a collective sufficient condition for 
the success of compellence in peace operations. 
 Moreover, each of the four components of the conjuncture seems to 
have been indispensable in this case. This means that they are likely to have 
been INUS conditions for the success. 
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 As discussed, the application of gradually increased pressure is likely 
to have been necessary regardless due to the nature of the target, and this 
is so even the three other components existed. At least the hard-core 
elements of the militias in the western area would have challenged 
INTERFET by themselves in the jungle even if INTERFET had used force in 
Dili in its early phase of operation without suffering casualties. For example, 
the militias in Aidabasalala did not leave there although INTERFET had 
already defeated other militias in contacts, and they even successively 
attacked the INTERFET patrol despite suffering casualties. Other militias 
also showed aggressive efforts regarding cross-border intrusion from West 
Timor in October (Boey, 1999). The Indonesian authorities were not able to 
seal the border nor establish control over the refugee camps in West Timor 
until long after late 1999 (Friel, 2000b; The Jakarta Post, 2000b; Arieff, 
2001), so hard-core militias must have been able to challenge INTERFET 
even if Indonesian support had faded away much earlier. Therefore, the 
satisfaction of the other three conditions would not have relieved INTERFET 
from the necessity of applying pressure on the ground in the western border 
area. 
 The course of events in this case also indicates that the actual use of 
force was necessary. Although other sources of credibility existed from the 
beginning (pre-earned reputation was mixed), INTERFET had to use force 
later, and this would not have been affected by the existence of the other 
three conditions. In fact, when INTERFET was deployed to the western area 
and had to use force, the only condition that had been unmet was the halt of 
third-party support. As discussed above, the militias would have challenged 
INTERFET even if Indonesian support had faded away earlier. Therefore, 
INTERFET would have to use force to stabilise the western area regardless. 
 Counter-coercion negation was also indispensable, because its 
absence would have made the militias bolder (McPhedran, 2007, p.86) and 
their attacks more persistent. The militias intended to take on opponents if 
they could cope with them. In fact, to check the new UN force’s competence, 
the remaining militias launched probing attacks against UNTAET just after it 
succeeded from INTERFET (Collins, 2000b; UN, 2000f, para.52; Greenlees 
and Garran, 2002, p.321). If INTERFET had had poor force protection and 
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had been vulnerable, as UN peace operations often are, the militias would 
have kept attacking INTERFET. The fact that INTERFET was using force in 
every area in which it was deployed would not have prevented hard-core 
elements from attacking it, as discussed above. In addition, the militias’ 
probing attacks against UNTAET happened although Indonesian support 
had almost halted, so even if Indonesia had withdrawn its support much 
earlier, the militias would have tried to exploit the weakness of INTERFET. 
The absence of effective counter-coercion negation and resulting persistent 
attacks against INTERFET would have kept the western area unstable. 
 Finally, the continuation of Indonesian support would have made the 
militias most intractable. As INTERFET’s mandate ended at the border and 
could not move into West Timor, the militias’ attacks in the border area and 
infiltrations from their safe heavens in West Timor would have been much 
more difficult for INTERFET to manage if the militias had continued to enjoy 
Indonesian support. Moreover, organisational support from the Indonesian 
military would have increased the chance of inflicting casualties on 
INTERFET, thereby making the condition of effective counter-coercion 
negation more difficult to satisfy. 
 In sum, each component of the conjunctural sufficient condition 
seems to have been indispensable. This means that each component is 
likely to have been an INUS condition for the success. Of course, the 
examination depends heavily on counterfactual thought experiments, and 
the conclusion cannot be as robust as that supported by observations in the 
real world. However, if the same conclusion can be derived from other cases, 
the reliability would be strengthened. The validity of the findings from the 
East Timor case should be examined in combination with those from other 
cases. 
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Chapter 4 
Sierra Leone: UNAMSIL and the UK Forces 
The second empirical chapter analyses compellence in Sierra Leone. The 
compellers were UNAMSIL, a UN peace operation, and the armed forces of 
the UK, which intervened unilaterally. The target was a rebel force called the 
RUF. As explained in the case-selection section, this is one of the most 
successful cases of compellence in peace operations, which means that at 
least some of the conditions for success are expected to be fulfilled in it. 
Therefore, the hypotheses based on deductively derived success conditions 
should be supported if they are valid. To elaborate the validity, this chapter 
employs two methods: the congruence method and the most-similar-design 
comparison. Compellence in Sierra Leone lasted for about a year, and it can 
be divided into three phases. Therefore, it is possible to not only check the 
congruence between the expectation of the hypotheses and the actual 
course of events but to also conduct within-case temporal comparison 
between the phases. A comparison between phases two and three is the 
most well-structured within-case comparison with the same protagonists and 
demand for disarmament, and it is possible to examine how the changes in 
the conditions affected the result while keeping other (time-invariant) factors 
basically constant. The first phase involved different demands, and the 
control of factors is not ideal, but it can still provide a relatively better 
controlled environment than cross-case comparisons. These two methods in 
combination provide valuable insights into the validity of the hypotheses. 
4.1  Background 
The civil war in Sierra Leone, a former British colony, started in 1991, when 
the RUF, led by Foday Sankoh, launched an invasion from neighbouring 
Liberia. The RUF aimed to defeat the All People’s Congress (APC) 
government, which had ruled the country under one-party dictatorship since 
1978. The RUF received support not only from Liberia but also from Sierra 
Leone people who were frustrated with the APC rule, and the rebels fought 
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well against the small and incapable Sierra Leone Army (SLA) (Sierra Leone 
Truth & Reconciliation Commission [SLTRC], 2004a, chs.1-3; Berman and 
Labonte, 2006, pp.143-145). The APC government requested military 
support from Nigeria and Guinea, and they intervened on the government 
side (SLTRC, 2004a, p.151; 2004b, pp.63, 65-66). 
 The APC government collapsed in 1992, when a group of SLA 
soldiers, led by Captain Valentine Strasser, carried out a coup d’état and 
established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). In countering 
the RUF, the NPRC expanded the SLA, contracted with private military 
companies (PMCs), and secured the continuation of Nigerian support. The 
NPRC’s counterattack pushed the RUF to the verge of defeat, but the RUF 
survived (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.152, 159, 175-179; 2004b, pp.66-69; Gberie, 
2005, pp.80, 91-94; Berman and Labonte, 2006, pp.145-146). The RUF 
shifted its effort to guerrilla warfare, established a network of jungle bases, 
and intensified its plundering and violence against civilians to inflict costs on 
the government (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.182-186, 191-196; Marks, 2019). Poorly 
situated and undisciplined government soldiers also preyed on civilians and 
were called “sobels”, a coined term that mixed the words “soldiers” and 
“rebels” (Gberie, 2005, pp.81-82; Keen, 2005, chs.7-8). 
 Sierra Leone experienced three major political changes in 1996, but 
none led to peace. First, against the background of the NPRC’s internal 
disputes about a transition to civilian rule, Strasser was ousted by the mutiny 
of his staff Julius Maada Bio in January (Abraham, 2001, p.211; SLTRC, 
2004a, pp.219-228). Second, Bio agreed to hold an election and Ahmed 
Tejan Kabbah was elected president. The RUF brutally demonstrated its 
objection to the election by performing mass amputations of the limbs of 
civilians. Third, a peace agreement was signed between the Kabbah 
government and the RUF. Kabbah countered the RUF with a contracted 
PMC and community-based hunter militias, such as Kamajors, and the 
pressure persuaded the RUF to sign the Abidjan Agreement in November 
(Abraham, 2001, pp.211-213; Berman and Labonte, 2006, p.146; Hough, 
2007, p.11). However, Sankoh was not committed to the peace agreement 
and prepared to resume the insurgency. He was arrested in Nigeria when he 
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visited there in March 1997, but his subordinates continued the war (Hirsch, 
2001, pp.54-55; SLTRC, 2004b, p.71; Kabbah, 2010, pp.51-54). 
 Another coup hit Sierra Leone in May 1997, and President Kabbah 
was ousted from the capital, Freetown. Mutinied SLA soldiers established 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) with Major Jonny Paul 
Koroma as its head. Koroma invited the RUF to join the junta, and the latter 
accepted the invitation (Gberie, 2005, pp.95-96; Berman and Labonte, 2006, 
p.148). 
 The restoration of the Kabbah government was realised by a regional 
power – Nigeria. Nigeria, which had stationed its units in Sierra Leone since 
1991 in support of the Sierra Leone government, launched a military 
operation to thwart the AFRC in June 1997. The offensive, however, failed to 
topple the junta (The Sierra Leone Web [SLW], 1997; Adeshina, 2002, 
pp.14-17; SLTRC, 2004b, pp.65-66). After sanctions were imposed by 
ECOWAS and the UN, Koroma signed the Conakry Agreement in October 
1997 and agreed to the reinstallation of the Kabbah government, but the 
junta did not implement it. Against this background, the hunter militias, now 
calling themselves the Civil Defense Forces (CDF), started counterattacks 
from late 1997, and Nigeria launched a full-scale military intervention in 
February 1998 with Kabbah’s agreement and the authorisation of ECOWAS. 
The Nigerian-led ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) soon 
kicked out the AFRC/RUF from Freetown, and the Kabbah government was 
reinstalled in March (Adeshina, 2002, pp.21-25; SLTRC, 2004a, pp.283-284, 
289-291; Berman and Labonte, 2006, pp.148-155). 
 ECOMOG, however, could not defeat the rebels. ECOMOG’s 
subsequent offensive went as far as capturing Kono District in the eastern 
area, which was the RUF’s stronghold, in April (Adeshina, 2002, ch.3; Keen, 
2005, p.219). However, the offensive had to stop due to the lack of troops 
and logistics, and ECOMOG lost almost all territories it secured to the rebels 
in their counter-offensive in December (Adeshina, 2002; Keen, 2005, 
pp.220-221). The AFRC/RUF’s counter-offensive culminated in the 
reinvasion of Freetown in January 1999. After some initial confusion, 
ECOMOG’s counterattack was able to repel the rebels again, but severe 
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damage was inflicted on the capital, including the killing of 5,000 to 10,000 
citizens (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.326-330; Berman and Labonte, 2006, p.155). 
 The military deadlock drove the protagonists to sign another peace 
deal in Lomé. Kabbah was reluctant but had to accept the conciliatory 
approach after being pressured by the US and ECOWAS states to seek a 
negotiated settlement with the RUF. This was because the new government 
of Nigeria was moving to shrink its involvement in Sierra Leone, and Kabbah 
needed alternative international support (Rashid, 2000, pp.27-28; Harris, 
2014, pp.112-113). A ceasefire was agreed in May 1999 (UN, 1999b), and 
the Lomé Agreement was concluded two months later. The Lomé 
Agreement provided power sharing with the RUF, including the appointment 
of Sankoh as the chair of the Commission for the Management of Strategic 
Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD). It also 
provided general amnesty, and the RUF was to be transformed into a 
political party. The agreement called for the monitoring of the ceasefire and 
the disarmament of combatants by ECOMOG and the United Nations 
Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), which had been established 
in July 1998 (UNSC, 1998; UN, 1999d). 
4.2  The Deployment and Activity of UNAMSIL and the UK 
Forces 
To bear the responsibility put on it by the Lomé Agreement, the UN replaced 
UNOMSIL with UNAMSIL. UNAMSIL was established by UNSC Resolution 
1270, and its various tasks included ceasefire monitoring and the support of 
DDR. It was authorised to use force to protect civilians and to secure its 
personnel and the freedom of movement (UNSC, 1999b). ECOMOG in 
parallel provided security to some key areas, but Nigerian President 
Olusegun Obasanjo soon expressed his intention to withdraw Nigerian 
troops from ECOMOG because of its huge cost (UN, 1999g, paras.36-38; 
Cunliffe-Jones, 2000a). The UNSC responded by adopting Resolution 1289 
and thereby expanding UNAMSIL from 6,000 to 11,100 troops and assigning 
new tasks, including the provision of security for key areas and DDR sites 
with the authority to use force (UNSC, 2000a). 
- 153 - 
 However, as with previous agreements, the Lomé Agreement did not 
bring peace to Sierra Leone. Although the RUF political leaders supported 
the agreement, the RUF military commanders were against it because they 
felt that they were being sacrificed for the sake of power sharing that would 
benefit only political leaders (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.335-339). The RUF was 
also resentful that the government had not allocated the RUF important 
cabinet and other posts as has been agreed. Sankoh and other RUF 
members in the power-sharing government complained that they were 
treated worse than their equivalents from other parties (SLW, 1999b; Bright, 
2000, p.38; Sankoh, 2000; SLTRC, 2004a, p.349; Hayner, 2007, pp.21-22; 
Binningsbø and Dupuy, 2009, p.97). Moreover, there were some armed 
clashes involving the RUF, the AFRC, the CDF, and ECOMOG even after 
the signing of the peace agreement (IRIN, 1999a; 1999b; SLW, 1999b; 
1999c; 1999d; Smith et al., 2004, pp.281-283, 373). 
 Frictions between UNAMSIL and the RUF also increased. Initially, 
Sankoh cooperated somewhat in disarming his troops (e.g. SLW, 1999b; 
1999c; 2000a; AFP, 10 Jan 2000; Smith et al., 2004, p.282). At the same 
time, he was sceptical about the UN from the beginning and repeatedly 
criticised it and UNAMSIL (SLW, 1999a; 2000b; Gberie, 2005, p.163). The 
RUF started to harass UNAMSIL in January 2000. The RUF challenged and 
disarmed the UNAMSIL units and blocked their movements on multiple 
occasions (AFP, 7 Feb 2000; API, 2000a; Conteh, 2000a; IRIN, 2000b; 
Lynch, 2000; UN, 2000d, paras.11-14; UNDPI, 2000c; 2000d; 2000e). 
Although UNAMSIL demanded that Sankoh stop the harassment, with the 
threat of a “forceful response” (AFP, 14 Feb 2000; IRIN, 2000c; SLW, 2000b; 
UNDPI, 2000b), he blamed the government and UNAMSIL in return. He 
instructed his combatants not to disarm, and using the threat of execution, 
the RUF commanders prevented the members from disarming (Hule, 2000a; 
Jalloh, 2000a; Roy-MacAulay, 2000c; SLW, 2000c; The Progress, 2000a; 
Gberie, 2005, pp.163-164). 
 The situation deteriorated rapidly in May 2000 as the RUF exploited a 
security vacuum created by the withdrawal of ECOMOG (Peacekeeping Best 
Practice Unit [PKBPU], 2003, p.5). After the completion of ECOMOG 
withdrawal in early May, RUF units attacked DDR sites and a number of 
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firefights erupted between UNAMSIL and the RUF. UNAMSIL suffered 
casualties and had to retreat from the sites. The RUF also apprehended as 
many as over 500 peacekeepers and advanced towards Freetown (SLW, 
2000d; UN, 2000e, paras.56-64; Prins, 2002, p.196; SLTRC, 2004a, pp.356-
358). 
 However, for Sankoh, the violent challenge against UNAMSIL and the 
Lomé Peace Agreement, came at a price. The RUF’s action incited an anti-
RUF demonstration in Freetown on 8 May, and a mob surged ahead to the 
residence of Sankoh. The provoked guards of the residence fired into the 
crowd, and some 40 people were killed in the ensuing firefight between the 
RUF and the mob (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.416-435; Higbie and Moigula, 2017, 
p.83). Sankoh escaped from the scene but was detained on 17 May (Onishi, 
2000c; SLTRC, 2004a, p.446). 
 The crisis in Sierra Leone led to a British intervention. The 
intervention’s initial objective was a non-combatant evacuation operation 
(NEO), but the British forces remained there after the NEO and provided 
assistance in the form of logistics, advice, and intelligence to UNAMSIL and 
the local forces supporting the Kabbah government. The British forces also 
secured the airport in Lungi and its surrounding area. The RUF advanced to 
the area and clashed with the British troops on 17 May, but the British forces 
repelled the RUF and killed more than 30 without suffering any casualties 
(Prins, 2002, pp.202-203; Dorman, 2009, pp.79-80, 92-94). 
 The pro-government local forces supported by British troops and 
UNAMSIL counterattacked and pushed back the RUF. They fought for the 
control of strategic places around and beyond the Freetown peninsula (UN, 
2000g, para.21; Smith et al., 2004, pp.210-211). Most of the UNAMSIL 
peacekeepers who had been held as hostages by the RUF were released 
after the mediation by Liberian President, Charles Taylor, but an Indian unit 
was left under siege (Paye-Layleh, 2000; UN, 2000g, paras.24-25). In July, 
UNAMSIL launched Operation Khukri, an offensive to break the encirclement, 
and rescued the besieged unit (UN, 2000g, paras.26-27; Jetley, 2007a; 
2007b). 
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 The British forces conducted another assault in September, but the 
target was another armed group in Sierra Leone – the WSB. With the arrival 
of reinforcements for UNAMSIL, the UK withdrew its major combat units in 
mid-June, but it continued to deploy smaller detachments to train the SLA 
(UN, 2000g, para.20; Dorman, 2009, p.99). In August, 11 UK troops 
stationed in Sierra Leone and an SLA soldier were detained by an armed 
group of ex-AFRC soldiers called the WSB. After realising the release of 
some troops in negotiation, the UK launched a hostage-rescue operation on 
10 September and rescued all the remaining hostages (Woods and Reese, 
2008, pp.65-71; Dorman, 2009, ch.6). After this operation, more than 200 
WSB members surrendered to UNAMSIL (UNDPI, 2000q). 
 The military situation came to a stalemate as both the pro-government 
forces and the RUF failed to achieve major advancements, and the battles 
subsided in late August (UN, 2000i, paras.13-15). The RUF in particular 
resisted strongly in its strongholds and in the diamond-mining areas of the 
eastern and southern parts of the country (Woods and Reese, 2008, p.72). 
UNAMSIL also defended its positions effectively and repelled the RUF’s 
attacks repeatedly in cooperation with the pro-government forces. 
 Meanwhile, the RUF side had two major changes in its situation. First, 
the RUF elected Issa Sesay as an interim leader in August to replace the 
arrested Sankoh (UN, 2000h, para.10). Second, in early September, the 
RUF, along with Liberian forces, opened a new front with an attack on 
Guinea (UN, 2000i, para.5; Amnesty International, 2001; Milner, 2005, 
pp.148-151).12 The offensive against Guinea was a bad move, as Guinea’s 
armed forces and the CDF counterattacked fiercely. In addition, Guinea 
boosted its support for the Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
 
12  Taylor was hostile to Guinea, which participated in ECOMOG in Liberia 
and supported the Liberian dissidents (Gberie, 2001, p.10). Guinea 
intervened in Sierra Leone on the government side, as mentioned earlier, 
and joined ECOMOG in Sierra Leone (Adeshina, 2002). The RUF had 
infiltrated Guinea in 1999 as well (Smith et al., 2004, pp.149-150, 155-
160, 372). 
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Democracy (LURD), a Liberian rebel group which fought against President 
Taylor (Gberie, 2001, p.11; Smith et al., 2004, pp.161-162, 375-376; Milner, 
2005, pp.149-154; Reno, 2007, pp.76-78). 
 The mounting pressure gradually choked the RUF, but additional time 
and pressure were required to induce the rebels to give up arms. In October, 
the RUF expressed its interest in returning to the peace process to 
UNAMSIL and ECOWAS. The Sierra Leonean government and the RUF 
signed the Abuja I Cease-Fire Agreement on 10 November, but the RUF did 
not cease its military activities (UN, 2000j; 2000n, para.2; SLTRC, 2004b, 
p.82). The rebels refused to disarm until an interim government was 
established, and they implemented the agreement only to the extent that 
they could maintain their military capabilities and mining activities (UN, 
2001a, paras.8, 12, 97). 
 Against the background of the CDF’s offensive agasint the RUF’s 
strongholds and dwindling Liberian support, the Sierra Leonean government, 
the UN, and ECOWAS met the RUF in Abuja again on 2 May 2001, and they 
agreed to the simultaneous disarmament of the RUF and the CDF (UN, 
2001e, paras.2-3; UNAMSIL, 2001i). This Abuja II Agreement was followed 
by a series of meetings starting with the one in Freetown on 15 May and the 
parties consulted on concrete plans for disarmament. DDR resumed on 18 
May, and substantial disarmament was finally realised (UN, 2001e, paras.7-
11). The disarmament proceeded step by step, and the parties declared the 
completion of disarmament on 17 January 2002 (UN, 2002a, para.12; Thusi 
and Meek, 2003). 
4.3  The Examination of the Hypotheses 
It is understood that pressure from the UK, UNAMSIL, local pro-government 
forces, and Guinea induced the RUF to accept disarmament (e.g. Richards, 
2004, p.16; Gberie, 2005, pp.177-178; Ucko, 2016). As pressure was 
employed to change the status quo, their attempts constituted compellence. 
The RUF resisted disarmament, despite signing the Lomé Agreement, and 
launched another offensive against the capital. The intervening forces in 
cooperation with the pro-government forces thwarted the offensive; put 
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further pressure on the RUF; and, with the help of Guinean pressure, finally 
succeeded in making the RUF commit once again to disarmament after new 
negotiations in Abuja. Therefore, Sierra Leone can be regarded as a 
successful case of compellence. 
 The compellence against the RUF was protracted. To conduct a 
temporal within-case comparison, this study divides the case into three 
phases with different demands and results. 
 The first compellent attempt was in February 2000. In the first phase, 
UNAMSIL tried to halt the RUF’s harassment of peacekeepers. The RUF 
had disarmed peacekeepers at least three times in January (Lynch, 2000a; 
UN, 2000d, para.11), and it had built roadblocks and hindered the movement 
of international troops many times (UN, 1999k, para.10; AFP, 6 Jan 2000; 
API, 2000a; Conteh, 2000a; IRIN, 2000b; SLW, 2000a; 2000b). 
 Against the background of these incidents, Oluyemi Adeniji, the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) of UNAMSIL, 
demanded that Sankoh stop acts contravening the Lomé Agreement, such 
as seizing weapons from peacekeepers or erecting roadblocks and hindering 
the move of peacekeepers.13 This demand, which was issued in a meeting 
on 12 February, was accompanied by a warning that the continuation of 
such acts would “invite a forceful response”. Adeniji demanded immediate 
compliance and issued a clearer deadline stating that he expected to see 
concrete signs of obedience within 24 hours. In the talk with Adeniji, Sankoh 
 
13  This “do not repeat it” type of demand sits on the border between 
deterrence and compellence. If events are viewed separately, “do not 
repeat it” means “do not do it again in the future” and is thus a deterrent 
demand. Conversely, if events are seen in a continuous way, such as a 
campaign, “do not repeat it” means “stop doing it” and is thus a 
compellent demand. In this case, the RUF repeatedly seized weapons 
from and hindered the movement of peacekeepers within a few months, 
and it showed continuity. Therefore, it can be said that the demands by 
UNAMSIL had some characteristics of compellence, as well as 
deterrence. 
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agreed to order his troops to return peacekeepers’ weapons and accept 
UNAMSIL’s free movement (AFP, 14 Feb 2000; IRIN, 2000c; SLW, 2000b; 
UNDPI, 2000b). 
 Nevertheless, none of UNAMSIL’s demands was fulfilled, so the first 
compellent attempt was unsuccessful. While the RUF stopped robbing 
weapons from peacekeepers for a while, it soon resumed hostile acts, 
including the detention and disarmament of peacekeepers on a much larger 
scale in May. The other demand regarding the peacekeepers’ freedom of 
movement ended in a much clearer failure. Even just after Adeniji’s threat, 
the RUF did not permit the UNAMSIL patrol to enter Koidu (AFP, 15 Feb 
2000; IRIN, 2000d; SLW, 2000b; Ashby, 2003, pp.142-151). Two UNAMSIL 
companies also had to retreat after a standoff with some 300 RUF members 
who blocked the peacekeepers’ way near Bendu in the eastern area (AFP, 
25 Feb 2000; IRIN, 2000f; SLW, 2000b; The Associated Press [AP], 2000a). 
The RUF continued to establish new roadblocks (Jalloh, 2000b; Momodu, 
2000a) and disturbed UNAMSIL’s movement (AP, 2000b; IRIN, 2000g; Roy-
MacAulay, 2000a; 2000b; SLW, 2000b; 2000c). Therefore, despite the threat, 
the RUF did not change its behaviour. In sum, the first stage of compellence 
ended in partial and temporary success in the short term and was a failure 
from a longer-term perspective. UNAMSIL did not put its threat into practice 
in the face of the defiance and instead emphasised dialogue and negotiation 
(Africa News, 2000a; Conteh, 2000c; Roy-MacAulay, 2000b). 
 The second phase of compellence covers the period from the May 
crisis to the Abuja I Agreement in November 2000. The overall demand 
against the RUF was to disarm in accordance with the Lomé Agreement. 
This demand, also directed to other warring factions, was repeatedly stated 
in UNSC resolutions (UNSC, 1999b; 2000a), and the Sierra Leone 
government also demanded that the RUF disarm (AFP, 20 May 2000; 
Orjollet, 2000b; SLW, 2000d). In addition, during the May crisis the UN 
demanded the halt of attacks and the release of hostages as well (AFP, 2 
May 2000; 8 May 2000a; Roy-MacAulay, 2000d; UNDPI, 2000g; 2000h). 
This phase entailed the intervention of the UK and the direct use of force by 
UNAMSIL, the UK forces, and the local auxiliary forces. In the Abuja I 
Agreement, the compellers were able to persuade the RUF to accept a 
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ceasefire and to resume disarmament. Although the RUF abided by the 
ceasefire, it did not start disarmament, and it demanded the release of 
detained RUF members and the establishment of an interim government. 
Moreover, its members were actively involved in attacks against Guinea. 
Therefore, despite the intervention of the UK forces and the enhanced 
posture of UNAMSIL, the pressure did not yield quick success. 
 The third and final phase covers the period between the Abuja I and II 
Agreements. The demand against the RUF was to disarm – the same as for 
phase two. While the RUF was refusing to commit to disarmament, further 
pressure was applied to it, including the threat of attack on its strongholds 
and sanctions against Liberia. Against the background of this pressure, new 
negotiations were held, and the Abuja II Agreement was struck in May 2001. 
The RUF finally committed to disarmament, and thereafter, full-scale 
disarmament was realised. After a prolonged effort, the compellence ended 
in success. 
 The following section analyses the case from the perspective of each 
hypothesis and examines the congruence between its prediction and what 
actually happened. Based on the result, the most-similar-design comparison 
between the phases is conducted in the conclusion. 
4.3.1  Troop Numbers 
The first hypothesis to be examined is H1, which is that the favourable 
balance of troops leads to the success of compellence in peace operations. 
The compellers constantly had a numerical advantage over the target in this 
case, but compellence did not succeed until the third phase. Therefore, the 
case is not consistent with the hypothesis. 
 The examination should include the strength of the SLA and the CDF, 
which operated as the local auxiliary forces of the compellers. The SLA was 
impotent and unreliable, as demonstrated by the AFRC coup, but some loyal 
troops fought for the Kabbah government, and their quality improved after 
they received equipment and training from the UK. The CDF was regarded 
as more competent and reliable than the SLA in reagard to resisting the 
rebels. Its core was composed of traditional hunters from communities, who 
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formed vigilante groups against the RUF and “sobels” (Keen, 2005, pp.90-
91; Okano, 2019, ch.6). They started to call themselves the CDF during the 
AFRC period, and they cooperated with ECOMOG to restore the Kabbah 
government. The government kept relying on the CDF and made it more 
formalised, but it remained a collection of groups based on patron–client 
networks rather than a modern military organisation (Hoffman, 2007; Okano, 
2019). 
 The international forces had over 10,000 troops in the first phase of 
compellence. In January 2000, UNAMSIL had some 4,820 troops comprising 
of five battalions, a reaction force, and administrative components (UNSC, 
1999d, p.4; 2000b, para.17). ECOMOG’s strength on 7 February was 5,500 
(UNSC, 2000c, p.2), so the total strength of the peacekeepers was some 
10,320. As of 1 March, UNAMSIL expanded to some 7,390 troops with three 
additional battalions. This meant an increase of some 2,570 troops, but the 
two Nigerian battalions were transferred from ECOMOG, and the net 
increase of the overall peacekeepers, excluding in-theatre re-hatting, was 
much smaller. This can be calculated as some 880 by subtracting 1,690 – 
the increase of Nigerian troops in UNAMSIL – from 2,570 (UN, 2000b, p.11; 
2000d, pp.5, 17). Therefore, the overall strength of the peacekeepers, 
combining UNAMSIL and ECOMOG, is calculated as 11,200 in early March. 
In sum, the peacekeepers’ strength during the first instance of compellence 
in February 2000 was between some 10,320 and some 11,200. 
 The estimation of the size of pro-government local forces in the first 
phase requires some calculations. The UN estimated that the SLA had 7,000 
troops in September 1999 (UN, 1999g, para.30), and about 3,800 of them 
were disarmed by 23 January 2000 (IRIN, 2000a). Therefore, there were 
some 3,200 SLA troops during the first phase of compellence. The strength 
of the CDF was estimated at 15,000 in September 1999 (UN, 1999g, 
para.30), and some 3,350 were disarmed by 16 February 2000 (IRIN, 
2000e). Therefore, there were some 11,650 CDF troops at the time of the 
first phase of compellence. 
 A similar calculation applies to the target side as well. The RUF was 
estimated to have about 15,000 troops in September 1999 (UN, 1999g, 
- 161 - 
para.30), and some 3,500 were disarmed by 16 February (IRIN, 2000e). 
Therefore, the strength of the RUF at the time of the first phase of 
compellence is estimated as 11,500. 
 The above examination shows that the balance of troops in the first 
phase was against the RUF. The international forces numerically matched 
the RUF, and the compellers had even larger auxiliary forces. As a result, 
the RUF was outnumbered two to one by potentially hostile forces. Despite 
this numerical weakness, the RUF did not accede to the demands of 
UNAMSIL. This does not coincide with the expectation of the hypothesis. 
 The situation changed little in the second phase. The compellers 
maintained a numerical advantage over the target, but compellence 
remained unsuccessful. 
 UNAMSIL and the RUF had similar-sized forces at the beginning of 
the second phase. When the May crisis erupted, UNAMSIL had some 8,500 
troops, while a battalion composed of about 700 to 800 troops was at Lungi 
and had not yet been deployed to its position (UNAMSIL, 2000). ECOMOG 
had just left Sierra Leone, so this was the total strength of the intervening 
force on the ground. On the target side, some 4,500 to 5,000 RUF had 
disarmed by early May (AFP, 5 May 2000; SLW, 2000d; UN, 2000e, 
para.26). Subtracting this figure from the estimated original strength of 
15,000 reveals that the estimated strength of the RUF at the time of the May 
crisis was around 10,000. The US estimation was some 6,000 (Perlez and 
Wren, 2000), and the UK forces commander’s was 5,000 to 10,000 (Zavis, 
2000b). An article says that the RUF had some 4,000 well-armed members 
and more others (Ucko, 2016, p.850). These figures mean that the overall 
balance of troops between UNAMSIL and the RUF was more or less equal 
or one of the sides had a slight advantage. 
 However, the strength of the international forces rapidly increased 
after the May crisis. First, the UK launched a military intervention, and a 
parachute battalion of 600 troops and about 40 SAS troops were deployed to 
Sierra Leone by around 8 May (Evans and Butcher, 2000; Dorman, 2009, 
pp.72-80; Richards, 2014, pp.142-144, 149). The UK also deployed a flotilla 
of naval vessels with 800 marines on board (Evans, 2000a; Sengupta, 
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2000a), which arrived in Sierra Leone on 13 May (API, 2000b; Orjollet, 
2000b). However, these were short-term deployments, and the paratroopers 
and the marines left Sierra Leone in late May and mid-June, respectively 
(AFP, 23 May 2000a; Cunliffe-Jones, 2000f; McGreal, 2000c). Thereafter, 
the UK deployed some 250 troops to train the SLA (Anon, 2000; Barnes, 
2000; Dorman, 2009, p.99). Second, UNAMSIL also expanded. The UN 
hastily gathered additional forces for the mission in the face of the crisis, and 
UNAMSIL’s strength increased to 11,280 by the end of May (UNDPI, 2000j). 
The troop numbers reached 12,428 on 22 July 2000, and this number 
remained at about 12,500 thereafter (UN, 2000g, para.29; UN, 2000p). 
Therefore, the total size of intervening forces was at least equivalent to and 
then surpassed that of the RUF. 
 Moreover, there were pro-government local forces. Some 3,800 SLA 
members and 8,700 CDF members disarmed by the beginning of May (SLW, 
2000d); subtracting these figures from the original estimated strengths of 
7,000 and 15,000, respectively (UN, 1999g, para.30), leaves 3,200 SLA 
members and 6,300 CDF members at the time of the May crisis. An article 
shows a similar figure of 2,000 to 3,000 as the size of the SLA at around this 
time (Ucko, 2016, p.852). The addition of local auxiliaries increases the 
overall strength of the compeller side at the time of the May crisis to some 
16,800 to 18,000, so the compellers had a large numerical advantage over 
the target. This advantage was further strengthened by the expansion of the 
international forces mentioned above and the new recruitment that was 
undertaken by the SLA and CDF. 
 In sum, the balance of troops was favourable to the compellers in the 
second phase too. The RUF did not commit to disarmament in this phase, 
and this contradicts the hypothesis. 
 In the third phase, the balance of the troops changed little, but the 
result of compellence changed from unsuccessful to successful. As the 
balance had been constantly favourable from the first phase, the change of 
the result cannot be explained by this factor. 
 The international forces experienced a slight temporary reduction and 
then an increase in the number of troops in phase three. The reduction was 
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because of the withdrawal of UNAMSIL’s Indian and Jordanian contingents, 
which were composed of some 3,200 and 1,800 troops, respectively, at the 
end of October 2000 (UN, 2000p). The withdrawal started just after the 
Abuja I Agreement (UNAMSIL, 2000q), and as a result, the number of 
UNAMSIL troops dropped to around 10,400 in December 2000 (UN, 2000p; 
2001h). However, as the withdrawal progressed gradually and other states 
provided additional troops, the size of the force returned to some 12,000 in 
March 2001 and remained at that level until June, when the scale increased 
to some 12,700 (UN, 2001e, para.18; 2001h; UNAMSIL, 2001h). The 
reduction in the size of UNAMSIL was also mitigated by the short-term 
deployment of British troops. The UK deployed 500 marines with naval 
vessels to Sierra Leone on 12 November, but they stayed there for only 
about a week (McGreal, 2000f; O’Loughlin, 2000; SLW, 2000j; Dorman, 
2009, p.119). Therefore, the size of the intervening forces at the timing of the 
Abuja II Agreement was some 12,000, differing little from when the Abuja I 
Agreement was agreed. 
 The size of the RUF does not seem to have changed greatly from the 
second phase. UNAMSIL estimated the strength of the RUF as 12,000 in 
February 2001 (UNAMSIL, 2001f). A media report also showed somewhat 
similar estimates of between 8,000 and 12,000 (Smith, 2001). The RUF itself 
reported its strength as 10,000 when DDR resumed in May 2001 (UN, 2001e, 
para.26). Although the final number of RUF members who were disarmed 
after the resumption of the disarmament programme in May 2001 reached 
19,183 (UN, 2002a, para.13), it seems that the RUF’s effective fighting force 
during the third phase of compellence was around 10,000. This means that 
the international forces were roughly equivalent in number to or somewhat 
larger than the RUF during this phase. 
 The local pro-government forces expanded. The UK provided training 
and equipment to restructure and enhance the SLA. The UK-trained and -
equipped SLA reached 3,000 by October 2000 and 6,000 by January 2001 
(AFP, 1 Jan 2001; API, 2001; Ucko, 2016, p.864). The commander of the 
UK forces deployed in this phase recalls the overall size of the SLA as 
14,000 (Riley, 2006, p.2). A minister of the Sierra Leone government stated 
that the size was about 12,000 in early April (Chanda, 2001). The same 
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minister said the CDF had 90,000 personnel (Chanda, 2001), but this seems 
to have been an exaggeration. The CDF itself declared its strength as 
15,000 to 20,000 at the time of the resumption of disarmament in May 2001 
(UN, 2001e, para.26). This means that the international forces were 
accompanied by 27,000 to 32,000 friendly forces when the Abuja II 
Agreement was concluded. 
 If this large local auxiliary force is combined with UNAMSIL’s own 
12,000 troops, the compeller had a large numerical advantage over the RUF 
by a ratio of almost four to one. Even if the RUF had some 20,000 fighters as 
its final figure for disarmed personnel, the compellers still had a larger force 
by a ratio of two to one. This balance of troops in favour of the compellers 
and the success of compellence correspond with the expectation of H1. 
However, because the compellers had a larger force from the beginning, this 
belated correspondence in the third phase does not provide strong support 
for the hypothesis. 
 In sum, the case was not consistent with the hypothesis. When the 
local friendly forces are taken into account, the compellers had a numerical 
advantage over the RUF throughout the entire period of compellence. 
Nevertheless, compellence did not succeed until the third phase, so this 
suggests that the favourable balance of troops per se is not an important 
condition for the success of compellence in peace operations. As a result, 
the Sierra Leone case does not provide support for H1. 
 However, there remains a possibility that the favourable balance of 
troops was a necessary part of a conjunctural success condition – that is, an 
INUS condition. In other words, the numerical advantage alone did not bring 
a success, but it remains possible that it was a factor that was necessary for 
compellence success in combination with other success conditions. This 
possibility is further examined in the conclusion. 
4.3.2  The Strategy of Compellence 
The next hypothesis is H2. It predicts that the combination of the gradual-
turning-of-the-screw strategy and the carrot-and-stick strategy is more 
effective than an ultimatum. The course of events in the case casts doubt on 
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the utility of ultimatums and demonstrates that the application of gradually 
increased pressure was necessary for success. However, positive 
inducements did not play a major role in the case. Therefore, the 
correspondence between the hypothesis and the case is partial. 
 UNAMSIL employed an ultimatum in the first phase of compellence 
with an unsuccessful result. From the beginning, UNAMSIL was authorised 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to “take the necessary action” to protect 
civilians and itself and secure its freedom of movement (UNSC, 1999b). In 
addition, UNSC Resolution 1289, adopted on 7 February 2000, expanded 
UNAMSIL’s tasks, including the provision of security for important locations 
and DDR sites, for which it could “take the necessary action” (UNSC, 2000a). 
Against this background, when SRSG Adeniji demanded that the RUF stop 
seizing weapons from peacekeepers and obstructing their movement, he 
threatened a “forceful response” if the RUF did not comply with the demands, 
and he set a deadline by which the RUF had to show its compliance (AFP, 
14 Feb 2000; IRIN, 2000c; SLW, 2000b; UNDPI, 2000b). This pressure had 
the three components of a full-fledged ultimatum: demand, clear threat, and 
time limit. The ultimatum did not work well; the RUF continued to hinder the 
movement of the peacekeepers, and UNAMSIL did not resort to a “forceful 
response” (Africa News, 2000a; Conteh, 2000c; Roy-MacAulay, 2000b). This 
unsuccessful result of the ultimatum corresponds with the expectation of H2. 
 In the second and third phases, the compellers as a whole employed 
the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy. The accumulation of pressure 
throughout the phases induced the RUF to accept the demand for 
disarmament, so the application of the strategy was necessary for success. 
 UNAMSIL employed proactive pressure and several threats. For 
example, just after the eruption of the May crisis, Major General Vijay Kumar 
Jetley, the force commander of UNAMSIL, issued a threat that force could 
be used as a last resort to retrieve hostages and stated that UNAMSIL was 
capable of enforcing a ceasefire (AFP, 2 May 2000; Roy-MacAulay, 2000d). 
In June, UNAMSIL took some proactive moves to secure the Horseshoe 
Road, which connected the capital to Lungi airport, by expelling the RUF as 
will be discussed in more detail later. SRSG Adeniji stated that the RUF 
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should be forced to retreat to the line before the aggression and that the 
Lomé Agreement should be enforced (Cunliffe-Jones, 2000c). The 
UNAMSIL spokesperson also stated that UNAMSIL would respond to force 
with force and would be deployed anywhere freely (Sengupta, 2000b). In 
July, UNAMSIL launched Operation Khukri, which was its most offensive 
move. Major General Jetley stated that he hoped that the operation 
demonstrated the military capability of the force, and he called on the RUF to 
disarm (UNAMSIL, 2000j). 
 At the same time, this proactive pressures was always accompanied 
by restraining and deescalating remarks. Throughout the second phase, 
UNAMSIL repeatedly issued remarks emphasising that it was a 
peacekeeping force, and it denied that it would achive objectives by using 
force (e.g. UNAMSIL, 2000b; 2000d; 2000e; 2000h; 2000o; 2000u). 
UNAMSIL also demanded that the pro-government forces’ counter-offensive 
be halted out of the concern for the detained peacekeepers’ safety (Farah, 
2000c; McGreal and Norton-Taylor, 2000a; Orjollet, 2000c; UNAMSIL, 
2000a). Operation Khukri’s purpose was to rescue besieged fellow troops, 
and it was a one-off operation, as Jetley later denied the need for another 
military operation (UNAMSIL, 2000m). Therefore, the message from 
UNAMSIL was mixed at best. 
 In contrast, the UK was more proactive in putting pressure on the 
RUF but was reluctant to confront the rebels directly with its own force. After 
conducting a NEO, the UK government announced that it would provide 
technical and logistic support to UNAMSIL and secure Lungi airport so that 
UN reinforcement troops could be deployed. Although the government 
emphasised that the purpose of the UK forces on the ground was not 
combat, it also warned that the forces would defend themselves (AFP, 8 May 
2000b; 10 May 2000a; 11 May 2000a; Ellison et al., 2000; Orjollet, 2000b; 
Waugh, 2000). In fact, the forces’ commander, Brigadier Richards, lured the 
RUF into a direct military confrontation near Lungi and defeated the 
attackers (Richards, 2014, pp.167-170). The UK forces also conducted some 
demonstration of force, including a gunfire exercise and flyovers by aircraft 
deployed on a carrier (Evans, 2000c; 2000d; McGreal, 2000b; SLW, 2000d; 
Richards, 2014, pp.165-166). 
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 The main tool that the UK forces used to tighten the screw was the 
assistance they gave to the SLA and other local pro-government forces 
which carried out counter-offensive against the RUF. Brigadier Richards 
helped to gather and organise these local forces into what he dubbed an 
“Unholy Alliance”, and UK officers coordinated the coalition’s operations and 
logistics (AFP, 23 May 2000b; McGreal, 2000b; McGreal et al., 2000; 
Richards, 2014, pp.145-147, 153-160). In addition, after thwarting the RUF’s 
offensive in May, the UK constantly dispatched the Short Term Training 
Team and provided six-week training programmes for some 1,000 SLA 
troops each time (AFP, 30 Jan 2001; Stone, 2001; Nelson-Williams, 2010, 
pp.132-133). Starting with the completion of training for the first batch of SLA 
troops in late July 2000 (Thomas, 2000b; Dorman, 2009, p.99), the UK-
trained and -equipped SLA increased steadily, and its number reached 
6,000 by January 2001 and over 10,000 by January 2002 (AFP, 1 Jan 2001; 
API, 2001; Malan et al., 2002, ch.8). The UK also provided training for SLA 
commanders (SLW, 2000f; The Progress, 2000c; Diggins, 2001; Nelson-
Williams, 2010, p.132), equipment (Berman, 2000, p.23; 2003, pp.209-210; 
SLW, 2000i), and operational support by seconding personnel to the SLA 
(AFP, 15 Jun 2000a; Cunliffe-Jones, 2000e; SLW, 2000e; Malan et al., 2002, 
ch.3; Le Grys, 2010, p.56). 
 Meanwhile, the UK commanders repeatedly warned the RUF that it 
would be defeated. Brigadier Richards issued the commander’s intent, 
stating that the objective was to make the RUF realise the inevitability of 
defeat. Accordingly, he employed radio programmes extensively to 
propagate the view that the British troops were there to defeat the RUF and 
that the latter had no future. The message was supported and enhanced by 
actions such as firepower demonstration, flyovers, and the contact at Lungi 
Lol, mentioned above (Richards, 2016). Brigadier Gordon Hughes, who 
succeeded Brigadier Richards in June, demanded that the RUF stop fighting, 
saying that the RUF would discover the futility of the military option sooner or 
later (Leighton, 2000a). UK Chief of the Defence Staff, Charles Guthrie, also 
warned the RUF that the training of the SLA was proceeding so well that the 
RUF would be defeated unless it accepted disarmament (API, 2000c). When 
he was deployed to Sierra Leone again in November, Brigadier Richards 
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also warned that it was in the interest of the RUF to return to the peace 
process or be defeated (SLW, 2000). During this November deployment, the 
UK forces again conducted an intimidation campaign, which included 
flyovers over RUF positions and live-fire exercises (SLW, 2000j; ICG, 2001, 
p.2; Richards, 2014, pp.176-177). 
 Therefore, the UK’s strategy to compel the RUF to disarm was the 
gradual turning of the screw. The UK threatened that the RUF would be 
defeated and indirectly applied gradually increased pressure by 
strengthening and assisting the pro-government forces – mainly the SLA. 
Brigadier Richards received intelligence that the RUF was becoming worried 
because of the growing pressure and the deteriorating situation (Richards, 
2016). The RUF repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of the UK forces (SLW, 
2000j; The Progress, 2000j; UNAMSIL, 2000r; AFP, 3 May 2001; Chanda, 
2001), and this fact also shows that the RUF was worried about their 
presence and activity. 
 In addition, the compellers used positive inducements in this case, but 
their effect requires cautious evaluation. This is because the Lomé 
Agreement of 1999 was generous to the RUF, and the rebels seemed to 
have set it as a reference line. The Lomé Agreement granted the RUF 
various governmental posts, including the chair of the CMRRD, whose status 
was equivalent to that of vice president, four ministers, and four deputy 
ministers; support to transform the RUF into a political party; and amnesty 
for acts carried out before the agreement (UN, 1999d). Although ministers 
were appointed from the RUF and Sankoh himself assumed office as the 
chair of the CMRRD, he had an unsatisfactory feeling that the government 
had not lived up to the agreement. In the May crisis, the ministers and later 
Sankoh were arrested by the government, and the power sharing collapsed. 
 Despite the resumption of violence, the RUF maintained that it was 
committed to the Lomé Agreement and demanded that the government 
implement its promise according to the agreement (AFP, 19 May 2000; 7 
Jun 2000a; Panafrican News Agency [PANA], 2000c; The Guardian, 2000; 
UNAMSIL, 2000e; SLW, 2001c). In addition, the RUF demanded the release 
of its detained members, including Sankoh; the establishment of an interim 
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government; and support for its transformation into a political party (AFP, 19 
May 2000; 9 Jun 2000a; 3 May 2001; Dumbuya, 2000b; PANA, 2000c; SLW, 
2000e; 2001b; 2001c; Chanda, 2001; UNAMSIL, 2001f; 2001g). The RUF 
maintained that its political demands needed to be addressed before it 
disarmed (IRIN, 2000m; SLW, 2000j). 
 The compellers, however, rejected most of these demands. The 
Sierra Leone government claimed that the RUF lost its benefit in the Lomé 
Agreement because of the contravention (Jalloh, 2000h; SLW, 2000e). The 
government firmly rejected the release of Sankoh from the beginning, and 
the UN and the UK took the same line (Crossette, 2000; Sullivan, 2000a; 
Waugh, 2000). The government released only some of the RUF detainees 
when Sesay was elected as the new RUF leader (AFP, 21 Aug 2000; Roy-
MacAulay, 2000h). The government also rejected the call to establish an 
interim government, citing the lack of a constitutional basis for such a 
measure, and extended the term of the existing one. President Kabbah 
included no RUF members in the reshuffled cabinet (AFP, 15 Feb 2001a; 
Concord Times, 2001b; Roy-MacAulay, 2001a; UN, 2001a, paras.12-14). 
The government claimed that political issues could be discussed only after 
the RUF implemented the Abuja I Agreement (Roy-MacAulay, 2001b; SLW, 
2001c; 2001d). The Abuja I Agreement referred to the Lomé Agreement as 
“the most appropriate framework” for resolving the conflict, but it did not 
provide any specific carrots for the RUF (UN, 2000j). 
 In the Abuja II Agreement, the government agreed to “consider” the 
release of detained RUF members and to provide support for the RUF 
regarding legal and property issues to transform it into a political party 
(UNAMSIL, 2001i).14 The government emphasised to the RUF in the 
negotiation that the release depended on the RUF’s compliance with the 
agreement and was not a precondition for disarmament (Concord Times, 
2001e). The remaining detainees, including ex-minister members from the 
 
14  The RUF had difficulty finding a property on which to locate its 
headquarters, which was a requisite for its registration as a political party 
(Jalloh, 2000c; MacJohnson, 2001). 
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RUF, were set free only after the disarmament resumed and got on track 
(AFP, 5 Sep 2001; 7 Nov 2001; IRIN, 2001d; Roy-MacAulay, 2001c; 
Richards and Vincent, 2008, p.87). The actual support for the RUF to 
transform into a political party also came only after the signing of the Abuja II 
Agreement (Concord Times, 2001i; Roy-MacAulay, 2001d; Standard Times, 
2001; Malan et al., 2002, ch.7). 
 Therefore, the carrots provided for the RUF were far smaller than 
those provided in the Lomé Agreement and could not have been attractive 
for the RUF. The RUF lost the benefit of power sharing and instead received 
more uncertain promises regarding the release of the detainees and support 
for the establishment of a political party. Taking into account the RUF’s 
demands based on the Lomé Agreement, these positive inducements 
accompanying compellence cannot be regarded as a major factor in 
persuading the RUF to give up arms. 
 Hence, the course of events in the second and third phases partially 
correspond to H2. The UK employed the gradual-turning-of-the-screw 
strategy throughout the second and third phases, and the pressure against 
the RUF increased gradually, supplanted by the occasional proactive moves 
by UNAMSIL. Therefore, the overall strategy of the compellers was the 
gradual turning of the screw. In addition, the compellers used positive 
inducements. The combination of the two strategies and the successful 
result of compellence in the third phase correspond with the expectation of 
H2. However, the small carrots do not seem to have played a major role in 
compelling the RUF, so the correspondence to the hypothesis is partial. 
 This section has reviewed the strategies that the compellers 
employed against the RUF. In the first phase, UNAMSIL employed an 
ultimatum. Although the demands were limited, it failed to fully persuade the 
RUF. In the second and third phases, the compellers employed the gradual-
turning-of-the-screw strategy combined with positive inducements, and the 
compellence ended in success. However, because the impact of positive 
inducements seems to have been small, the congruence with H2 is partial. 
The course of events in this case demonstrates that the application of 
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gradually increased pressure was necessary to compel the resilient rebels, 
while ultimatums and carrots were not. 
4.3.3  Credibility 
The next to be examined is the credibility hypothesis – H3. There are four 
factors that can be the source of threat credibility: national interests, strong 
domestic support, previously acquired advantageous reputation, and the 
actual use of force. As discussed in Chapter 2, although each has its 
rationale for enhancing the credibility of threats, the hypothesis is that the 
actual use of force is the most effective way to support credibility, taking into 
account the characteristics of the context of peace operations. The 
compellers extensively and effectively employed force in the second phase, 
and there is some evidence which indicates that the RUF was affected by 
the actual use of force. Therefore, this case is consistent with the hypothesis. 
 The first factor to be examined is whether the compellers’ national 
interests were involved. There are three states to be examined: Nigeria, 
which was a major troop contributor to UNAMSIL; India, which provided the 
first force commander and a large number of troops for UNAMSIL; and the 
UK. In this case, only Nigeria had strategic interests in Sierra Leone. 
 For Nigeria, regional stability was at stake in the conflict in Sierra 
Leone; thus, its national interest was involved. It was feared that creating a 
precedent of power grab by a rebel may lead to rebellions in other regional 
countries. Another concern was the flow of refugees, which could also 
destabilise the region (Fawole, 2001, pp.14-18; Okolie, 2010, pp.114-115; 
Harris, 2014, pp.107-108; Mohammed, 2015, pp.397-398). There were also 
temporary interests, such as the need to keep the Sierra Leonean contingent 
of ECOMOG in Liberia so that the force could maintain an international look 
and the hope of Nigeria’s military regime to distract from the criticism against 
its hold on power (Adeshina, 2002, pp.6-7; Adebajo, 2008, pp.193-194; 
Harris, 2014, p.108). These temporary interests had already disappeared in 
2000, but regional stability remained important for Nigeria (IRIN, 2000i). 
 India did not have any specific national interests in Sierra Leone. India 
is an active troop contributor to peace operations, and the motivations 
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behind such activeness are thought to include sympathy to non-aligned 
states; practical merits, such as operational experiences; competition with 
regional rival states; and regional stability in some missions (Bullion, 2005, 
pp.198-199). A somewhat more concrete interest at the time of UNAMSIL 
was the country’s ambition to be a permanent member of the UNSC. This 
desire promoted India to participate in a new peace operation to increase its 
international presence (Bullion, 2005, pp.199-202; Banerjee, 2013, p.240). 
However, this was a rather general interest and not specific to Sierra Leone. 
In fact, the foreign minister and retired senior military figures of India stated 
explicitly that no Indian interest was directly involved in Sierra Leone (AFP, 
16 Jul 2000; Bullion, 2005, pp.202-203). 
 The UK also had no strategic interests in Sierra Leone. In the 
“Strategic Defence Review” issued in 1998, Sierra Leone and West Africa 
received no specific reference. According to the document, the UK 
government regarded European security as most important and referred to 
the Middle East as a region which could also have a direct impact on British 
interests. Although the document recognised the importance of international 
stability for the UK, it stated that other regions posed small risks to specific 
British interests (UK Ministry of Defence, 1998, ch.2). Therefore, Sierra 
Leone posed a risk to the British general interest of international stability, but 
not to a more specific, strategic interest. 
 Regarding the motivations for British intervention, there was a need to 
evacuate its own nationals. Beyond this necessity, factors such as the 
responsibility as the former colonial power, humanitarian concern, and a 
general interest in supporting democratic governments and preventing the 
UN’s failure seem to have worked in deciding the intervention (AFP, 11 May 
2000a; 13 May 2000a; Ellison et al., 2000; Government of the UK, 2000; 
MacAskill and Norton-Taylor, 2000; McElderry, 2000; Williams, 2001, 
pp.154-162; Kargbo, 2006, pp.298-299; Dorman, 2009, pp.58, 64-65). 
However, these cannot be regarded as specific UK strategic interests. 
 Therefore, the only national interest of the compellers involved in the 
case was that of Nigeria, and this fact does not seem to have increased the 
credibility of the compellers’ threats. As it existed from the beginning, the 
- 173 - 
compellence in Sierra Leone should have succeeded from the start if the 
factor had been important for the success of the strategy. In fact, the first 
phase of compellence ended in limited success and long-term failure. The 
compellence succeeded at last, but only after lengthy efforts throughout the 
second and third phases. This result casts doubt on the importance of 
national interests and corresponds with the expectation of H3. Logically, 
there remains the possibility that this factor was an INUS condition for 
success and required other conditions to be fulfilled to achieve success. 
However, while the Nigerian contingents fought to defend their positions, 
they did not participate in UNAMSIL’s proactive operations, as discussed 
below. Hence, it is unlikely that Nigerian national interests enhanced the 
credibility of the threats. 
 The second possible source of credibility is domestic support. None of 
the three states had strong domestic support for the intervention in Sierra 
Leone, so this factor could not have been a source of the threats’ credibility 
in this case. 
 Nigerian domestic support was weak from the beginning. The 
Nigerian government’s National Security Council was against the 
involvement of Nigerian armed forces in Sierra Leone in addition to Liberia, 
and the then President, Ibrahim Babangida, had to emphasise that the role 
of the dispatched Nigerian battalion was defensive (Kargbo, 2006, pp.168-
169). This weak support became even weaker because of the costs Nigeria 
suffered in the intervention. It is said that Nigeria lost more than 700 troops 
in Sierra Leone by mid-1999 (Adebajo, 2002, p.95). In addition, Nigeria 
suffered large casualties in the preceding intervention in Liberia – the 
casualties of the two interventions totalled more than 1,500 – and spent over 
eight billion dollars (Adebajo, 2008, p.196). The Nigerian people did not see 
why their soldiers had to go there and be killed, and they questioned 
whether the intervention was merited (IRIN, 2000i; Lington, 2000a). The 
unpopularity of the intervention led all major presidential candidates in the 
1999 election to promise withdrawal from Sierra Leone; this promise was 
also made by Obasanjo, who won the election (Bangura, 2000, p.562-563; 
Howe, 2005, p.188). The Nigerian people thought that Nigeria should 
concentrate on its domestic affairs (Howe, 2005, p.188). When the Obasanjo 
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government agreed to send reinforcement troops to Sierra Leone to join 
UNAMSIL, Nigerian parliament members condemned the decision, pointing 
out the enormous burden (Isibor, 2000). It can be said that Nigeria did not 
have domestic support for its involvement in Sierra Leone. 
 India also lacked domestic support for its participation in UNAMSIL. 
The withdrawal of the Indian troops from UNAMSIL was decided by Prime 
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. His decision was prompted by mounting 
criticism of the participation made by the parliament and the military (Bullion, 
2005, p.197). Hostage taking, including of Indian peacekeepers by the RUF, 
strengthened domestic discontent with the risk in a faraway country (Bullion, 
2001, p.81). 
 The UK lacked strong domestic support as well. Although the British 
public was aware of the humanitarian misery in Sierra Leone, there was no 
public call to intervene there militarily (Kargbo, 2006, pp.132-133, 304-305). 
The oppositions in parliament were also sceptical about the Blair 
government’s method of intervention. The Conservative Party supported the 
NEO but continuously criticised the continuation of intervention without clear 
objectives as mission creep (e.g. Baldwin and Binyon, 2000; Evans, 2000b; 
Schaefer, 2000a; 2000b; The Times, 2000). After the hostage-rescue 
operation from the WSB, the party called for the withdrawal of British training 
team and criticised the dispatch of marines and naval vessels in November 
(Abrams, 2000b; Kiley et al., 2000; Roberts, 2000). 
 Therefore, none of the states had domestic support, and the fact that 
compellence succeeded without this factor demonstrates that it was not 
necessary for the success of the strategy in this case. This is in line with the 
expectation of H3. 
 The third possible source of credibility is previously acquired 
reputation. Similar to domestic support, a favourable reputation based on the 
compellers’ past behaviour seems to have been absent in this case. 
Therefore, this factor could also not have increased the credibility of threats. 
 Nigeria could not have had a good reputation, taking into account its 
poor performance during ECOMOG. As Nigeria had long engaged with the 
RUF throughout the civil war, the RUF knew the capability and resolve of the 
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Nigerian forces. On the one hand, the Nigerian forces inflicted many defeats 
on the RUF and sustained the costly intervention for years. On the other 
hand, the RUF could push back Nigerian forces to the point of re-invading 
Freetown, and Nigeria finally gave up and handed over the mission to the 
UN. Therefore, the RUF could compete with the Nigerian forces, and the 
latter’s resolve waned. 
 India also does not seem to have built an advantageous reputation for 
supporting the credibility of threats. India had participated in many UN peace 
operations, but the post-Cold War missions that it joined before UNAMSIL 
did not resort to the proactive use of force. An exception was UNOSOM II in 
Somalia, to which India sent some 5,000 troops. However, the Indian troops 
did not conduct compellence in the mission; they only arrived in Somalia in 
September and became operational in October, but the mission had 
abandonded its coercive approach by that time (Howe, 1995, p.53; Nambiar, 
2009, pp.263-264). 
 The UK’s activities in Bosnia could have militated for building an 
advantageous reputation. The UK was one of the major troop contributors to 
UNPROFOR. Although UNPROFOR lacked capabilities and was cautious 
about using force at first, the UK along with France and the Netherlands 
established the Rapid Reaction Force, which comprised some 12,500 troops 
and was equipped with artillery, in the summer of 1995. The Rapid Reaction 
Force engaged with the Bosnian Serbs in tandem with NATO’s air strikes 
(Dodd, 1995; Berdal, 2000, pp.63-66; Findlay, 2002, ch.7; Smith, 2008, 
pp.357-358, 367-371). This precedent of proactive military action could have 
built an advantageous reputation for the British forces. 
 However, the RUF seemed to view both UNAMSIL and the UK forces 
as having weak resolve. At the very early stage of the May crisis, one of the 
UN observers heard the RUF saying that it intended to repeat Somalia 
(Ashby, 2002, p.194). Sankoh also stated that UNAMSIL was a paper tiger 
(AFP, 1 Dec 1999; Keen, 2005, p.263). A local news article also reported 
that Sankoh regarded UNAMSIL as a “toothless bulldog” and thought that 
killing a few of its members could force it to retreat (Lington, 2000b). After 
the UK launched an intervention, the RUF also tried to “do a Somalia” 
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against the UK forces (McGreal and Norton-Taylor, 2000b; Smith, 2000a; 
Ashby, 2002, p.299). The RUF sought an opportunity to kill British troops, 
and according to Richards (2014, p.166), it was called “Operation Kill British”. 
The above information suggests that the RUF constructed the image about 
UNAMSIL and the UK based on the precedent of Somalia. 
 This reputation for weak resolve cannot have strengthened the 
credibility of the threats. Compellence succeeded without a favourable 
reputation, and this corresponds with the expectation of H3. 
 The final source of credibility is the actual use of force. The 
compellers employed force extensively in the second phase of compellence. 
The use of force seems to have demoralised the RUF and induced the 
rebels to disarm, so the case is consistent with the hypothesis. 
 UNAMSIL had a small firefight in the first phase of compellence, but it 
did not lead to the success of the ultimatum. On 23 February, a Nigerian 
contingent of UNAMSIL engaged with and repelled a RUF group who 
assaulted a village on Pepel Island (AP, 2000a; Conteh, 2000c; UN, 2000d, 
para.13). This use of force occurred about 10 days after Adeniji issued his 
threat that a “forceful response” would be taken if the RUF obstructed 
UNAMSIL. Therefore, there was a possibility that the use of force gave some 
credibility to the threat. However, as discussed above, the RUF continued to 
erect roadblocks and to disturb UNAMSIL’s movements. This result indicates 
that the actual use of force per se does not guarantee the success of 
compellence. 
 The compellers’ major use of force started in the May crisis – namely, 
the second phase of compellence. The compellers in cooperation with local 
auxiliary forces used force both passively and proactively. It is this extensive 
use of force that seems to have lent credibility to threats by establishing 
precedents of the defeat of the rebels. 
 At first, UNAMSIL fought back when attacked by the RUF but could 
not hold its positions and had to retreat. The RUF attacked DDR sites in 
Magburaka and Makeni on 2 May. The Kenyan contingents guarding there 
resisted, and reinforcements were sent in, but all had to relinquish their 
positions and retreat in a week (AFP, 11 May 2000b; UN, 2000e, paras.59, 
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62-64; Ashby, 2002, p.308). As the RUF launched an offensive towards 
Freetown and attacked Rogberi on 6 May and Masiaka on 7 May, the 
UNAMSIL units in these places also retreated after firefights (AFP, 9 May 
2000; Jourand, 2000; T’Sas, 2000; Zavis, 2000a; Ashby, 2002, pp.305-306). 
 After the UK intervention, UNAMSIL and the pro-government forces 
receiving UK support came to resist the RUF’s attacks robustly. The RUF’s 
southward advance towards Freetown was stopped at Newton by 12 May 
and was pushed back by UNAMSIL, the SLA, and other pro-government 
forces (di Giovanni, 2000; Farah, 2000b; McGreal, 2000a; Onishi, 2000a). 
The pro-government forces advanced and engaged with the RUF to retake 
towns on the Horseshoe Road connecting the capital to the Lungi airport 
(AFP, 10 May 2000b; Kahler, 2000a; Moreno, 2000; Roy-MacAulay, 2000e; 
SLW, 2000d; Sullivan, 2000b; Smith et al., 2004, p.211). UNAMSIL and the 
SLA also defended their positions in Mile 91 and Kabala from the RUF’s 
attacks (AFP, 7 Jun 2000b; 9 Jun 2000b; Jalloh, 2000f; SLW, 2000d; 2000e; 
UNDPI, 2000l). 
 The compellers also prevented the RUF’s westward advance heading 
to Lungi airport. The RUF repeatedly attacked Port Loko after 10 May, and 
UNAMSIL’s Nigerian contingent and the SLA repelled the rebels (AFP, 13 
May 2000b; 15 Jun 2000b; IRIN, 2000h; Orjollet, 2000a; The Progress, 
2000d; UNAMSIL, 2000a; 2000f; UNDPI, 2000i; Smith et al., 2004, pp.210-
212). The UK forces also had direct contact with the RUF near Lungi airport. 
Richards had deployed a pathfinder platoon composed of 27 troops to Lungi 
Lol, a village on the approach to the airport, and a group of about 100 RUF 
attacked the platoon’s position on 17 May. The paratroopers fought back 
and killed some 30 rebels while suffering no casualties (McGreal and 
Norton-Taylor, 2000a; Dorman, 2009, p.94; Richards, 2014, pp.166, 169-
170). 
 In addition to these passive uses of force, the compellers used force 
proactively. UNAMSIL took a few proactive moves to secure the Horseshoe 
Road. On 2 June, two UNAMSIL Indian companies accompanied by a 
helicopter advancing to Rogberi were attacked by the RUF. The UN troops 
fought back, broke through the RUF’s roadblocks, and secured the town 
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(Cunliffe-Jones, 2000b; 2000d; Roy-MacAulay, 2000f; Sengupta, 2000c; 
UNDPI, 2000k). On 3 July, UNAMSIL dispatched the Indian quick reaction 
company and Jordanian troops to secure Masiaka, and they repelled the 
RUF after an engagement without suffering casualties (UN, 2000g, para.21; 
UNAMSIL, 2000i; UNDPI, 2000m). 
 The SLA also struck RUF positions, including those in inner land, 
using an attack helicopter. The pro-government forces’ counter-offensive 
towards RUF-held areas was stopped at Lunsar (McGreal, 2000e; SLW, 
2000d; 2000e; UNAMSIL, 2000g). The gunship was therefore the SLA’s only 
available means to attack RUF positions behind the front. The SLA’s 
helicopters were operated by PMC contractors, and the British forces 
coordinated the gunship’s operation and provided support (Abrams, 2000a; 
Venter, 2012, pp.243-244; Richards, 2014, p.160). The British forces 
penetrated the RUF’s radio network and sent threatening messages stating 
that they knew where the rebels were. Then, they made the attack helicopter 
attack known RUF positions just a few minutes after sending the message 
so that the attacks had a greater psychological impact (Richards, 2016). In 
addition to the provision of air cover for ground battles and the interceptions 
of the RUF’s moves (Prins, 2002, pp.205-206; Ross with Marafono, 2011, 
pp.142-144; Venter, 2012, ch.16), the attack helicopter raided RUF positions 
in inner areas, such as Makeni, Tongo, and Kenema (Concord Times, 
2000a; Jalloh, 2000g; McGreal, 2000d; McKenzie, 2000; Momodu, 2000b; 
SLW, 2000f; The Progress, 2000e; Tostevin, 2000; Venter, 2012, pp.214, 
219-220). 
 UNAMSIL’s most proactive use of force was Operation Khukri in July. 
The RUF had seized two companies of UNAMSIL’s Indian battalion at 
Kailahun since the May crisis (Raman, 2002). The denial of supply, the 
release of other hostages, the deadlock in the release negotiations, and the 
arrival of reinforcements led UNAMSIL to launch a rescue operation 
(UNAMSIL, 2000j; Jetley, 2007a). The operation commenced with the air 
extraction of military observers, as well as the wounded and sick troops, 
from Kailahun town using two UK helicopters on the morning of 15 July. The 
next move was preemptive attacks against known RUF positions on the 
route between Daru and Kailahun using artillery and attack helicopters. 
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Three manoeuvres followed. The first was the forceful breakout of a siege by 
the trapped troops, and they moved towards Pendembu, which sits between 
Kailahun and Daru. Attack helicopters and reinforcements, including 
elements of special forces inserted by air on the route, provided cover for the 
move. The second manoeuvre was the advancement of Indian units from 
Daru to Pendembu to link up with the troops from Kailahun. Both columns 
had to fight fiercely on their way to and when securing Pendembu, where the 
RUF had its brigade headquarters. The third manoeuvre was the 
advancement of two Ghanaian companies to Bendu Junction with the 
purpose of pinning down the RUF’s reserve force. The RUF did not resist 
this move. The units rendezvoused in Pendembu and stayed there for a 
night, repelling the RUF’s attacks. They retreated to Daru by air and land the 
next day, again repelling the RUF’s ambushes along the way (Raman, 2002; 
Jetley, 2007a; 2007b; Nambiar, 2009, pp.389-392). In the operation, Indian 
units suffered casualties – one killed and seven wounded. Regarding the 
RUF, 34 were killed and 150 wounded (Jetley, 2007b). 
 The RUF’s attacks against the compellers, however, continued even 
after Operation Khukri, despite its extensiveness, and the compellers also 
forcefully responded to them. The RUF repeatedly attacked Port Loko, and 
UNAMSIL and the pro-government forces had to repel the rebels many times 
until September (AFP, 24 Aug 2000; AP, 2000c; SLW, 2000g; UNAMSIL, 
2000n; 2000p; UNDPI, 2000p; Smith et al., 2004, p.212). They also engaged 
around Rogberi Junction on 16 July and 30 September (SLW, 2000i; UN, 
2000g, para.21; UNAMSIL, 2000k). The SLA expanded its control area 
around the northern town of Kabala (SLW, 2000f; The Progress, 2000f) and 
defended the town and nearby villages from the RUF’s attacks in August and 
September (AFP, 20 Aug 2000; SLW, 2000g; Thomas, 2000c; UNDPI, 
2000o). In the northwestern area, the SLA and the RUF fought against each 
other around Kambia. On one occasion, the SLA’s attack helicopter targeted 
RUF troops trying to cross a river and killed some 25 (SLW, 2000g; UN, 
2000i, para.14). In the eastern area, the pro-government forces advanced 
towards Koidu in Kono and engaged with the RUF in the surrounding areas 
in August (AFP, 20 Aug 2000; Africa News, 2000i; Momodu, 2000d; SLW, 
2000g; UN, 2000i, para.14). RUF hardliners continued to conscript civilians 
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as fighters and enhanced the defence of their positions (Concord Times, 
2000b; 2000c; Koroma, 2000; Momodu, 2000c; The Progress, 2000k; 
Thomas, 2000d). Although the rainy season temporarily reined in the RUF’s 
activities, it continued to attack villages and the pro-government forces (AP, 
2000d; SLW, 2000i). 
 There is evidence indicating that the extensive use of force in the 
second phase affected the target, and this is in line with H3. About 80 RUF 
combatants disarmed within two weeks after Operation Khukri (UNAMSIL, 
2000l). The total number of RUF combatants who joined the DDR 
programme between 7 May and 8 September was 90 (SLW, 2000h), so 
most of them did so after the operation. There is also a report that RUF 
members in Makeni started to desert after the operation (The Progress, 
2000g). The SLA’s offensive in Kono demoralised some RUF members and 
reportedly led to desertion and even internal conflict between those who 
wanted to surrender and those who tried to prevent them from doing so (AFP, 
16 Aug 2000; SLW, 2000g; The Progress, 2000h). In addition, RUF 
members also referred to the impact of the UK raid against the WSB in 
September as a factor for changing their course (Keen, 2005, p.272). The 
fact that the RUF accepted demands after the demonstration of the 
compellers’ competence through the use of force corresponds with H3. 
 At the same time, after these uses of force in the second phase, it 
took long for the RUF to agree to disarmament in the third phase, so other 
conditions also had to be fulfilled to achieve success. In the third phase of 
compellence after the conclusion of the Abuja I Agreement, a ceasefire was 
generally observed, and the compellers did not use force (UN, 2000n, 
para.22; 2001a, para.17; 2001e, para.2; UNAMSIL, 2001b). Fighting 
between the Guinean forces and the RUF continued for months in this phase, 
but it was out of the control of the compellers. Although the RUF must have 
learned the compellers’ competence and the reputation must have been 
maintained in the third phase as well, because the use of force in the second 
phase was extensive and the distinctions between the phases are artificial, 
the credibility of threats had to be combined with other factors to induce the 
RUF to give up arms. 
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 In sum, the demonstration of the compellers’ competence through the 
actual use of force was necessary in the Sierra Leone case, and this is 
consistent with H3. The four possible sources of threat credibility were 
basically constant in this case: domestic support and pre-earned 
advantageous reputation did not exist throughout the case, Nigeria’s national 
interest was involved from the beginning, and the compellers used force 
from phase one. As the variations of the variables were concurrent, temporal 
comparison cannot indicate the relative importance of national interests and 
the actual use of force. However, there is some evidence that the extensive 
use of force by the compellers affected the RUF, while there is no evidence 
indicating that Nigeria’s national interest increased the credibility of the 
threats. Moreover, UNAMSIL’s proactive operations were mostly conducted 
by Indian contingents, and Nigeria did not play a major role in putting 
pressure on the RUF. Therefore, Nigerian national interest is not likely to 
have affected the credibility of the compellers’ threats. In conclusion, the 
case is in line with H3; the actual use of force seems to have been effective 
in compelling the RUF. The other sources of credibility were not important in 
this case. 
4.3.4  Denial 
The next hypothesis, H4, focuses on how to realise denial. There are four 
approaches to denial that are generally applicable to peace operations: 
attrition, stronghold neutralisation, decapitation, and counter-coercion 
negation. The hypothesis is that counter-coercion negation is the most 
effective of the four. The Sierra Leone case involved the application of all 
four approaches against the RUF. The course of events demonstrates that 
counter-coercion negation facilitated the success, so the case corresponds 
with the hypothesis. However, decapitation and stronghold neutralisation 
were also effective in this case, and a temporal comparison between the 
phases indicates that stronghold neutralisation was especially important. 
 The first type of denial that is applicable to peace operations is 
attrition. The compellers inflicted a relatively large number of casualties in 
the context of peace operations – at least several hundred and possibly 
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more – on the RUF, but it is unlikely that attrition worked against the RUF, 
given its large manpower of some 10,000 or more. 
 A substantial amount of force was used in the second phase of 
compellence, and the RUF suffered a relatively large number of casualties. 
According to Jetley (2007b), 34 RUF were killed and 150 wounded in 
Operation Khukri. The UK forces are thought to have killed some 30 rebels 
in a contact near Lungi Lol (Dorman, 2009, p.94; Richards, 2014, p.170). 
The accumulated number of reported casualties that the RUF suffered in 
contacts with the compellers easily exceeded 300, even excluding the above 
two engagements. Moreover, there are other reports which, without 
providing specific numbers, indicate that the RUF suffered heavy casualties. 
Of course, this type of information is unreliable, and it is impossible to know 
the exact number of RUF casualties. However, at least it can be safely said 
that the RUF suffered more than several hundred casualties in contacts with 
the compellers. 
 Although the RUF suffered substantial casualties in phase two, this 
was not enough to threaten the RUF’s war-fighting capabilities. The 
estimated strength of the RUF was around 10,000, and it had enough 
manpower to continue the war even after losing several hundred members. 
Moreover, it was reported that the RUF forcefully conscripted new recruits to 
compensate for its lost fighting force (Concord Times, 2000b; 2000c; 
Momodu, 2000c). Therefore, attrition does not seem to have worked in the 
second phase. 
 The RUF suffered additional attrition from the Guinean attacks in the 
third phase. The specific number of casualties that the RUF suffered is even 
less clear, because the rebels who fought against Guinea included other 
factions, such as Guinean dissidents (UN, 2001g, paras.132-134). Guinea 
not only fought back against the invasion by the RUF and other rebels within 
its territory but also launched fierce reprisal attacks against northern Sierra 
Leone using artillery fire, air strikes, and ground raids (AFP, 22 Dec 2000; 
Dumbuya, 2000a; IRIN, 2000l; Roy-MacAulay, 2000i; SLW, 2000h; 2000j). 
The Guinean forces reportedly killed over 200 rebels, including RUF 
members, in December alone (AFP, 8 Dec 2000; 12 Dec 2000; 22 Dec 
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2000). The Guinean counterattack even intensified after January 2001 and 
inflicted heavy damage on the rebels (Barrie, 2001; Concord Times, 2001c; 
SLW, 2001a). The rebels also suffered heavy casualties in engagements 
within Guinea. It is reported that 83 were killed in January and hundreds in 
March (Bah, 2001a; 2001b; 2001c). 
 Although the RUF seems to have felt strong pressure from the 
Guinean attacks, the additional attrition in the third phase could not have 
threatened its fighting capability. The RUF explicitly called for UNAMSIL’s 
deployment to Kambia District, where Guinea attacked it intensively 
(UNAMSIL, 2001a). The RUF claimed that this request was to prove that it 
was not recruiting civilians rather than to use UNAMSIL as a shield (Concord 
Times, 2001a; UNAMSIL, 2001e). However, it was agreed in the Abuja II 
Agreement, in the clause titled “Cross-border attacks in Kambia”, that the 
SLA would be deploy to the border area and that UNAMSIL would increase 
its patrols (UNAMSIL, 2001i). Therefore, it seems that the RUF’s intention 
was to utilise UNAMSIL and the SLA as shields against Guinea (Keen, 2005, 
p.269). This means that the RUF was afraid of the Guinean attacks and 
hoped to stop them. Nevertheless, once again, the number of casualties that 
the RUF suffered does not seem to have been substantial enough for it to 
lose its fighting capabilities, taking into account its overall strength of over 
10,000 and possibly some 20,000. 
 In sum, although the compellers and Guinea inflicted large casualties 
on the RUF, the effect of attrition must have been modest at best. The RUF 
had large manpower and could also resort to forceful recruitment to offset 
the loss. The ineffectiveness of attrition is congruent with H4. 
 The second method of denial is stronghold neutralisation. Although 
this is not the type of denial that the hypothesis predicts is the most effective, 
the course of events in this case indicates that stronghold neutralisation was 
a factor that turned unsuccessful compellence into successful compellence. 
 The RUF had strongholds in the eastern and northern areas of Sierra 
Leone. The RUF set up its headquarters in Buedu in Kailahun District, 
located in the eastern area of the country, after 1998, and in Makeni in 
Bombali District, in the northern area, after 1999 (Smith et al., 2004, p.46). 
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Neighbouring to Liberia, Kailahun District was vital as a supply route, and the 
RUF maintained its presence there throughout the war (Smith et al., 2004, 
pp.251, 279-280). When the Lomé Agreement was struck, the RUF kept a 
large portion of eastern and northern Sierra Leone, including the diamond-
mining areas, under its control (UN, 1999c, para.19; 1999f, para.25; SLTRC, 
2004a, pp.350-352). These were the RUF’s strongholds. 
 The compellers did not threaten the RUF’s strongholds during the first 
stage of compellence. UNAMSIL deployed its units not only to the western 
areas, such as Freetown and Lungi, but also to the RUF’s strongholds, 
including Makeni and nearby Magburaka in the northern area and Kenema, 
Daru, and Kailahun in the eastern area (UN, 2000b, para.17; UNDPI, 2000f). 
ECOMOG also had a presence in Mano Junction near Kenema (UN, 2000b, 
para.15). Although this means that the compellers existed near the 
strongholds of the RUF, they were not trying to take control of the area, and 
their presence was not threatening to the RUF. 
 The compellers put some pressure on the strongholds in the second 
phase, but not to the extent of threatening their safety. The compellers’ 
presence in the second phase was mainly constrained to the western area. 
In the May crisis, UNAMSIL had to retreat from Makeni and Magburaka and 
lost its presence in the northern area. In the east, the UNAMSIL units in 
Kailahun were besieged by the RUF and were rescued in Operation Khukri. 
After this retreat, UNAMSIL maintained its positions in Daru and Kenema in 
the eastern area (UN, 2000g, para.30; UNAMSIL, 2000o), but UNAMSIL did 
not push into the RUF strongholds during the second phase. Regarding the 
local pro-government forces, their advance northwards halted at Lunsar, and 
they had to retreat from there after fightings broke out within the forces. The 
SLA conducted airstrikes against Makeni and Magburaka using a helicopter, 
but they did not expel the RUF from there. Therefore, the compellers were 
not in a position to threaten the RUF’s northern strongholds. In the eastern 
area, the pro-government forces advanced towards Koidu in Kono, and this 
caused some disturbance within the RUF, as mentioned above. However, 
the RUF strengthened its defences in Kono and kept the area under its 
control. Therefore, although the pro-government forces put some pressure 
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on the RUF’s strongholds, there was no immediate threat that they would be 
overrun. 
 UNAMSIL’s expansion of its deployment in the third phase was not 
threatening. UNAMSIL expanded its deployment to the RUF’s strongholds 
after the Abuja I Agreement, but the RUF had repeatedly expressed its 
readiness to accept UNAMSIL and even requested its deployment to specific 
areas (e.g. UNAMSIL, 2000t; 2001a; 2001c; 2001d; 2001g; UNDPI, 2000r). 
In fact, RUF commanders told a journalist that one of the reasons why they 
allowed UNAMSIL to be deployed into their areas was to prevent attacks by 
the SLA or the UK forces (Farah, 2001b). These remarks indicate that the 
expansion of UNAMSIL’s deployment cannot be considered an exertion of 
pressure. 
 Threats to the RUF’s strongholds came from Guinea and the CDF. In 
January and February 2001, the CDF attacked the RUF in the northern part 
of Kono District, and the RUF retreated from the area (Smith et al., 2004, 
p.375). The Guinean forces and the CDF supported by Guinea invaded 
Kono and Kilahun in March and April 2001 and further advanced inwards 
(Concord Times, 2001d; IRIN, 2001b; SLW, 2001d; Smith et al., 2004, 
pp.375-376). In Kono District, the CDF launched an offensive from the east 
towards Koidu, the headquarter town of the district, and drove off the RUF in 
battles. The CDF advanced to the point of about 10 kilometres from Koidu 
and was intending to launch an assault on the town. However, UNAMSIL 
arrived at the theatre in early May and persuaded the CDF to halt its 
offensive and abide by the ceasefire agreement (Smith et al., 2004, pp.375-
376). The CDF also attacked Tongo near Koidu (AFP, 20 Apr 2001; IRIN, 
2001c; Pitman, 2001a; SLW, 2001d; UNSC, 2001b, pp.4, 31). Another group 
of the CDF attacked towns in Kailahun District and threatened the line of 
communication between Kilahun town and Kono District (Smith et al., 2004, 
p.286). Therefore, the RUF’s strongholds in the east were under graver 
threats than ever in the third phase of compellence. These attacks did not 
overrun the strongholds in Kilahun and Kono, but the CDF supported by 
Guinea was on the offensive and must have posed a serious threat to the 
RUF. 
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 This threat of stronghold neutralisation seems to have played an 
important role in compelling the RUF, because the rebels accepted 
disarmaments only after this type of denial was applied in the third phase. 
Based on H4, this approach to denial is not expected to be the most 
effective, but the Sierra Leone case suggests otherwise. Moreover, this 
pressure was not applied by the compellers. Although the CDF offensive 
seems to have been carried out with the consent of the Sierra Leone 
government (Smith et al., 2004, pp.375-376), the government was not able 
to fully control the militias, particularly those called Donsos, that participated 
in the offensive (Concord Times, 2001f; 2001g). Guinea, of course, was 
acting independently, so the offensive was beyond the control of the Sierra 
Leone government, let alone the intervening international forces. Therefore, 
the threat of stronghold neutralisation was realised by forces other than the 
compellers. In this sense, the compellence in Sierra Leone was assisted by 
fortune. 
 The third type of denial is decapitation. It seems that decapitation also 
contributed to the success of compellence in this case. Decapitation was 
applied against the RUF in the second phase, and Sankoh was removed 
from its head, but the application was not fully intentional. The trigger event 
which eventually led to the decapitation was the mass protest in front of 
Sankoh’s residence on 8 May. Sankoh fled from his residence when 
bloodshed erupted after the RUF guards at the residence fired upon the 
demonstrators. Sankoh was detained by a pro-government militia by chance 
when he sneaked into Freetown on 17 May (Onishi, 2000; SLTRC, 2004a, 
p.446). Therefore, the arrest of Sankoh was a result of events beyond the 
control of the compellers. 
 That being said, the compellers seized this opportunity and 
deliberately moved to replace the head of the RUF. The UN, the Sierra 
Leone government, and the UK government remarked that they lost 
confidence in Sankoh and that he could no longer be an interlocutor in the 
peace process (Crossette, 2000; Harispe, 2000a; 2000b; Jourand, 2000; 
Toros, 2000; Waugh, 2000). They kept Sankoh under arrest and moved to 
try him in court (Jourand, 2000; Leighton, 2000b; The Progress, 2000b). On 
behalf of the parties involved, the ECOWAS leaders, including Taylor, 
- 187 - 
conveyed to the RUF that the RUF needed to elect a new leader. Persuaded 
by them, the RUF elected Sesay as its interim leader, effectively replacing 
Sankoh. The presidents of Nigeria and Mali let Sankoh know of this decision 
and confirmed his acceptance (AFP, 27 Jul 2000; IRIN, 2000k; PANA, 
2000b; Roy-MacAulay, 2000g; SLW, 2000f; Special Court for Sierra Leone 
[SCSL], 2007b, pp.56-61; Olonisakin, 2008, p.77). 
 This decapitation worked positively for compellence. Sankoh was 
obsessed with obtaining power, and it was difficult to persuade him to give 
up arms. As discussed earlier, he was distrustful of the UN and instructed his 
combatants not to disarm. It is said that he was not committed to 
disarmament due to the fear of losing an election and his dissatisfaction 
regarding the government’s implementation of the Lomé Agreement (Conteh, 
2000b; Farah, 2000a; SLW, 2000c; Thomas, 2000a). It seems that the May 
crisis started because of the reckless behaviour of the local RUF 
commanders in Makeni and Magburaka rather than because of an order 
from Sankoh, but he did not rein them in and let the situation exacerbate (UN, 
2000e, paras.58, 70, 73, 95; Ashby, 2002, p.198). Moreover, it is said that 
Sankoh was planning a coup to grab total power of the state (MacJohnson, 
2000; SLW, 2000d; Smith and Dillon, 2000). Sankoh’s strong desire for 
power made him an intractable target of compellence. 
 However, the succeeding Sesay was a relatively modest figure within 
the RUF and was more susceptible to pressure than Sankoh. Of course, 
being a moderate person in the RUF does not mean that Sesay was a 
peaceful man. Sesay, who was one of the early recruits (SLTRC, 2004a, 
p.105), had fought the war for a decade and led battles as a commander 
(e.g. SLW, 1999b; SCSL, 2009, pp.255-256, 275-278). He was second in 
command of the RUF from December 1999, and his unit blocked and 
disarmed peacekeepers in January 2000 (SLW, 2000a; SCSL, 2009, 
pp.217-218, 292). He also stated that white people always caused trouble, 
and he conducted a mock execution of a UN observer who had been 
detained in the May crisis (Smith, 2000b). 
 Therefore, pressure from outside was necessary, but it worked on him. 
According to Richards (2004, p.16), Sesay admitted that the UK intervention 
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and the ensuing enhancement of UNAMSIL convinced the RUF to give up 
arms. He was said to be reasonable, and he supported negotiation from as 
early as just after the May crisis (IRIN, 2000j; Jalloh, 2000d; 2000e; Farah, 
2001b). He was also the main interlocutor in the release of UNAMSIL 
hostages (Farah and Mufson, 2000a; Rupert, 2000). Unlike the haughty 
Sankoh, Sesay obeyed Nigerian President Obasanjo when Obasanjo 
reproached him and demanded that Sesay stop making people call him a 
general (Concord Times, 2001h; SCSL, 2008, pp.34-35). President Kabbah 
testified in the Special Court that Sesay was very cooperative and made an 
important contribution to the disarmament (SCSL, 2008, pp.31, 33-34, 40, 
104). The UN spokesperson also praised Sesay’s contribution to the 
promotion of disarmament (SLW, 2002). 
 Therefore, it can be said that decapitation worked positively in Sierra 
Leone. The replacement of the intractable Sankoh with the relatively 
moderate Sesay facilitated the success of compellence. Based on H4, 
decapitation is not expected to be the most effective method of denial, so the 
relative importance of this factor requires further examination in the 
conclusion. 
 The final denial style to be examined is counter-coercion negation. At 
first, UNAMSIL had difficulty protecting itself, but it later came to achieve 
effective counter-coercion negation. The success of compellence after the 
fulfilment of the condition corresponds to the expectation of H4. 
 The RUF employed all three counter-coercive strategies: civilian 
suffering, coalition fracturing, and casualty generating. The RUF’s main 
strategy was casualty generation. As discussed above in the section on 
reputation, the RUF intended to repeat Somalia and thought that inflicting 
casualties on the peacekeepers would lead to their retreat. 
 While the British forces performed good force protection from the 
beginning, as demonstrated in the battle in Lungi Lol, UNAMSIL was 
vulnerable to the RUF’s threat to inflict casualties on the force until the end 
of the May crisis. In the first phase of compellence, the RUF did not kill 
UNAMSIL troops but threatened to attack when it blocked the troops’ 
movements. The UNAMSIL units that were involved were heavily 
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outnumbered or were not ready to resist, and they were disarmed or had to 
retreat (e.g. Africa News, 2000a; AP, 2000a; Lynch, 2000a; SLW, 2000b). 
Initially, UNAMSIL could not effectively defend itself in the second phase. 
The RUF’s attacks killed two Kenyan soldiers at the DDR site in Makeni (The 
Nation, 2000; SCSL, 2009, pp.539-540), another two Kenyan soldiers when 
they were retreating (SLW, 2000d; The Nation, 2005; SCSL, 2009, pp.540-
541), and two Nigerian and four Zambian soldiers in Logberi (Jourand, 2000; 
T’Sas, 2000; Ashby, 2002, pp.305-306). Between 25 and 30 troops were 
injured by the end of May (UNAMSIL, 2000c). Moreover, scores of UNAMSIL 
troops were detained and disarmed by the RUF. More than 100 Nigerian 
troops were briefly detained and disarmed by the RUF in Kambia on 3 May 
(Hule, 2000b; UN, 2000e, para.61). Over 400 Zambian peacekeepers were 
detained without resistance after being tricked to proceed into the RUF’s trap 
in a piecemeal manner (Holloway, 2000b; PANA, 2000a; UN, 2000e, 
para.62; Ashby, 2002, pp.216-218). Detention in other places brought the 
number of total detainees to near 500. Some 460 of them were released by 
the end of May, and the remaining 20 or so were released at the end of June 
(Kahler, 2000b; Paye-Layleh, 2000; SLW, 2000d; UN, 2000g, para.24). 
 The failure of self-protection occured because the troops were not 
ready for combat. They were prepared under best-case assumptions, and 
some contingents did not understand the mandate and the rules of 
engagement. They also lacked training, equipment, and logistics (Farah, 
2000d; UN, 2000g, para.54; Ashby, 2002, p.282; PKBPU, 2003, pp.34-38; 
Gberie, 2005, p.165; Olonisakin, 2008, pp.62-63). UNAMSIL was to be 
equipped with attack helicopters, but they had not yet arrived when the crisis 
erupted (Perlez and Wren, 2000; Nambiar, 2009, p.380). 
 It was difficult to prevent casualties completely, even after UNAMSIL 
recovered from the initial shock, because the RUF was equipped with highly 
lethal weapons. A Nigerian was killed and six others wounded when the RUF 
attacked Port Loco with mortars on 16 May (UNAMSIL, 2000a; 2000b). A 
Jordanian peacekeeper was killed and four others wounded in an ambush by 
the RUF using an anti-tank rocket near Mile 91 on 30 June (Africa News, 
2000b; SLW, 2000f; UNDPI, 2000l). A Nigerian peacekeeper was killed in 
another ambush near Rogberi Junction on 16 July (UN, 2000g, para.21; 
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UNAMSIL, 2000k; UNDPI, 2000n). In Operation Khukri, an Indian soldier 
was killed by an anti-tank rocket, and seven other peacekeepers were 
wounded (Jetley, 2007b). Two Nigerians were also wounded when the RUF 
attacked their position near Port Loko on 23 August (AP, 2000c; SLW, 
2000g). 
 That being said, UNAMSIL came to defend itself more effectively after 
the May crisis. Troops were redeployed in defensive positions, and 
additional troops and equipment arrived (UN, 2000g, para.57). The 
reinforcements sent from India were battle-hardened troops who had served 
in Kashmir (AFP, 10 May 2000c; Nambiar, 2009, 387). UNAMSIL still 
suffered several casualties, as mentioned above, but the number was 
smaller, and there were no more hostages. For example, the Indian units 
showed very good force protection during Operation Khukri. The use of 
armoured vehicles and attack helicopters was invaluable in supressing the 
RUF’s attacks, and utility helicopters enabled the medevac of casualties. In 
addition, the compellers gathered intelligence on the RUF’s strength and 
positions beforehand and during the operation. This enabled the Indian units 
to preempt and prepare for engagements with the RUF (Raman, 2002). 
Between late August and October, UNAMSIL experienced several 
engagements but did not suffer any casualties (UN, 2000i, para.15). In sum, 
the compellers came to achieve largely effective force protection by the end 
of phase two. 
 The RUF also tried to exploit civilian casualties generated by the 
compellers, but the effort was ineffective. UNAMSIL paid attention to avoid 
collateral damage. For example, in Operation Khukri, artillery fire was 
preceded by smoke shells to warn civilians, and targets were limited to 
known RUF positions (Jetley, 2007b). Regarding the SLA, its helicopter 
attacks generated collateral damage, and the RUF exploited them. At least 
seventeen civilians were killed when the SLA’s gunship attacked Makeni 
(McKenzie, 2000). The HRW reports that the helicopter attacks in Makeni, 
Magburaka, and Kambia cost the lives of at least 27 civilians, and some 50 
were wounded in May and June 2000 (HRW, 2000b). The RUF told the 
civilians in Makeni not to leave and hid among them when the helicopter 
raids were launched (HRW, 2000b; McKenzie, 2000). Although the collateral 
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damage drew criticism (HRW, 2000b), the Sierra Leone government kept 
operating the gunship. Guinea, which was not a part of the compellers, also 
continued its attacks despite being widely accused of causing civilian 
suffering (AFP, 5 Feb 2001; 19 Feb 2001; HRW, 2001). Therefore, civilian 
casualties did not hinder compellence. This was largely because the civilian 
casualties were inflicted by local actors rather than by intervening 
international forces. The governments of Sierra Leone and Guinea were less 
sensitive to collateral damage and were able to continue their military 
operations. 
 Finally, the RUF also tried to split the coalition, but this also failed. 
The RUF demanded the withdrawal of the UK forces, calling them 
mercenaries (SLW, 2000j; 2001d; UNAMSIL, 2000r). There was a possibility 
that this coalition fracturing worked, because UNAMSIL and the UK forces 
took different stances on the RUF, which caused some friction (Malan et al., 
2002, ch.8). The UK was pursuing the defeat of the RUF in cooperation with 
the Sierra Leone government. The UK was reportedly frustrated by 
UNAMSIL’s timid approach and urged it to take more proactive moves 
(Farah, 2000g; Onishi, 2000d; Olonisakin, 2008, p.66). In contrast, 
UNAMSIL made much of dialogue and was not active in putting military 
pressure on the RUF. A senior UN officer stated, “If the British want war, 
they can have it and we will leave” (Farah, 2000g). UNAMSIL and in 
particular Nigeria were also frustrated that the UK’s role was heavily featured, 
while UNAMSIL’s contribution was under-evaluated (Kamara, 2000b; 
Olonisakin, 2008, pp.65-66). The outgoing acting force commander of 
UNAMSIL, Brigadier Mohammed Garba, a Nigerian, criticised the UK forces’ 
amphibious-landing exercise in Freetown just after the conclusion of the 
Abuja I Agreement, stating that it was threatening (API, 2000d; SLW, 2000j). 
However, the friction was not strong enough to destroy the coalition, and the 
UK remained involved. A UNAMSIL spokesperson downplayed the remark 
by Brigadier Garba (UNAMSIL, 2000s), and the UN and the Nigerian 
government also distanced themselves from the remark, admitting the 
positive role played by the UK forces (API, 2000d; Concord Times, 2000d). 
 In sum, the compellers effectively negated the RUF’s counter-
coercion. At first, UNAMSIL could not deny the RUF’s casualty generation, 
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but it came to defend itself effectively from the middle of the second phase. 
Civilian suffering did not work, because civilian casualties were inflicted by 
the governments of Sierra Leone and Guinea, which were insensitive to 
collateral damage. The RUF also could not split the coalition. Although there 
was a crack between UNAMSIL and the UK, they managed the difference 
and prevented the RUF from exploiting it. The Sierra Leone case ended in 
success after the achievement of effective counter-coercion negation, so the 
case corresponds to H4. 
 This section has reviewed how the compellers achieved denial. None 
of the four specific forms of denial was realised in the first phase. Three were 
applied in the second phase, but these were not enough to compel the RUF 
to restart disarmament. The impact of attrition in the order of hundreds on its 
war-fighting capabilities could not have been serious, taking into account the 
size of the RUF. Decapitation replaced the stubborn Sankoh with the 
moderate Sesay, but some commanders preferred to continue to fight than 
to negotiate and did not obey his direction (Momodu, 2000e; 2000f; Chanda, 
2001). The effective counter-coercion negation reduced the attacks against 
the peacekeepers, but the RUF did not give up arms. To compel the RUF to 
disarm, additional pressure during the third phase was necessary. One form 
of additional pressure was the further attrition that was inflicted on the RUF 
by Guinea and the CDF. However, because the RUF had over 10,000 
members, the attrition does not seem to have had a huge impact. The other 
form of pressure was the threat of stronghold neutralisation by the offensive 
of the Guinean forces and the CDF. This came to be applied in the third 
phase only, and from the denial perspective, it seems to have been the 
cause of the different results between the second and third phases. These 
attacks by Guinea and the CDF, however, were not under the control of the 
intervening forces. Therefore, the compellence was facilitated by powers 
other than the compellers. 
 The success of compellence after achieving the effective negation of 
counter-coercion corresponds with the expectation of H4, but the relative 
importance of this type of denial compared to other types requires further 
examination. The spokesperson of the RUF stated in April 2001 – that is, 
near to the end of the third phase – that the RUF returned to the peace 
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process because it found that military victory was no longer possible. He 
stated, “We are in a stalemate … We are not defeated but we can’t take 
power” (Farah, 2001b). This remark indicates that effective counter-coercion 
negation facilitated the success of compellence. However, it is not clear 
whether this was the most effective method of denial, as predicted by H4, 
because the case also demonstrates that decapitation and stronghold 
neutralisation can work positively in peace operations. In particular, 
stronghold neutralisation, which came to be applied in the third phase only, 
seems to have been a key in terms of turning the case from unsuccessful to 
successful. This point is further discussed in the conclusion. 
4.3.5  Third-Party Support 
The final hypothesis to be examined is H5. It predicts that compellence in 
peace operations is more likely to succeed if targets do not receive support 
from third parties. Liberia had provided substantial support to the RUF, and 
the effective end of the support under international pressure caused a great 
damage to the RUF. This condition came to be fulfilled in the third phase, 
and then the compellence became successful. Therefore, the case 
corresponds well to the hypothesis. 
 The RUF had received support from neighbouring Liberia, led by 
Taylor, for a long time – even from before the launch of the rebellion. Both 
Sankoh and Taylor, as well as other Sierra Leonean and Liberian dissidents, 
received training in Libya and agreed to cooperate with each other to realise 
revolutions in the two countries (Abdullah, 1998, pp.220-221; SLTRC, 2004a, 
pp.93-95; 2004b, p.60). Taylor led the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) and commenced a civil war in Liberia in 1989. Sankoh joined the 
NPFL and fought alongside Taylor in Liberia. Meanwhile, Sankoh also set up 
training camps in Liberia and trained his own rebels (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.96, 
100-109; 2004b, p.61; Higbie and Moigula, 2017, pp.26-27). 
 Taylor had some incentives to support Sankoh. Taylor hoped to make 
Liberia as prominent in the region as Nigeria was, and his envisioned sphere 
of influence included Sierra Leone and Guinea (Olonisakin, 2008, p.73; 
Harris, 2014, p.84). Moreover, Sierra Leone let ECOMOG, which intervened 
in the Liberian civil war, use an airport and contributed troops to the force. In 
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1991, ECOMOG was thought to be planning the build-up of forces in Sierra 
Leone near the border with Liberia. In addition, elements supporting the 
Liberian government had escaped to Sierra Leone and prepared for a 
counterattack. Taylor wanted to crush these counter-moves before they 
became serious threats against him (Byman et al., 2001, pp.75-76; SLTRC, 
2004a, pp.96-99, 118-119). 
 Sankoh commenced his insurgency against the Sierra Leone 
government with substantial support from Taylor. The majority of the initial 
invasion force were NPFL fighters; among the 2,000-strong force, some 
1,600 were NPFL combatants, and the initial strength of the RUF was only 
360 to 370 personnel (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.118-123). This provision of NPFL 
fighters ended in 1992 when violent clashes erupted between them and the 
RUF (SLTRC, 2004a, pp.142-144, 170-174; Keen, 2005, pp.38-39). 
 The cooperation between Sankoh and Taylor continued despite the 
friction, but Liberian support was interrupted for several years from around 
1993. This is because a Liberian anti-Taylor force – the United Liberation 
Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) – and the SLA occupied the 
border area and cut the supply line between the RUF and Taylor (Smith et 
al., 2004, p.268; Keen, 2005, pp.39, 116; SCSL, 2012, pp.850-853; Marks, 
2019, pp.5, 9). Thereafter, the RUF obtained arms and ammunition by 
grabbing from opponent forces or trading robbed cash crops and diamonds 
with Guineans and corrupt and undisciplined “sobels” (Smith et al., 2004, 
p.271; Keen, 2005, pp.121, 134; Marks, 2019, pp.5-6). 
 Liberian support for the RUF resumed on a large scale after Taylor 
became the country’s president in 1997 (Keen, 2005, p.216). He provided 
and facilitated financial, training, and other operational support, as well as 
weapons, ammunition, and other war matériel, while the RUF provided 
diamonds in return (UN, 1999c, para.13; 1999m, paras.10-11; 2000l, 
paras.32, 40; 2000m, pp.33-37; Berman, 2000, p.14; HRW, 2000a; Smith et 
al., 2004, p.277; SCSL, 2012, pp.1374-2156). Diamonds were attractive for 
Taylor as a financial source for his own war, and he established a smuggle 
network for the trade of diamonds and weapons (Woods and Reese, 2008, 
p.18). According to documents that were found in Sankoh’s home, Taylor 
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took the majority of the profit from diamond sales (AFP, 12 Jun 2000; Farah, 
2000e). Besides for his personal needs, Taylor seemed to need money to 
repay Libya the debt from its support for his insurgency (Buchan et al., 2000). 
Strategically, Taylor expected the RUF to secure the border areas to prevent 
hostile powers and dissidents from using there (Rupert and Farah, 2000; 
Keen, 2005, p.249). 
 It is said that Liberia’s support for the RUF even strengthened in 2000 
(Berman, 2000, p.15). The UK media reported that truckloads of weapons 
and other materials were sent from Liberia to the RUF in mid-2000 (Berman, 
2001, p.8; Kargbo, 2006, p.215). RUF commanders made trips with Taylor, 
and Liberia provided the RUF with arms, ammunition, and other supplies on 
multiple occasions in June 2000 (UN, 2000l, paras.46-48; 2000o, para.22). 
The SCSL (2012, pp.1787-1823) found that the RUF obtained weapons and 
ammunition from Liberia on multiple occasions throughout 2000. 
 However, of course, Taylor acted based on his own interests. His 
aims of cooperating in regard to the release of UNAMSIL hostages were to 
obtain development assistance and lift the sanctions which had been 
imposed against Liberia during its civil war (Farah and Lynch, 2000; Lington, 
2000b; Onishi, 2000b). The RUF returned the hostages through Taylor, and 
he showed the strong influence that he had on the RUF (AFP, 15 May 2000; 
Holloway, 2000a; Paye-Layleh, 2000; Rupert, 2000; UN, 2000g, para.24; 
Zavis, 2000b; SCSL, 2007a, pp.87-92). 
 Contrary to his expectation, Taylor faced mounting international 
pressure to stop supporting the RUF after the release of the hostages. In 
particular, Liberia’s involvement in the trade of conflict diamonds from Sierra 
Leone attracted a great deal of attention, because it had exported a much 
larger number of diamonds than it had produced (Smillie et al., 2000, pp.18, 
34, 48-49). This increased concern about conflict diamonds and the fear of a 
consumer boycott affected the diamond industry and trading governments 
(Masland et al., 2000; Campbell, 2004, pp.115-116; Grant and Taylor, 2004, 
pp.389-392; Wright, 2012, p.183). They held international meetings to 
discuss measures to block conflict diamonds, starting with the one held in 
Kimberley in South Africa in May 2000 (Grant and Taylor, 2004, pp.392-394; 
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Wright, 2004, pp.698-699).15 Against the background of this move, the 
international community also imposed measures specifically targeting 
diamonds from Sierra Leone. The UK took the initiative to impose a ban on 
diamonds from Sierra Leone, and the UNSC resolution imposing the ban 
mentioned Liberia as a conduit of such diamonds (UNSC, 2000b; Kargbo, 
2006, p.216). 
 The threat and application of sanctions against Liberia followed. The 
EU froze development assistance for Liberia because of its support for the 
RUF (Fletcher, 2000; Osborn, 2000; Osborn and MacAskill, 2000). The US 
and the UK also threatened Liberia that it would face sanctions if it did not 
stop supporting the RUF (AFP, 17 Jul 2000; 31 Jul 2000; Farah and Mufson, 
2000b; Kahler, 2000c; Lederer, 2000; Lynch, 2000b; SLW, 2000f). The US 
imposed unilateral diplomatic sanctions on Liberia in October 2000 (Farah, 
2000f; Kamara, 2000a; Nubo, 2000). The UN committee monitoring the ban 
on arms exports to Sierra Leone pointed out that the Liberian government 
had been involved in the illicit diamond trade and the provision of arms to the 
RUF, and it recommended the strengthening of sanctions against Liberia 
(UN, 2000m, paras.87-89, 193, 202, 270-273). The US and UK governments 
further pushed for sanctions against Liberia in line with the recommendation 
of the committee (The Perspective, 2000; Winfield, 2001). 
 Facing the threat of new sanctions, President Taylor moved to detach 
himself from the RUF and tried to avoid the sanctions. He announced that 
the RUF members in Liberia had left the country, that the RUF’s office in 
Monrobia had closed, and that he would no longer provide any support to 
the RUF (AFP, 12 Jan 2001; 7 Feb 2001; Farah, 2001a; Holloway, 2001). He 
also claimed that Liberia had landed all aircraft that were accused of 
involvement in the illicit arms trade (Farah, 2001a; Adebajo, 2002, p.72). The 
UK and the US argued for the immediate imposition of new sanctions, but 
France and the African states called for a moratorium (Lederer, 2001a; 
 
15  This Kimberley Process culminated in the international certification 
scheme on diamonds, which was adopted in 2002 and put into effect in 
2003 (Grant and Taylor, 2004, pp.393-394; Wright, 2004, pp.699-700). 
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2001b; The Perspective, 2001). The UK and US conceded, and the UNSC 
adopted the resolution to impose new arms sanctions on Liberia immediately 
and a diamond ban and travel sanction in two months if it did not cut ties with 
the RUF (UNSC, 2001a). 
 After the adoption of the resolution, President Taylor took further 
steps to avoid the implementation of the sanction. He announced a halt in 
the exportation of diamonds, the closure of the border between Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, and the closure of Sankoh’s bank account (AFP, 20 Mar 2001; 
IRIN, 2001a; Lederer, 2001c; Paye-Layleh, 2001a; 2001b; UN, 2001b). 
However, the ECOWAS investigation concluded that doubt remained 
regarding whether Liberia had actually and thoroughly implemented what it 
had said it had done (UN, 2001c). Without clear evidence that Liberia had 
complied with the demands of the sanction resolution, the UNSC decided not 
to halt the implementation of the sanctions, and they were put into practice 
(Cooney, 2001; Lederer, 2001c). 
 The relationship between the RUF and President Taylor continued in 
2001, but the character of the relationship changed. It was reported in 
December 2000 that Liberian support for the RUF was decreasing because 
of international pressure on Liberia and due to its economic collapse. What 
made matters worse for Taylor was the resurgence of insurgency in his own 
country, and the military operations against the insurgents were an added 
burden on him (Farah, 2000g). The LURD progressed to the area 
neighbouring Kailahun and thereby severed the supply line between the 
RUF and Taylor (ICG, 2002, p.5; Harris, 2014, p.116). The trade of 
diamonds and arms still continued between the RUF and Liberia in 2001 
(AFP, 13 Feb 2001; 15 Feb 2001b; UN, 2002b, para.116; SCSL, 2012, 
pp.1787-1797, 1807-1816, 2110-2138), but the diamond ban on Liberia 
made it difficult and less profitable for the RUF to trade the diamonds it 
mined compared to before (Keen, 2005, pp.271-272). Moreover, the 
struggling Taylor used RUF fighters for the war in Liberia (Astill, 2001; 
Gberie, 2001, p.11; ICG, 2002, p.6; Keen, 2005, p.288). He continued to 
provide support for the RUF for this purpose, even after the conclusion of the 
Abuja II Agreement, and the RUF moved its weapons into Liberia instead of 
surrendering them for DDR (ICG, 2001, p.4; UN, 2001g, paras.112-123). 
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 Therefore, although it may not have ended completely, Liberia’s 
support for the RUF surely dwindled. The sanctions affected President 
Taylor’s capabilities and willingness to support the rebels (Pitman, 2001b; 
PKBPU, 2003, p.7; Harris, 2014, p.116), and he even drained some 
resources from the RUF to fight insurgents in Liberia. The third-party support 
for the RUF decreased in the third phase of the compellence, and the RUF 
accepted disarmament. This course of events corresponds well with H5. 
4.4  Conclusion 
The chapter has analysed the compellence in Sierra Leone from the 
perspective of each hypothesis. As this is one of the most successful cases 
of compellence in peace operations, the derived conditions are expected to 
be satisfied in the case. The result of the examination is summarised in the 
table below. 
Table 4.1  The Summary of the Sierra Leone Case Study 




Unsuccessful Almost successful 
Demand type Limited Heaviest Heaviest 
Favourable balance of troops 
(H1) ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Strategy (H2) Ultimatum 
Gradual turning of 
the screw 




National interest ✓ (only Nigeria) ✓ (only Nigeria) ✓ (only Nigeria) 




– – – 
Actual use of force ✓ ✓ 
✓ (continuing effect 




Attrition – ✓ ✓ 
Stronghold 
neutralisation 
– – ✓ 
Decapitation – ✓ 
✓ (continuing effect 
from the second 
phase) 
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Counter-coercion 
negation 
– –  ✓ ✓ 
Absence of third-party support 
(H5) 
– – ✓ (largely) 
(Note) ✓ : present, applied, or fulfilled       – : absent 
 
 The protracted case of Sierra Leone can be analysed using the most-
similar-design comparison. As the compellence succeeded in phase three, 
the factors that did not exist in the first two phases but came to exist in the 
third seem to have caused the difference in the results. 
 There are two such factors: stronghold neutralisation as a form of 
denial and the absence of third-party support on the target side. Stronghold 
neutralisation was applied by the Guinean forces and the CDF during phase 
three. They did not actually neutralise the RUF’s strongholds, but they 
threatened to do so when they invaded the RUF’s eastern strongholds. The 
strongholds threatened by the offensive included diamond-mining areas and 
the RUF headquarters in a region neighbouring Liberia which was important 
as a supply route. The other condition that came to be satisfied in the third 
phase was the halt of third-party support. The RUF had received support 
from Taylor in Liberia, but this support dwindled as international sanctions 
were imposed on Liberia and a new insurgency intensified there. 
 These two factors seem to have been necessary in compelling the 
RUF. The RUF had already been in an unwinnable situation by the middle of 
the second phase of compellence. By this time, UNAMSIL, which was 
occupying the western part of Sierra Leone, including the capital, had begun 
to defend itself effectively. The RUF must have realised this, because its 
repetitive attacks against the UNAMSIL positions were repelled each time. 
However, the RUF still had half of the country under its control and could 
maintain the war as long as it had diamond-mining areas and support from 
Liberia. As these were fundamental for the RUF, the stronghold 
neutralisation and the halt of third-party support in the third phase posed 
serious threats to the RUF’s capability to continue the war. The offensive 
against the RUF’s strongholds and the increasing pressure against President 
Taylor raised the prospect of the RUF’s defeat if the trend continued. This 
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shift from “unable to win” to “likely to be defeated” seems to have been the 
difference between phases two and three, and the shift compelled the RUF 
to accept disarmament. 
 Therefore, the most-similar-design comparison provides clear support 
to H5 but seems to force reconsideration of H4. H4 predicts that the most 
effective method of denial for compellence in peace operations is counter-
coercion negation. However, the above analysis indicates the importance of 
stronghold neutralisation as a form of denial. UNAMSIL was vulnerable to 
the RUF’s counter-coercion until the May crisis but came to be able to 
defend itself after the UK intervention. Other counter-coercive efforts by the 
RUF also did not bear fruit, so the compellers had achieved effective 
counter-coercion by the end of phase two. Nevertheless, the compellence 
did not succeed until phase three. Does this mean that counter-coercion 
negation was unimportant? 
 Although there is a logical possibility that stronghold neutralisation 
and the absence of third-party support were not only necessary but also 
sufficient for the success of the case, the results of the examination of the 
pre-UNAMSIL period of the conflict negate this possibility. As mentioned 
earlier, the RUF lost the supply line with Taylor as ULIMO occupied Liberia’s 
border area with Sierra Leone around 1993. Nevertheless, the RUF 
sustained its guerrilla operations through robbing or trading arms and 
ammunition until Liberian support resumed on a large scale after Taylor 
became president in 1997. Therefore, the halt of third-party support per se 
did not bring an end to the RUF. The RUF also experienced the loss of or 
pressure against its strongholds, but it did not cease its activities. Pro-
government forces under the support of a PMC took Kono, destroyed the 
RUF’s main camp called Zogoda in the southeast, and attacked the 
northeast strongholds in Kailahun in 1995 and 1996 (Smith et al., 2004, 
pp.23, 29, 274, 314-315; Keen, 2005, pp.151-152, 194). This pressure 
compelled the RUF to sign the Abidjan Agreement, but the RUF was not 
committed to disarmament. In contrast, utilising the agreement, Sankoh 
expelled the PMC and continued the efforts to purchase arms (Abraham, 
2001, pp.212-214; Penfold, 2012, p.13; Higbie and Moigula, 2017, pp.52-53). 
In 1998, ECOMOG’s offensive went as far as securing Kono and attacking 
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Kailahun. However, the RUF survived the attacks and launched a counter-
offensive at the end of the year, resulting in the invasion of Freetown in early 
1999 (Adeshina, 2002; Smith et al., 2004, pp.34, 36, 278-281; Higbie and 
Moigula, 2017, p.67). Therefore, the pressure of stronghold neutralisation 
per se was also not sufficient to compel the RUF to disarm. Moreover, the 
combination of stronghold neutralisation and the absence of third-party 
support was not sufficient either, because the RUF did not have Liberian 
support when its strongholds were threatened in 1996. Hence, the two 
factors were not sufficient conditions for the success of compellence; other 
factors were necessary as well. 
 As other factors existed at least from phase two, the most-similar-
design comparison does not indicate anything about their importance. 
However, the congruence analysis so far and some additional counterfactual 
examinations indicate which factor was necessary for success. 
 First, the above examination demonstrates the indispensability of 
effective counter-coercion negation. As this was absent, the RUF was able 
to rob weapons from opponent forces and to fight back when its strongholds 
were threatened. The same could have happened in the third phase of the 
compellence if the compellers had been vulnerable. In fact, the RUF grabbed 
about 1,000 firearms, tons of ammunition, and even armoured vehicles from 
UNAMSIL by the end of the May crisis (Berman, 2000, pp.19-20; Anon, 2001, 
p.237). If UNAMSIL and the SLA had remained weak to counter-coercion, 
the RUF would not have given up armed resistance, believing that it could 
push back the compellers. The effective counter-coercion negation made the 
RUF realise that it could no longer achieve military victory, as the RUF 
spokesperson stated (Farah, 2001b). It can be said that the effective 
counter-coercion negation enabled the stronghold neutralisation and the halt 
of third-party support to choke the RUF. Therefore, effective counter-
coercion negation was necessary for the success of this case, and the case 
is consistent with H4 despite the result of the most-similar-design 
comparison. 
 Regarding the remaining two forms of denial, it is not clear whether 
decapitation was necessary for the case to be successful, although it worked 
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positively in this instance. The compellers conducted decapitation as Sankoh 
was detained by chance and the RUF was urged to elect a new leader. The 
succeeding interim leader, Sesay, played an important role in the 
acceptance and implementation of disarmament, so the change of the RUF’s 
leadership from Sankoh to Sesay surely facilitated the success of 
compellence. Sankoh was stubborn and seems to have been obsessed with 
taking total power of the state. Even after accepting the power sharing that 
was stipulated in the Lomé Agreement, it is said that he planned to stage a 
coup in May 2000, although the plan was foiled by the demonstration and 
subsequent violent confrontation on 8 May that forced him to escape from 
the capital (MacJohnson, 2000; SLW, 2000d; Smith and Dillon, 2000). If he 
had made up his mind to take power at all cost, it may have been impossible 
to compel him to accept total disarmament, and therefore he had to be 
removed. However, it is not clear whether this was the case. He initially 
cooperated with disarmament under the Lomé Agreement and he even 
moved to expel the senior RUF second in command for his objection to the 
disarmament (UN, 1999k, paras.13-14; TRC, 2004a, pp.337-338; SCSL, 
2009, p.289; Penfold, 2012, pp.164-165). This implies that he was able to 
accept disarmament under certain conditions or based on certain 
calculations. In particular, if the RUF was cornered and on the verge of 
defeat due to effective counter-coercion negation, stronghold neutralisation, 
and the halt of third-party support, even Sankoh could have chosen to give 
up arms and obtain whatever small carrots were being provided. Therefore, 
it is not clear whether the elimination of Sankoh was necessary. What this 
case demonstrates is that decapitation can work and facilitate compellence 
in peace operations. 
 Regarding attrition, its contribution to the success of compellence 
must have been modest at best and cannot be regarded as a necessary 
factor. The compellers, pro-government forces, and Guinean forces killed 
hundreds of RUF members in contacts. These are substantial casualties in 
the context of peace operations, but not to the extent that they threatened 
the RUF’s war-fighting capability, taking into account its large manpower and 
the availability of replacements. 
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 Moving to other hypotheses, the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-
screw strategy seems to have been necessary for success, and this partially 
corresponds to H2, which predicts that the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-
screw strategy combined with the carrot-and-stick approach is effective. 
UNAMSIL employed an ultimatum in the first phase and failed to achieve 
RUF compliance, despite the limited demands. The compellers did not 
employ an ultimatum in the second and third phases. However, taking into 
account the fact that it failed to derive compliance even for the limited 
demands in the first phase, it is easy to imagine that an ultimatum would not 
have worked even if it had been tried. The rebels had fought the war for a 
decade, sometimes resurging from a near defeat. Such a resilient armed 
group would not have given up arms before trying resistance. In the second 
and third phases, the compellers employed the gradual-turning-of-the-screw 
strategy, and the case ended successfully. The UK continuously provided 
training and equipment to the SLA and supported the pro-government 
forces’ offensive against the RUF. This increasing pressure was supplanted 
by the occasional show of force by the UK forces and UNAMSIL’s proactive 
operations. The failure of an ultimatum and the success of the gradual-
turning-of-the-screw strategy correspond with the expectation of H2. 
 However, carrots did not play a large role in this case, and this thus 
contradicts the latter half of the hypothesis. When the RUF accepted 
disarmament, it had lost the generous power sharing and amnesty provided 
in the Lomé Agreement. Instead, the RUF obtained support to transform 
itself into a political party, which was also included in the Lomé Agreement, 
and the consideration of RUF detainees’ release, depending on the 
implementation of the Abuja II Agreement. The RUF kept demanding the 
provision of the carrots that had been agreed to in Lomé, so the far-reduced 
positive inducements that were actually provided could not have been 
attractive for the RUF in terms of encouraging it to accept the disarmament. 
Therefore, this case indicates that compellence can succeed without 
substantial carrots if threats are serious enough. 
 In making the threats credible, reputation building through the actual 
use of force also seems to have been necessary in this case. The fact that 
the compellence succeeded after the compellers’ use of force corresponds 
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with H3. As discussed in the section on credibility, there is some evidence 
that the demonstration of the compellers’ competence through the 
substantial use of force drove the RUF members to choose disarmament 
and caused frictions between those who wanted to disarm and those who 
tried to prevent it. Regarding the other sources of credibility, Nigeria’s 
national interest was involved. However, Nigeria did not play a role in putting 
proactive pressure on the RUF; thus, this factor does not seem to have 
increased the credibility of the threats. The other two sources of credibility – 
domestic support and previously acquired advantageous reputation – did not 
exist in this case. 
 Finally, the course of events does not correspond to H1, which 
predicts that compellence succeeds if the compellers have larger forces than 
the targets. Throughout the case, the balance of troops was always 
favourable to the compellers combined with the local auxiliary forces. 
Therefore, it does not match the shift in results from unsuccessful to 
successful. 
 Although this inconsistency does not negate the possibility that the 
factor was an INUS condition and had to be combined with other conditions 
to make the case successful, the numerical advantage does not seem to 
have been necessary to fulfill any of the above factors that were necessary 
for success. The CDF’s offensive against the RUF’s stronghold in Kono in 
the third phase was conducted by a small force that was composed of some 
200 militias (Smith et al., 2004, p.376). Although they had Guinean support, 
this shows that a small force could threaten the RUF’s strongholds if it was 
well supported. The end of Liberian support had nothing to do with the size 
of the international forces on the ground. Therefore, the two factors which 
are found important in the most-similar-design comparison did not rely on 
numerical advantage. 
 Effective counter-coercion negation and the effective use of force also 
did not require a larger force than the target of compellence. This was well 
demonstrated by the British platoon that repelled the attack by about 100 
RUF in Lungi Lol without suffering any casualties. The arrival of 
reinforcements surely helped UNAMSIL to realise good force protection, but 
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this does not necessarily mean that UNAMSIL was unable to defend itself 
when it faced larger opponents. A part of a Kenyan company, composed of 
70 troops, that was surrounded by hundreds of RUF members in Makeni in 
the May crisis could repel attacks and defend its camp, although the lack of 
ammunition and other supplies forced them to abandon the position later 
(Ashby, 2002, pp.203-213, 308). This indicates that UNAMSIL could have 
been able to defend itself if it had been appropriately prepared even before 
receiving reinforcement; the problem was posture – that is, deploying under 
the best-case scenario and being unprepared for combats – rather than 
number. 
 Finally, regarding the gradual turning of the screw, the training of the 
SLA by the British forces was an important component, but here again, what 
mattered more in regard to pressure on the RUF seems to have been the 
improvement of its quality rather than the increase of its size. As discussed 
in the section on the strategy of compellence, the UK-trained SLA steadily 
increased after British intervention. However, the SLA had already 
experienced quick and massive expansion and had over 10,000 troops 
during the NPRC’s rule, and the RUF, which was a much smaller force of 
several thousand at the time, could fight against it because of the 
undisciplined SLA’s incompetence. In fact, many of the government soldiers 
became “sobels” and later joined the rebel force as AFRC (Howe, 2001, 
pp.200-201; SLTRC, 2004a, pp.159, 161-163; Gberie, 2005, pp.77-82, 102-
103; Woods and Reese, 2008, pp.27-28). Therefore, the RUF could cope 
with the SLA if it merely swelled in size. What was new in the British training 
was the enhancement of the SLA’s quality. The SLA was becoming much 
more competent owing to the training (Barnes, 2000; Stone, 2001; Webber, 
2001), and this fact must have threatened the RUF. 
 In conclusion, the Sierra Leone case is not consistent with H1, is 
partially consistent with H2, and is consistent with H3 to H5. The conditions 
represented by the congruent hypotheses – that is, the use of the gradual-
turning-of-the-screw strategy, the actual use of force to support the credibility 
of threats, effective counter-coercion negation to achieve denial, and the 
absence of third-party support – were individually necessary for success. In 
addition, the examination demonstrates that stronghold neutralisation was 
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also necessary, which is related to H4. These five conditions were INUS 
conditions for the success of the case and constitute the collective sufficient 
condition for its success. Decapitation, another factor related to H4, also 
contributed to the success, but it is not clear if it was necessary for the 
success. 
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Chapter 5 
Somalia: UNOSOM II and the US Forces 
The final empirical chapter explores compellence in Somalia. The compellers 
were UNOSOM II, a UN peace operation, and the armed forces of the US 
which supported the UN mission. The target was a Somali armed group 
called the SNA. Somalia is a case of failed compellence, which means that 
the conditions for success are expected to be absent. This chapter employs 
the congruence method, which checks whether the prediction of each 
hypothesis corresponds with the actual course of events. Although 
UNOSOM II was preceded by a US-led multinational force called UNITAF, 
the limited nature of the demands made by UNITAF keeps its compellence 
out of the scope of this research. Therefore, the hypotheses are examined 
with a focus on the UNOSOM II period. 
5.1  Background 
Somalia had been under the dictatorial rule of Mohammed Siad Barre, who 
took power by a coup in 1969. The deterioration of economic and social 
conditions, the loss caused by a war with neighbouring Ethiopia in 1977 and 
1978, and Barre’s repressive policies led to rebellions by multiple groups 
from around 1980 (Lyons and Samatar, 1995, pp.14-19; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, 
pp.9-11; Elmi and Barise, 2006, pp.34-35; Kapteijns, 2013a, ch.2). One of 
the rebel organisations, the United Somali Congress (USC), rallied several 
other rebel movements; attacked the capital, Mogadishu, in December 1990; 
and successfully ousted Barre the next month (Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p.11; 
Kapteijns, 2013a, pp.97-99, 121-130). 
 The end of Barre’s regime did not bring stability but instead brought 
chaos that led to international interventions. The USC was based on the 
Hawiye clan but was divided by two leading figures from different sub-clans 
of Hawiye. One was Mohammed Farah Aidid, who was the chair of the USC 
and played a leading role in its military campaign. The other was Ali Mahdi 
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Mohamed, who did not accept Aidid’s election to the chair and declared 
himself as the interim president of the country, a move that Aidid strongly 
rejected in turn. Their rivalry culminated in a destructive battle over the 
control of Mogadishu (Drysdale, 1994, pp.15-16, 23-38; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, 
pp.11-12). The battles between the resisting Barre’s forces and Aidid’s 
forces continued in the southern part of Somalia, and other factions also 
fought against each other for power (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.12-13). 
These battles were accompanied by clan-based violence against civilians 
(Bakonyi, 2009, pp.446-448; Kapteijns, 2013a, ch.3). The nonexistence of 
government led to the deterioration of general security, including the 
proliferation of heavily armed bandits. The violence forced people to flee, 
and this, combined with a drought, led to a dramatic drop in food production. 
With the dysfunctional governance and the civil war disturbing international 
aid, Somalia plunged into famine (Hansch et al., 1994, pp.3-4; Boutros-Ghali, 
1996, pp.12-14). It is estimated that the number of Somali deaths caused by 
the violence and famine excedded 210,000 by the end of 1992 (Hansch et 
al., 1994, p.24). 
 A ceasefire was established between Aidid and Ali Mahdi in March 
1992 under the mediation of the UN, and the UNSC decided to establish the 
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) to monitor the ceasefire 
and provide security for humanitarian relief activities (Boutros-Ghali, 1996, 
pp.18-20). UNOSOM I, a 500-strong traditional peacekeeping operation, 
started its deployment in September 1992, but it faced strong opposition 
from Aidid. He and his newly formed faction, the SNA, started to attack 
UNOSOM I, and the latter was unable to carry out its tasks (Wagner, 1992a; 
Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.26-27; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, pp.26-28; 
Rutherford, 2008, p.70). Meanwhile, armed factions and bandits attacked 
and looted international humanitarian agencies (Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p.29; 
Natsios, 1996, pp.74-77). 
 Against the background of rising concern and public calls to respond 
to the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, the US offered to lead a multinational 
force to enable humanitarian relief activities there (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, 
pp.35-44; Poole, 2005, pp.15-20). In December 1992, the UNSC adopted 
Resolution 794, which authorised UN member states “to use all necessary 
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means” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter “to establish as soon as 
possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia” 
(UNSC, 1992). 
 The US-led multinational force, UNITAF, started its deployment within 
a week of the adoption of the resolution and worked on stabilisation. Aidid 
had expressed that he would welcome the US intervention, while strongly 
criticising the UN (e.g. AFP, 28 Nov 1992; Wagner, 1992c), and the 
members of armed factions and bandits had already started to hide their 
weapons or leave the capital even before UNITAF had arrived (AFP, 4 Dec 
1992; Cable News Network [CNN], 1992b; Perlez, 1992a). US special 
representative Robert Oakley secured the agreement of Aidid and Ali Mahdi 
on the deployment of UNITAF, and the armed factions stayed away from the 
force (AFP, 8 Dec 1992; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p.54). UNITAF secured 
several major cities in the southern part of the country, and the security 
situation improved (e.g. AFP, 26 Dec 1992; Perlez, 1992b; Richburg, 1992d; 
UN, 1993a; 1993b, para.21). Humanitarian assistance progressed in full 
scale, and the famine ceased, although international assistance was still 
indispensable (Abrams, 1993a; AP, 1993a; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p.35). 
 However, UNITAF did not commit to conducting a large-scale 
disarmament programme in Somalia. Somali armed factions agreed to a 
ceasefire and disarmament at UN-sponsored conferences in January 1993. 
The agreement stipulated that all heavy weapons would be handed over to 
UNITAF and the UN and that armed faction members would be encamped 
and disarmed (UN, 1993b, Annex III; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p.38). Some 
cantonment sites were established, and factions brought in their heavy 
weapons. The factions still controlled the sites, but the international troops 
inspected them (UN, 1994a, p.13; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p.39; United States 
Army Center of Military History [USACMH], 2003, p.86). The then UN 
Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, requested that UNITAF carry out the 
thorough disarmament of Somalia, but the US interpreted the mandate as 
not including disarmament (Graham, 1992; P. Lewis, 1992; Boutros-Ghali, 
1996, pp.40-41). From the beginning, the US thought of the multinational 
force as a temporary measure with the limited task of establishing minimal 
security for humanitarian assistance, and it expected that a UN 
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peacekeeping mission would soon succeed its operation (e.g. AP, 1992; 
Connell, 1992; LaFraniere, 1992; Oberdorfer and Rowe, 1992). Therefore, 
the issue of disarmament was left for the follow-on peacekeeping operation. 
5.2  The Deployment and Activity of UNOSOM II and the US 
Forces 
As the follow-on force, the UNSC established UNOSOM II with its Resolution 
814, which was adopted in March 1993. The resolution authorised various 
tasks under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including the prevention of any 
violence “and, if necessary, [taking] appropriate action against any faction 
that violates or threatens to violate the cessation of hostilities”; the control of 
heavy weapons; disarmament, including small arms; the provision of security 
of ports, airports, and the lines of communications necessary for 
humanitarian assistance; and the protection of personnel and materials of 
UN and other humanitarian agencies by taking “such forceful action as may 
be required to neutralize armed elements that attack, or threaten to attack, 
such facilities and personnel”. The rules of engagement were to permit “to 
take certain specific actions if they were judged necessary to fulfil the 
mandate”. The authorised size of the force was 28,000 troops (UN, 1993c, 
paras.57, 71, 88; UNSC, 1993a). 
 UNOSOM II formally succeeded the command on the ground from 
UNITAF on 4 May 1993, and the US thereafter provided the Quick Reaction 
Force (QRF), composed of some 1,300 troops as an independent supporting 
force for UNOSOM II (Alexander, 1993b; Richburg, 1993b). According to the 
terms of reference between the US and UNOSOM II, the QRF’s mission was 
to “counter specific threats that exceed the capability of UNOSOM II units” 
as a rapid-response combat capability (Department of the Army, 1994, p.70). 
The QRF composition included a light infantry battalion, four attack 
helicopters, eight scout helicopters, and 15 utility helicopters (USACMH, 
2003, p.119). 
 Only one day after the adoption of UNSC Resolution 814, the leaders 
of Somali armed factions adopted the Addis Ababa Agreement at another 
UN-sponsored conference. In addition to an outline of how to rebuild 
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governing structures, the agreement contained the armed factions’ renewed 
commitment to a complete and simultaneous disarmament in accordance 
with their agreement in January. The agreement called for the assistance of 
UNITAF and UN troops in the disarmament and the application of “strong 
and effective sanctions against those responsible for any violation of the 
Cease-fire Agreement of January 1993” (UN, 1996b, pp.264-266). 
 Although he signed the agreement, Aidid did not abide by it. His aim 
was to be the president of Somalia; he thought he was entitled to the 
presidency because of his principal role in ousting Barre from the position 
(Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p.13; Durch, 1997, p.351; Daniel et al., 1999, 
p.84). Aidid was against any foreign intervention that would obstruct his 
ambition (Richburg, 1992a; Clarke, 1997, p.8). 
 He disliked Boutros-Ghali because he was a foreign minister of Egypt, 
which supported Barre and Ali Mahdi, and opposed UN involvement from the 
beginning (Richburg, 1993a; Hirsh and Oakley, 1995, pp.15, 19). Some UN 
moves also exacerbated his hatred. The UN tried to empower communal 
leaders, including women, in re-establishing a governing system. This 
orientation conflicted with the desires of the leaders of warring factions, 
including Aidid, who wanted to dominate state power (Eknes et al., 1995, V-
4; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.135-136; Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p.55; 
Halim, 1996, pp.72-74; Durch, 1997, p.331). UNOSOM II started an initiative 
to re-establish the judicial system, but this also conflicted with the de facto 
system in Mogadishu, in which the SNA had appointed judges (UN, 1994a, 
pp.17-18; Eknes et al., 1995, VI-6; Halim, 1996, p.76). In addition, when 
Aidid tried to obtain UNOSOM II’s support on holding a peace conference, 
they had disputes over who should convene it, who should participate in it, 
and what the agenda should be. They ended up holding two separate 
conferences (Clarke, 1993, pp.52-53; Drysdale, 1994, pp.167-173, 176-177; 
UN, 1994a, pp.18-19; Eknes et al., 1995, VI-6). 
 Aidid’s stance on the US had also soured by the end of UNITAF. In 
contrast to his vocal opposition to the UN, Aidid welcomed the US 
intervention at first, because he expected that he could align with the US to 
strengthen his position (AFP, 28 Nov 1992; Wagner, 1992b; Stevenson, 
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1995, p.26). However, he came to be disillusioned as it became clear that 
the US was trying to diminish the power of armed factions (Stevenson, 1993, 
p.140; Eknes et al., 1995, V-4; Lyons and Samatar, 1995, p.48). In particular, 
Aidid was disgruntled when UNITAF failed to prevent an attack on Kismayo, 
a southern city, by an armed faction that drove out his allied faction from 
there (Drysdale, 1994, pp.111-113; 1997, pp.130-131; Prunier, 1997, p.142). 
Moreover, UNOSOM II forcefully pushed back Aidid’s allies who tried to 
enter the city later (UN, 1994a, p.18; USACMH, 2003, p.84). Thus, Aidid was 
frustrated by the perceived bias of the US and UNOSOM II against him. 
 Because of these troubles, the relationship between UNOSOM II and 
the SNA deteriorated badly by June, when the first violent confrontation 
between them in Mogadishu erupted. In accordance with Resolution 814 and 
the Addis Ababa Agreement, UNOSOM II carried out inspections of 
weapons storage sites belonging to the SNA on 5 June. In return, the SNA 
ambushed Pakistani troops who were returning from the inspection, and it 
attacked another Pakistani unit that was providing humanitarian assistance, 
killing 24 and wounding some 60 troops (Richburg, 1993c; UN, 1993d, 
paras.5-9; 1994a, pp.23-24). The UNSC responded by adopting Resolution 
837 the next day. The resolution reaffirmed that the Secretary-General was 
“authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures 
against all those responsible for the armed attacks” on Pakistani 
peacekeepers (UNSC, 1993b). 
 The attack triggered a series of reprisals between UNOSOM II and 
the SNA. Despite warnings from UNOSOM II, Aidid denied the SNA’s 
involvement in the attack against the Pakistani troops and demanded the 
establishment of an independent investigative commission, while the SNA 
continued its anti-UN propaganda (AFP, 7 Jun 1993a; Richburg, 1993d; UN, 
1993d, para.12). Accordingly, the QRF and UNOSOM II launched attacks 
against the SNA’s weapons storage sites from the air and ground and 
destroyed and seized its weapons (Richburg, 1993e; Schafer, 1993; UN, 
1993d, paras.19-28). In addition, SRSG Jonathan Howe issued an arrest 
warrant for Aidid (AP, 1993d; UN, 1993d, para.32). The SNA, however, 
continued to attack the international troops, and the southern part of 
Mogadishu, which was the stronghold of Aidid, became a battleground 
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between UNOSOM II and the SNA. Frequent engagements produced 
mounting casualties not only on both sides but also on civilians who were 
caught in the cross-fire, as well as those who had been used as human 
shields by the SNA (UN, 1993e, paras.63-68, 73; 1994a, annexes 4 and 5; 
Boutros-Ghali, 1996, pp.51-53). Aidid probed the possibility of holding 
negotiations with the UN; his efforts included sending a letter to former US 
president Jimmy Carter, in which he again demanded the establishment of a 
neutral investigative commission (Blumenthal, 1993; N.A. Lewis, 1993; The 
Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 1993; Rutherford, 2008, p.156), but he did 
not commit to disarmament. 
 The conflict between the international forces and the SNA came to an 
end when one of the interveners’ operations ended in a fiasco. To 
apprehend fugitive Aidid, the US deployed special forces to Mogadishu in 
August. They launched some airborne raids and apprehended some of 
Aidid’s aides, but Aidid himself remained at large. The deadlock forced the 
US government to reconsider its approach, and it came to emphasise the 
importance of the political process (AFP, 17 Sep 1993; Devroy and Williams, 
1993; Hunt, 1993a; Sciolino, 1993). However, arresting operations continued, 
and while Aidid’s aides were being successfully apprehended during a raid 
on 3 October, catastrophe struck when two helicopters were shot down, and 
the special forces troops and rescuing units from the QRF and UNOSOM II 
had to fight against the swarming Somalis overnight. This battle left eighteen 
US and one Malaysian soldier dead; over ninety US, Malaysian and 
Pakistani soldiers wounded; and one US pilot captured by the SNA. The 
Somali casualties from the battle are thought to total over 300 killed and over 
700 wounded (Atkinson, 1994a; 1994b; UN, 1994a, p.88; Boutros-Ghali, 
1996, pp.53-54). 
 The casualties, the video footage of a dead US soldier being dragged 
through the street, and the captured pilot caused a backlash in the US and 
led to US disengagement. Torn between mounting domestic pressure to 
withdraw from Somalia quickly and the concern that a hasty US withdrawal 
would lead to the collapse of the UN mission and the re-emergence of the 
famine, the US government decided to send in reinforcements but to also 
withdraw US troops by the end of March 1994 (AP, 1993g; Jehl, 1993b; 
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Marcus and Devroy, 1993). The reinforcement was aimed at force protection, 
and President Bill Clinton instructed that offensive action against Aidid 
should be halted (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.128-129; Stewart, 2003, 
p.13). He felt that the situation was out of control and that there was no 
domestic support for the operation (Public Broadcasting Service [PBS], no 
date a). Washington also indicated that African leaders should decide who 
would participate in a renewed political process and that the US would not 
object to the involvement of Aidid (AFP, 9 Oct 1993a; Hunt, 1993c). The US 
also proposed the establishment of an independent commission to 
investigate the violence in Somalia; this was what Aidid had called for (AFP, 
9 Oct 1993a; 9 Oct 1993b). 
 On 9 October, two days after the US announcement, the SNA 
declared a unilateral ceasefire (AFP, 9 Oct 1993b; Richburg, 1993m; 
Boutros-Ghali, 1996, p.61). Aidid later explained that he decided to do so 
because of the mediation effort by Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italy (Drysdale, 
1994, p.212). 
 Following the US turnabout, the UN also agreed to relinquish the 
coercive approach (Jehl, 1993c; Richburg, 1993n; Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, 
p.130). The UNSC adopted Resolution 885 on 16 November and decided to 
suspend any actions to arrest those who were responsible for the attacks on 
peacekeepers; meanwhile, it established a commission of inquiry to 
investigate the attacks (UNSC, 1993d). The subsequent Resolution 897, 
adopted on 4 February 1994, redefined the tasks of UNOSOM II. They 
included the protection of ports, airports, and the lines of communications 
necessary for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, as well as the 
protection of the personnel and materials of the UN and other humanitarian 
agencies. However, they no longer included authorisation to use force 
beyond self-defence (UNSC, 1994a). 
 Thereafter, inter-clan fighting and banditry intensified, while 
negotiations between the clans produced no substantial progress (Hirsch 
and Oakley, 1995, pp.144-148; Boutros-Ghali, 1996, pp.68-71). The 
deterioration of security and the lack of progress in reconciliation finally 
exhausted the patience of the international community, and the UNSC 
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decided on 4 November that UNOSOM II would be terminated on 31 March 
1995 (UN, 1994b; UNSC, 1994b). Under the cover of another multinational 
force deployed for the short term, UNOSOM II completed its withdrawal on 3 
March (Boutros-Ghali, 1996, pp.76-77; Findlay, 2002, p.204). 
5.3  The Examination of the Hypotheses 
Peace operations in Somalia resorted to multiple compellent attempts with 
different demands, but not all of them fall within the scope of this research. 
The demands in compellence by UNITAF were limited. UNITAF tried to 
compel armed groups in Mogadishu to confine their heavy arms to 
designated areas and to stop brandishing weapons, and it succeeded to 
some extent (AFP, 31 Dec 1992; Oberdorfer, 1992b; Mitchell, 1993; Hirsch 
and Oakley, 1995, pp.58-59, 81). UNITAF also employed compellence 
several times in a southern city of Kismayo to stop conflicts between armed 
factions who were fighting for the control of the city (AP, 1993b; Schemo, 
1993a; 1993b; Hirsh and Oakley, 1995, pp.76-77). UNITAF did not demand 
that armed factions should disarm completely nor that they should give up 
their struggle for power at once. Although UNITAF tried to bring about 
stability for humanitarian activities and restricted some movements of armed 
factions, they could continue to hold weapons and operate where UNITAF 
was not deployed. Therefore, demands in the UNITAF phase did not belong 
to the heaviest type, and the compellence by UNITAF is outside of the scope 
of this research. 
 Compellence by UNOSOM II and supporting US forces was 
accompanied by the heaviest type of demands against the SNA. UNSC 
Resolution 814, which established UNOSOM II, demanded that warring 
factions commit to disarmament, as they agreed in January 1993 (UNSC, 
1993a). Resolution 837, which was adopted after the SNA’s attack against 
the Pakistani peacekeepers, repeated the same demand (UNSC, 1993b). 
After the attack, SRSG Howe also addressed a letter to Aidid, in which he 
emphasised that weapons should not be brandished and demanded full 
cooperation with reagrad to disarmament (UN, 1993d, para.18). The SNA 
resisted disarmament with violence, and UNOSOM II and the US forces put 
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pressure on the SNA by pursuing Aidid in person, as well as destroying the 
SNA’s weapons depots and other facilities. However, the SNA did not 
capitulate and countered the pressure by inflicting costs on peacekeepers. 
When the cost exceeded the extent that the compellers could bear, they 
backed down and abandoned the coercive approach. Thereafter, the 
intervening forces did not employ compellence, and disarmament was not 
realised, so the compellence ended in failure. 
 In the following section, compellence by UNOSOM II and the US 
forces against the SNA is analysed from the perspective of each hypothesis. 
Each section examines whether the expectation of a hypothesis corresponds 
with the course of events. 
5.3.1  Troop Numbers 
The first hypothesis to be examined is H1. This hypothesis predicts that 
compellence in peace operations is more likely to succeed if the balance of 
troops is favourable to compellers. Despite the compellers having an 
advantageous balance of troops in Mogadishu, the case ended in failure. 
Therefore, the case does not correspond to the hypothesis. 
 UNOSOM II, whose initial authorised strength was 28,000, had some 
20,000 troops when it started its operations on 4 May (AP, 1993c; Richburg, 
1993; Eknes et al., 1995, VI-1). However, the number decreased to some 
16,400 at the end of the month, as Australia, Canada, and the US reduced 
their participation as planned in the transition from UNITAF (UN, 1993f; 
Howe, 1997, p.179; USACMH, 2003, p.75). The US provided a QRF of some 
1,300 in support of UNOSOM II (Alexander, 1993b; Richburg, 1993). 
 The international troops did not have any local auxiliary forces to 
count on in this case. To relief itself of the burden of law enforcement in the 
streets, UNITAF established the Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) as a local 
police force. The ASF was composed of former police officers and had some 
3,000 officers in Mogadishu when UNOSOM II succeeded UNITAF. They 
performed various policing functions but were only lightly armed and had no 
capability to confront heavily armed factions (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, 
pp.87-92; Ganzglass, 1997, pp.24-25; Thomas and Spataro, 1998, pp.189-
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197, 202-204). Therefore, the analysis does not include the ASF among the 
compellers. 
 Accordingly, the compellers had some 17,700 troops, composed of 
UNOSOM II and the QRF, when they started to use compellence in mid-
June. The scale of compellers continued to increase thereafter. UNOSOM II 
had some 18,400 troops at the end of June, some 20,300 at the end of July, 
some 23,300 at the end of August, and some 26,100 at the end of 
September (UN, 1993f). In addition, the US sent in special operation forces 
as Task Force (TF) Ranger, which was composed of some 440 troops and 
was given the tasks of hunting down Aidid and his top lieutenants (Warner 
and Levin, 1995, p.29; Ecklund, 2004, p.50; Poole, 2005, p.48). 
 The compellers concentrated the majority of their force in Mogadishu, 
where the confrontations with the SNA occurred. Between 10,000 and 
11,000 troops, out of some 18,000 in total, were redeployed to the city when 
the offensive against the SNA commenced in mid-June (AFP, 11 Jun 1993a; 
Alexander, 1993d). UNOSOM II troops in Mogadishu numbered some 
13,000 by mid-July and some 15,000 in August (AFP, 11 Jul 1993; Lorch, 
1993e; Miller, 1993b). In September, the number dropped to some 12,000 
(Leopold, 1993). 
 The size of the SNA, the target of compellence, is uncertain at best. 
The US estimated in late 1992 that the strength of the SNA was 20,000 in 
total and that it had 5,000 to 10,000 fighters in Mogadishu (Mroczkowski, 
2005, p.22; Harned, 2016, p.21). After June 1993, US and UN officials 
estimated that the number of hard-core fighters that Aidid could mobilise in 
Mogadishu was between 300 and 1,000 (e.g. Abrams, 1993c; Lippman, 
1993; Lorch, 1993b; Shaw, 1993c). After the battle on 3 October, former US 
president Carter told the media that he had been informed by Eritrean 
delegates that Aidid had 2,000 to 3,000 capable fighters in Mogadishu (CNN, 
1993h). Another news article cites SNA sources, stating that the figure as 
about 12,000 (Atkinson, 1994a). The US “After Action Report” includes an 
estimation that the SNA had 5,000 to 10,000 fighters in total and had some 
1,500 in Mogadishu (USACMH, 2003, p.65). 
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 As a whole, it can be said that the compellers had almost the same or 
a larger number of troops than the target in Somalia. When compared to the 
largest estimated number of the SNA – 20,000 in total – the compellers had 
smaller troops at first. However, the compellers had some 19,700 troops at 
the end of June, and their strength soon surpassed 20,000. Moreover, if the 
comparison focuses on Mogadishu, the compellers had almost the same or 
a larger number of troops from the beginning in comparison to the largest 
estimate of the SNA’s fighters, which is 12,000, and the numerical 
advantage expanded as reinforcements arrived. The advantage is much 
larger if the comparison is made with more moderate estimates of several 
thousand. 
 The fact that compellence failed even though the compellers had a 
numerical advantage casts doubt on H1. This does not necessarily mean 
that the scale of the force did not matter. A commander of the SNA stated in 
an interview that UNOSOM II was too large to fight squarely (PBS, no date 
b). However, the SNA was able to fight an urban guerrilla war against a 
larger opponent in its stronghold and compelled the international forces to 
retreat. Therefore, the Somalia case is inconsistent with H1. Of course, there 
remains a possibility that a numerical advantage was an INUS condition and 
that other factors had to be fulfilled to achieve compellence. This possibility 
needs to be confirmed in successful cases, but the two cases examined in 
previous chapters indicate that a numerical advantage was not an INUS 
condition for their success. Hence, the balance of troops in favour of 
compellers is not likely to be an INUS condition, and this point is further 
discussed in the cross-case analyses in Chapter 6. 
5.3.2  The Strategy of Compellence 
The next hypothesis to be examined is H2, which predicts that the gradual-
turning-of-the-screw strategy in combination with the carrot-and-stick 
strategy is more likely to succeed than an ultimatum. The compellers first 
employed an ultimatum and then turned to the gradual-turning-of-the-screw 
strategy, but they did not use any positive inducements. The unsuccessful 
outcome corresponds to the hypothesis because the compellers did not 
employ the strategy that was expected to be effective – namely, the 
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combination of gradually increased pressure and carrots. However, because 
this correspondence is based on the absence of positive inducements, their 
utility should be confirmed in cases that ended in success. On the contrary, 
the two successful cases examined in previous chapters demonstrate that 
compellence can succeed without carrots. The two cases suggest that the 
use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy is an INUS condition, and 
the outcome of the Somalia case is also consistent with this view. 
 In the beginning, UNOSOM II did not employ compellence in 
promoting disarmament, although UNSC Resolution 814 endorsed Boutros-
Ghali’s idea that the disarmament programme which warring factions agreed 
to should be enforceable and that the weapons of noncompliant parties 
should be confiscated or destroyed (UN, 1993c, paras.63-64; UNSC, 1993a). 
In fact, the purpose of UNOSOM II’s inspection of the SNA’s weapon storage 
sites on 5 June was only to survey the latest situation at the sites, because 
the former had received information that the latter had moved out its stored 
weapons (UN, 1994a, p.22; Adibe and Potgieter, 1995, p.93; USACMH, 
2003, pp.87-88).16 
 UNOSOM II came to employ compellence after the inspection 
triggered a violent confrontation between UNOSOM II and the SNA. First, 
the compellers issued a tacit ultimatum just after the attack against Pakistani 
troops on 5 June. SRSG Howe sent a letter to Aidid demanding that he 
change his behaviour and cooperate with the peace process, stating that this 
was his last chance (Lorch, 1993a; UN, 1993d, para.13). A few days later, 
Howe sent another letter to Aidid, in which he emphasised the prohibition 
against brandishing weapons and the need to adhere to the disarmament 
programme (UN, 1993d, para.18). This demand to comply with the peace 
process and disarmament was accompanied by the heightened prospect of 
 
16  UNOSOM II, however, intended to forcibly carry out the inspection even 
if the SNA refused it (UN, 1994a, p.22; USACMH, 2003, p.89). The 
inspection found that the actual stockpile differed greatly from the 
inventories created by UNITAF (UN, 1993d, para.7; USACMH, 2003, 
p.90). 
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reprisal attacks by the international forces against the SNA. UNSC 
Resolution 837 was adopted on 6 June, and in addition to the restatement of 
the demand for the warring factions to abide by the Addis Ababa Agreement, 
it was a reminder that UNOSOM II could “take all necessary measures 
against all those responsible for the armed attacks” on Pakistani 
peacekeepers, including “their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and 
punishment” (UNSC, 1993b). Although neither Aidid nor the SNA was 
directly named as assailants in the resolution, it was clear that the 
compellers regarded the SNA as responsible (AFP, 6 Jun 1993b; Katell, 
1993; Richburg, 1993c). The following week, UNOSOM II concentrated more 
than half of its total force in Mogadishu, and the US sent in four AC-130 
gunships as reinforcements (AFP, 11 Jun 1993a; Jehl, 1993a). Howe stated 
on the radio that “appropriate steps will be taken against those responsible” 
(Lorch, 1993a). 
 This tacit ultimatum, however, did not make the SNA comply with the 
demand of the compellers. Aidid denied the SNA’s involvement in the 5 June 
incident, claiming that it was UNOSOM II who fired on Somali demonstrators 
first and that the attack against the force was a voluntary and spontaneous 
reaction by angry citizens. He also demanded the establishment of a neutral 
commission to investigate the incident (AFP, 7 Jun 1993a; Richburg, 1993d). 
Just after the attack, he broadcasted anti-UN messages on the radio and 
warned that more violence would ensue if his demands were not met (UN, 
1993d, para.12). A pro-Aidid newspaper and radio criticised the UN and the 
US as trying to colonise Somalia and demanded that UNOSOM II leave the 
country immediately, while warning that Somalis would fight until the end 
(AFP, 8 Jun 1993; 9 Jun 1993). Although Aidid also showed some 
conciliatory stances by stating that he was ready to cooperate with the UN 
and releasing a Pakistani soldier detained in the engagement on 5 June, he 
did not commit to disarmament and continued to blame the UN (Alexander, 
1993d; CNN, 1993a; Richburg, 1993d). This failure of the tacit ultimatum is 
concurrent with H2. 
 In the face of the defiance, the compellers resorted to the gradual-
turning-of-the-screw strategy and pressured the SNA through continual 
military operations. As further discussed in the following sections, the 
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international troops attacked and destroyed the SNA’s weapons storage 
sites, a radio station, and headquarters, including Aidid’s residence in 
Mogadishu, in the first wave of the offensive. SRSG Howe announced via 
radio that UNOSOM II would enforce disarmament and warned that those 
who resisted would “be firmly dealt with” (AFP, 12 Jun 1993). UN and US 
officials explained that the aim of the attacks were to eliminate heavy 
weapons and diminish the SNA’s capability so that it would be unable to 
disrupt UN operations (AFP, 17 Jun 1993b; CNN, 1993c; Richburg, 1993g). 
UNOSOM II also issued an arrest warrant for Aidid and distributed leaflets 
indicating that a reward – later announced as 25,000 dollars – would be paid 
for cooperation in capturing him (AFP, 26 Jun 1993; 10 Jul 1993; Susman, 
1993e; UN, 1993d, para.32). The compellers continued their military 
operations, and the US even deployed TF Ranger in August and intensified 
its effort to capture Aidid and his top lieutenants. 
 The response of the SNA to this growing pressure was a mix of 
counter-coercion and a search for negotiation. The SNA attacked UN and 
US troops almost daily after July (UN, 1994a, pp.60-67; USACMH, 2003, 
p.96). It also countered the arrest warrant for Aidid with its own warrant for 
Howe with a reward of a million dollars (AFP, 26 Jul 1993; Susman, 1993f). 
In addition to these countermeasures, the SNA showed some willingness to 
negotiate with the compellers. SNA senior members requested a US official 
who was visiting Somalia to restart negotiations (Shaw, 1993d). The SNA 
also issued a message which expressed its expectation regarding mediation 
by former US president Carter (AFP, 21 Aug 1993), as well as another 
message calling for mediation by other third parties (AFP, 28 Aug 1993). 
Aidid contacted Carter and sent him a letter in August, in which he 
expressed his hope to have a neutral commission established to investigate 
his involvement in the attacks against the international troops (Blumenthal, 
1993; N.A. Lewis, 1993; The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 1993; 
Rutherford, 2008, p.156). 
 The compellers’ side also came to embrace the idea of a political 
solution. While UNOSOM II rejected negotiations with certain SNA members, 
including Aidid and his aides (AFP, 26 Aug 1993; 28 Aug 1993), UNOSOM II 
and the SNA moved to have a dialogue between them. They held a meeting 
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on 4 September and discussed a ceasefire. However, a major combat 
occurred between Nigerian troops and the SNA the next day, and this stalled 
the initiative for dialogue (Drysdale, 1994, pp.207-208; Poole, 2005, p.49). At 
the same time, being faced with the lack of a breakthrough in the military 
approach, the Clinton administration started to emphasise the necessity of a 
political track. The US envoy to Somalia and the National Security Advisor 
recommended a political solution to President Clinton (Rutherford, 2008, 
p.156). During their meeting, the US secretary of defence and Italian 
defence minister agreed on the importance of political solution (AFP, 12 Sep 
1993; The Washington Post, 1993), and President Clinton and Italian Prime 
Minister Carlo Ciampi agreed on the necessity of a political initiative (AFP, 
17 Sep 1993; Devroy and Williams, 1993; Hunt, 1993a). The US set a new 
policy to deprioritise the arrest of Aidid and to instead promote political 
reconciliation in Somalia without Aidid (Sciolino, 1993). 
 Nevertheless, this did not mean that the UN and the US ceased 
compellence, and military pressure continued. While UNSC Resolution 865, 
adopted on 22 September, urged “the Secretary-General to re-double his 
efforts” towards achieving “national reconciliation and political settlement”, it 
did not change the mandate of UNOSOM II (UNSC, 1993c). Boutros-Ghali 
persisted with the goal of arresting Aidid when he was told that the new US 
policy was to deemphasise doing so (Sciolino, 1993), and US Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher also maintained that the US supported the 
mandate of UNOSOM II and that Aidid should be arrested (AFP, 28 Sep 
1993; Fournier, 1993). Despite the increasing emphasis on a political 
approach within the US administration, no new direction was given to the 
forces on the ground, and they continued their operations against the SNA 
(USACMH, 2003, p.107; Poole, 2005, p.55). 
 However, the escalating pressure under the gradual turning of the 
screw also failed to compel the SNA. In return, the SNA escalated its attacks 
against the international troops, and Aidid escaped the hunt. The military 
pressure continued until the engagement on 3 October but ended when the 
compellers gave up compelling the SNA. 
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 Regarding positive inducements, the compellers did not use any in 
this case. In fact, UNITAF examined the possibility of collecting weapons in 
exchange for cash or food and launched an experimental programme in a 
section of Mogadishu for a short period. However, UNITAF decided not to 
expand the programme due to its limited effectiveness and to concerns such 
as costs and the possibility that it would disarm weaker people who needed 
food rather than affecting predatory armed factions (Lorenz, 1994, pp.414-
415; Adibe and Potgieter, 1995, p.87; Patman, 1997, pp.514-515). Therefore, 
UNOSOM II and the US did not provide any positive inducements for the 
SNA. 
 The fact that the compellers did not employ the combination assumed 
in H2 and the case ended in failure is consistent with the hypothesis, but 
requires cautious evaluation. The compellers first employed a tacit ultimatum 
and then the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy without any positive 
inducements. Both attempts failed to compel the SNA, and this result is 
concurrent with the expectation of H2. Although this concurrence can be 
interpreted as providing support for H2, such an interpretation assumes that 
positive inducements play an important role in the success of compellence, 
and this needs to be confirmed with positive cases indicating that the factor 
actually promotes success. On the contrary, the previous two case studies 
demonstrate that compellence in peace operations can succeed without 
positive inducements. Therefore, the cases examined in this study do not 
provide evidence that supports this interpretation. 
 The Somalia case does not contradict the other possible interpretation 
that the two successful cases suggest: The use of the gradual-turning-of-the-
screw strategy is an INUS condition that needs to be combined with other 
factors to achieve success. The two cases examined in the previous 
chapters provide support for the utility of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw 
strategy regarding H2, and the analyses indicate that the strategy was a 
necessary part of the conjunctural sufficient conditions. The fact that the 
compellers in Somalia employed the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy 
and the case ended in failure does not contradict this finding. The insights 
from the previous chapters suggest that the failure was because of the 
absence of other factors that had to be combined with the use of the 
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gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy to achieve success. This point is 
further discussed in cross-case comparisons in Chapter 6. 
5.3.3  Credibility 
The next hypothesis, H3, is about the credibility of threats. There are four 
factors that can be the source of threat credibility: national interests, strong 
domestic support, previously acquired reputation, and the use of force. The 
hypothesis predicts that the actual use of force is the most effective way to 
lend credibility to threats. However, the case ended in failure despite the 
massive use of force by the compellers. There are two possible 
interpretations of the result. One is that rather than the use of force, any or 
all of the other three sources, which were absent in this case, were 
necessary for success. The other is that the actual use of force was 
necessary but needed to be combined with other conditions to achieve 
success. Insights from the other two case studies suggest that the latter is 
likely to be the case, meaning that the case does not contradict the 
hypothesis. 
 The first possible source of credibility is the compellers’ national 
interests. There are two states to be examined: the US, which led the 
proactive military operation against the SNA, and Pakistan, which provided 
the largest contingent and was in charge of southern Mogadishu, where the 
confrontation between the compellers and the SNA erupted. 
 No US strategic interest was involved at the time of the intervention, 
although Somalia was strategically important to the US during the Cold War. 
Barre took the side of the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War and 
obtained various forms of support, including military equipment. However, 
when he launched a war with Ethiopia, counting on Soviet support, the 
Soviets instead supported the newly formed Marxist regime of Ethiopia. The 
Cold War logic worked, and Barre turned to the US. The US, in turn, found 
Somalia, especially its port and airfield, valuable in countering Soviet 
expansion in the region and the Middle East, and it provided economic and 
military assistance to the country (Clarke, 1992, pp.3-4; Hirsch and Oakley, 
1995, pp.6-7; Stevenson, 1995, pp.15-21). However, the withdrawal of the 
Russians and Cubans from the region and the end of the Cold War had 
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changed the strategic setting, and any past US strategic interests were no 
longer involved there (Oberdorfer, 1992a; Natsios, 1996, p.69; Woods, 1997, 
p.151). The US decision to deploy UNITAF was based on President George 
Bush’s humanitarian concern and was facilitated and pushed by domestic 
calls to respond to the humanitarian crisis (Johnston and Dagne, 1997, 
p.195; Woods, 1997, p.158; Western, 2002; Briggs and Soderlund, 2008, 
pp.69-70). 
 Pakistan also had no narrow strategic interests in Somalia. The 
Pakistani government raised its strong support for the UN and Islamic 
linkage in explaining the reasons for the country’s participation in the 
missions in Somalia (Delvoie, 1996, p.140; Krishnasamy, 2002, p.99). It is 
also pointed out that the government had more specific interests. The first 
was the enhancement of its relationships with the US. The end of Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan and the Cold War itself decreased the value of 
Pakistan as “the ‘front-line’ state”. This led the US to criticise Pakistan and 
freeze aid to it because of its nuclear development programme, to which the 
former had turned a blind eye in the context of the Cold War. Moreover, the 
US was moving towards rapprochement with India, which was the rival of 
Pakistan. These changes in the strategic setting drove Pakistan to re-
establish relations with the US, and the expansion of its commitment in 
Somalia was a part of this effort. The second Pakistani interest was the 
improvement of its international image. Pakistan was also accused of 
supporting terrorists, and the government wanted to change this image by 
confronting Aidid, who used terror tactics. The third interest was to win a 
competition with India regarding peace operations. India had been a 
proactive participant in UN peacekeeping, and Pakistan wanted to compete 
with its rival in this area as well (Krishnasamy, 2002, pp.99-101). However, 
these interests do not constitute the type of national interests dealt with in 
this research, which focuses on narrow strategic interests that can directly 
affect interveners’ security or the accumulation of power. The above 
interests could lead to an increase in Pakistani power only indirectly – for 
example, by strengthening its relationships with the US or the wider 
international community – but were not specific to Somalia. Therefore, it can 
be said that no Pakistani national interests were involved in this case. 
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 In sum, the compellers had no national interests in Somalia. The 
strategic value of Somalia for the US had disappeared by the end of the 
Cold War, and the US had intervened based on humanitarian concerns. 
Pakistan had some expected benefit from participating in the missions, but it 
had no narrow, strong national interest that could support the credibility of 
the threat to use force. 
 The second source of credibility is domestic support. Both the US and 
Pakistan lacked this factor during UNOSOM II. The US had widespread 
domestic support during the UNITAF phase, and the SNA was aware of this 
(AFP, 28 Nov 1992). President Bush briefed some key members of 
Congress and secured broad bipartisan support when he decided that the 
US would lead a multinational force to Somalia, although a few members 
expressed concern about the nature of the operation (CNN, 1992a; Devroy 
and Cooper, 1992; Schafer, 1992; Johnston and Dagne, 1997, pp.195-197). 
 However, Congressional support was weakened by the launch of 
UNOSOM II in March 1993. The Senate passed a resolution which 
supported the US participation in UNITAF in February 1993, but it took 
several months to go through the House because of a heated debate about 
the objective of the operation. The House passed the resolution by 243 to 
179 in May, with an amendment to add support for the use of US forces in 
the implementation of UNSC Resolution 814, which established UNOSOM II. 
On the one hand, the House resolution showed explicit support for US 
participation in UNOSOM II. On the other hand, the resolution did not obtain 
unanimous support, as shown by the vote result and the objections 
expressed by the minority. Moreover, the Senate did not discuss the 
amendment made by the House and did not show the same support for 
participation in UNOSOM II (Abrams, 1993b; Johnston and Dagne, 1997, 
pp.198-199; Delaney, 2004, pp.38-39). Therefore, the Congressional 
support at the time of UNOSOM II’s initiation was partial at best. 
 In July, several sceptical Congress members started to raise their 
voices against US involvement in Somalia. The most prominent was Senator 
Robert Byrd, who insisted that the US forces should withdraw because their 
mission had changed without the consent of Congress (CNN, 1993f; Shaw, 
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1993b; Warner and Levin, 1995, pp.27-28). As four US troops were killed 
and reinforcements were sent in August, several more Congress members 
came to express their concerns about the mission and increasing 
commitment (Abrams, 1993d; R. Burns, 1993; Duke, 1993). In Congress, 
debates on Somalia arose again in September during the examination of the 
Defense Authorization Act of 1994. Some senators vocally questioned the 
role of US forces in Somalia, claiming that their mission had been expanded 
too much and should be withdrawn soon. They somewhat softened their 
stance after a consultation with the Senate leaders, and the Senate passed 
the act, which included a provision calling on the president to clarify the US 
mission in Somalia by submitting a report to Congress by 15 October and to 
obtain the approval of Congress by 15 November to continue the operation. 
This course was followed by the House, and it passed the Defense 
Authorization Bill with an identical provision in the same month (Warner and 
Levin, 1995, pp.36-37; Johnston and Dagne, 1997, pp.199-200). 
 The battle of 3 October completely crashed the shaky support in the 
Congress. Hundreds of calls came from angry constituents who had watched 
the video of a US soldier’s body being dragged through the streets of 
Mogadishu. This drove many Congress members to call for immediate 
withdrawal from Somalia (Cassata, 1993; Logan, 1996, p.159; Johnston and 
Dagne, 1997, p.200; MacKinnon, 2000, p.78). On 7 October, President 
Clinton set new tasks for the US forces in Somalia and announced that they 
would be withdrawn by the end of March 1994. Senators debated the 
president’s position heatedly, with some demanding earlier withdrawal, but in 
the end, the Senate passed a resolution that accepted the president’s 
withdrawal date while limiting the US forces’ mission to humanitarian 
assistance (Johnston and Dagne, 1997, p.201). The House passed a 
resolution which called for the withdrawal by the end of January, followed by 
another resolution affirming the end-of-March deadline (Johnston and Dagne, 
1997, pp.201-202). 
 US public support was also strong during the UNITAF phase but 
became weaker thereafter. The US public supported the military intervention 
at a rate of over 70% in December 1992 and January 1993 (Larson, 1996, 
p.118; Klarevas, 2000, pp.532-534). However, this support soon started to 
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decline. In March, support fell to about 50% (Delaney, 2004, p.38). In 
another poll, US public support remained at the same level of about 50% in 
late June, a period just after the compellers started proactive military 
operations. Two polls in September showed some 40% support, so there 
existed only partial support for the offensive. The polls in October showed 
about 30% support (Larson, 1996, p.118; Logan, 1996, pp.160-161; 
Klarevas, 2000, pp.532-534). 
 The polls also showed the lack of strong support for the tasks of 
disarmament and the establishment of peace. Although differently worded 
questions drew somewhat inconsistent results, the US public was divided 
over whether the troops should focus on food delivery or also engage in 
disarmament and/or the establishment of peace during the UNITAF phase. 
In December 1992 and January 1993, each of the positions earned about 
40%–50% support in polls (Logan, 1996, p.163; Klarevas, 2000, pp.535-536). 
In September 1993, however, some 70% supported food delivery, while only 
some 20% thought the troops should pursue disarmament (Klarevas, 2000, 
p.536). 
 The attempt to capture Aidid received two-third support according to 
polls conducted in mid- to late June (Larson, 1996, p.67; Klarevas, 2000, 
p.536; Baum, 2004, p.215). In a poll in September, however, over 50% 
showed concern that the US was too involved in Somalia, and another poll in 
the same month showed that 57% felt that the US should halt its active 
military involvement (Larson, 1996, p.68; Klarevas, 2000, p.537). 
 Pakistan also lacked strong domestic support. When Pakistani troops 
suffered heavy casualties in the attack on 5 June, some members of 
parliament called for the withdrawal of the troops from Somalia (AFP, 7 Jun 
1993b). An Islamist political party which demanded the withdrawal organised 
rallies and demonstrations and condemned not only the killing but also the 
Pakistani government, arguing that the government had sacrificed the troops 
for American interest (AFP, 11 Jun 1993b). The party also criticised the 
following offensive against the SNA, arguing that Pakistan should focus on 
humanitarian activities and should not engage in offensive operations 
against Muslims (Krishnasamy, 2002, p.98). 
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 In short, the compellers did not have strong domestic support. US 
domestic support was partial at best when the compellence started in June 
1993, and it continued to decline. As US troops became involved in more 
military actions and fewer humanitarian activities, the operation lost the 
support of the Congress and public. Aidid must have known of the declining 
support, because he is said to have watched international satellite 
broadcasts (CNN, 1993i). The Pakistani government also received criticism 
as Pakistani troops suffered large casualties and conducted offensive 
operations. 
 The third factor that can support the credibility of threats is reputation 
based on the compellers’ past behaviour. The behaviour of the compellers 
during UNOSOM I and UNITAF damaged their reputation, so this factor was 
also absent in this case. 
 The US had an advantageous reputation on account of its military 
capability when it intervened in 1992. When he met with Aidid at the 
beginning of UNITAF, US special representative Oakley mentioned the 
enormous firepower that the US had employed and its victory over the large 
Iraqi army in the Gulf War the previous year (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, p.55; 
Peterson, 2000, p.58). Aidid seemed well aware of this fact, as was the 
wider Somali public (CNN, 1992c; Richburg, 1992c; Sommer, 1994, p.75; 
Rutherford, 2008, p.181). 
 However, this advantageous reputation was damaged as it became 
clear that UNITAF would not work on forcible disarmament. Observing that 
the US would not enforce disarmament, Somalis became emboldened and 
dared to challenge the US forces (Sommer, 1994, p.75; Eknes et al., 1995, 
IV-2). Therefore, it can be said that the reputation of the US forces had 
waned when the compellence commenced in the UNOSOM II phase. 
 In addition, the UN and especially Pakistani troops earned a poor 
reputation because of their ineffectiveness and the lack of forceful response 
against local armed groups during UNOSOM I (Claiborne, 1992; CNN, 
1992c; Alexander, 1993a; Williams, 1993a). Aidid and the SNA regarded 
Pakistani capabilities as weak. Aidid’s troops sneered at the obsolete 
equipment that the Pakistani troops had when they arrived (Peterson, 2000, 
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p.61). Aidid and the SNA thought that they could push around the less 
capable and less prepared UNOSOM II, in comparison to UNITAF, and win 
over the UN force by inflicting casualties (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.114-
115; Poole, 2005, p.44). Aidid was reported as saying that he would be able 
to drive UNOSOM II “into the ocean” (Woods, 1997, p.169). 
 Therefore, the compellers did not have a pre-earned advantageous 
reputation. Although the US had a good reputation in terms of capabilities at 
first, this was damaged by the time UNOSOM II started. The UN troops did 
not have a good reputation from the beginning. 
 The final factor that can support the credibility of threats is the actual 
use of force. Although the compellers employed a massive amount of force, 
as described below, the compellence ended in failure in Somalia. This does 
not match the expectation of H3; therefore, it is necessary to consider the 
implication of this case with regard to the hypothesis. 
 UNOSOM II’s first major use of force happened in Kismayo, and the 
compellers successfully inflicted a defeat on an allied group of the SNA. On 
6 May, just two days after the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, local 
warlord Omar Jess’s force attacked Kismayo, and the Belgian troops 
stationed in Kismayo repelled the attack. A Belgian officer was wounded, 
and some 40 members of the armed faction were thought to have been killed 
or injured in the battle (Alexander, 1993c; Miller, 1993a; USACMH, 2003, 
p.84). As SRSG Howe (1995, p.53) writes, “UNOSOM II had met its first 
military test successfully”. As Jess’s faction was part of the SNA, this 
successful use of force could have had the effect of strengthening the 
credibility of threats by demonstrating the competence of the compellers. 
 However, a month later, the SNA carried out a large-scale attack 
against UNOSOM II in Mogadishu as a response to its weapons storage 
sites inspection. The SNA ambushed Pakistani troops returning from the 
inspection and attacked another Pakistani unit guarding a soup kitchen. The 
UN troops fought back but suffered large casualties, with 24 killed and some 
60 wounded (Richburg, 1993c; UN, 1993d, paras.5-9; 1994a, pp.23-24). 
 After this incident, UNOSOM II and the QRF launched a campaign of 
proactive use of force. The campaign mainly targeted the SNA’s command-
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and-control and weapons storage facilities. On 6 June, US helicopters 
destroyed the SNA’s artillery pieces (AFP, 6 Jun 1993a; Susman, 1993a; UN, 
1994a, p.60). On 12 June, AC-130 ground attack aircraft, attack helicopters, 
and the QRF destroyed a factory building that had been used for the 
ambush on 5 June, the SNA’s weapons storage sites in Mogadishu, and 
Aidid’s radio station. The QRF also secured another radio facility that had 
been controlled by Aidid (UN, 1994a, p.72; Evans, 2000, pp.39-41; 
USACMH, 2003, p.93). On the following two days, AC-130 again carried out 
air strikes on the SNA’s hidden arms depots and the manufacturing facilities 
of the so-called “technicals” (UN, 1993d, para.21; UN, 1994a, p.72; 
USACMH, 2003, p.93).17 
 On 17 June, the international force conducted another large-scale 
offensive. AC-130 attacked multiple targets that included not only hidden 
weapon sites but also the residences of Aidid, Jess, and Osman Atto, who 
was one of Aidid’s top lieutenants. A cordon-and-search operation by troops 
from Pakistan, Italy, Morocco, and France followed to clear the targets. 
Although the international troops suffered casualties in the engagements – 
six killed and over forty wounded – they successfully secured the targets 
(Lorch, 1993c; UN, 1994a, pp.28, 73-74; USACMH, 2003, pp.94-95). 
Frequent strikes and raids by UNOSOM II and the QRF against the SNA’s 
weapons stockpiles continued thereafter (Shaw, 1993a; Susman, 1993g; UN, 
1994a, pp.60-61; USACMH, 2003, p.95). 
 Despite the repeated use of force by the compellers, the SNA did not 
give in; rather, it intensified its own attacks against the international forces. 
On 28 June, a Pakistani contingent conducting a search operation around an 
SNA facility was attacked and suffered casualties, with two killed and three 
wounded (UN, 1994a, p.75). On 2 July, 500 Italian troops returning from a 
 
17  Technicals refer to trucks, land cruisers, and other vehicles which are 
modified to carry mounted weapons, such as machine guns, anti-aircraft 
guns, or rocket launchers. The name came from the way in which 
humanitarian operators described the expense of hiring armed guards 
as “technical assistance” (Richburg, 1992b). 
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cordon-and-search operation were attacked, and a heavy firefight ensued. 
While the counterattack was thought to have inflicted heavy casualties – 
possibly hundreds – on the assailants, the Italian unit also suffered 
casualties, with three killed and over twenty wounded. Moreover, the Italian 
contingent withdrew from its outposts near the site (UN, 1994a, pp.28, 76-
77; Ignazi et al., 2012, p.103). Starting in july, the SNA conducted attacks 
almost daily, such as ambushing vehicles, sniping, and firing mortars and 
anti-tank rockets at the compounds of the international troops (AFP, 11 Jul 
1993; UN, 1994a, pp.30, 61; USACMH, 2003, p.96). 
 In response, the QRF conducted a further escalatory strike on 12 July. 
The target was a command-and-control centre of the SNA called “Abdi 
House”. Upon receiving information that SNA leaders would hold a meeting 
there, the QRF attacked the house using helicopters and ground troops. This 
strike was different from previous ones in that no prior warning was provided; 
this is because the operation aimed to degrade the SNA’s command-and-
control capabilities by neutralising its leadership rather than destroying its 
facilities and weapons. The number of Somali casualties is in question. 
UNOSOM II announced that 20 SNA members were killed. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) announced that 54 were killed and 161 
wounded. The SNA claimed that 73 were killed and hundreds were wounded 
(UN, 1994a, pp.30, 79-80; Evans, 2000, pp.44-46). Beside this raid, the QRF 
conducted four other weapons sweep operations in July (UN, 1994a, p.61). 
In addition, the Pakistani contingent received the reinforcements of tanks 
and started routine weapons searches (USACMH, 2003, p.97). UNOSOM II 
and the QRF conducted at least four weapons searches in August (AFP, 5 
Aug 1993; UN, 1994a, p.62). 
 Although it was reported that these proactive moves and weapons 
searches at checkpoints led to the reduction of attacks (USACMH, 2003, 
p.97), the SNA’s attacks continued and even escalated to using command-
detonated mines to attack vehicles and firing anti-tank rockets at helicopters 
(UN, 1994a, pp.30-31, 62-63; USACMH, 2003, p.98). On 5 September, the 
SNA launched another large-scale attack against UNOSOM II’s Nigerian 
outpost in Mogadishu. The Nigerian reinforcements that were sent to the 
outpost fell into an ambush on the way and suffered heavy casualties, with 
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seven killed and eight wounded. One Nigerian was also captured. A 
Pakistani unit moving to reinforce the Nigerians was also attacked, and two 
Pakistanis were wounded (UN, 1994a, pp.81-83; USACMH, 2003, p.103). 
 In September, the compellers used force on multiple occasions when 
they tried to remove the roadblocks that were obstructing their supply routes. 
On 9 September, the SNA attacked a peacekeepers’ convoy that included 
tanks and armoured vehicles that were stopped by a roadblock using 
recoilless rifles and anti-tank rockets. The Pakistani counterattack, backed 
by QRF helicopters, was able to repel the attackers. The convoy fell under 
attack again when the peacekeepers tried to remove another roadblock. This 
time, the SNA mobilised a mob of over 1,000 people, including women, and 
the Somalis fired heavily from the crowd, as well as from their positions in 
nearby buildings. The Pakistani troops and QRF helicopters again repelled 
the attack but inflicted heavy casualties on the Somalis, including women, 
and were thus criticised. On the side of the compellers, a Pakistani tank was 
destroyed, a Pakistani was killed, and two Pakistani and three US troops 
were wounded (CNN, 1993g; Richburg, 1993j; UN, 1994a, pp.83-84; 
USACMH, 2003, p.104). On 16 September, Pakistani troops removing 
another roadblock came under fire. They returned fire and destroyed the 
SNA’s position (UN, 1994a, p.65; USACMH, 2003, p.104). 
 The compellers also proactively searched for weapons and 
confiscated hidden stockpiles. On 13 September, the QRF, conducting one 
such operation near a hospital used by the SNA as a firing position, 
confiscated a number of weapons and ammunition, including mortar rounds. 
As they withdrew, however, the SNA started to attack the force, and a heavy 
firefight ensued. The QRF suffered three wounded in the two hours of 
engagement, while Aidid claimed that 25 to 60 SNA members were killed 
(Patterson, 1999; Baumann, 2003a, pp.125-130; USACMH, 2003, p.105; 
Whetstone, 2015, pp.81-92). 
 In addition, TF Ranger’s seventh raid developed into the fiercest 
battle in the case. On 3 October, TF Ranger raided a building in Mogadishu 
based on intelligence that SNA senior members were gathering there. The 
targets were arrested, but the SNA shot down a helicopter covering the 
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ground operation, and a heavy combat ensued as TF Ranger and the QRF 
tried to rescue the crew of the downed helicopter. The US troops secured 
the crash site and kept beating back swarming armed Somalis, but another 
helicopter was shot down, thus exacerbating the situation. The US convoys 
were unable to approach the second crash site because of heavy attacks 
and the complicated urban terrain, which was full of hastily built roadblocks. 
After several failed attempts, a new convoy was formed with additional units 
from Pakistan and Malaysia, who were equipped with armour. The convoy 
fought its way to the crash sites and rescued the troops who had been 
pinned down at the first one, but no one had been left at the second 
(Atkinson, 1994a; 1994b; Bowden, 1999; Baumann, 2003b, pp.142-155; 
Whetstone, 2015, pp.124-193). In total, 19 soldiers, including 18 US soldiers, 
were killed and over 90 were wounded. A US helicopter pilot was captured 
by the SNA. On the Somali side, the casualties were understood to be over 
300 killed and over 700 wounded (UN, 1994, p.88; Stewart, 2003, p.13; 
USACMH, 2003, p.106). 
 H3 predicts that the actual use of force is the most effective way to 
enhance the credibility of threats and that other sources would be ineffective, 
but this case does not match that expectation. As has been described, the 
compellers repeatedly employed heavy force in a proactive manner in this 
case. Nevertheless, the compellence failed. Moreover, other three possible 
sources of credibility – national interest, domestic support, and previously 
acquired advantageous reputation – were absent in this case, so the result 
cannot deny the importance of any of these. 
 There are two possible interpretations of the result in relation to the 
hypothesis. One is that, contrary to the prediction of H3, the use of force was 
not important as a source of credibility and one or more of the other three 
sources were important. The other interpretation is that the case does not 
contradict H3; the use of force was an INUS condition and factors other than 
the credibility of threats had to be present to realise the success of 
compellence. 
 The appropriateness of these interpretations needs to be confirmed 
by the examination of successful cases. In fact, the two successful cases 
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examined in previous chapters suggest that the latter interpretation is 
appropriate; the two cases demonstrate the necessity of the actual use of 
force. The Somalia case ended in failure in spite of the heavy use of force, 
but this does not contradict H3 if the factor is an INUS condition. The cross-
case analyses in Chapter 6 come back to this point. 
5.3.4  Denial 
The next hypothesis is H4, which addresses denial. There are four generally 
applicable ways to achieve denial in peace operations: attrition, stronghold 
neutralisation, decapitation, and counter-coercion negation. The hypothesis 
predicts that counter-coercion negation is the most effective among them. 
The compellers in this case failed to achieve counter-coercion negation, and 
the case ended in failure. Therefore, the case is consistent with the 
expectation of the hypothesis. 
 The first option to achieve denial is attrition. There is no reliable 
information about the exact number of casualties that the SNA suffered in 
the combats with the international troops, but the figure seems to be quite 
large. The fact that the compellence ended in failure despite the application 
of attrition casts doubt on the effectiveness of the approach and is consistent 
with H4. 
 The available information indicates that the SNA suffered large 
casualties in the first month of the compellent military campaign. At least 
three SNA gunmen were killed, and some 40 were detained in the QRF’s 
attack on 12 June (Evans, 2000, p.40). The UN estimated that “dozens” of 
SNA combatants were killed or wounded in the engagement on 17 June 
(Lorch, 1993c), while initial reports estimated that more than 150 combatants 
were killed (UN, 1994a, p.74; USACMH, 2003, p.94). According to a UN 
report, 67 Somalis were killed and 103 wounded in the engagements on 2 
July that involved Italian troops and the QRF (UN, 1994a, p.77). The number 
of Somali casualties was possibly in the hundreds (Ignazi et al., 2012, p.103). 
 The ensuing engagements also inflicted casualties on the SNA. For 
example, a US convoy was ambushed on 7 August, and the US 
counterattack killed five gunmen, wounded fifteen, and captured more (AFP, 
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8 Aug 1993a). The Somali side reportedly suffered some 30 casualties in the 
engagement between the Nigerian contingent and the SNA on 5 September 
(Miller, 1993c; Richburg, 1993i). Between 25 and 60 SNA combatants were 
also killed in the engagement with US QRF on 13 September (Patterson, 
1999, p.10). 
 The number of SNA casualties resulting from some other battles was 
also thought to be large, but the use of human shields by the SNA makes it 
difficult to distinguish the combatants from the civilians in terms of the 
number of casualties. The Somali casualties in the engagement on 9 
September included women and possibly children who were mobilised by 
the SNA. The SNA claimed that over 150 were killed, but they initially 
claimed some 200 were killed and some 350 were wounded. The ICRC 
maintained that 107 were wounded but was unclear about those who were 
dead, and the local hospital staff stated that 24 to 29 were killed and 117 
wounded (AFP, 11 Sep 1993; 15 Sep 1993). The battle on 3 October surely 
inflicted the largest casualties on the Somali side in the compellent campaign. 
The US and UN estimated that 300 to 500 Somalis were killed and over 700 
wounded (UN, 1994a, p.88; USACMH, 2003, p.106). The ICRC also put the 
number of wounded Somalis at over 700 and said that one-third were 
women and children. The SNA maintained that some 300 Somalis were 
killed and some 800 wounded (Miller, 1993d). A sectoral commander of the 
SNA later said in an interview that 133 SNA fighters were killed in the battle 
(PBS, no date b). 
 Summing up the above information, the compellers inflicted quite 
substantial casualties on the target side, but the compellence nevertheless 
ended in failure. Even a conservative estimate would bring the number of 
SNA combatants killed in engagements with the compellers to more than 
250. This number could have been much larger, and there must have been 
hundreds more wounded. The fact that the compellence failed despite the 
SNA suffering significant casualties casts doubt on the effectiveness of 
attrition and is concurrent with the expectation of H4. 
 The second possible form of denial is stronghold neutralisation. The 
compellers tried to achieve it but failed to do so. As the hypothesis did not 
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predict this approach to be most effective, the absence of stronghold 
neutralisation in a failed case of compellence does not reveal much about 
the hypothesis. 
 The southern part of Mogadishu was the stronghold of the SNA. Aidid 
and the SNA had continued to fight for control of Mogadishu before and after 
the fall of Barre (Duyvesteyn, 2012, pp.94-99). Mogadishu, which had a port 
and an airport, was the central entry point for relief goods, and controlling the 
goods meant having enormous power and wealth (Maren, 1996, p.204). 
 The compellers attempted to bring Mogadishu under their control, but 
the attempt was unsuccessful. The aim of the UNOSOM II offensive in June 
was to destroy the SNA facilities in south Mogadishu and flush it out by 
means of search-and-clear operations (CNN, 1993e; USACMH, 2003, p.129; 
Cassidy, 2004, p.157). The compellers destroyed the SNA’s command-and-
control centres and arms depots, but the SNA did not leave the capital and 
continued resistance there. After the attack on Pakistani troops in early June, 
the UN troops lost their will to leave their compounds, especially without US 
support, and almost stopped patrolling the streets (Richburg, 1993h; 
Anderson, 1995, pp.274-275; Warner and Levin, 1995, p.17; USACMH, 
2003, p.64). Despite repeated military operations, 40% of Mogadishu was off 
limits for UN troops by mid-July (AFP, 19 Jul 1993; Shaw, 1993c). The 
compellers were not able to secure even major communication roads, which 
were coloured red on a Pentagon map, which meant that they were under 
high threat (Gellman, 1993). Of course, the major presence of international 
troops in Mogadishu itself could mean that the SNA’s stronghold was under 
pressure, but the situation was far from neutralised. Therefore, stronghold 
neutralisation was not achieved in this case. 
 The third form of denial is decapitation, which ended in failure despite 
the compellers’ explicit and extensive effort. As with stronghold neutralisation, 
the failure of decapitation in a failed case does not say much about the 
hypothesis, because H4 does not predict that it will be the most effective 
form. 
 The effort of decapitation started soon after the SNA’s attack on 
Pakistani troops on 5 June. The UNSC adopted Resolution 837 the next day 
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and emphasised that UNOSOM II could arrest those who were responsible 
(UNSC, 1993b). The UN reportedly requested the detention of Aidid and his 
aides before the initial offensive against the SNA commenced (CNN, 1993b; 
Schafer, 1993). On 17 June, SRSG Howe publicly announced that he had 
ordered the arrest of Aidid and called on him to surrender (AFP, 17 Jun 
1993a; AP, 1993d). On the same day, international troops raided some SNA 
facilities, including the residence of Aidid (Lorch, 1993c; UN, 1994a, pp.28, 
73-74; USACMH, 2003, pp.94-95), but he escaped and remained at large 
thereafter. 
 The compellers employed three major steps for decapitation after 
Aidid went underground. The first was to offer a prize for his head. UNOSOM 
II announced that 25,000 dollars would be paid for information that led to the 
capture of Aidid, and it distributed wanted posters (AFP, 26 Jun 1993; 10 Jul 
1993; Susman, 1993e). The prize was offered to show the local people the 
seriousness of the attempt to capture Aidid, and the UNOSOM II leaders 
hoped to offer an even higher prize if possible (Warner and Levin, 1995, 
pp.15, 23; PBS, no date c; no date d). However, the lack of intelligence on 
the whereabouts of Aidid kept hindering the effort to arrest him. 
 The second step was the attack against “Abdi House” on 12 July. As 
explained earlier, the operation aimed to degrade the SNA’s command-and-
control capabilities by neutralising its leadership. The attack was based on 
information that Aidid would attend the meeting, but he was not there, 
because he had another appointment (Drysdale, 1994, pp.202-203). 
Moreover, the identities of attendees remain in question. The US claimed 
that those who gathering there were hard-core, anti-UN SNA leaders who 
were planning future attacks against the international troops (Peterson, 2000, 
p.130; USACMH, 2003, p.132). The other view was that they were leaders of 
the SNA and the sub-clan to which Aidid belonged and that they were 
discussing the resumption of dialogue with UNOSOM II (Drysdale, 1994, 
pp.199-204; Bowden, 1999, pp.71-72; Peterson, 2000, pp.117-120). The 
compellers recognised the necessity to distinguish and alienate Aidid from 
the clan to which he belonged (USACMH, 2003, pp.96, 99). However, it is 
understood that the attack and killing of moderate clan leaders drove non-
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supporters of Aidid to support him; thus, the attack was counterproductive 
(Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, pp.121-122; Kaempf, 2012, pp.403-404). 
 The third step of the decapitation was the deployment of TF Ranger. 
SRSG Howe requested that the US government deploy special operation 
forces just after the attack on Pakistani troops in early June, but the 
government was reluctant at first (Warner and Levin, 1995, p.24; Howe, 
1997, p.181; Poole, 2005, p.43). It decided to deploy TF Ranger only after 
four US soldiers were killed on 8 August; these were the first US fatalities 
after the transition to UNOSOM II (Warner and Levin, 1995, pp.25-27; 
Findlay, 2002, pp.197-198; Poole, 2005, p.48). 
 TF Ranger conducted raids with the aim of detaining Aidid and his 
aides, and it succeeded to some extent but ultimately failed. The first raid on 
30 August did not capture any targets. The second operation, on 7 
September, captured 17 SNA fighters. Two US soldiers were slightly 
wounded in the operation. The third one, on 14 September, followed the 
wrong target. TF Ranger arrested 39 people, including a man who was 
supposed to be Aidid, but he turned out to be a Somali police chief who was 
cooperating with the UN. On 16 September, TF Ranger raided an SNA 
compound and detained several people while killing another. The fifth raid, 
on 18 September, targeted one of Atto’s garages and captured eight people, 
but Atto was not there. Atto was arrested along with his three bodyguards in 
the sixth raid, on 21 September. The SNA attacked TF Ranger helicopters 
with anti-tank rockets, and TF Ranger’s counter-fire inflicted casualties on 
the SNA (Atkinson, 1994a; USACMH, 2003, p.138). In the seventh raid, on 3 
October, captured twenty-four people, including three senior aides of Aidid, 
were captured (Bowden, 1999, pp.32, 50). However, the operation ended in 
a fiasco, and the hunt for Aidid ceased thereafter. 
 In the end, the compellers were not able to capture Aidid despite their 
extensive efforts. He changed his location every night, disguised himself 
when he moved, used only low-power radio, and changed its frequencies to 
prevent detection (Sinai, 1993a; Peterson, 2000, p.96; Kaempf, 2012, p.396). 
Although the compellers forced Aidid to go underground and detained some 
senior SNA members, this did not lead to the degradation of the SNA’s 
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combat capability. On the contrary, the SNA introduced new techniques and 
improved its attacks against the international troops, as discussed below. In 
sum, the compellers tried decapitation but failed to achieve it. 
 The final form of denial is counter-coercion negation. The SNA 
countered the compellence by employing all three possible strategies – 
casualty-generating strategies, civilian suffering-based strategies, and 
coalition-fracturing strategies – and the compellers failed to counter these 
counter-strategies. The fact that effective counter-coercion negation was 
absent and the case ended in failure corresponds well to H4. 
 The compellers sustained heavy casualties from the SNA’s attacks 
throughout the period of compellence. The first large-scale UN casualties 
occurred duing the weapon-site inspection on 5 June. Despite receiving a 
warning from a notified SNA senior member that the planned inspection 
would bring about “a war”, UNOSOM II went through with the inspection. 
UNOSOM II judged that the warning was a bluff based on the past behaviour 
of the SNA, which had repeated such bold words but had not carried them 
out. Based on intelligence and the experience of UNITAF, UNOSOM II 
supposed that the worst possible situation would be armed riots (USACMH, 
2003, pp.87-88). However, the SNA followed through with its threat. The 
SNA fired heavily on the returning inspection team, which was pinned down 
by roadblocks; overwhelmed about a dozen Pakistani troops, who were 
manning a feeding site; and ambushed the reinforcements who had been 
sent in (AFP, 7 Jun 1993c; Lorch, 1993a; Richburg, 1993c; UN, 1994a, 
pp.23-24, 69-70; Evans, 2000, pp.37-38). In total, 24 Pakistani troops were 
killed and some 60 troops injured (AFP, 8 Aug 1993b; UN, 1994a, pp.24, 70). 
 Subsequent engagements also generated casualties on the side of 
the international forces. Between 6 June and 12 July, 11 UNOSOM II troops 
were killed and 137 wounded (AFP, 12 Jul 1993a). The number, including 
the casualties on 5 June, increased to 39 killed and over 160 wounded by 8 
August (Shaw, 1993e). The total number of casualties since the handover in 
May reached 47 killed and 175 wounded by 6 September (C. Burns, 1993). 
By the end of the month, the number further increased to 56 killed and over 
200 wounded (Richburg, 1993k). The US Forces suffered the heaviest 
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casualties in the battle on 3–4 October, in which 18 US soldiers were killed 
and 84 wounded. A Malaysian was also killed, and more UNOSOM II troops 
were wounded in the battle (UN, 1994, p.88; USACMH, 2003, p.106). By 7 
October, when President Clinton announced a new US policy on Somalia, 
the total casualties of the compellers had reached 77 killed and 301 
wounded. Six US troops were missing and were later confirmed dead, and a 
US and a Nigerian soldiers were detained by the SNA (AP, 1993h).18 
 The lack of armour surely worsened the situation. The majority of the 
casualties on 5 June occurred when Pakistani reinforcements tried to reach 
the trapped units in soft-skin vehicles (UN, 1994a, p.71). The TF Ranger and 
the QRF, unequipped with armoured vehicles, also struggled to rescue 
trapped troops on 3–4 October and had to receive assistance from other 
countries’ armoured units. 
 However, because of the abundance of anti-armour weapons, having 
armour did not necessarily mean being safe. For example, a Pakistani tank 
was destroyed by the SNA using recoilless rifles on 9 September (CNN, 
1993g; Richburg, 1993j). On 21 September, a Pakistani armoured vehicle 
was destroyed by an anti-tank rocket and suffered casualties, with three 
killed and seven wounded (UN, 1994a, pp.84-85; USACMH, 2003, p.104). 
On 27 September, Pakistani armoured vehicles were ambushed in two 
separate attacks. One of the vehicles was hit by an anti-tank rocket, and two 
Pakistani were wounded (UN, 1994a, p.85). Finally, three or four Malaysian 
armoured vehicles were destroyed in the rescue operation on 3–4 October 
(Casper, 2001, p.81; USACMH, 2003, p.106). The SNA possessed hundreds 
of anti-tank rockets and fired more than 200 in that battle (Whitney, 1993; 
Atkinson, 1994a). 
 Mortars posed a challenge to the compellers that was difficult to 
counter. Mortar attacks killed one and wounded nineteen in total (UN, 1994a, 
p.30). The SNA started to use mortars in its attacks on the compounds of the 
international troops in July (UN, 1994a, pp.61-67). At first, the compellers 
 
18  The two captured soldiers were later released (Hirsch and Oakley, 1995, 
p.131). 
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used helicopters to counter the mortar fire. Later in September, the 
international troops came to use its own mortar fire in counterattacks. The 
use of mortar, however, had restrictions regarding the avoidance of collateral 
damage. The counterattacks were able to reduce the intensity of the attacks 
but could not stop them (USACMH, 2003, p.105). 
 Command-detonated mines also inflicted casualties on the compellers. 
On 8 August, a vehicle on patrol was blasted by a command-detonated mine, 
and four US soldiers were killed (UN, 1994a, pp.80-81; USACMH, 2003, 
p.98). The attack on 19 August using the same type of weapon wounded 
four US soldiers, and another on 22 August, combined with an ambush, 
wounded six US soldiers (UN, 1994a, pp.62-63, 81; USACMH, 2003, p.98). 
In addition, on 3 October, a US vehicle was hit by a command-detonated 
mine, and three US soldiers were wounded (UN, 1994a, p.86). The 
compellers tried to prevent and find mines by patrolling major roads, and 
they actually found and destroyed some (USACMH, 2003, p.134). However, 
as indicated by the incidents just noted, it was difficult to completely prevent 
damage caused by this type of attack. 
 Helicopters were also not invincible. Aidid regarded helicopters as the 
vulnerability of the international troops. Whenever he held a meeting, he 
made his combatants deploy on rooftops around the venue and instructed 
them to concentrate their fire on helicopters if they appeared (PBS, no date 
e). The SNA started to use anti-tank rockets against helicopters in August. 
The first hit occurred on 25 August, but the damage was slight (USACMH, 
2003, p.98). The SNA shot down the first helicopter on 25 September. The 
armed group used anti-tank rockets, and three crew members were killed 
and two wounded. The troops who were sent to rescue the crew members 
also suffered casualties in the firefights (UN, 1994a, p.85; Casper, 2001, 
pp.25-28; USACMH, 2003, p.105; Whetstone, 2015, pp.97-114). The US 
troops regarded it as just a lucky shot and kept believing that the risk could 
be managed in a way that enabled them to avoid being shot down. However, 
it turned out that they underestimated the SNA’s adaptability, as 
demonstrated on 3 October (Ecklund, 2004, pp.56-57). That day, the SNA 
shot down two helicopters and severely damaged two others (Atkinson, 
1994b). 
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 In sum, the compellers were not able to prevent nor limit casualties. 
Using guerrilla-style attacks, the SNA not only kept the compellers bleeding 
but also advanced its attack capability by introducing new weapons, such as 
mortars and remote-controlled mines, and new techniques, such as the use 
of anti-tank rockets against helicopters. 
 The SNA also fully exploited the compellers’ inclination to avoid 
civilian casualties. The SNA used human shields in engagements on 5 and 
17 June (AFP, 7 Jun 1993c; Lorch, 1993c; Richburg, 1993c; USACMH, 2003, 
pp.89, 94). A hospital building was used as a cover in the latter case, and 
the SNA repeated the practice, as seen in the engagement on 13 September 
(Lorch, 1993c; Susman, 1993d; Baumann, 2003a, p.126; USACMH, 2003, 
p.94). The SNA also used hospital compounds or vicinities as the firing 
positions from which they used mortars to attack the UN compounds (AFP, 
19 Sep 1993; LaBelle, 1993; UN, 1994a, p.86). The use of human shields 
and hospitals constrained the peacekeepers from firing back and increased 
their casualties (AFP, 8 Jun 1993; Lorch, 1993c; Susman, 1993d; Kaempf, 
2012, pp.396-397). 
 The SNA’s use of human shields put the international troops in a 
difficult situation when the troops faced mobs. On 13 June, a demonstration 
of 1,500 to 3,000 citizens – mainly women and children – approached an 
outpost of Pakistani peacekeepers. According to the UN, the Pakistani 
troops fired warning shots in vain, and then Somali gunmen within and 
around the mob started to fire upon not only the Pakistani troops but also the 
civilians. The incident is understood as a plot to create a scene of massacre 
by peacekeepers. The number of casualties is unclear, but it is thought that 
eight people were shot (UN, 1993d, paras.23-24; 1994a, pp.27-28, 72-73; 
Peterson, 2000, pp.85-86). Journalists on the ground, however, told a 
different story. They reported that Pakistani troops started to shoot into the 
crowd without warning shots and did so without being fired at (Alexander, 
1993e; Richburg, 1993f; Peterson, 2000, pp.84-85). The facts are unclear, 
but the incident drew criticisms from international human rights organisations 
(AFP, 31 Jul 1993; UN, 1994a, p.73). Similarly, the compellers were 
criticised for firing into a crowd when they were attacked on 9 September, as 
mentioned earlier. 
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 The SNA repeatedly claimed that the attacks by the international 
troops generated civilian casualties. For example, the SNA claimed that the 
QRF attack on the SNA’s command-and-control centre on 12 July killed 73, 
including women and children, and wounded hundreds, including bystanders 
(UN, 1994a, p.79). The SNA also blamed the Nigerian contingent, stating 
that the engagement on 5 September erupted because the UN troops fired 
on civilians, killing 23 and injuring 56 (AFP, 6 Sep 1993). After the 
engagement with the QRF on 12 September, the SNA claimed that the 
Somalis suffered casualties – 37 killed and 62 wounded – most of whom 
were women and children (AFP, 13 Sep 1993). 
 The compellers recognised the importance of avoiding collateral 
damage. The QRF utilised staff judge advocates in its operations so that 
force was used in accordance with the rules of engagement and the risk of 
collateral damage was assessed (Baumann, 2003a, pp.130-131). In the 
early phase of their operations, the compellers issued warnings before 
conducting air strikes so that non-combatants could evacuate the target 
areas (CNN, 1993d; Susman, 1993c; 1993g; USACMH, 2003, p.130). The 
compellers deviated from this practice when they carried out the strike 
against “Abdi House” on 12 July without providing any warning (USACMH, 
2003, p.132). This was because the aim of the attack was decapitation, but it 
resulted in the killing of non-SNA participants at the meeting. 
 Collateral damage was unavoidable even with preventive effort. For 
example, an airstrike on 14 June killed a boy who happened to be sleepling 
against the wall of a target compound, and a woman was killed and a dozen 
others wounded in another airstrike that day (Susman, 1993b; Peterson, 
2000, pp.86-87). In a large-scale engagement on 17 June, a missile fired 
from a helicopter missed its target and struck a relief agency facility. One 
person was killed, and seven were wounded (Lorch, 1993c). A counterattack 
against SNA gunmen who took cover in a refugee camp resulted in two 
civilians being killed (Susman, 1993h). The number of civilian casualties on 3 
October is unclear. Hundreds of Somalis were thought to have been killed or 
wounded, and civilians must have been included among them, because the 
battle was fought extensively in one of the busiest areas in Mogadishu (PBS, 
no date b). 
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 The total number of civilian casualties is unclear. Aidid claimed that 
13,000 Somalis were killed by the international troops. Oakley estimated that 
6,000 to 10,000 Somalis were killed or wounded. A journalist estimated that 
the number of Somali casualties was less than 2,000 (Peterson, 2000, p.88). 
Subtracting the estimated number of SNA casualties, which is also 
ambiguous, from that of the overall Somali casualties would give an 
estimated number of civilian casualties that might be huge. The SNA 
intentionally created civilian casualties and exploited those that the 
compellers inflicted, which undermined support for the mission (AFP, 31 Jul 
1993; 12 Aug 1993). 
 Finally, the international coalition was not cohesive, and the SNA 
exploited this too. The main fissure emerged between the US and the UN on 
the one hand and Italy, a former colonial power, on the other. Italy provided 
the Barre regime with military and economic aid, and due to corruption there 
were Italian politicians who benefitted from such aid programmes (Achtner, 
1993; Prunier, 1997, pp.137, 142-143; Tripodi, 1998, pp.60, 62). Italian 
participation in the Somalia was a move that was taken to depart from Italy’s 
dirty past in the context of a nationwide anti-corruption investigation. Italy 
tried to join UNITAF in its earliest stage. However, the US was concerned 
about Italy’s relations with Somalia and thus delayed acceptance, which 
frustrated Italy (Simpson, 1992; Prunier, 1997, p.137). The Italian 
government made much of showing its domestic audience its departure from 
past regimes. When the international forces intervened, the ex-finance 
minister from the Barre regime, with whom Italian politicians had corrupt 
relationships, aligned with Ali Mahdi. This fact led Italy to be amicable to the 
side that was opposed to Ali Mahdi – that is, Aidid (Prunier, 1997, pp.142-
143). 
 The US and the UN pursued military confrontation with Aidid, but Italy 
was critical of this approach. Italy regarded the approach as belated. It also 
did not want to benefit Ali Mahdi by confronting and weakening Aidid. Italy 
disobeyed the UNOSOM II commander’s order to forcefully take a position 
occupied by the SNA, and it relied on negotiations with the faction (UN, 
1994a, p.29; Prunier, 1997, p.143; Ignazi et al., 2012, p.104). Italy called for 
restraints after Pakistani troops fired on demonstrators on 13 June and for 
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the halt of offensive operations after the QRF attacked “Abdi House” on 12 
July (AFP, 15 Jun 1993; 12 Jul 1993; AP, 1993e). It also demanded the 
redeployment of its troops from southern Mogadishu (AFP, 13 Jul 1993; AP, 
1993f). Discontent with the aggressive posture against Aidid, Italy demanded 
that its officer be given a senior post at UNOSOM II headquarters. Italy’s 
demand strengthened, especially after it suffered casualties in a weapons-
search operation. However, the US did not agree to weaken the pressure 
against Aidid (AFP, 13 Jul 1993; Lorch, 1993d; Rutherford, 2008, pp.145-
146). 
 The friction between the UN and the US on the one hand and Italy on 
the other culminated in the UN’s demand to change the commander of the 
Italian contingent. Italy rebuffed the demand (AFP, 15 Jul 1993; Wakin, 
1993; Prunier, 1997, p.143), but it was later announced in August that Italian 
troops would be redeployed out of Mogadishu and that the commander 
would leave Somalia at the time of rotation, which was the end of August 
(AFP, 13 Aug 1993; Reuter, 1993). Italy continued to criticise UNOSOM II 
when Pakistani and US troops fired into a mob on 9 September (AFP, 10 
Sep 1993; Rutherford, 2008, p.155). 
 The suffering of casualties and killing of civilians in incidents involving 
the SNA widened the crack in the international coalition. The SNA 
intentionally focused its attacks on US and Pakistani troops and avoided 
attacking other coalition members who were critical of the heavy-handed 
approach (PBS, no date b). As the situation deteriorated, Italy and other 
coalition members asked for instructions from their respective capitals before 
implementing orders from the UNOSOM II commander, and this hindered 
timely operations. Many also refused to deploy to Mogadishu, the most 
dangerous place in the theatre of operatoin (UN, 1994a, pp.45, 78; Hirsch 
and Oakley, 1995, p.119; Bir, 1997, p.24; Rutherford, 2008, pp.142-143). It 
can be said that the coalition members were unable to unite their efforts in 
compellence. 
 To sum up, the compellers failed to achieve counter-coercion 
negation. The SNA kept inflicting casualties on the international troops by 
improving its attack capability. It also utilised civilians to constrain the 
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compellers’ responses and the actual or claimed civilian casualties to 
delegitimise the operation. The casualties of the troops and civilians 
deepened the split among the participating countries of the mission, so the 
armed group exploited the weakness of the coalition as well. The absence of 
counter-coercion negation in the failed case is consistent with the 
expectation of H4. 
 This section has examined the different types of denial pressure that 
compellers can employ in peace operations. In Somalia, the international 
troops applied attrition and inflicted heavy casualties on the SNA. Despite 
this, the compellence failed, and this fact casts doubt on the utility of attrition. 
The compellers also tried to achieve stronghold neutralisation and 
decapitation but failed to do so. The entire confrontation between the 
international troops and the SNA can be understood as a contest over the 
control of Mogadishu, and the compellers could not achieve this. The 
compellers also extensively pursued the capture of Aidid and his top aides, 
but Aidid remained at large, and the SNA’s combat capability did not suffer a 
severe blow because of this effort. The fact that these two types of denial 
were absent in the unsuccessful case of compellence leaves open the 
possibility that a compellent effort can succeed if they are achieved. Insights 
from other cases are required to examine this possibility, and this issue is 
further discussed in the cross-case analyses in Chapter 6. Finally, the 
compellers failed to achieve counter-coercion negation. The SNA employed 
all the casualty-generating strategies, civilian suffering-based strategies, and 
coalition-fracturing strategies, and the compellers ended up suffering from 
them until the end. H4 predicts that counter-coercion negation is the most 
effective form of denial, so the case of Somalia, which ended in failure, is 
concurrent with the prediction. 
5.3.5  Third-Party Support 
The final hypothesis to be examined is H5, which predicts that the absence 
of third-party support on the target side will lead to the success of 
compellence in peace operations. The SNA received support from actors in 
other countries, and the compellence ended in failure. Therefore, the case is 
consistent with the hypothesis. 
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 Ethiopia was a source of weapons for the SNA. Somalia had a huge 
stock of weapons supplied by the Soviet Union and the US during the Cold 
War, and warring factions used them in the civil war (Gordon, 1992; Eknes et 
al., 1995, II-2). In addition, the uncontrolled border between Somalia and 
Ethiopia enabled weapons to move freely through it. Ethiopian soldiers sold 
their weapons to Somalis after the Ethiopian Mengistu regime collapsed 
(Adibe and Potgieter, 1995, pp.70-71; Natsios, 1996, pp.76-77; Duyvesteyn, 
2012, p.59). Aidid imported new weapons, including heavy ones such as 
recoilless rifles, from Ethiopia. The compellers were aware of the flow of 
weapons from Ethiopia to Mogadishu, but the contingents under the French 
command that was in charge of the area could cover only the major roads, 
thus leaving other routes unchecked due to the lack of troops (Richburg, 
1993l). 
 Sudan was also accused of supplying Aidid with weapons and training, 
but the government denied it (Osman, 1993; Sinai, 1993b). US intelligence 
showed that Sudan and Iran, which supported Sudan, provided Aidid with 
weapons, including remote-controlled mines, and the training to use them 
(Hunt, 1993b; Sinai, 1993b; Williams, 1993b). Sudanese Islam 
fundamentalists who fought in Afghanistan are said to have trained SNA 
combatants on how to attack helicopters with anti-tank rockets (Bowden, 
1999, pp.110-111; Ecklund, 2004, p.56). Other Islamic states also seem to 
have supported the SNA. A local commander of the SNA said in an interview 
that most SNA combatants were trained in Islamic countries, including Libya 
(PBS, no date b). 
 Ironically, the presence of international actors, including the 
compellers, helped Aidid to obtain support from other countries. The US, UN, 
and non-government organisations located their headquarters and offices in 
the southern part of Mogadishu, which was under the control of Aidid, 
because the area possessed a port, an airport, and the US embassy building. 
This resulted in the pouring of a huge amount of money into the SNA 
through payment for properties, armed guards, and other services, and it is 
understood that the SNA used the income to obtain weapons (Sommer, 
1994, pp.86, 116; Augelli and Murphy, 1995, pp.346-347; Farrell, 1995, 
p.198; Kapteijns, 2013b, p.426). 
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 In sum, the compellers were not able to prevent the SNA from 
receiving support from third parties. The SNA smuggled weapons and 
received training from foreign actors, and this improved their combat 
capabilities. The international troops could not control the border areas, and 
let the smuggling continue. Moreover, the wider international presence even 
had the effect of providing the SNA with funds to obtain weapons. The 
compellence failed in a situation in which the target received third-party 
support, and this is concurrent with the expectation of H5. 
5.4  Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed whether the course of events in Somalia was 
concurrent with the hypotheses. As this is a case of outright failure, the 
conditions for success are expected to be absent. The analysis indicates that 
the case is consistent with three hypotheses, while one of them requires 
cautious evaluation, and it is inconsistent with the other two. 
 The Somalia case is in line with H4 and H5. H4 predicts that 
achieving counter-coercion negation as a form of denial makes compellence 
likely to succeed. The compellers failed to achieve this and kept suffering 
from the SNA’s counter-coercion. The case ended in failure, so it 
corresponds to the expectation of H4. Regarding other types of denial, the 
case casts doubt on the utility of attrition, which the compellers applied 
extensively, but neither supports nor denies stronghold neutralisation and 
decapitation, which the compellers tried but failed to achieve. 
 This case also corresponds with H5, which predicts that compellence 
is likely to succeed if the targets do not receive third-party support. In the 
case of Somalia, the SNA imported weapons and received training from 
foreign actors. The compellers could not prevent this, and the case ended in 
failure, so what happened in the case was concurrent with the expectation of 
the hypothesis. 
 The case is consistent with H2 as well, but with caveats. H2 predicts 
that compellence is likely to succeed if compellers employ the gradual-
turning-of-the-screw strategy combined with positive inducements. In the 
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Somalia case, the compellers employed a tacit ultimatum and the gradual-
turning-of-the-screw strategy, but did not give any carrots to the SNA. The 
combination which H2 predicts to be most effective did not materialise, and 
the compellence ended in failure, so the result corresponds with the 
expectation of the hypothesis. 
 Although this correspondence can be interpreted as support for the 
effectiveness of the combined strategy represented in H2, this interpretation 
contains a problem. Given that the compellers employed the gradual-turning-
of-the-screw strategy in this case, such an interpretation assumes that 
positive inducements play an important role in compellence, and this should 
be confirmed in successful cases of compellence. However, the other two 
studies of successful cases cast doubt on the utility of positive inducements. 
They rather indicate that compellence can succeed without providing carrots 
if the use of gradually increased pressure is combined with other conditions. 
 The Somalia case does not contradict the finding from the other two 
case studies that the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy is an 
INUS condition. If the use of the strategy is a necessary part of a 
conjunctural sufficient condition, the unsuccessful result after the use of the 
strategy does not negate the importance of the strategy; the likely cause of 
the failure is the absence of other conditions. This point is further discussed 
in the next chapter. 
 The expectations of the remaining two hypotheses – H1 and H3 – do 
not coincide what happened in Somalia. H1 predicts that the favourable 
balance of troops for compellers is likely to lead to the success of 
compellence. The case casts doubt on this hypothesis because it ended in 
failure despite the compellers’ numerical superiority over the SNA in 
Mogadishu. Logically, there is a possibility that numerical superiority is an 
INUS condition and that other conditions also have to be fulfilled to achieve 
success. However, the two successful cases examined in previous chapters 
negate this possibility. 
 H3 predicts that compellence is likely to succeed if the credibility of 
the threats is supported by the actual use of force. The compellence in 
Somalia ended in failure in spite of the massive use of force by the 
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compellers, and this casts doubt on the hypothesis. This result can be 
interpreted in two ways. One is that the importance of the use of force is 
denied and other sources of threat credibility that were absent in this case 
are important. The other is that the actual use of force is an INUS condition 
and needs to be combined with other conditions to achieve success. The two 
previous case studies support the latter interpretation, which will be 
discussed further in the next chapter. Therefore, the Somalia case does not 
contradict the hypothesis. 
 In conclusion, the Somalia case corresponds well to H4 and H5; 
corresponds to H2 as well, but this result requires evaluation based on 
insights from other cases; and does not contradict H1 and H3 if the 
conditions represented in the hypotheses are understood as INUS conditions. 
The cross-case analyses in the next chapter discuss what the findings mean 
for the validity of the derived conditions for success. 
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Chapter 6 
Cross-Case Analysis 
This chapter puts together the findings from the three case studies and 
conducts cross-case analyses. The previous three chapters have performed 
within-case analyses of three cases using the congruence method, which 
checks the congruence between the hypotheses and what actually 
happened. The most-similar-design comparison has also been applied to the 
prolonged case of compellence in Sierra Leone, and the temporal 
comparison between phases has provided additional insights into the 
derived conditions for success. This chapter looks into the patterns and 
consistencies between the three cases. Such consistency provides 
additional support for the findings of each case study, which are summarised 
in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. 
 
















Demand type Heaviest Limited Heaviest Heaviest Heaviest 
Favourable balance of 
troops (H1) 
































Mixed – – – – 
Actual use of 
force ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ * ✓ 
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Denial 
(H4) 
Attrition – – ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Stronghold 
neutralisation ✓ (partial) – – ✓ – 




✓ – –  ✓ ✓ – 
Absence of third-party 
support (H5) ✓ (largely) – – ✓ (largely) – 
(Note) ✓ : present, applied, or fulfilled     ✓ * : continuing effect from the previous phase     – : absent 
Table 6.2  Congruence Between the Hypotheses and the Course of Events 
in the Cases 
Hypotheses East Timor Sierra Leone Somalia 
H1 Incongruent Incongruent Incongruent * 
H2 Partially congruent Partially congruent Congruent 
H3 Congruent Congruent Incongruent * 
H4 Congruent Congruent Congruent 
H5 Congruent Congruent Congruent 
(Note) Incongruent result with * does not contradict the hypothesis if the condition 
represented by the hypothesis is understood as an INUS condition. 
 
 As explained in Chapter 2, this study assumes that compellence has 
conjunctural causation. Conditions are expected to work in combination to 
derive the success of the strategy, and there can be multiple combinations of 
conditions that lead to the same result – namely, equifinality. If a condition 
composing a conjunctural sufficient condition is indispensable for that 
conjuncture, that component condition is an INUS condition. The following 
analysis, like the case studies, examine the validity of the derived conditions 
for success based on these assumptions. 
 As summarised in the tables, the results of the three case studies 
show some consistencies. The congruence method finds that all three cases 
are congruent to H5. Substantial third-party support provided to target armed 
groups turned out to be largely absent in two successful cases. Pro-
integration militias in East Timor were proxies created by the Indonesian 
military, and they received weapons, training, and operational support from 
the Indonesian authorities. However, as Indonesian interests changed under 
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international pressure, the support shrank to the point of effective 
abandonment. As the militias depended heavily on Indonesian support, its 
disappearance was a severe blow to them. The RUF in Sierra Leone was 
supported by Taylor of neighbouring Liberia. The RUF received arms and 
ammunition from Taylor and traded diamonds with him. Taylor’s support also 
dwindled after international sanctions were threatened and applied to the 
country, and a new insurgency threatened his regime. In contrast, the SNA 
in Somalia continued to receive third-party support, and the case ended in 
failure. Weapons flowed from Ethiopia, Sudan, and Iran, and they included 
heavy weapons, such as recoilless rifles and command-detonated mines. 
Sudanese Islamc fundamentalists are also said to have trained the SNA to 
attack helicopters with anti-tank rockets. The support enhanced the SNA’s 
combat capabilities and it kept fighting against the compellers. 
 In addition to the congruence method, the most-similar-design 
comparison of the Sierra Leone case provides further support to this 
consistency. The end of Liberian support was one of the two factors that 
emerged in the final phase of compellence. In combination with the other 
factor, the cessation of Liberian support enhanced the prospect that the RUF 
would be defeated. As the acceptance of disarmament by the RUF followed 
only thereafter, the course of events indicates that the absence of third-party 
support was necessary for success. 
 Similarly, a counterfactual thought experiment in the East Timor case 
also suggests that the factor was necessary for the success. The pro-
integration militias escaped to West Timor, which is an Indonesian territory, 
and launched cross-border attacks against INTERFET. As the mandate of 
INTERFET covered East Timor only and the force could not move into West 
Timor, the continuance of Indonesian support would have enabled the 
militias to persistently maintain their resistance against the compeller. 
 Overall, the three cases provide the clearest support for H5 among 
the hypotheses. All three cases were consistent with the hypothesis, and the 
two successful cases indicate that the absence of third-party support was an 
INUS condition for the success. 
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 On the contrary, all three cases contradict H1. The inevitable 
uncertainty over the size of non-state armed groups poses some difficulty for 
the examination, but the comparison between the best estimation of this and 
the size of compellers does not match the prediction of the hypothesis. The 
compellers had a larger number of troops than the targets not only in the 
successful case of Sierra Leone but also in the failed case of Somalia. The 
overall size of UNOSOM II and the supporting US forces was smaller than 
the largest estimate of that of the SNA at first, but the compellers’ size soon 
surpassed that of the target as reinforcements arrived. Moreover, if the 
comparison is focused on Mogadishu, where the compellence was 
conducted, the balance was almost equal from the beginning, and the 
compellers soon came to have larger force. If the comparison is made with 
more moderate estimates of the SNA’s size, the compellers’ numerical 
advantage become even larger. Despite the favourable balance of troops, 
the compellence ended in failure. 
 The Somalia case does not negate the possibility that the favourable 
balance of troops was an INUS condition and that other conditions had to be 
fulfilled to derive success, but the other two cases do not support this 
interpretation. The compellers also maintained a numerical advantage in 
Sierra Leone from the beginning, but the compellence did not succeed until 
the final phase. The balance between the international troops and the RUF 
had been roughly equal throughout the phases. The international forces had 
local friendly forces, the SLA and the CDF, and their inclusion almost 
doubled the size of the compellers in phases one and two. In phase three, 
the size of the SLA and the CDF even swelled, and the ratio between the 
compellers and the target was at least two to one and possibly four to one, 
depending on the estimation of the RUF’s size used in the calculation. 
Therefore, the compellers had a clear and constant numerical advantage 
over the target. The fact that compellence did not succeed until the third 
phase in spite of the advantage does not match the expectation of H1. 
Moreover, the numerical advantage was not necessary to fulfil other 
conditions. Hence, the factor was not an INUS condition for the success of 
the case. 
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 INTERFET also demonstrates that having a larger number of troops 
than the target is not necessary for successful compellence. INTERFET 
quickly deployed more troops than the number of militias who remained in 
Dili, but the force was outnumbered in the western border areas because 
only combat-ready troops from Western countries could be deployed to the 
area, and almost all the militias retreated to West Timor. The border area 
was where most of the confrontations between the compeller and the target 
took place, but the multinational force could compel the militias to give up 
violence despite the numerical disadvantage. This means that other 
conditions were sufficient to achieve success and that the favourable 
balance of troops was not a necessary part of the conjuncture. Therefore, 
the three cases examined do not provide support for H1. 
 The three cases do not indicate consistency regarding H2; the 
Somalia case is consistent with the hypothesis, but the other two cases are 
only partially so. The Somalia case corresponds with the hypothesis 
because the case ended in failure in the absence of the combination of the 
strategies that were expected to be effective based on the hypothesis. The 
compellers employed a tacit ultimatum and later tried the gradual-turning-of-
the-screw strategy but did not provide any positive inducements for the SNA. 
The congruence can be interpreted as providing support to the hypothesis, 
but such support depends on the lack of a carrot. As this is a negative case, 
the factor’s impact should be confirmed by positive cases. 
 The two successful cases, however, do not confirm the importance of 
positive inducements. The compellers employed the combination of the 
gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy and the carrot-and-stick strategy in 
Sierra Leone, and the case ended in success. However, the RUF obtained 
only a very small carrot when it agreed to disarm despite its claim for far 
greater positive inducements that were granted in the Lomé Agreement, 
which it had overturned earlier. Therefore, it seems that the carrot played a 
modest role at best and that the success mostly depended on the application 
of gradually increased pressure. Moreover, INTERFET did not employ any 
positive inducements, but the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy could 
derive success. Therefore, the two successful cases demonstrate the utility 
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of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy but not that of the carrot and 
stick. 
 The result indicates that the use of carrots is not necessary for the 
success of compellence in peace operations. However, this does not deny 
the possibility that the provision of carrots plays a positive role. In fact, if the 
wider pool of cases is considered, the case of Ituri in the DRC involved the 
substantial use of carrots to induce armed groups to disarm (ICG, 2008; 
Tamm, 2013). The use of carrots combined with other sets of conditions that 
are different from those observed in this research may lead to the success of 
compellence, and the exploration of this possibility requires additional 
empirical studies. 
 Regarding the use of an ultimatum, the compellers employed the 
strategy in the Somalia case and the first phase of the Sierra Leone case, 
but they failed to compel the targets. In particular, the failure of the ultimatum 
in the first phase of the Sierra Leone case casts doubt on the utility of the 
strategy, because the compeller’s demands were limited. Moreover, there 
are additional cases, such as MONUC in Ituri and MINUSTAH, in which the 
use of ultimatums did not compel the targets if the wider pool of cases is 
considered (ICG, 2008, pp.31-32; Cockayne, 2014, pp.750-752). Of course, 
there remains a possibility that an ultimatum can be effective if it is combined 
with other specific conditions, but again, additional empirical studies are 
required to examine this possibility. 
 What this study shows is that the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-
screw strategy was indispensable to the two most successful cases of 
compellence in peace operations. INTERFET had to exert pressure against 
the pro-integration militias from region to region to quell the violence. The 
compellers in Sierra Leone also had to increase the pressure until the RUF 
accepted disarmament. Therefore, the case studies suggest that the use of 
the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy was an INUS condition for the 
success. The compellers also employed the strategy in Somalia and in the 
second phase of Sierra Leone case without success, but this does not 
contradict the understanding that the use of the strategy was an INUS 
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condition. In sum, the empirical examination provides support for the first half 
of H2 but not for the other half. 
 The three cases also do not completely match the expectation of H3. 
The compellers used actual force not only in the successful cases but also in 
the failed case of Somalia and the unsuccessful phases of the Sierra Leone 
case. 
 However, the analyses of the two successful cases demonstrate that 
the actual use of force was necessary for the success, and the Somalia case 
does not contradict this understanding. Although all the other sources of 
credibility existed from the beginning in the East Timor case (pre-earned 
reputation was mixed), the compeller’s mere threats could not compel the 
militias to give up their objective of retaining the western part of East Timor. 
INTERFET had to actually employ force and inflict tactical defeats on the 
militias to make them realise the futility of resistance. Similarly, in Sierra 
Leone, the actual use of force by the compellers demoralised and facilitated 
the disarmament of the RUF. Taking into account the fact that the RUF had 
fought a prolonged civil war, the rebel group was unlikely to be induced to 
disarm without resisting the compellent attempt. Therefore, in this case too, 
the actual use of force and the accumulation of tactical defeats were 
necessary for the success of compellence. These courses of events 
correspond with the prediction of the hypothesis, and the fact that the failed 
compellent instances also involved the actual use of force does not 
contradict the understanding that the factor was necessary for the success of 
compellence. 
 In fact, in light of other cases, the actual use of force seems to be a 
necessary condition, rather than an INUS condition, for the success of 
compellence in peace operations if the scope is limited to compellence with 
the heaviest type of demands. Table 2.3 shows that all the cases that ended 
in success involved the actual use of force, and combined with the insights 
from the case studies, this factor can be regarded as a necessary condition. 
If the scope is expanded to the cases with limited demands, there are at 
least a few cases of successful compellence without the actual use of force. 
For example, during the civil war in Bosnia, NATO in support of UNPROFOR 
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issued an ultimatum against all parties to the conflict to remove their heavy 
weapons from the surrounding areas of Sarajevo or hand them over to 
UNPROFOR, and the armed factions acquiesced to the demand (Daniel et 
al., 1999, pp.57-60). NATO-led IFOR also successfully employed threats to 
compel Bosnian Serbs to accept the inspection of a weapons site (UN, 
1996a, para.6; Baumann, 2004). The United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium also compelled a Serb 
armed group called Scorpions to retreat from the oil fields they occupied 
without the actual use of force (Boothby, 2004, pp.45-46; Howard, 2008, 
p.239). Therefore, there is a possibility that compellence succeeds only with 
threats and without actually using force if the demands are limited. However, 
if the demands are those of the heaviest type, the actual use of force is 
highly likely to be necessary. As Kilcullen (2019) states, “[T]here is always a 
language barrier and people don’t trust you when you first arrive. The actions 
speak much louder than words. So, if you can act in such a way as to 
demonstrate a message, it’s always more powerful than just words”. 
 The three cases do not confirm the importance of the other three 
possible sources of credibility. The East Timor case leaves open the 
possibility that they are also INUS conditions, but the Sierra Leone case 
denies the possibility. Domestic support and previously acquired 
advantageous reputation were absent in Sierra Leone, so they were not 
necessary for the success. Regarding national interests, those of Nigeria 
were involved in the case, but contingents from the country did not play a 
part in the application of proactive pressure. Therefore, this factor is unlikely 
to have enhanced the credibility of the threats. Moreover, if the wider pool of 
cases is considered, there is at least a successful case in which the 
compellers’ national interests were absent. It is the case of Ituri in the DRC, 
in which the countries that constituted the Ituri Brigade, which were Pakistan, 
Uruguay, Nepal, and Bangladesh, did not seem to have any strategic 
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interests.19 This case also raises doubts about the importance of this factor 
as a source of credibility. 
 Finally, all three cases are congruent to H4, but the utility of methods 
other than counter-coercion negation to achieve denial requires further 
examination. The congruence method shows that the cases of East Timor 
and Somalia correspond with the prediction of the hypothesis. In East Timor, 
INTERFET achieved counter-coercion negation very well. It suffered only 
two wounded in attacks by pro-integration militias and was also able to 
prevent civilian casualties and coalition fracturing. INTERFET also achieved 
stronghold neutralisation but only partially; the militias abandoned their 
strongholds within East Timor as a part of their game plan and instead 
established and maintained new strongholds in West Timor. Therefore, 
INTERFET denied the militias’ victory mainly through containing their 
counter-coercion. 
 The necessity of counter-coercion negation is clearly illustrated in the 
Somalia case, in which the condition was not fulfilled. In Somalia, the 
compellers continued to suffer casualties due to SNA attacks, and the SNA 
exploited the civilian casualties and the rifts among the compellers. The 
SNA’s effective counter-coercion turned the situation into a contest of 
endurance and finally led to the withdrawal of the compellers. 
 Counter-coercion negation was also achieved in the Sierra Leone 
case, but the timing of the achievement does not completely correspond with 
the prediction of the hypothesis. UNAMSIL could not protect itself from the 
RUF’s obstructions and attacks at first. UNAMSIL came to be able to do so 
after the British intervention, and counter-coercion negation was achieved by 
the end of phase two of the compellence. However, the compellence did not 
succeed until phase three, and other conditions needed to be fulfilled. 
Therefore, the achievement of counter-coercion negation did not 
automatically lead to the success of compellence in Sierra Leone. 
Nevertheless, a counterfactual thought experiment suggests that the factor 
 
19  Regarding MONUC’s operation in Ituri, see, for example, Isberg and 
Tillberg (2012). 
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was necessary for success. The RUF sustained itself by robbing weapons 
and ammunition from weak hostile forces when support from Taylor was 
unavailable for several years in the middle of the decade-long civil war. The 
RUF would have done the same to the compellers and kept resisting 
disarmament if they had remained vulnerable to attacks. In fact, the rebels 
could grab tons of arms and ammunition from the peacekeepers before the 
British intervention. Effective counter-coercion negation was indispensable to 
denying the RUF of any hope of driving back the compellers, and this factor 
enabled the other two factors that emerged in the third phase to choke the 
rebels. Hence, all three cases provide support for H4 and suggest that 
counter-coercion negation was an INUS condition. 
 With regard to other types of denial, attrition did not work in all cases. 
The compellers did not use it in East Timor, and the Somalia case ended in 
failure although the compellers inflicted huge casualties on the target side. 
The compellers also killed or injured a relatively large number of rebels in 
Sierra Leone, but because of the size of the RUF and the availability of new 
recruits, their impact was not immense. Attrition is not likely to work unless 
the target armed groups are small in scale and have difficulty replacing lost 
personnel. 
 The Sierra Leone case demonstrates that decapitation can work 
positively. The replacement of power-greedy RUF leader Sankoh by more 
modest Sesay facilitated the RUF’s acceptance of disarmament. However, 
the success of INTERFET without decapitation shows that it is not an INUS 
condition for success. Even in Sierra Leone, it is not clear whether 
decapitation was necessary for success. Sankoh might also have accepted 
disarmament if the RUF’s defeat had become unavoidable. Moreover, the 
Somalia case vividly illustrates the difficulty of decapitation. The 
whereabouts of the target leader is difficult to determine. In addition, the 
apprehension or killing of the leader can be difficult even if the compellers 
know his or her location. 
 The two successful cases provide contradictory results over the 
necessity of stronghold neutralisation. The most-similar-design comparison 
of the Sierra Leone case indicates that stronghold neutralisation was 
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necessary for the success of the case. This was a factor, along with the 
absence of third-party support, that came to be achieved only in the third 
phase of the compellence, and it seems to have led to the difference in 
results compared to those of the earlier phases. In fact, the threat of attack 
on the RUF’s strongholds seems to have worked as a final blow which 
convinced it to accept disarmament. In contrast, the East Timor case ended 
in success despite the pro-integration militias maintaining their new 
strongholds. INTERFET only partially achieved stronghold neutralisation, as 
the militias abandoned their strongholds in the western areas of East Timor, 
which INTERFET then occupied. The militias retreated to West Timor, an 
Indonesian territory, and turned the military and refugee camps that had 
been set up there into their new strongholds. The fact that the compellence 
ended successfully despite the new strongholds demonstrates that their 
neutralisation was not an INUS condition for the success of the case. 
 The difference of success conditions between the two successful 
cases examined is seemingly caused by the differences in the situations. In 
the East Timor case, the militias’ new strongholds were outside of East 
Timor, so the persistence of the strongholds and the cessasion of violence in 
East Timor – the compeller’s demand against the militias – were compatible. 
Other conditions were sufficient to make it difficult for the militias to sustain 
their struggle against INTERFET, especially because Indonesia ceased to 
support the militias, and the multinational force achieved high-level counter-
coercion negation. In contrast, the RUF in Sierra Leone was highly resilient, 
and its strongholds included diamond-mining areas. As long as the RUF held 
the area under its control, it was able to sustain its activities. Moreover, 
although the RUF’s objective was to take over national power, the rebels 
were mostly composed of socially marginalised youth, and they were in a 
better position than in peacetimes by having arms (Abdullah, 1998; Bøås, 
2007; Peters, 2011). Therefore, the continuance of conflict itself was in the 
rebels’ interest even though national power had become unattainable. In 
such a situation, it was indispensable to threaten the rebels with defeat and 
the loss of diamond-mining areas to induce them to end the rebellion. The 
case indicates that stronghold neutralisation is likely to be necessary when 
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the target armed groups of compellence are self-sustainable because of the 
strongholds and have an interest in the continuation of the conflict. 
 As compellence is a complicated phenomenon, equifinality is 
expected in causal relationships, as discussed in Chapter 2. In other words, 
different sets of conditions can derive the same result of success. Each of 
the two conjunctural sufficient conditions with and without stronghold 
neutralisation may represent two different paths to the success of 
compellence in peace operations. Another possibility is that either case is a 
deviation. The success of one of the two cases may be a rare, exceptional 
occasion, and the other case may represent the usual set of conditions for 
success. The confirmation of either possibility requires additional empirical 
examinations of wider patterns among the relevant cases. 
 In conclusion, the empirical examination provides support for H3 to 
H5, partial support for H2, and little to no support for H1. The cases 
examined indicate that there are five conditions which favour the success of 
compellence in peace operations: the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-
screw strategy; the actual use of force as the source of credibility; the 
achievement of counter-coercion negation as a form of denial; the 
achievement of stronghold neutralisation, which is another form of denial; 
and the absence of third-party support on the target side. All of them 
constituted the conjunctural sufficient condition of success in Sierra Leone, 
and four of them, other than stronghold neutralisation, constituted that in 
East Timor. Stronghold neutralisation is likely to be necessary when the 
target can sustain itself due to the strongholds and has an incentive in the 
continuation of the conflict. Each component of the conjunctures is at least 
an INUS condition, and the actual use of force is a necessary condition. 
 The applicability of this finding to other relevant cases should be 
confirmed through additional empirical studies. The finding is expected to 
apply to other cases that fall into the scope of this research: explicit military 
compellence in UN-related peace operations that is employed against non-
state armed groups and accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. Of 
course, this does not negate the possibility that other conjunctures of 
conditions also lead to the success of compellence in peace operations. For 
- 264 - 
example, the above examination leaves open the possibility that the use of 
carrots, an ultimatum, and decapitation play a positive role in compelling 
armed groups. The exploration of the roles of other conditions also requires 
additional empirical studies. 
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Conclusion 
This research has explored the conditions under which compellence is likely 
to succeed in the context of peace operations. Compellence, a strategy for 
altering the status quo by putting pressure on opponents, is a widely 
employed strategy, along with its sibling – deterrence. Despite its utility and 
wide applicability, compellence has been less recognised and explored than 
deterrence, and there remain a number of issues to be studied to enable the 
strategy to be employed more effectively and reliably. The identification of 
conditions for success is one of the remaining gaps, and this research is an 
attempt to promote understanding of this aspect of the strategy. As the lack 
of consensus on the conditions for success is at least partly due to the 
mixing up of empirical data from different contexts in research studies, this 
study narrows its scope to a specific context in which compellence is 
employed so that the conditions can be better specified in exchange for their 
generalisability. 
 The focus of this research is peace operations, which have 
transformed from the consent-based and non-coercive deployment of 
international troops for ceasefire monitoring to robust, potentially coercive, 
and ambitious interventions aimed at stabilising states suffering from civil 
conflicts. Contemporary peace operations, authorised to use force if 
necessary, have difficulties carrying out their missions, such as the 
restoration of order and the protection of civilians. What contemporary 
peacekeepers are expected to do can be understood as compellence – that 
is, inducing spoilers to stop violence and disarm by putting pressure on them 
– and the application of the compellence theory to peace operations seems 
useful in enabling a better understanding of the utility of force in the field. 
This combination is expected to be beneficial to the field of compellence as 
well, because its application against non-state actors is one of the least 
explored aspects of the strategy. 
 To find out the conditions for the success of compellence in peace 
operations, the study has proceeded as follows. First, it has clarified the 
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scope of the study. Because of feasibility and the necessity to ensure the 
homogeneity of cases so that sound findings can be derived from 
comparison, the study limits its scope to the cases of explicit military 
compellence in UN-related peace operations employed against non-state 
armed groups and accompanied by the heaviest type of demands. Then, it 
has deductively derived the conditions favouring the success of compellence 
that have been specifically modified to the context of peace operations 
based on insights from the literature. The conditions are represented in five 
hypotheses, and they have been empirically examined in a comparative 
case study using three specific methods: the congruence method, the most-
similar-design comparison, and cross-case comparison. The cases 
examined are the two most successful ones in East Timor and Sierra Leone, 
and the apparent failure in Somalia. 
 The empirical examination has provided answers to the three 
questions that have guided this research. The first and overarching question 
is the following: Under what conditions is compellence in peace operations 
more likely to succeed? The three cases examined demonstrate that there 
are five conditions which favour the success of compellence in peace 
operations: the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy; the actual 
use of force as the source of credibility; the achievement of counter-coercion 
negation as a form of denial; the achievement of stronghold neutralisation, 
which is another form of denial; and the absence of third-party support on 
the target side. 
 One of the successful cases examined indicates that all of them 
constituted a conjunctural sufficient condition for its success, and the other 
successful case demonstrates that only four, other than stronghold 
neutralisation, were sufficient for its success. Stronghold neutralisation is 
likely to be necessary when the target armed groups of compellence are 
self-sustainable because of the strongholds and have an interest in the 
continuation of the conflict. Each condition composing the two conjunctures 
is an indispensable part of each conjuncture – namely, an INUS condition. In 
other words, if any of them is missing, the other components of the 
conjunctures would not be sufficient for deriving success. However, this is 
not to deny the possibility that other combinations of factors also lead to 
- 267 - 
success. As compellence is a complicated phenomenon, its causal 
relationships are expected to involve equifinality. Nevertheless, any 
collective sufficient condition is expected to include the actual use of force. 
Among the factors examined in this study, the pool of relevant cases 
demonstrates that the actual use of force is a necessary condition for the 
success of compellence in peace operations if the scope is limited to cases 
with the heaviest type of demands. The identification of other such 
conjunctural conditions for success requires additional empirical research. 
 This result also provides an answer to the second research question: 
Do the conditions for success shown in the theory of compellence correctly 
predict and explain the results of compellence in peace operations? The 
answer is yes and no. The existing theory of compellence provides a good 
starting point, and appropriate modification enables the theory to be applied 
to the context of peace operations. Overall, this study provides support for 
three of the five hypotheses based on the existing studies and provides 
partial support for another. Some factors regarded as important in existing 
studies turn out to be important in compellence in peace operations as well. 
Other factors are not confirmed to be important; some of them are expected 
to be unimportant when the hypotheses are derived, but others turn out to be 
unimportant unexpectedly. 
 This study enhances the existing belief that the lack of third-party 
support on the target side is important for the success of compellence (e.g. 
George and Simons, 1994a; Kagan, 1998; Downes, 2018). This factor, 
which is also regarded as important in the literature of peace operations and 
counterinsurgency (e.g. Pushkina, 2006; Connable and Libicki, 2010; Paul et 
al., 2013), received the clearest support in the empirical examination of this 
study. 
 The result also demonstrates the importance of the actual use of force, 
as the literature of cumulative deterrence has discussed. In the existing 
studies of compellence, there is disagreement over the utility of the 
exemplary use of force, as discussed in Chapter 1 (e.g. George, 1994a; 
Kagan, 1998; Schaub, 1998). However, the empirical examination in this 
study indicates that it is actually a necessary condition for success in the 
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context of peace operations if compellence is accompanied by the heaviest 
type of demands. This finding is in line with the argument of cumulative 
deterrence that has developed based on Israeli experience (Bar-Joseph, 
1998, pp.156-157; Almog, 2004; Bar, 2008, pp.36-38; Rid, 2012). When 
compellers are faced with persistent threats by non-state armed groups, 
compellers need to demonstrate their competence through the actual use of 
force and by accumulating tactical victories. 
 Building on the consensus in the literature that the denial type of 
pressure is more effective than that of punishment (e.g. Pape, 1996; Byman 
and Waxman, 2002; Art, 2003b), this research has explored the most 
effective way to achieve denial in the context of peace operations; it has 
found that counter-coercion negation is most effective. This is in line with 
some studies that point out the importance of countering the efforts at 
resistance by the target side (Byman and Waxman, 1999; Johnson et al., 
2002, pp.22-23; Dekker, 2011; Harvey and Wilner, 2012). Compellence 
involves interaction between the compellers and the targets, and either side 
tries to affect the other. The importance of containing the opponents’ 
counter-moves applies to compellence in peace operations too. 
 In contrast, the study finds that an ultimatum is not effective in 
compellence in peace operations despite some existing studies of 
compellence emphasising its utility (e.g. Jakobsen, 1998a; 1998b; 2000; 
Seybolt, 2008). Morgan (2009, p.173) argues that the gradual increase in 
pressure by collective actors is expected to be ineffective, and Nadin et al. 
(2015, p.84) regard an ultimatum as “a central element of robust 
peacekeeping”, but this study disagrees with these views; it instead finds 
that the use of the gradual-turning-of-the-screw strategy is necessary for 
success. This lack of support for an ultimatum is as expected, taking into 
account the feature of non-state armed groups. To make an ultimatum 
credible, it is necessary to threaten to inflict a quick and decisive defeat, but 
this is hard to achieve in compellence against non-state actors (Jakobsen, 
1998a; 1998b; 2010). In compelling evasive and resilient non-state armed 
groups, compellers usually have no choice but to apply pressure gradually 
and continually until the targets accede to demands, which can be a 
prolonged process. 
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 The three sources of credibility for threats other than the actual use of 
force also turn out to be ineffective, as expected. Although the national 
interests and domestic support of compellers are factors that multiple studies 
of compellence regard as important for success (e.g. George and Simons, 
1994a; Blechman and Wittes, 1999; Treverton, 2000), this study 
demonstrates that their existence does not guarantee nor is it necessary for 
the success of the strategy in the context of peace operations. The utility of 
reputation based on past behaviour as a source of credibility is a major issue 
of debate in the literature (e.g. Mercer, 1996; Shannon and Dennis, 2007; 
Press, 2005), but this study does not find it important in compellence in 
peace operations. Although only limited information is available, the 
empirical cases examined in this study indicate that armed groups had an 
image of weak resolve about international forces. However, the armed 
groups in East Timor and Sierra Leone built such an image based on the 
famous episode in Somalia rather than on the actual past behaviour of each 
troop contributor. An image of advanced capability that militias had about 
Australian troops also seems to have been based on a general image of 
developed countries rather than on Australia’s own past operations. The 
available evidence, therefore, suggests that armed groups do not pay 
attention to each compeller’s past behaviour but, rather, construct an image 
about their opponents based on well-known events or general impressions. 
Moreover, compellence could succeed in the absence of an advantageous 
reputation. Hence, the three factors do not play an important role in 
enhancing the credibility of threats in compellence in peace operations. 
 In addition, there are two conditions that turn out to be unimportant for 
success, in contradiction to the predictions of the hypotheses – namely, 
compellers’ numerical advantage over the targets and the use of positive 
inducements. In a sense, this should not be surprising, because the existing 
theory has been developed based on insights from compellence between 
states, and different conditions can be important in different contexts. Still, 
the non-support of the predictions is counter-intuitive. 
 The result indicates that the mere presence of a large force does not 
guarantee success and that quality, rather than quantity, matters. If a small 
force can satisfy the above success conditions, that small force is expected 
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to achieve success. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that a small 
force is always enough; a quite large force may be necessary to fulfil the 
conditions depending on the situation. Nevertheless, however large a force 
is, it cannot achieve success if it cannot satisfy the success conditions. 
Studies of peace operations – in particular quantitative ones – tend to focus 
on the number of troops (e.g. Ruggeri et al., 2012; Hultman et al., 2013; 
2019; Kathman and Wood, 2016; Bara and Hultman, 2020), but the result of 
this research implies that it is necessary to take into account the quality of 
troops in addition to their quantity. 
 An even more counter-intuitive finding may be the lack of support for 
the utility of positive inducements. The two most successful cases did not 
involve any substantial positive inducements despite the wide support for 
their utility in the literature (e.g. George and Simons, 1994b; Byman and 
Waxman, 2002; Art and Cronin, 2003). The result indicates that negative 
inducements, or pressure, play a much more important role than positive 
inducements in compellence in peace operations. This may be because of 
the intrinsic difficulty of providing carrots for spoilers. The provision of 
positive inducements for spoilers who renege on and violently disrupt peace 
processes would be perceived as rewarding malicious acts and would be 
hard to accept locally and internationally. Since the principle of peace 
operations shifted from neutrality to impartiality, it has become even more 
difficult for peace operations to compromise with illegitimate parties. Even in 
the Ituri case, which is an example of the substantial use of carrots 
mentioned in the previous chapter, several of the armed groups’ leaders who 
were offered high-ranking posts in the national army were later arrested and 
tried in the International Criminal Court (ICG, 2008, pp.20-21). Although 
doing so was desirable from the perspective of avoiding impunity and 
building up deterrent effects on future violence against civilians, such a 
precedent of revocation would harm the credibility of future promises to give 
positive inducements. Nevertheless, the Ituri case indicates the possibility 
that the use of substantial carrots combined with other factors can facilitate 
the success of compellence. Although there are problems discussed above, 
if lives are saved by the earliest possible cessation of violence, it can still be 
valuable to provide the targets of compellence with positive inducements. 
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Therefore, it would be useful to further investigate the utility and limitation of 
positive inducements in compellence in peace operations. 
 As has been discussed, compellence in peace operations are 
somewhat different from that between states, and this is the issue addressed 
by the third research question: How do the unique features of the context of 
peace operations affect the form or requirement for the success of 
compellence? The assumed features in deriving the hypotheses are that it is 
coalitional compellence employed against non-state actors, and the balance 
of interest, a factor that literature considers to be one of the most important 
conditions for success, is unfavourable for compellers. The targets of 
compellence in this context are risk- and cost-acceptant and evasive armed 
groups, which are difficult to defeat quickly. Therefore, peace operations 
have to rely on gradually increased pressure including the actual use of force, 
rather than an ultimatum, to convince the target armed groups that their 
defeat is inevitable. In doing so, international forces have to achieve counter-
coercion negation so that target armed groups cannot turn the situation into 
a contest of endurance. Here, the coalitional nature of peace operations 
poses a unique challenge. Ad-hoc coalitions often have contingents whose 
preparation is not sufficient to cope with operational environments, and they 
tend to be harassed and preyed upon by target armed groups. Target armed 
groups may also try to estrange coalition partners by exploiting the rifts 
between them. Peace operations need to manage these challenges so that 
target armed groups do not harbour the hope of driving back international 
troops. The absence of third-party support also contributes to denying the 
hope of the target side. Non-state armed groups often cannot produce 
weapons and other war matériel by themselves and require support from 
outside. To deprive the armed groups of their hope to prevail, the 
international forces need to create a situation in which the targets do not 
receive support from third parties. 
 In other words, the features of the context of peace operations require 
the compellers to gain the clear upper hand, leaving no doubt about the fate 
of the targets if they continue their resistance. Peace operations have to 
corner target armed groups to the point that they are cut off from their 
supporters, their counter-moves are contained, and increasing pressure can 
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be brought to bear. This clearly one-sided situation is necessary, because 
the target is evasive armed groups and they have far larger interests and 
stronger motivation in what is in dispute. 
 Of course, there is the possibility that other sets of conditions also 
lead to the success of compellence in peace operations. For example, the 
scope of the above discussion is limited to compellence with the heaviest 
type of demands. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some cases ended 
in success without using force if the scope is expanded to compellence with 
limited demands, and they suggest that different sets of conditions that do 
not include the actual use of force can derive success when demands are 
limited. Even in compellence with the heaviest type of demands, the 
substantial use of positive inducement, for example, combined with other 
conditions may lead to success. These possibilities deserve further 
exploration. 
 That being said, the specification of sets of conditions that are 
expected to lead to the success of compellence in peace operations 
constitutes a meaningful contribution to the literature. Studies of 
compellence have largely focused on interstate compellence and have shed 
little light on that against non-state actors. The existing studies on 
compellence in peace operations have not explored the conditions for the 
success of the strategy in a dedicated and systematic manner. This study 
fills the gap; this is the first attempt to identify the conditions for the success 
of compellence in the context of peace operations based on the existing 
insights of the field and a systematic empirical examination. 
 This research demonstrates the utility of context-specific middle-range 
theories as well. The findings of this study indicate that the conditions for the 
success of compellence focusing on peace operations are somewhat 
different from those for compellence in general. As has been discussed, 
some conditions that are regarded as important for success turned out not to 
be so in the context of peace operations. Some are even hard to satisfy in 
the context. Taking into account the lack of consensus on the conditions for 
the success of the strategy, narrowing the scope and building middle-range 
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theories focusing on specific contexts is a viable approach to promoting the 
understanding of the conditions. 
 The focus on a specific context is also useful in advancing the 
understanding of coercive mechanisms by identifying effective ways to 
achieve denial. Although it has been generally agreed in the literature that 
denial is a more effective coercive mechanism than punishment, the specific 
forms of denial depend on what aims the targets of compellence are 
pursuing and how. This study identifies four possible approaches to denial 
that are employable in the context of peace operations and finds counter-
coercion negation to be especially effective, while stronghold neutralisation 
also plays an important role under certain circumstances. A narrow focus on 
a specific context enables a study to examine the relative utility of different 
approaches to denial in a more concrete manner. 
 The findings of this research on the conditions for success and 
coercive mechanisms contribute to the literature of compellence by 
improving the specificity of the theory focusing on a specific context. If such 
middle-range theories are developed for various contexts, they advance the 
understanding of not only compellence in each context, but also of 
compellence in general by combining the findings of these middle-range 
theories. 
 This study also contributes to the field of peace operations, which is 
still suffering from a paucity of causal theories and continues to face practical 
difficulties. The application of compellence theory facilitates the theorisation 
of peace operations. Compellence provides a causal mechanism that can 
work in robust peace operations that are tasked with stabilising conflicts and 
stopping violence by using force if necessary. This research demonstrates 
the conditions under which such a mechanism is expected to work in peace 
operations. Of course, compellence covers only a part of the versatile tasks 
and activities of peace operations. However, the part it can cover is one of 
the most challenging parts, and insights are needed. 
 The contribution of this research is not limited to academics; it also 
has practical implications. Contemporary peace operations have difficulty in 
managing ongoing violence, and the identified success conditions are 
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expected to be a guide for practitioners when they employ the coercive 
approach. The conditions for success are at least somewhat manageable by 
the intervening international forces and the wider international community, so 
they are an indication of what practitioners should try to achieve. 
 The conditions may not be a surprise for practitioners, because they 
share some commonalities with existing recommendations. The importance 
of sound force protection has been emphasised in past review reports, such 
as the Brahimi Report, the HIPPO Report, and the Cruz Report (UN, 2000a; 
2015; dos Santos Cruz et al., 2017). Although self-preservation is a natural 
requirement and its importance is obvious, this research indicates that it is 
also important for pursuing more proactive purposes. Effective counter-
coercion negation is a prerequisite for the success of compellence. The 
study also demonstrates that international troops should be prepared for the 
actual use of force, as the above review reports recommend too. Unless 
intervening forces demonstrate their potency and credibility by actually 
employing force, it is unlikely that armed groups will give up their objectives 
and accept disarmament. 
 There are sceptics and critics of such a coercive approach to peace 
operations. In fact, as discussed in the introduction, compellence is neither 
easy nor risk free, and it is thought of as more difficult than deterrence. If the 
compellent pressure cannot achieve the acceptance of the demands, the 
compellers have to choose whether to pursue the objectives by brute force 
or give them up and leave. The risk of escalation was vividly demonstrated in 
the case of Somalia. The compellent attempt failed to induce a target armed 
group to disarm, and the exchange of attacks turned the situation into a 
contest of endurance. The compellers lost the contest and left the country 
without achieving their objectives. If compellers are not able to fulfil the 
conditions for success, the cost of failure can be huge in terms of lives and 
finances. 
 Therefore, compellence should not be tried without preparation. 
Before launching an operation, the situation should be assessed to 
determine whether the conditions for success are fulfilled or expected to be 
fulfilled given reasonable efforts. If there is no such expectation, it would be 
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better not to try the approach. However, if the international community hopes 
to halt violence in intrastate conflicts and expects peace operations to bear 
the responsibility for this task, they need to be ready to employ compellence. 
Such a task requires the status quo on the ground to be changed rather than 
maintained, and operations in passive mode do not lead to the achievement 
of the objective. To induce warring factions to change their behaviour, 
compellence is required. 
 Taking into account the limitation of UN operations, the division of 
labour with coalitions of the willing and regional organisations can be a more 
realistic approach (e.g. Mockaitis, 1999, pp.54-55; Sloan, 2011, p.295; 
Howard, 2019, pp.194-196). In fact, one of the most successful cases of 
compellence in peace operations was carried out by an Australian-led 
multinational force, and the other also had support from unilaterally 
intervening British forces. If a militarily potent multinational force takes 
charge of the security tasks or cooperates with a UN operation in carrying 
them out, this increases the prospect of fulfilling the conditions for success. 
 At the same time, UN operations will not be able to abstain from 
robust missions. Local actors and especially spoilers, who are the targets of 
the robust approach, would not distinguish UN missions from non-UN 
missions operating in parallel; both of them are international forces 
intervening from the outside (Hunt, 2017, p.114). UN operations would 
inevitably be involved in confrontations with spoilers if they were deployed 
into situations of ongoing violence. In fact, despite the increase in the use of 
multinational force for high-intensity peace operations, UN peace operations 
also have been “militarised” in the past two decades (Sloan, 2011). 
Coalitions of the willing and regional organisations tend to try to hand their 
missions over to the UN as soon as possible because they cannot sustain 
the missions financially (Aoi and de Coning, 2017, p.302). UN missions have 
expanded their involvement in security-related tasks and actually used 
progressively more military force in their implementation. There are 
precedents; it would be difficult to reject and ignore calls for forceful 
interventions from those who are suffering (Hunt, 2017, p.125). 
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 Recently, some scholars have argued that there should be a new 
category of UN peace operations called “stabilisation operations” to 
distinguish them from peacekeeping (Aoi and de Coning, 2017; Karlsrud, 
2018, pp.100-101). Such a new category may be helpful for making it clear 
that these operations require robust military capabilities and need to act 
proactively in carrying out their mandates. However, the distinction problem 
is also applicable here; it is doubtful whether local factions distinguish UN 
stabilisation operations from normal peacekeeping (Peter, 2015, p.363). 
Moreover, the creation of a new category of mission may not relieve the 
normal UN peacekeeping ones from performing robust tasks. If it is obvious 
that the local security situation is volatile in the planning phase, the UN 
would try to assemble and deploy a stabilisation mission from the beginning. 
However, if the situation is assessed as manageable by a normal 
peacekeeping mission at the time of deployment but the security deteriorates 
and violence resurfaces later, the normal peacekeeping mission on the 
ground would face the same problem it has today. Once peace operations 
are deployed, the UNSC seldom withdraws them, even if the local security 
situation deteriorates. Therefore, the UN would try to send reinforcements of 
a stabilisation mission, but it may take a long time to assemble such a force, 
or it may not be realised at all. If the reinforcements do not arrive, the normal 
peacekeeping mission on the ground would be required to respond to and 
handle the violence. It would be better to assume that UN peace operations, 
whatever they are called, can be requested to perform compellence. 
 Discussions about peace operations often fall into normative 
arguments, such as the traditional principles of peacekeeping, but peace 
operations are a type of military operation that is undertaken to achieve 
specific objectives. Therefore, peace operations require strategic thinking 
just the same as other military operations. Insights from the studies of 
compellence promote the understanding of peace operations from a 
strategic perspective, and the utility and limitation of compellence in peace 
operations deserve further studies. 
 There are some potential topics for further research. First, the 
generalisability of this study’s findings should be empirically examined. The 
conjunctural sufficient conditions that study identifies are expected to be 
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valid in other cases of compellence with the heaviest type of demands. This 
expectation deserves further empirical study. Second, other sets of 
conditions that can bring success should be searched for as well. As 
compellence is a complex phenomenon, it is expected to entail equifinality or 
multiple causal paths for the same result. Additional case studies and QCA 
will be helpful in exploring these points. 
 Third, compellence with limited demands in peace operations also 
deserves to be studied. Because of practical limitations, this type of 
compellence is outside the scope of this research. In contrast to 
compellence with the heaviest type of demands, compellence with limited 
demands may succeed without the actual use of force. This is better success 
of compellence, and the analysis of such cases can provide insights to 
advance the theory of compellence. Such studies will also be practically 
useful, because inducing conflicting parties to comply with demands short of 
total disarmament must be a frequent challenge for peacekeepers on the 
ground. 
 Finally, the wider applicability of this study’s findings to contexts 
beyond peace operations should be examined. Although the focus of this 
research is peace operations, the findings may also apply to similar contexts, 
such as counterinsurgency. Further expansion would entail application to 
cases of compellence against states by coalitions of states in which the 
targets have clearly larger interests and stronger motivations. An 
examination of these contexts will be helpful in understanding the 
commonalities and differences between compellence in different contexts 
and will promote the understanding of the strategy as a whole. 
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